

The Philosophy of **VIŚIṢṬĀDVAITA**

*As expounded by Śrī Vedānta Deśika
in the Nyāya-siddhānta*



Śrī Rāmānujacārya

Dr. M. E. Rangachar

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Nyāya-siddhāṇjana*

Nyāya-Vedānta Vidvān, Vidyāratna,
Vedāntavāridhi, Deśikadarsanaratna

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PREFACE

Keeping an eye, not just on the next world, but on attaining ultimate spiritual perfection, even while not neglecting the life here and now, has been the unique characteristic of the six systems of Indian philosophy. Of these six systems it is the Vedānta of Bādarāyaṇa-Vyāsa, based mainly on the Upaniṣads and the *Bhagavadgītā*, that has gained greater currency, popularity and respectability, thanks to the special treatment meted out to it by the three great Ācāryas (Śaṅkara, Rāmānuja and Madhva) and their eminent successors.

Somehow, an impression has been formed in the imagination of our intellectuals that Vedānta means the Advaita Vedānta of Śaṅkara. This is rather unfair since it ignores or is unaware of the extensive and intensive contribution of the other two, equally important, systems viz, Viśiṣṭādvaita and Dvaita Vedāntas.

Like the disciples of Śaṅkara (A. D. 788-820), the disciples of Rāmānuja (A. D. 1017-1137) and of Madhva (A. D. 1197-1276) also have contributed considerably to the development of these two systems of Vedānta, not only in the primary fields of expounding their tenets, but also in the dialectical field of defending them against the onslaughts of rival schools.

One of the most outstanding scholars and teachers of Viśiṣṭādvaita, considered as next only to Rāmānuja, was Vedānta Deśika (A. D. 1268-1370), also known as Nigamānta Deśika and Venkaṭanātha. He enriched the world of Viśiṣṭādvaita Vedānta and the cult of Śrīvaiṣṇavism for over three quarters of a century with his writings which number more than a hundred. These works are characterised by versatility, beauty of style and thought, and a deep spiritual insight. He was a poet, a philosopher, a thinker, a polemist

and a mystic, all rolled into one. His writings include original works in Tamil and Sanskrit, as also commentaries on older works.

One of the greatest of his services was his saving the work *Śrutaprakāśikā* (a commentary on the *Śrībhāṣya* of Rāmānuja) from the chaos that followed in the wake of the invasion of Śrīraṅgam town by the Mohammedans. It is for this reason that his name as 'Vedāntācārya' is gratefully remembered by all the Śrīvaiṣṇavas, without sectarian bias, in beginning the study of the *Śrībhāṣya*.

The exposition of an āstika system of philosophy like the Vedānta requires two things:

1. proving that its basic tenets are based on the primary authority, viz., the Vedas (including the Upaniṣads and the *Bhagavadgītā*); 2. logically defending it from the attacks of rival schools.

Treatises of this type are called 'prakaraṇa-granthas'.

The *Nyāya-pariśuddhi* and the *Nyāya-siddhāntajana* of Vedānta Deśika are two works of this type. They are complementary to each other. If the former deals with the pramāṇas (valid means of knowledge) the latter deals with the prameyas (what is to be known, the ultimate truths like God, soul and nature).

The *Nyāyadarśana* (Nyāya philosophy) of Gautama is an excellent work on Indian logic. Its knowledge is of fundamental importance to all systems of Indian philosophy. Vedānta Deśika's view is that this work—the *Nyāyasūtras*—gives not only the details of the pramāṇas but also of the prameyas, which are very near to the ones given in the Viśiṣṭādvaita philosophy. Boldly differing from the traditional commentators of the *Nyāyasūtras*, he has given his own interpretation, bringing that system much nearer to Viśiṣṭādvaita Vedānta.

Till now, the philosophy of the *Nyāya-siddhāñjana*, has not been studied and expounded in detail. This doctoral thesis of Dr. M. E. Rangachar has done exactly that. With the depth of scholarship of the Sanskrit language, the traditional tarkaśāstra or logic and the good grip of the tenets of Viśiṣṭādvaita philosophy based both on the Sanskrit and the Tamil works at his finger-tips, he has acquitted himself admirably in this task of interpreting and expounding this recondite work.

We earnestly hope that this work will be well-received with the esteem that it deserves, by all the scholars interested in Indian philosophy.

13th March 2000
Ramakrishna Math
Bangalore

Swami Harshananda

प्रस्तावना

महर्षिणा गोतमेन प्रवर्तितस्य न्यायदर्शनस्य भाष्यकारः वात्स्यायनमुनिः प्रारम्भे वदति स्म-प्रमाणं प्रमेयं प्रमाता प्रमितिः इति चतसृषु अर्थतत्त्वं परिसमाप्यते । अन्यतमस्याप्यभावेऽर्थतत्त्वस्यापरिज्ञानात् । ईप्सा जिहासाभ्यां प्रेरितो यः प्रमिणोति स प्रमाता । येन प्रमिणोति तत् प्रमाणम् । योऽर्थः प्रमीयते तत् प्रमेयम् । यदर्थविज्ञानं सा प्रमितिः इति । अतिसंग्रहेण लोकव्यवहारोपयुक्तं चतुष्टयं निर्दिदेश । विविधशास्त्रप्रवर्तका महर्षय आचार्याश्च एतच्चतुष्टयमवलम्ब्यैव सविमर्श सूत्रभाष्यवार्तिकादिकान् ग्रन्थान् प्रणिन्युः ।

उक्तेषु चतुर्षु प्राधान्येन प्रमाणं प्रमेयं च बोधयितुं न्यायदर्शनं वैशेषिकदर्शनं च प्रादुरभूताम् । प्रमाणं विना प्रमेयं, प्रमेयं विना प्रमाणं च न सत्तां प्राप्नुतः । अतोऽन्यतरस्य प्रतिपादनेऽन्यतरस्य प्रतिपादनमवर्जनीयमापतति । तत्र गोतमप्रणीतं न्यायदर्शनं प्रमाणप्रधानम्, कणादप्रणीतं वैशेषिकदर्शनं च प्रमेयप्रधानम् । एतद्दर्शनद्वयापेक्षया अन्यान्यपि सांख्ययोगमीमांसावेदान्तदर्शनानि प्रादुर्भूतानि । इमान्यास्तिकदर्शनानि । चार्वाकबौद्धजैनदर्शनानि नास्तिकदर्शनानि । एतेषु सर्वेष्वपि दर्शनेषु प्रमाणप्रमेयोभयविषयका विचाराः सन्ति । प्रमाणानां संख्या, तेषां लक्षणं, तेषां कार्यम्, तथा प्रमेयानां संख्या, तेषां लक्षणं, तेषां ज्ञानेन लभ्यमानं प्रयोजनम् इत्येतान् विषयानधिकृत्य विस्तरेण विवेचनं तेषु दर्शनेषु उपलभ्यते । परं तु एकैकस्मिन्नपि विषये सर्वेऽपि दार्शनिकाः समानाभिप्रायाः इति वक्तुं न शक्यते । प्रत्युत अभिप्रायभेद एवावलोक्यते । स्वस्वमतस्थापनाय परमतखण्डनस्याप्यवर्जनीयता आपर्तिता । अस्यां दशायां प्रमाणप्रमेययोर्विषये विशिष्टाद्वैतमते का स्थितिः इति विमृश्य निर्णयं भवति । एतत् मनसि निधाय श्रीमन्तः सर्वतन्त्रस्वतन्त्राः निगमान्तमहादेशिकाः न्यायपरिशुद्धिः न्यायसिद्धाञ्जनमिति ग्रन्थरत्नद्वयं निरमासिषुः । तत्र न्यायपरिशुद्धौ प्रमाणान्यधिकृत्य विस्तरेण प्रतिपाद्य संग्रहेण प्रमेयानि प्रस्तुतानि । प्रमाणवत् प्रमेयान्यपि विस्तरेण प्रतिपादनीयानित्यभिप्रायेण पृथक्न्यायसिद्धाञ्जनं व्यरचयन् । उक्तं च तैरेव—

यन्यायपरिशुद्धयन्ते संग्रहेण प्रदर्शितम् ।

पुनस्तद्विस्तरेणात्र प्रमेयमभिदध्यहे ॥

इति । न्यायपरिशुद्धौ प्राधान्येन गोतममुनिप्रणीतन्यायदर्शनविमर्शपूर्वकं प्रमाणानि निश्चीयन्ते । न्यायसिद्धाञ्जने कणादमुनिप्रणीतवैशेषिकदर्शनविमर्शपूर्वकं प्रमेय-निष्कर्षः क्रियते । तदुक्तं देशिकचरणैरेव न्यायसिद्धाञ्जने बुद्धिपरिच्छेदान्ते—

“वैशेषिकशैलीमनुसृत्य यथावस्थितपदार्थस्वरूपं ह्यत्र विशोध्यते”

इति । पटलाख्यः कश्चन नेत्ररोगविशेषः । तस्मिन् सति वस्तु सम्यक् द्रष्टुं न शक्यते । सिद्धाञ्जनलेपपूर्वकं दृश्यते चेत् पटलरोगवतोऽपि सम्यक् वस्तुदर्शनं भवति । भूम्यन्तर्हितवस्तुदर्शनमपि भवेत् । तद्वत् अस्मिन् ग्रन्थे प्रदर्शितन्याय-विशेषात्मकाञ्जनसहकारेण मोहवन्तोऽपि वेदनिगूढतत्त्वानि सम्यङ् निरीक्षितुं शक्नुवन्ति । तदुक्तं मङ्गलश्लोके—

श्रीमद्वेङ्कटनायकः श्रुतिशिरस्तात्पर्यपर्याप्तधीः

लब्धार्थो वरदार्यपादरसिकाद्रामानुजाचार्यतः ।

बालानामतिवेलमोहपटलावष्टम्भसोदहृशां

सम्यक्तत्त्वनिरीक्षणाय तनुते सत्तर्कसिद्धाञ्जनम् ॥

इति । इत्यम् ह्युक्ताभिः युक्तिभिः भासुरमिदं न्यायसिद्धाञ्जनमेकमप्यक्षरमविहाय आमूलाग्रं यः पठति अर्थज्ञानपूर्वकं, स संशयविपर्ययौ विना ज्ञातव्यं प्रमेयतत्त्वं सम्यग्ज्ञातुं प्रभवतीति अनुभवसिद्धमेतत् विदुषाम् । प्रौढगम्भीरभावगर्भः अनुपमोऽयं ग्रन्थः । अत्र सर्वतन्त्रस्वातन्त्र्यम् अद्भुतमेधाशक्तिः तार्किकाग्रेसरत्वं प्रमाणशरणात् बृहद्गम्यदर्शित्वम् प्राचीनाचार्यग्रन्थेषु युक्तयुक्तविवेचनकौशलम् इत्यादयः देशिकचरणानां प्रभावस्य प्रख्यापकाः गुणाः पदे पदे दृश्यन्ते ।

अस्मिन् न्यायसिद्धाञ्जने षट् परिच्छेदाः सन्ति । एकैकस्मिन् परिच्छेदे अपूर्वा ये विषयाः वर्तन्ते ते संग्रहेण प्रदर्श्यन्ते ।

जडद्रव्यपरिच्छेदः

अत्र बौद्धमतखण्डनपूर्वकं धर्मधर्मिणोरुभयोः स्थापनम्, द्रव्याणां क्षणिकत्वनिरासपूर्वकं स्थिरत्वस्थापनम्, परमाणुकारणवादनिरसनम्, इन्द्रियाणां भौतिकत्व निरसनम्, कर्मेन्द्रियस्थापनम्, आकाशस्य प्रत्यक्षविषयत्वनिरूपणम्, अन्धकारस्य द्रव्यत्वपार्थिवत्वसाधनम्, कालस्य विभुत्वप्रत्यक्षत्वे, दिक्तत्वस्यातिरिक्तस्याभावः, अवयवातिरिक्तावयवखण्डनम्, शरीरलक्षणनिष्कर्षः इत्येतेषु विषयेषु देशिकचरणानां मेधाविलासः अद्भुतं प्रसरति ।

जीवपरिच्छेदः

अत्र जीवलक्षणम्, जीवस्य देहेन्द्रियमनः प्राणधीभ्योऽन्यत्वम्, ज्ञानस्वरूपत्वे सति ज्ञातृत्वम्, अहंप्रत्ययगोचरत्वम्, कर्तृत्वं भोक्तृत्वम् अणुत्वं स्वयंप्रकाशत्वम्, प्रतिशरीरं भिन्नत्वं बद्धमुक्तनित्यरूपेण त्रेधा विभागः, भक्तिप्रपत्योः मोक्षहेतुत्वम्, सुकृतदुष्कृतयोः हानोपायननिष्कर्षः, कैवल्यविचारः इत्येते विषयाः सप्रमाणं निष्कृष्टाः ।

ईश्वरपरिच्छेदः

अत्र ईश्वरलक्षणम्, श्रीमतो नारायणस्यैव जगत्कारणत्वं ब्रह्मत्वं च, ईश्वरस्य सर्वत्र परिपूर्णत्वम्, उभयलिङ्गत्वम्, ब्रह्मणः प्रपञ्चाध्यास एव सृष्टिरिति मतनिराकरणम्, त्रिविधपरिच्छेदराहित्यम्, न्यायकुसुमाञ्जल्याद्युक्तस्य ईश्वरानुमानस्य निरासः, ईश्वरानुमाननिरासप्रयोजनम्, लक्ष्मीस्वरूपविषयकनिष्कर्षः, इत्यादयः प्रधानविषयाः निष्कर्षपूर्वकं निर्व्यूढाः ।

नित्यविभूतिपरिच्छेदः

अत्र नित्यविभूतौ लक्षणप्रमाणे, नित्यविभूतेः अचेतनत्वस्वयंप्रकाशत्वे, शरीरेन्द्रियप्राणविषयरूपेण विभक्ततया अवस्थानम्, नित्यानित्यशरीरादिमत्त्वम् इत्यादयः विषयाः विवेचिताः ।

बुद्धिपरिच्छेदः

अत्र धर्मभूतज्ञानलक्षणम्, प्राकट्येनानुमेयत्वनिरसनपूर्वकं धर्मभूतज्ञानस्य स्वयंप्रकाशत्वस्थापनम्, ज्ञानस्य सङ्कोचविकासौ, द्रव्यत्वम्, सम्भावितानां द्वादशानामाक्षेपाणां समुचितं समाधानं च ।

अद्रव्यपरिच्छेदः

अत्र सत्त्वरजस्तमांसि शब्दस्पर्शरूपरसगन्धाः संयोगः शक्तिश्चेति दशैवाद्रव्याणि । तत्र शब्दस्य द्रव्यत्वगुणत्वपक्षयोः विवेचनम्, अद्रव्यत्वपक्षस्य श्लाघ्यत्वम्, पाकजगुणप्रक्रिया, शक्तेः अतिरिक्ताद्रव्यत्वस्थापनम्, गुरुत्वस्य निराकरणम्, द्रव्यत्वस्य निरासः, स्नेह वेगस्थितस्थापकभावनानां निराकरणम्, संख्यापरिमाणपृथक्त्व विभागपरत्वापरत्वानां वैशेषिकाभिमतानां गुणानां निराकरणम्, कर्मणः अतिरिक्तत्वनिरासपूर्वकं विभागपूर्वकसंयोगरूपत्वसाधनम्, सामान्यस्य खण्डनम् इति विषयाः सयुक्तिकं निरूपिताः ।

यथात्र ग्रन्थे प्रौढगम्भीरपरिमितवचोभिः युक्तिप्रमाणगर्भैः मतान्तरविवेचन-पूर्वकं प्रमेयनिष्कर्षः कृतोऽस्ति न तथान्यत्रेति शक्यं वक्तुम् । अयमेकः असकृदावर्त्यमानः सकलशङ्कानिरासपूर्वकं प्रमेय निश्चयमादधानः मनसस्सन्तुष्टिं जनयतीति निश्चप्रचमेतत् ।

ईदृशस्याद्भुतसृष्टिरूपस्य ग्रन्थस्य सम्यक् अध्ययनपूर्वकमतिसरलया स्पष्ट्या च शैल्या आङ्गलभाषया पूर्वोक्तानामनुक्तानां च विषयाणां प्रतिपादनं मेलुकोटै एम्बार् रङ्गाचार्यैः

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in the
Nyāya-siddhāṅjana

इति शीर्षकाङ्किते ग्रन्थे कृतमिति महानयं प्रमोदस्य विषयः । एतावत्पर्यन्तम् आङ्गलभाषायामीदृशः ग्रन्थः न केनापि व्यरचि ।

अयं हि अध्यायसप्तकात्मना विभक्तः । प्रथमाध्यायः भागद्वयात्मकः उपोद्घातरूपः । तत्र प्रथमे भागे आत्वात् पदवाच्यैः दिव्यसूरिभिः नाथमुनिप्रभृतिभिः देशिकात् पूर्वतनैराचार्यैः कृतानां ग्रन्थानां न्यायसिद्धाञ्जने उद्घृतानां परिशीलनपूर्वकं तैः कृतं विशिष्टाद्वैतदर्शनस्य योगदानमधिकृत्य विवेचनं व्यधायि । द्वितीयभागे वेदान्तदेशिकानां जीवनचरितग्रन्थादिकमधिकृत्य अनुसन्धानं कृतम् । द्वितीये ग्रन्थस्योपोद्घातरूपेण न्यायपरिशुद्धि न्यायसिद्धाञ्जन-प्रतिपाद्यसंक्षेपः प्रस्तुतः ।

ततः जडपरिच्छेदमारभ्य अद्रव्यपरिच्छेदपर्यन्तं न्यायसिद्धाञ्जने ये ये विषयाः विवेचिताः तेषां क्रमशः, विभागपूर्वकं समुचितानि शीर्षकाणि विन्यस्य एकैकोऽपि विषयः ग्रन्थोक्तरीतिमनुल्लङ्घ्य सुष्ठु प्रतिपादितः । नायमनुवादरूपो ग्रन्थः अपि तु स्वतन्त्रः । स्वयं ग्रन्थाशयं सम्यगवगम्य लिखितः सुबोधः उपादेयतमश्चायं प्रबन्ध इति ममाशयः । ईदृशस्य उत्तमस्य प्रबन्धस्य निर्माणेन सर्वेषां विदुषामभिनन्दनभाजनभूतः प्राच्यप्रतीच्यदर्शन निष्णातः मेलुक्नेटै एम्बार् रङ्गाचार्यः अन्येषामपि बहूनां ग्रन्थानां रचनेन विदुषामुपकारमातृत्वाः चिरं विराजतामिति भगवन्तं श्रियः पति प्रार्थये ।

महामहोपाध्यायः

१०-३-२०००

बेङ्गलूरु

एन्. एस्. रामानुजताताचार्यः

तिरुपतिराष्ट्रीयसंस्कृतविद्यापीठस्य कुलपतिचरः

EXCERPTS FROM THE SANSKRIT INTRODUCTION

Vātsyāyana, the great commentator of Nyāya-Darśana founded by sage Gautama, in the beginning said that the entire substances of the universe can be included in the four categories i.e. *pramāṇam* (the valid source of knowledge), *prameyam* (objects of knowledge), *pramāta* (the agent), *pramiti* (valid knowledge). In the absence of any one of them knowledge becomes impossible. *Pramāta* is one who acts being instigated by desire or abandoning the desire. An object that is known is *prameyam*. The knowledge of an object is *pramiti*. The means of knowing is *pramāṇam*. He told that these things are very useful in the day-to-day transactions. The great sages and Ācāryas who wrote Sūtras, Bhāṣyas and Vārticas, wrote them on the basis of these four concepts.

Among these four, the *pramāṇa* and *prameya* are very important concepts. Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika took birth to give us the correct knowledge about them. Without *pramāṇa*, there cannot be *prameya* and vice-versa. Therefore, if one is interpreted, the other too needs interpretation.

In this regard the philosophy of Nyāya founded by Gautama deals mainly with *pramāṇas* whereas Vaiśeṣika school founded by Kaṇāda deals with *prameyas*. Apart from these two schools of philosophy, other schools like Sāṅkhya, Yoga, Mīmāṃsa and Vedānta also were born. They are orthodox systems. All these systems discuss *pramāṇas* and *prameyas*. The system of Cārvāka, Buddha and Jaina are heterodox systems. All these systems discuss *pramāṇas* and *prameyas*.

Number of the means of knowledge and their definition and their purpose, like that, the number of *prameyas*, their

definition and the purpose of their knowledge are delineated in their respective philosophies. But in every aspect, we cannot expect agreement. On the other hand, we see difference of opinion. To establish their respective philosophies, it becomes their duty to refute other systems.

In this juncture, it becomes necessary to decide with discretion, the position of Viśiṣṭādvaita regarding pramāṇas and prameyas. Having this in his mind, Śrī Nigamānta Deśika composed two great works i.e. *Nyāya-pariśuddhi* and *Nyāya-siddhānta* which are pearls among great works. In *Nyāya-pariśuddhi*, pramāṇas are discussed in detail and prameyas are introduced in concised form. Deśika wrote *Nyāya-siddhānta* separately to explain prameyas in detail. It was stated by Deśika himself in the beginning of the work.

*yannyāyapariśudhyante saṅgrahena pradarsitam |
punastadvistareṇātra prameyamabhidhādmahe ||*

and in the end of *Buddhi pariccheda* also he said:

*"vaiśeṣika śailīmanusṛtya yathāvasthitapadārtha
svarūpam hyatra viśodhyate"*

'Paṭala' is a type of eye-disease. Under its influence one cannot perceive things properly. If an ointment is applied, a person who is caught by 'paṭala' can also see things clearly. In the same way, if a person of erroneous knowledge applies the collyrium prepared in this work, will see the truths of vedas in their proper perspective. It is stated in the invocatory stanza itself.

In this way, this work is radiant with attractive 'yuktis'. A person who masters this work with meaning and without omitting a single letter, becomes capable of understanding prameyas without doubt or erroneous knowledge. This is the experience of erudite scholars.

This is an excellent work pregnant with magnanimous, bold, deep and sagacious ideas. Here the celebrated author has appropriated his title *sarvatantra swatantratva* and has exhibited his great logical acumen, extraordinary wisdom, resorting to vedic passages and his mastery of all great works of his ancestors. We can say it confidently that this work is filled with scholarly, deep ideas stated in limited words which are pregnant with *yuktis* and *pramāṇas*. Here the position of the opponent schools are discussed in detail. Finally the decision is arrived at the *prameyas* of the *Viśiṣṭādvaita*. Nowhere in philosophical literature do we come across this type of discussion. Hence this work occupies a unique place among the works of philosophy.

The readers also come to realize at every step, his discretionary capacity over the old works of great *ācāryas* of the systems. Thus we understand the greatness of *Ācārya Deśika*. In the *Nyāya-siddhāñjana* there are six chapters. Each chapter contains very rare subject matter (please refer to the original or the contents of the present work).

Thus this work is a wonderful creation. I am very glad to know that Dr. Melkote Embar Rangachar has studied this work in depth. He has expounded this work in English in a very easy and clear style. He has discussed all aspects of the work in detail. Upto this date, this kind of work is not produced by anybody else.

Each topic of the original work is discussed with proper division under appropriate captions. Every topic discussed by him is very good. He has not transgressed the limits of the original work. This work is not a translation but it is an independent treatise. In my discretion, Dr. Rangachar has written this work after deep study of *Nyāya-siddhāñjana* and hence the work is easy to understand. In my view, this work is worth possession.

Melkote Embar Rangachar is an expert in the philosophies of both the East and the West. Having written this great work, he has become the recipient of acclamation of all great people. Let him write many other great works like this for the benefit of scholars and thus live a long life. Thus I pray God Śrīman Nārāyaṇa.

Thus

Mahāmahopādhyāya

N. S. Rāmānujātātācāryah

Former Vice-Chancellor,

Rāṣṭriya Saṁskṛta-Vidyāpīṭha

Tirupati

Date 10-03-2000

Bangalore

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Dedicate to
My revered Father and Ācārya
Melkote Sri Embar Narasimhacharya Swamy
and beloved Mother
Smt. Shellammal

The Philosophy of VIŚIṢṬĀDVAITA

*As expounded by Śrī Vedānta Deśika in the
Nyāya-siddhāñjana*

Chapter 1

INTRODUCTION

Part I

THE ROLE OF ĀLVĀRS AND THE IMPORTANT PRECEDING ĀCĀRYAS OF DEŚIKA AND THEIR WORKS IN THE GROWTH OF VIŚIṢṬĀDVAITA

It becomes clear by the study of great works of Viśiṣṭādvaita, that this system is based upon śruti, smṛti, Divyaprabandhams of Ālvārs and the experience and sayings of great ācāryas. Śrī Rāmānuja did not invent this school but he only expounded this system, which was already in practice. It becomes evident from the study of *Rgveda*,¹ that the love of God is the means of God-realisation. Love unites the lover and the loved. After the Samhitās, the Upaniṣads gloriously enjoined that the loving meditation upon the Brahman, is the summum bonum of life. The Itihāsas and Purāṇas expound gloriously this philosophy of bhakti. The torchbearers of that bhakti-cult were great saints of Tamilnad who were known as the Ālvārs. The 4000 Tamil verses of these Ālvārs compendiously, known as the "*Divyaprabandhas*".

Ālvārs in their *prabandhams* have dived deep into the divine bliss of God-love, and their works furnish several phases of loving meditation of all auspicious qualities of the Paramātman of a very impassionate nature. We can see the Viśiṣṭādvaitic God-experience in the great sayings of Ālvārs.

1. *Rgveda*, X-133.6.

Rgveda, X VIII-92.32.

Even to this day those who study sampradāya or siddhānta of Śrī Rāmānuja have to study the meaning of these *prabandhams* under a competent ācārya without which the study of Viśiṣṭādvaita becomes incomplete, as the *prabandhams* of Ālvārs contain the important tenets of Viśiṣṭādvaita.

Bhakti or God-love is insisted upon by all schools of vaiṣṇavite thought as an essential prerequisite to attain God-realisation. Therefore bhakti is considered as the important means for salvation. Madhva, Vallabha, Caitanya and all other great vaiṣṇava ācāryas have admitted the need for bhakti or bhagavatprema (Love of God) and all of them led a life of divine love. It is the same with the Ālvārs. The Ālvārs have laid emphasis on God-love and they have immersed themselves in the experience of God-enjoyment. In fact they take their name 'Ālvārs' (one who gets immersed) from the fact of their being immersed in God-love.

To the Ālvārs and ācāryas of Viśiṣṭādvaita school, bhakti is not only the means to the attainment of God, but it is also the summum bonum of religious experience. Bhakti is both the means and the end. It is also 'puruṣārtha' (the highest human value) since there is no higher state to be realised by man than to love God. The sayings of Ālvārs and ācāryas reveal the fact that the attainment of 'vaikuṇṭha' is not to be preferred to pleasure obtainable here by loving Him. This type of God-love can be seen in every Ālvārs.

In Śrīvaiṣṇavism there are ten Ālvārs. Vedānta Deśika in his *Rahasyatrayasāra* divides them to ten incarnations of God himself. These Ālvārs, having realised God, have expressed their experiences in Tamil which is within the reach of even an ordinary man.

Because of this special characteristic feature, the *prabandhams* of Ālvārs were given the name 'Tamiḷ-veda' and were considered to be one of the great pillars of

Viśiṣṭādvaita-siddhānta. The tradition says that these Ālvārs belong to 3000 B. C. But the historians are not prepared to accept this date and they say that one among Ālvārs namely, Tirumangai Ālvār belonged to 7th century A. D. From this it becomes clear that, in the opinion of the historians the dates of Ālvārs begin from 3rd century A. D. and last up to 7th century A. D.

ĀCHĀRYAS

After the period of Ālvārs, ācāryas began to propagate this philosophy of love of God, by giving a beautiful shape to the system. These ācāryas experiencing the divine bliss, expressed those experiences in their several works and propagated them among their disciples and whatever is known about them and their works is only through the references by Deśika in his works. This is one of the greatest contributions of Deśika to the system.

In the galaxy of ācāryas, Nāthamuni occupies the first place. In the beginning of *Śrībhāṣya*, Rāmānuja quotes¹ the name of the great sage Bodhāyana as belonging to the system of Viśiṣṭādvaita and opines, that there were many commentators on *Brahmasūtra* of Bādarāyaṇa, even before him. In *Vedārtha-saṅgraha* Rāmānuja² declares that this system of Viśiṣṭādvaita is a very ancient one and was propagated by great sages like Bodhāyana, Ṭaṅka, Dramiḍa, Guhadeva, Kapardi, Bhāruci, and so on. Rāmānuja quotes from Ṭaṅka

1. *bhagavad bodhāyana kṛtām brahmasūtravṛttim pūrvācāryāḥ sañcikṣipuh, tanmatānusāreṇa sūtrākṣarāṇi vyākhyāsyante. Śrībhāṣya: p. 2).*

2. Refer *Vedārtha-saṅgraha*, p. 117

*bhagavadbodhāyana-ṭaṅka-dramiḍa-guhadeva-kapardi-bhāruci
prabhṛti avigīta śiṣṭa parigrhīta veda-vedānta vyākhyāna
swyaktārtha śrutinikara darśitoyam panthāḥ ||*

Yatiraja saptati of Vedānta Deśika, (Śloka 57)

and Dramiḍa, calling them as vākyakāra and bhāṣyakāra respectively and thus substantiates his stand. Among these ācāryas, Guhadeva, Kapardi, and Bhāruci, are known only by their names, and nothing else is known about them. The works of Ṭaṅka, Dramiḍa and vṛtti of Bodhāyana are not available. All these ācāryas are the great representatives of this great system. Bodhāyana is said to be the predecessor of ācārya Śaṅkara. The dates of the remaining ācāryas are not yet known decisively.

NĀTHA MUNI¹

While contemplating on the Guruparampara, the followers of Śrī Rāmānuja remember the great services rendered to the system of Viśiṣṭādvaita, by three great ācāryas namely Śrīmannāthamuni, Śrīmadyāmunamuni and Śrī Rāmānujamuni. Among them Śrīmannāthamuni is considered to be the darśana sthāpanācārya (founder of the school). Vedānta Deśika in his *Tattvamuktā-kalāpa*² says that Nāthamuni was the first man to propagate the ideals of Viśiṣṭādvaita.

Nāthamuni the first ācārya of ubhaya vedānta (both Sanskrit and Tamil Vedas) was the grand-father of the great Yāmunācārya, who was the spiritual teacher of Śrī Rāmānuja, and he lived towards the end of 8th century A.D. (800 to 923 A.D.).

Two works namely *Nyāyasūtra* and *Yogarahasya* are ascribed to Nāthamuni but they are not available. Deśika in his *Nyāyasiddhānta* and *Nyāyapariśuddhi* quotes

1. His life mission was the preservation of the songs of the Great Ālvārs. Vedānta Deśika in his *Rahasyatrayasāra* says, that Nammālvār himself became the ācārya of Nāthamuni while he was in the trance of yoga and imparted the lores of *prabandhams*.
2. *Nāthopajñam pravṛttam bahubhirupacitam yāmuneya prabandhaiḥ* ||

profusely from *Nyāyatattva*. In this work, Nāthamuni criticises the traditional expositions of Nyāya-vaiśeṣika teachers. It is clear from the references of Vedānta Deśika to the *Nyāyatattva* that it was the most comprehensive treatises on the philosophy of Viśiṣṭādvaita. That it is now extinct is a great pity indeed.

PUNḌARĪKĀKṢĀCĀRYA

Vedānta Deśika in his *Śata-dūṣaṇi* (vāda 7) quotes two stanzas of Puṇḍarīkākṣācārya, without mentioning the name of the work. He was the teacher of Yāmunācārya. These quotations prove the logical and dialectical character of the work of Puṇḍarīkākṣācārya.

RĀMAMIŚRA I

Deśika in his *Nikṣepa-rakṣā* quotes some portions from the works of Rāmamiśra. He was the disciple of Puṇḍarīkākṣācārya and the teacher of Yāmunācārya. He was the upholder of yathārthakhyāti theory. He is different from Rāmamiśra II who is other wise known as Somāsiyāṇḍān (12th century A. D.).

YĀMUNĀCĀRYA and RĀMĀNUJA

Almost all works of Yāmunācārya and Śrī Rāmānuja are available now. The credit for preserving the works of Yāmunācārya and Rāmānujācārya goes to Vedānta Deśika. But *Puruṣa-nirṇaya* of Yāmunācārya, mentioned by Vedānta Deśika has become extinct at present.

RĀMAMIŚRA II

Rāmamiśra II is known as Somāsiyāṇḍān. Deśika refers to his works frequently. He was the exponent of the works of Rāmānuja. His exposition of *Śrībhāṣya* is almost extinct, except for the portions quoted by Vedānta Deśika.

Vivaraṇakāra referred to by Vedānta Deśika and Rāmamiśra II are identical. It is he who first expounded the works of Rāmānuja. Sudarśana Sūri better known as Śrutaprakāśikācārya refers to Rāmamiśra II as the first exponent of Rāmānuja Siddhānta. Vedānta Deśika in his *Tattvaṭīka* criticises some of the opinions of Rāmamiśra II. Deśika shows his acquaintance with another work of Rāmamiśra II, which is known as *Vedārtha saṅgrahavivaraṇa*. But this work is also extinct.

'*Ṣaḍārtha-saṅkṣepa*' was another Mīmāṃsā work of Rāmamiśra II. Deśika in his *Nyāya-siddhānta* quotes from it and examines it. It is clear from Deśika's references to it that Rāmamiśra II was a Mīmāṃsaka and a Viśiṣṭādvaitin and he had explained the works of Rāmānuja from the standpoint of the Anvitābhidānavāda of Mīmāṃsā school.

ŚRĪVATSĀNKA MIŚRA.

Śrīvatsānka Miśra was one of the fore-most of direct disciples of Rāmānuja. He is known as Kūrattālvān. Tradition says that Kūrattālvān procured Bodhayana vṛtti for Rāmānuja while Kūreśa (another name of Kūrattālvān) accompanied Rāmānuja to Kaṭṭavai. It is said that it was Kūreśa who took-down Śrībhagavata was first dictated by Rāmānuja to him. Kūreśa wrote the entire works of Rāmānuja. It is also said that Cōttu Kulottuṅga plucked the eyes of Kūreśa because Kūreśa was an ardent follower of Rāmānuja.

His works are:

1. A Bhāṣya on the *Dramiḍabhāṣya*. (It is lost).
2. *Śrīvaikunṭha-stava*.
3. *Atimānuṣa-stava*.
4. *Sundarabāhu-stava*.

5. *Varadarāja-stava*.6. *Śrī-stava*.

These devotional lyrics are traditionally known as *Pañcastava*, which are quoted by Vedānta Deśika.

PARĀŚARA BHATṬA

According to Vedānta Deśika Parāśara Bhaṭṭa was the son of Śrīvatsāṅka Miśra. Deśika refers to him as Bhaṭṭāraka or Abhiyukta. It seems that the works of Śrīvatsāṅka influenced Vedānta Deśika to a very great extent. Deśika refers to Parāśara Bhaṭṭa and his works more than 24 times in *Nyāyapariśuddhi*. In *Nyāyasiddhāṅjana* also Deśika refers to him and his works more than twenty times. No where Deśika differs from the view point of Parāśara Bhaṭṭa. Deśika opines that Parāśara Bhaṭṭa was the best among the post-Rāmānuja Viśiṣṭādvaitic logicians.

His works are:

1. *Śrīraṅgarāja-stava* (I and II part).
2. *Śrīguṇaratnakōśa*.
3. *Aṣṭaślokī*.
4. *Śrīraṅganātha-stotra*.
5. *Bhagavadguṇa-darpaṇa*. (A commentary on the *Viṣṇusahasranāma stotra*).

An important treatise on the logic of Viśiṣṭādvaita namely *Tattvaratnākara* of Parāśara Bhaṭṭa, which is frequently quoted in *Nyāya-pariśuddhi* and *Nyāya-siddhāṅjana* is unfortunately extinct. *Tattvaratnākara* is known to us only from its quotations in Vedānta Deśika's *Nyāya-pariśuddhi* and *Nyāya-siddhāṅjana*.

Another important work of Parāśara Bhaṭṭa mentioned by Deśika in *Nyāya-siddhāṅjana* is the *Adhyātma-khaṇḍa-*

dvaya vivaraṇa. This work is also extinct now. Deśika quotes from this work in his *Pañcarātra-rakṣā*.

VARADA VIṢṆU MIŚRA

Deśika refers to Varada Viṣṇu Miśra in his *Nyāya-pariśuddhi* and *Nyāya-siddhāñjana*. Deśika characterises him as 'ekadeśin'. He was a great Viśiṣṭādvaitic logician. He tried to synthesise the nyāya with the Rāmānuja darśana. It seems that he was the follower of Udayana, Bhāsarvajña and Vāsudeva. That is why Deśika states that his views are against the writings of Rāmānuja. His foremost work, extensively used by Vedānta Deśika was *Māna-yāthātmya-nirṇaya*. It was an authoritative work on Viśiṣṭādvaitic logic.

NĀRĀYAṆA MUNI

Deśika quotes Nārāyaṇamuni in his *Pañcarātra-rakṣā* and *Stotratratnabhāṣya*. He was the disciple of Śrīraṅga Nārāyaṇācārya, who was presumably the direct disciple of Rāmānuja. Deśika has not mentioned the name of his works. But the quotations suggest that it must have been the treatise on the doctrine of prapatti and pañcakāla kriyā. He seems to have written a commentary on the *Stotratratna* of Yāmuna and the works of Vāṅgivaṅdeśvara.

His works are:

1. *Aṣṭaśloki-vyākhyā*.
2. *Ārādhana-saṅgraha-kārikā*.
3. *Bhagavadgītārtha-saṅgraha-vibhāga*.
4. *Bhāvaprakāśikā* (A commentary on *Brahmasūtras*).

VIṢṆUCITTA (A. D. 1106-1200)

Traditionaly Viṣṇucitta is known as Eṅgaḷ Āḷvān, who was the successor of Kurukeśvara or Tirukkurehaippirān Pillān. Vedānta Deśika quotes on many occasions from Viṣṇucitta's works.

His works from which Deśika quotes are:

1. *Prameya-saṅgraha*.
2. *Saṅgatimālā*.

Another work of Viṣṇucitta is known as *Viṣṇucittīya* is a commentary on the *Viṣṇupurāṇa*. It seems that Vedānta Deśika was much obliged to these works (especially *Prameya-saṅgraha* and *Saṅgatimālā*), in the composition of *Nyāya-pariśuddhi* and *Nyāya-siddhāṇjana*.

VARADA NĀRĀYAṆABHAṬṬĀRAKA (12th century A. D.)

Varada Nārāyaṇa Bhaṭṭāraka was another eminent Viśiṣṭādvaita writer known only through Vedānta Deśika's works. Varada Nārāyaṇa Bhaṭṭāraka followed the views of the *Māna-yāthātmya-nirṇaya* and his works are:

1. *Prajñā-paritrāṇa*. This work is known as through its quotations in Vedānta Deśika's works. It was a treatise on Viśiṣṭādvaita logic.

2. *Nyāya-sudarśana*. It is also known as *Vedānta-nyāya-sudarśana* and it was an exposition on *Śrībhāṣya*.

VARADĀCĀRYA (A. D. 1165-1275)

Varadācārya is known as Naḍādūr Ammāḷ. He is also called as Vātsya Varada. He was the greatest of the exponents of Rāmānuja Darśana. Ātreya Rāmānuja was his devoted student. Vedānta Deśika in his childhood is said to have received the blessings of Varadācārya which Deśika remembers¹ in many of his works.

1. *venkateśo varadagurukṛpālambitoddhāmbhūmā* |

Tattvamuktā-kalāpa, 1-2.

śrīmadbhyaṃ syādasāvityanupadhi varadācārya rāmānujābhyaṃ Adhikaraṇa-sārāvāḷi, 2 and refer *Saṅkalpa-sūryodaya*, (Act 2-15).

His works referred to by Vedānta Deśika are

1. *Tattvasāra*
2. *Tattvanirṇaya*.

Other works which are not mentioned by Vedānta Deśika but are supposed to have been written by Varadācārya, are:

1. *Ārāḍhanā-kārikā*.
2. *Paramārthastutiḥ*.
3. *Prapanna-pārijāta*.
4. *Prameyamālā*.

SENESVARĀRYA (13th century A. D.)

In his *Adhikaraṇa-sārvaṇī* Deśika mentions Senesvarārya. In *Tattvaṭīka* Deśika refers to *Nyāya-saṅgraha* as the work of Senesvarārya. Before the composition of *Śrutaprakāśikā* and the *Nyāya-sudarśana*, *Nyāya-saṅgraha* was considered to be the authoritative interpretation of the *Brahmasūtra* topics.

SUDARŚANA-BHAṬṬĀRAKA

Sudarśana Bhaṭṭāraka is mentioned as Vyāsārya or Sudarśana Bhaṭṭāraka. He was a contemporary of Vedānta Deśika. Nāṭhār Anṇaṅgaḥ is supposed to have been his teacher.

His works are:

1. *Śruta-prakāśikā*.
(It is a commentary on the *Śrībhāṣya*).
2. *Śruta-pradīpikā*.
(An independent exposition of *Brahmasūtra*).
3. *Tātparya-dīpikā*.
(A commentary on the *Vedārtha-saṅgraha*).
4. *Subālopaniṣad-vyākhyā*.
(An exposition of *Subālopaniṣad*).

5. An exposition of the *Rāmānuja-gadya*.
(This is known as *Gadyatraya-vivaraṇa*).

NĀRĀYAṆĀRYA (13th Century A. D.)

Vedānta Deśika refers to the works of Nārāyaṇārya and on that basis we can say that the following works are written by him.

1. *Nītimālā*: (This work of Nārāyaṇārya is published.) Vedānta Deśika calls the views of *Nītimālā* as “ekadeśi-matam”.

2. An exposition of the *Mīmāṃsā-sūtra*. Vedānta Deśika has criticised this exposition in *Nyāya-siddhāṇjana* and labels it as ‘*prauḍhi-prakāśana*’. (Mere show of one’s skill).

ĀTREYA RĀMĀNUJA (1221-1295 A. D.)

Ātreya Rāmānuja or Vādihaṃsāmbudācārya was Vedānta Deśika’s great teacher. It was he who initiated Vedānta Deśika to the secrets of Viśiṣṭādvaita and Śrīvaiṣṇavism. He was the fourth in direct descent from Rāmānuja. Deśika calls him Vedāntodayana. He was also known as Praṇatārtihara. He was the resident of Kāñci and Vedānta Deśika was his sister’s son. Tradition says that he was the author of three works. But so far only his *Nyāya-kulīśa* is published and other two works are extinct.

From the reference of Vedānta Deśika in his *Tātparya candrikā* to a śloka, it is presumed that Ātreya Rāmānuja was the author of the commentary on *Śrībhāṣya*.

Dr. S. N. Das Gupta mentions *Mokṣa-siddhi* of Ātreya Rāmānuja in his *Indian Philosophy*.

MEGHANĀDĀRI SŪRI

Meghanādāri Sūri was an early contemporary of Vedānta Deśika. Deśika mentions him as ‘*asmadīyaḥ*’ (our own man).

His works are:

1. *Nyāya-prakāśikā*. (A commentary on *Śrībhāṣya*) Deśika refers to it in *Tattvaṭīka* and calls it as an ekadeśin's work.
2. *Naya-dyumaṇi*. (A treatise on Nyāya-viśiṣṭādvaita-syncretism). Deśika indirectly alludes to it in his *Nyāya-pariśuddhi*.
3. *Bhāvaprabodha*

Thus from the references of Deśika in his works to the above well-known Viśiṣṭādvaita writers and their works, the student of Viśiṣṭādvaita philosophy gets the glimpses of the vast literature and their authors.

In addition to the above mentioned Viśiṣṭādvaita writers Deśika refers to some others also, who are of great importance to the reconstruction of the history of Viśiṣṭādvaitic thought.

YĀDAVAPRAKĀŚA (11th century A. D.)

Yādavaprakāśa was the teacher of the great Rāmānuja. Rāmānuja converted Yādavaprakāśa from Advaitism to Viśiṣṭādvaitism by his beautiful explanation of Upaniṣads and śāstric text. This episode is referred to by Vedānta Deśika in his *Yatirājasaptati*.

Then Yādava wrote a classic known as *Yatidharma-samuccaya*. For Vedānta Deśika, Yādava Prakāśa is an authority on the point of *Yatidharma-samarthana*.

Another work of Yādava is the *Bhāṣya* on the *Bhagavadgītā*. Deśika criticises some portions of it and this work is not available now.

Another work of Yādavaprakāśa is a commentary on *Brahmasūtras*. In *Tattvaṭīka* Deśika refers to it.

Other Gītābhāṣyakāras referred to by Deśika are:

1. Piśāca.
2. Rantideva.
3. Yajña Svāmin.
4. Abhinavagupta.

TĀTPARYA TŪLIKĀKĀRA

Deśika refers to Tātparya Tūlikākāra in his *Tattvaṭīka* and accepts his interpretations as authoritative.

VĀMANA

Deśika refers to Vāmana as the commentator of the *Draṁḍa-bhāṣya*.

VARADARĀJA PAṆḌITA

Varadarāja Paṇḍita is referred to by Vedānta Deśika in his *Saccaritra-rakṣā*. He also refers to his work called the *Sanmārga-dīpikā*. He was the pre-Vedānta Deśika exponent of Śrīvaiṣṇavism. Further Deśika mentions the names of Bhojarāja (his work is *Prayogapaddhati-ratnāvalī*), Śrīkrṣṇa Muni (and some of his ślokas), Baladevācārya Vāsudeva Swāmy, Ṛḍhra Saromuni, Vaṅgi Vaṅgeśvara, Pratāpa Bhūpa (his work *Ācamana-nirṇaya*), Bharatamuni, Bhāvasvāmin, Nārāyaṇācārya (his work *Tattvanirṇaya*), Varadarājācārya (who is different from Varadarāja Paṇḍita), Śāḍguṇya Viveka, Parakāla Sūri and so on. Nothing else is known about them.

From the above details one can know the vast literature of Viśiṣṭādvaita philosophy and its ācāryas, known from the works of Vedānta Deśika.



INTRODUCTION

Part II

LIFE, WORKS AND CONTRIBUTION OF VEDĀNTA DEŚIKA

Ācārya Vedānta Deśika was born in Tūpul, a suburb of Kāñcīpuram in 1268 A.D. He was the son of Anantasūri Somayāji. His mother was Totāramma, the sister of Ātreya Rāmānuja. Tirumaṅgai was the wife of Deśika. Deśika is regarded as an incarnation of the 'ghaṇṭā' (bell) of the Lord Venkaṭeśvara at Tirumalai. Deśika himself hints this idea in the introductory stanza of *Sankalpa-sūryodaya*¹.

He lived a life of 102 years leaving behind him innumerable intellectual products which inspire the thoughts of learned people. He composed several devotional songs which can appeal to the hearts of the learned as well as the common people.

Ācārya Deśika's ability to become the spiritual teacher was recognised by the famous ~~teacher~~ Naḍādūr Ammaḷ. This episode took place when he was five years old. His maternal uncle Kadāmbi Appullār ~~once took~~ the boy Venkaṭanātha (the birth name of Vedānta Deśika) to the temple of Lord Varadarāja where the famous teacher of the time, Naḍādūr Ammaḷ was imparting ~~discourses on Śrībhāṣya~~ of Rāmānuja. It is said that Ammaḷ was wonder-struck at the spiritual luster of the boy and enquired about him. While being astonished at the recognition of immeasurable power in the

1. *vitṛāsinī vibudhavairavarūthinām
padmāsanena paricāraavidhai prayuktā |
utprekṣyate budha janairupapattibhūmnā
ghaṇṭā haressamajaniṣṭa yadātmaneti ||*

young boy to become a great ācārya of the school, Ammāḷ even forgot the context of the discourses that was going on. Immediately the young boy stood up with folded hands and stated with modesty the summary of the discourse which was being imparted by ācārya Ammāḷ at the time of his entrance to the hall of discourse. The joy of the ācārya knew no bounds at this. He hugged the boy and gracefully patted him and heartily blessed him in the following manner:

*pratiṣṭhāpitavedāntaḥ pratikṣiptabahirmataḥ |
bhūyāstraividya mānyastvam bhūrikalyāṇabhājanam ||*

Guruparampara p. 119.

You establish the philosophy of Viśiṣṭādvaita on firm grounds, refuting other systems and thus become honoured by all scholars. Let all auspicious things come to you.

Thus having blessed the boy, the ācārya asked his disciple Ātreya Rāmānuja to instruct the boy in all the lores of sciences. Accordingly, the maternal uncle trained the boy in all sciences that were known at the time. It is recorded that by his twentieth year, he had mastered all the śāstras, and had given the exposition of Rāmānuja's *Śrībhāṣya* several times. Deśika himself has stated this fact in his *Sankalpa-sūryodaya*:

*vimśatyabde viśrutanānāvidhavidyaḥ |
trimśadvāram śrāvitaśārīrakabhāṣyaḥ ||* Act I. St. 15.

By his erudition and marvellous intellect, he won the title of 'Sarvatantra-svatantra'. Because of his mastery over the Vedāntaśāstra, it is stated that the Lord Raṅganātha Himself, was pleased to confer the title, i.e., "Vedānta Deśika" on him.

Deśika was a great poet. His poetic talent was supreme, beyond any comparison. Many scholars are of the opinion that the poetry of Deśika excels even that of Kālidāsa, the renowned poet of our country. Deśika's poetry is full of

Vedānta and Bhakti. He used his poetic talent for the easy interpretation of the principles of the doctrine of Viśiṣṭādvaita. His poetic beauty can be experienced in his *Yādavābhyudaya*, *Haṁsa-sandeśa*, *Pādukā-sahasra*, *Subhāṣitanīvi* and *Saṅkalpa-sūryodaya* (an allegorical drama). The mahākāvya, viz., *Yādavābhyudaya*, is commented upon by no less a person than Appayya Dīkṣita, an ardent advaitin and a rhetorician of a very high order. Appayya Dīkṣita has complimented Deśika in the following stanza:

ittham vicintyāḥ sarvatra bhāvāssanti pade pade |
kavitārkikasimhasya kāvyeṣu laliteśvapi ||

Refer commentary on *Yādavābhyudaya*, Canto I, Stanza I.

Because of his poetic skill and ability he has transformed the entire *Śrībhāṣya* of Rāmānuja into the form of poetry giving his own logical explanations. He was a great scholar in Tamil, Sanskrit and Prakṛt and therefore he has many poetic works of high merit in all these three languages, to his credit.

Deśika was a powerful debater. With his poetic talent, forceful logic and lucid exposition of the tenets established by the great Rāmānuja, he was a formidable, viz., Kavitārkika-simha. Even the great scholars of other systems held him in high esteem. It is stated in the *Ācārya-parā* (traditional history of ācāryas) that he was an arbitrator in the philosophical dispute between the scholars Akṣhobhyamuni and Vidyāranya who was his opponent.

Deśika played an important role in guarding Raṅganātha's shrine, at the time of Malik-kafur's invasion. He protected the two children of Sudarśana Bhaṭṭa and the *Śrutaprakāśika*¹ (the commentary on *Śrībhāṣya* by Sudarśana) from the Mohammadan devastation.

1. *śrutaprakāśikā bhūmau yenādaḥ parirakṣitā |*

Vedānta Deśika Mangala Stotra by Kumāra Vedāntācārya

Vedānta Deśika's greatest service to Viśiṣṭādvaita philosophy is his powerful defence of the system against rival schools, with the help of his powerful logic, which was not against the Upaniṣadic philosophy. Deśika wrote many scholarly works. To mention some of them *Tattvamuktā-kalāpa* with his own commentary, i.e., *Sarvārtha-siddhi*, *Tattvaṭīka*, *Adhikaraṇa-sārāvaḷi*, *Śata-dūṣaṇī*, *Tātparya-candrikā*, *Mīmāṃsā-pādukā*, *Seśvaramīmāṃsā*, *Nyāya-pariśud-dhi* and *Nyāya-siddhāṇjana* etc. He has written fourteen Sanskrit works on Vedānta expounding, defending and establishing Rāmānuja's doctrines. He was a great commentator. He has commented upon Rāmānuja's *Gadyam*, *Bhāṣyam* and *Stotratatna* of Yāmuna and *Īsopaniṣad*. He has produced 32 works in 'Maṇi-pravāḷa' (a blend of Tamil and Sanskrit) for the easy understanding of his followers. They all explain in a simple manner the importance of the śaraṇāgati-tattva. In this direction, his magnum opus is *Rahasyātrayaśāram*.

In addition to this, he has composed 28 stotras in Sanskrit which are full of devotional aroma. Unfortunately, some of his works are lost. Some 120 works in Tamil, Sanskrit, Prākṛt and in Maṇi-pravāḷa prose are available. Vedānta Deśika was an outstanding poet, philosopher, dialectician, dramatist and a great devotee of the order of Ālvārs. His writings cover all fields of knowledge and they are prodigious and prolific, both in content and in style. He possessed amazing knowledge in art, science, religion, philosophy and even in handicrafts.

Deśika, in spite of all such divine qualities showered on him, was free from egoism and attachment. He was free from pride and prejudice. He was free from the pursuit of power, name and wealth. For him a clod of earth and a nugget of gold were equal in value. Friends and foes were alike to him. He spurned worldly wealth. He had supreme

scorn for worldly fame and power, though he was living on 'uñchavṛtti' (begging). The reply to Vidyāranya who was his classmate and the Prime Minister of Vijayanagar, is a classic masterpiece¹. This incident justified his 'jñānavairāgya-bhūṣaṇam' title. Śrī Deśika lived a life of an ascetic even though he did not actually become a sannyāsin. Thus Deśika dedicated his entire life for the sake of Hinduism or Vaidikadharma in general and Viśiṣṭādvaita philosophy in particular.

Incidentally, we have to know the devotion of Deśika towards Rāmānuja. For Deśika, Rāmānuja was only next to God. After Rāmānuja, the Viśiṣṭādvaita philosophy received a vigorous attack from several schools. They too were basing their interpretations on the Vedas, *Brahmasūtras* and the *Gītā*. Though Rāmānuja had interpreted the Vedas and *Upaniṣads* in their entirety, yet it appears as if his interpretation did not give so much importance to the varṇāśrama-dharma and karma. This wounded the prestige of the scholars of his time who were strictly following the supremacy of caste. They did not like the approach of Rāmānuja. But they could not meet the arguments of Rāmānuja. ācārya Deśika, with his wonderful, profound and accurate knowledge in the Sanskrit philosophical texts and rules of interpretation, established the *Śrībhāṣya* on firm grounds. Deśika built an everlasting steel fortress around the system of Rāmānuja to safeguard it against the attack of anyone at any time. That is why for his signal service rendered to the system of Rāmānuja, ācārya Deśika is worshipped by Śrīvaisṇavas, at the beginning of their study of *Śrībhāṣya*, as a mark of their gratefulness and respect for the great ācārya. At the time of Deśika, Śrī Rāmānuja's

1. *nāsti pitrārjitam kiñcit na mayā kiñcidārjitam |
asti me hastiśailāgre vastu paitāmaham dhanam ||*

teachings had begun to wane and were losing their grip on the minds of the people. Among the followers of Rāmānuja himself, the disintegration had crept in. At that critical juncture, Vedānta Deśika appeared on the scene, and wrote proper commentaries in a remarkable manner and thereby maintained the unity among the followers of Rāmānuja. He declared¹ that there was no difference of opinion among the followers of Rāmānuja though the interpretations might vary regarding the minor and insignificant topics.

Vedānta Deśika never for a moment forgot the teachings of great ācārya Rāmānuja. He declares that all his conclusions are based on the teachings of Rāmānuja and other ācāryas. He offers prayer to Śrī Rāmānuja and other great ācāryas in every important work, both in the beginning and at the end.²

Deśika has written an extensive gloss, viz., *Tattvaṭīkā* on Rāmānuja's *Śrībhāṣya*. To Rāmānuja's commentary on the *Bhagavadgītā*, Deśika has written elaborate notes, viz., *Tātparya-candrikā*. In writing this commentary, Deśika enters into the hearts of the Lord and Rāmānuja who is considered to be the Lord's avatāra. These writings of Deśika have a great impact on the reader because of their versatality, profundity of thought, beautiful diction and inspiring spiritual fervour. To Vedānta Deśika, Rāmānuja was the veritable incarnation of the Lord himself. In his *Yatirājasaptati*, Deśika presents Rāmānuja to us as the avatāra of Lord Kṛṣṇa³.

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1. *Śrībhāṣyakāraṇaḍayaśiṣya sampradāyaṅgaḷil onrilum artha-virodhamille. Vākyaayanābhedame ullad. Deśakālāvasthā viśeṣaṅgaḷale varum anuṣṭhāna vaiśamyam śāstrānumatam.*

Sampradāyapariśuddhi, p. 6; Tūppul Venkatācārya edition.

2. *jayati yatirājasūktiḥ jayati mukundasya pādukā yugaḷi |
tadubhayadhanāstrivedīm avandhyayanto jayanti bhuvi santaḥ ||*
Pādukāsahasra 1008
3. *śamitodaya śankarādi garvaḥ svabalādudhṛtayādava-prakāśaḥ |
avaropitavān śruterā parthān nanu rāmāvaraṇassa eṣa bhūyaḥ ||*
Yatirājasaptati 13.

It is said that Deśika was regretting for not being born during the lifetime of Rāmānuja to serve him as his disciple. This regret found its solace in the philosophical drama, *Saṅkalpa-sūryodaya*, where he has presented Rāmānuja as the embodiment of Lord Viṣṇu himself and Deśika himself as a disciple. In the history of Viśiṣṭādvaita, no other ācārya understood the spiritual teacher, Rāmānuja, as Vedānta Deśika did. Thus, with the unbounded devotion at the feet of Rāmānuja, Deśika systematised, defended and expounded Rāmānuja's philosophy which is called Rāmānuja darśana.

The great scholars of the system opine that the philosophy of Rāmānuja is called Deśika-darśana for the yeoman service rendered by Deśika to the system of Viśiṣṭādvaita. Some of the special contributions of Deśika to the system may be briefly stated as follows:

Nyāya-kandaḥ, a work of Nyāya, defines philosophy, as the science that states the means of liberation of the soul from bondage. Accordingly, all systems except cārvāka school endeavour to explain the ways and means of liberation. Among those schools, the Mīmāṃsā system is very important. Even there, the system, namely, Vedānta-mīmāṃsā is considered to be the sole means of liberation.

The Viśiṣṭādvaita system which is one of the Vedāntamīmāṃsā śāstras, is expounded by Ālvārs, Nāthamuni, Yāmuna and Rāmānuja. Therefore, they are worshipped as Darśanasthāpaka ācāryas. Even though this system is established by many other ācāryas, still it is called Rāmānuja-darśana or the philosophy of Rāmānuja, because Rāmānuja wrote a commentary on Brahmasūtras and thus established its darśanatva. For the reasons stated below the same Rāmānuja-darśana is called Deśika-darśana.

1. Just as Rāmānuja collected the statements of his predecessor ācāryas and established the philosophy on firm

footing, Deśika also wrote versatile works on the statements of Rāmānuja. For this purpose, he used Nyāya and Mīmāṃsā schools as his weapons. He interpreted those two systems in the light of Viśiṣṭādvaita without any contradiction with the statements of Rāmānuja. In addition to this, Deśika systematically expounded the religious philosophy of Rāmānuja by writing *Nikṣepa-rakṣā* and commenting on *catuślokī* of Yāmuna.

It is said that the knowledge of Nyāya is very essential for the understanding of the technique of every śāstra.

"kāṇādam pāṇinīyam ca sarvaśāstropakāraṇam".

It is with the help of this wonderful science the great scholars of different philosophies have put their systems on firm foundation. The sage Gautama founded this school. But almost all other systems of Vedānta have refuted the philosophy of Gautama. Now Deśika's problem was whether to admit the tenets of this science or reject them as other systems had done. Deśika in his *Nyāya-pariśuddhi* elaborately discusses this problem and comes to the conclusion¹ that this system should be admitted to the fold of Viśiṣṭādvaita, leaving aside the statements which are against the principles of Vedānta. So Deśika purified the nyāya aphorisms of Gautama, by writing a bhāṣya on it according to Viśiṣṭādvaita.

2. Deśika had realised the importance of Mīmāṃsā school in interpreting the tenets of Vedānta. Generally Mīmāṃsā school is divided into two groups, viz., pūrvamīmāṃsā and uttaramīmāṃsā. Between them, the exponents of pūrvamīmāṃsā reject uttaramīmāṃsā, because

1. *yāvadiha yuktīyuktam tāvadupjīvyate nahi tatākasthaḥ paṅkopya-paṅkila buddhibhiḥ tadavagāhibhirupajīvyate | ataḥ simhavanaguptīnyāyena nyāyanugrhitam vedam, vedānugrhitam nyām ca anusarāmaḥ | na punaḥ nyāyamātram |*

of the latter's rejection of karma. In the same way, the *uttaramīmāṃsakas* like Advaitins, reject *pūrvamīmāṃsā* for its reluctance in acquiring knowledge. Rāmānuja rejected both these views and stated that the two systems are not mutually opposed, but are complementary to each other. Deśika, following in the foot-steps of Rāmānuja, ridicules the *pūrvamīmāṃsakas* as *kabandha* (body without head) *Mīmāṃsakas* and he calls the *advaitin* as *Rāhu* (head without the rest of body) *Mīmāṃsakas*. Both the head and the rest of the body will be useless when they are separated. For the proper use, they should be united. So Deśika interpreted the aphorisms of Jaimini in the light of Vedānta. In this effort, Deśika neither contradicts the sage Jaimini nor Rāmānuja. His works, namely, *Seśvara Mīmāṃsā* and *Mīmāṃsāpādukā* are meant for this purpose. In these two works Deśika says, Brahman is the object of *jigñāsā*.

Let alone the astounding and the versatile talent of Deśika in interpreting the aphorisms of Nyāya and Mīmāṃsā. On the lines of the Vedānta sūtras he also ventured to compose sūtras in the style of the great ṛṣi. In the beginning of *Nyāya-pariśuddhi*, he had composed 49 sūtras explaining the philosophy of Viśiṣṭādvaita and has asked why they should not be called sūtras: "*etādrṣāṇi vākyāni kinna sūtrāṇi syuḥ?*" (*Nyāya-pariśuddhi* p. 86).

3. Next important contribution of Vedānta Deśika is his teaching regarding *prapatti* or *śaraṇāgati*. Rāmānuja had only stated that *prapatti* is the only means to attain liberation. Deśika established this truth on scriptural basis and for this purpose wrote the work called *Niṣkpa-rakṣa*. He declared that *śaraṇāgati* is an *upāya* (means) which is available to all castes and that is the only method of attaining salvation. Deśika in his work, i.e., *Abhayapradānasāram*, has proved that the entire *Rāmāyaṇa* deals with the philosophy of *prapatti*. Deśika renames *Rāmāyaṇa* as '*Śaraṇāgati-veda*'.

4. Further, some schools of Vedānta do not regard the *Pāñcarātra* as a *pramāṇa*. Deśika established its *prāmāṇya* in *Pāñcarātra-rakṣā* and on the basis of this āgama expounded the religious philosophy of Viśiṣṭādvaita.

5. Deśika proves in many of his works that 'Śrī', the consort of Lord Nārāyaṇa is also the *Īśvarī* of the world. The word 'Īśvara' denotes both 'Śrī' and Nārāyaṇa'. He also proves that 'Śrī' is 'Vibhu' (all-pervasive). He says that they are one *tattva*, only with two forms, on the basis of scriptural evidence: '*ekatattvamivoditau*' (*Pāñcarātra*). Deśika establishes all these views on the basis of the statements of Rāmānuja and other ācāryas.

6. For Deśika, all languages were equal. One can pray to God in any language that one likes. For this purpose, he composed a *stotra*, viz., *Acyutaśataka*, in *prākṛt* language and thus has contributed to world thought that there should be no prejudice regarding languages.

7. Deśika declares¹ that *śaraṇāgati mārga* can be followed by all *jīvas* irrespective of caste, creed or colour.

8. Deśika contended that the songs of Āḷvārs are equal to the *Vedas* in merit and called them as *Tamil Veda* and thus he was responsible for the conventional title often used by scholars, namely 'ubhayavedānta-ācārya'.

9. Deśika in all his *stotras* has drawn pointed attention to *arcā* form of worship. Though he is a philosopher of very high order, he enjoys the temple festivals which are the sources of mass appeal. In one of such festivals, he sings in rapture "*satyam śape vāraṇaśailanātha vaikunṭhavāse'pi na me'bhilāṣaḥ*." (*Varadarāja-pañcāśat*, stanza 49). "Oh, Lord, your Vaikuṇṭha itself is less attractive to me when I enjoy the beauty of your *arcā*-manifestations".

1. *niṣādānām netā* ||

Dayāśataka stanza 65 and see (*Adaikkalappattu*, 4th stanza).

For all these above mentioned and such other contributions, to the philosophy of Viśiṣṭādvaita, *Rāmānuja darśana* itself is called as *Deśika-darśana*. The philosophy of Viśiṣṭādvaita was called as *Rāmānuja-darśana* for Rāmānuja's special contributions. In the same way *Rāmānuja-darśana* is called *Deśika-darśana* (the philosophy of Vedānta-Deśika) for his dedicated service and special contributions to the system.

Deśika has rendered many-sided service to the system of Rāmānuja. It is impossible to deal exhaustively with his philosophy and his works here. My humble effort is only to give glimpses of his service.

NYĀYA-SIDDHĀNJA

Every system of philosophy in India is having a text, namely *Prakarāṇa* which explains the special tenets of the system that are scattered in different works of the same school. In addition to this, these texts fill up the deficient portions of the system. *Nyāya-siddhāṇja* is a *Prakarāṇa-grantha* which explains the ~~prameyas~~ (objects of valid knowledge) of the school. This ~~work is~~ not only a *prakarāṇa*, but also an independent ~~and~~ important treatise of Viśiṣṭādvaita. Deśika here ~~has~~ explained the prameyas of the system of Rāmānuja, which ~~are~~ scattered in the works of his predecessors and Rāmānuja himself.

The text is logically ~~rigorous~~. Every sentence in it, contains abundant meaning like the aphorisms of great ṛṣis. In fact, this work is also one of his great contributions to the system. Unfortunately, this text is incomplete. The commentators like Rangarāmānuja and Kṛṣṇatātārya¹ have

1. Rangarāmānuja's commentary is named *Nyāya-siddhāṇja-ṭikā*, and Kṛṣṇatātārya's commentary is named *Ratnapetikhā*.

said¹ that the remaining portions are already explained in other works of Deśika.

The text ends in the middle of the explanation of *sāmānya* (generality) which is included in the structure of the object. The inclusion of other categories of different systems, especially *Nyāya-vaiśeṣika*, is explained in other works of Deśika. The main purpose of this thesis is to explain and examine in a summarised form, the concepts of Viśiṣṭādvaita as they are expounded by Deśika. But more details which are found unnecessary to my thesis are avoided.

HOW THIS WORK TENDS TO THE GENERAL ADVANCEMENT OF KNOWLEDGE

Nyāya and *Vaiśeṣika* are considered to be the *samānatantra* or allied systems. Because both of them agree in several philosophical respects they are understood to be as parts of one whole. Generally it is also said that these two systems are uncompromisingly opposed to the *Vedānta* system. However, thinkers of Viśiṣṭādvaita from the very early period have tried to make these systems important accessory systems to *Vedānta* and have also tried to prove that *Nyāya* is not opposed to *Vedānta*. For this purpose some of the views of the *Nyāya* system which are opposed to the scriptures, are reinterpreted. According to these thinkers, the followers of *Nyāya* have misinterpreted the tenets of that school. Further these thinkers opine that such principles as cannot be shown to agree with the scriptures and reason should be omitted. Deśika writes that "there is nothing wrong in accepting some principles which can be

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1. *na kvāpyataḥ paramaḍṛṣyata kośaśeṣaḥ
taccheṣapūraṇakṛtiḥ parihāsaheṭuḥ |
jñātavyamanyadapi tairniraṇāyi saṁyak
granthāntareṣviti na kincidihāsti cintyam ||*

substantiated on the basis of sound reasoning. In the same way irrational principles will be omitted like the mire of a pond¹ etc.”

Like his predecessors Vedānta Deśika also has attempted for the unification of Nyāya and Vedānta and has achieved complete success in his attempt. His *Nyāya-pariśuddhi*, as the name itself suggests, exclusively deals with this subject. This work deals with the *pramāṇa* (means of knowledge) and his *Nyāya-siddhāntajana*, which is like the second part of the *Nyāya-pariśuddhi*, deals with the *prameyas* (objects of the valid knowledge).

In this context it is necessary to understand some of the important points of differences between Nyāya-vaiśeṣika and Vedānta and the attempt made by Viśiṣṭādvaita thinkers to synthesise them.

The sage Gautama is the founder of Nyāya philosophy and Kaṇāda is the founder of Vaiśeṣika philosophy. The synthesis of these two systems is known Nyāya-vaiśeṣika. According to Gautama there are sixteen *padārthas* and their real knowledge leads one towards *nīśreyasa* (liberation). Vaiśeṣika system accepts seven *padārthas*, viz., *dravya*, *guṇa*, *karma*, *sāmānya*, *viśeṣa*, *samavāya* and *abhāva*.

Among these seven *padārthas*, *dravyas* are nine in number which include *ātman* also. *Ātman* is of two types. One is *jīvātman* and the other is *Paramātman*. According to the thinkers of this system even *jīvātman* is of all-pervasive nature. *Paramātman* also possesses *jñāna* (knowledge) *chikīrṣā* (desire) and *kṛti* (effort).

1. *yāvadiha yuktīyuktam tadvadupaśrjyate | nahi tatākaṣṭhaha pañk-
opyapañkilabuddhibhiḥ tadavagāhibhirupaśrjyate | ataḥ sirṃha
vanaguptinyāyena nyāyānugṛhītaṁ vedam, vedānu gṛhītaṁ
nyāyam ca anusarāmaḥ | na punaḥ nyāyamātram | akṣapādīyamapi
asmaduktyaikāntikatayā sthāpayiṣyāmaḥ |*

Nyāya-pariśuddhi, p. 86.

The five fundamental elements like *prthvī*, *jala*, etc., are eternal while they are in atomic form. These philosophers hold the view that atoms are the causes of this universe and thus favour the view of *ārambhavāda*. For them the *avayavi* (the created object) is different from *avayava* (the parts).

In this system the *Paramātman* is only an instrumental cause of creation and dissolution and His existence is known by inference. The *Śrutis* only establish what is known through inference. The *Vedas* according to them are *pauruṣeyas* (composed) and their author is God himself.

Further this system accepts the plurality of *jīvātman*, the theory of *karma*, the theory of rebirth and *dharma* and *adharma*. According to this system *mokṣa* means complete freedom from *duḥkha* and it is the *sumum bonum* of human life. Further *jīvātman* is not conscious by nature and it is only when he gets into contact with the *manas*, he gets consciousness. He experiences *icchā*, *sukha*, *duḥkha* and *dveṣa* when he is embodied. The real knowledge of the *padārthas* dispels the erroneous knowledge and enables the *ātman* to attain liberation or freedom from pain.

There is a vast difference between the two systems *Viśiṣṭādvaita Vedānta* and the philosophy of *Nyāya-vaiśeṣika*. According to *Viśiṣṭādvaita*, *ātman* is *jñāna guṇaka*, *jñāna-svarūpa* and *aṇu*. This system refutes the *paramāṇu kāraṇavāda* and prefers *satkāryavāda*, on the basis of *Śruti*. *Adṛṣṭa* and *samavāya* of *Nyāya-vaiśeṣika* school are not admitted in this system. This system argues, that the *vibhutva* of *jīvātman* as admitted by *Nyāya-vaiśeṣika* goes against the *Śrutis* and hence concludes that *jīva* is *aṇu*.

The grace of the Lord is the real cause of liberation in this system. *Viśiṣṭādvaita* further points out that *mokṣa* is not merely the destruction of *duḥkha* as held by *Nyāya-*

vaiśeṣika but is the attainment of ānanda. It is a positive state of bliss. God is not only the nimitta-kāraṇa (instrumental cause) as in the Nyāya-vaiśeṣika school but He is also the upādāna-kāraṇa (material cause) of the universe. In Nyāya-vaiśeṣika system both cetana and acetana are independent of God. But in Viśiṣṭādvaita they are considered to be the attributes of the Lord.

Though there are such wide differences between these two systems the thinkers of Viśiṣṭādvaita did not forget the indispensability of Nyāya to the development of any system. Manu the great law giver of the land has regarded¹ the Nyāya philosophy "As the science of spirit" (ātmavidyā). Manu also has said that he alone understands the spirit of dharma and sampradāya who uses the tenets of Tarkaśāstra, without any contradiction with the Vedaśāstra². Vātsyāyana the celebrated commentator on the *Nyāyasūtra* of Gautama has rightly said³ that tarka is the light of all the sciences, karmas and dharmas. Hence it is an essential pre-requisite to the study of Indian philosophy in general and Vedānta in particular.

The thinkers of Viśiṣṭādvaita beginning from Nāthamuni to Vedānta Deśika, having realised the truth, have put more efforts for the synthesis of Nyāya and Vedānta and have written many erudite works. But no other ācārya except Vedānta Deśika has achieved complete success in this effort. From the frequent references to these works and their authors

1. *ānulkṣakīm ca ātmaavidyām* | *Manusmṛti*, 7-43.

2. *ārṣam dharmopadeśam ca vedaśāstrāvirodhinā*
yastarkeṇānusandhatte sa dharmam veda netaraḥ |
Manusmṛti, 12-106.

3. *pradīpaḥ sarva śāstrāṇām upāyaḥ sarvakarmaṇām āśrayaḥ sarva dharmāṇām vidyoddeśe prakīrtitā* |

Vātsyāyana on *Nyāyasūtra*, 1-1-1.

Also refer *Yājñavalkya-smṛti*, 1-3.

by Vedānta Deśika in his *Nyāya-pariśuddhi* and *Nyāya-siddhāñjana*, one can easily infer the incompleteness of those works in bringing about the synthesis of Nyāya and Vedānta.

The *Nyāyatattva* of Nāthamuni is aphoristic and difficult to decipher correctly. The works like *Ātmasiddhi* of Yāmunācārya do not discuss the nature of all padārthas in detail and cannot effectively meet the new arguments and challenges by the opposite schools. No doubt the celebrated writings of Rāmānuja are competent to give the befitting answer to such new arguments, but they are merely directed to discussion of the topics which are relevant to Vedānta alone.

The *Mānayāthātmya-nirṇaya*, *Prajñā-paritrāṇa* and *Nyāya-sudarśana* of Varadanārāyaṇa Bhaṭṭāraka also deal with the synthesis of Nyāya and Vedānta. But these works contain some ideas which go against the writings of Rāmānuja and the author of these works seems to be under the influence of some other systems. This point is clear from the references to these theories and their criticism by Vedānta Deśika in his *Nyāya-siddhāñjana*.

In the same way the works of Śrīviṣṇucittārya and Śrīrāmamiśra have also not succeeded in bringing about the synthesis. But works like *Tattvaratnākara* and *Adhyātma-khaṇḍadvaya-vivaraṇa* etc., of Bhaṭṭa Parāśarapāda, really have made some progress in this direction. But as Vedānta Deśika himself points out in *Nyāya-siddhāñjana*, these works are not completed by the author himself. *Tattvasāra* of Varadaguru and *Nyāya-kulīśa* of Vādhihamsāmbhuvāha (Ātreya Rāmānuja) also do not completely satisfy the contemplated aspiration of the synthesis, because they are also concised in their meaning. In this way after Nāthamuni and before Vedānta Deśika, there were several works of Viśiṣṭādvaita thinkers, to rationalise their Vedānta with the help of Nyāya. But they had not yielded the required result.

Here in this work I have endeavoured to show how *Nyāya-siddhāñjana* of Vedānta Deśika has achieved success in bringing about the synthesis of Nyāya and Vedānta. I have also tried to show, how this synthesis of these two systems is in conformity with the Śruti, smṛti, sūtragranthas, the writings of Rāmānuja and saṃpradāya.

I have shown how Deśika has rationalised the prameyas of Viśiṣṭādvaita in *Nyāya-siddhāñjana* and how this work of Deśika differs in its theme from his other works which also deal with the synthesis of Nyāya and Vedānta.



Chapter II

AUTHOR'S INTRODUCTION TO THE TEXT

In the beginning the author himself, introducing the text, explains the theme and purpose of this work. It is evident from the introductory stanzas of this work, that the *Nyāya-pariśuddhi* was written by Deśika himself before the present work was written. *Nyāya-pariśuddhi* is a successful attempt of Vedānta Deśika at synchronisation of ancient Nyāya-philosophy with Viśiṣṭādvaita. Deśika had realised like his predecessors, the role of nyāya in the study of Vedānta. But some of the tenets such as, 'the all-pervasive nature of the individual-self', 'the idea that God is the instrumental cause of the universe' etc., of Nyāya-philosophy were against the tenets of Vedānta. Therefore, Deśika decided to reorient the Nyāya-philosophy by reinterpreting the *Nyāya-sūtras* and thus harmonized Nyāya and Vedānta.

Vedānta Deśika, after purifying the nyāya aphorisms in the furnace of Viśiṣṭādvaita gives a wonderful collyrium which dispels our ignorance of subject, object and their relation. He says: "*labdhārtho varadāryapādarasikād rāmānujācāryataḥ*" (*Nyāya-siddhāñjana*, p. 1), that he got this wonderful collyrium from his ācārya, ācārya Rāmānuja. This 'añjana' is called *Nyāya-siddhāñjana*, prepared with the help of nyāya.

Here one may ask in what way is this work helpful in realizing the ultimate reality which is already revealed by his predecessors. Deśika answers that the 'tattva' that is Brahman is upapluta¹ (eclipsed) by different systems through

1. *upaplutasya tattvasya śudhyartho'yamupakramaḥ* |

their misrepresentation. Here Brahman is presented in its real nature.

Deśika further says that the present work explains in detail the objects of valid knowledge which are already stated summarily in *Nyāya-pariśuddhi*¹. So he says: "Here I shall explain the prameyas already introduced towards the end of *Nyāya-pariśuddhi*", in detail.

Now let us see how he has introduced the theme of *Nyāya-siddhāñjana* in the end of *Nyāya-pariśuddhi*. There at first he defines what prameya is the object of valid knowledge. He writes² the object of valid knowledge is called prameya. The nature of the object that is known should not be superimposed. This is the general definition of a prameya. But in Vedānta the prameya must be *niśāreyaśa-antarāṅga*, that is, it should be helpful to the final liberation of the soul. Erroneous understanding of prameya is the root cause of cycle of birth and death. The true knowledge of prameya, will lead to mokṣa (liberation).

In this context he explains different philosophical views regarding the divisions of categories and finally proves that the division by *dravya* and *adṛavya* is correct.

Akṣapāda with the same intention; subjects prameya to twelve-fold division. He says:

*ātma-śarīra-indriya-artha-bhūti-manah-pravṛttidoṣa-
pretyabhāva-phala-duḥkha-saṃsāra-gāstu prameyamiti |*

Gautama-nyāya-sūtra, 1-1-9.

1. *yannyāyapariśuddhyante saṅgrahaṇa pradārṣitam |
punastadvistareṇātra prameyamabhidadhmahe ||*

Nyāya-siddhāñjana, p. 2.

2. *pramāviśayaḥ prameyamiti vyutpatyā ūpitākāvyavacchedārtha-
tayā anāropitarūpaṁ sarvaṁ prameyam |*

Nyāya-pariśuddhi p. 183.

Here ātma is of two types. They are Īśvara and Anīśvara. Īśvara is God who is the creator of this universe. The Anīśvara is the individual soul who is not concerned with the creation and destruction of the world. That which co-exists with consciousness and is also inseparable from ātman is called śarīra (body). Śarīra is of two types. They are, body which is born of karma and the body which is not born of karma. We and other like beings possess the body of the first type and god possesses the body of the second type.

Our sense organs are born out of sāttvikāhankāra. They are eleven in number. Five jñānendriyas, five karmendriyas and one manas. The objects that are grasped by them are arthas. Even their qualities are known by sense organs.

The substance by which the objects are revealed, is called buddhi. Manas is the extraordinary cause of recollection and other feelings. The action of mind, speech and body which brings merits or demerits to ātman is called pravṛtti. The causes of these pravṛttis are called doṣas (errors). They are rāga (desire), dveṣa (hatred), and moha (illusion), Phala (result) is the thing attainable from pravṛtti (effort).

Pretyabhāva (transmigration) is leaving the previous body and entering into the fresh one. This action of jīva (individual soul) is called pretyabhāva.

The object of pravṛtti is phala (result). It is this result of pravṛtti that is the purpose of the doer or puruṣa. Unpleasant feeling is duḥkha. For the soul, who is desirous of liberation, even the pleasure and its causes are considered to be obstacles.

Apavarga (liberation) is the absence of pain. Both sukha and its sādhana also are obstacles to apavarga. They should be avoided like honey which is mixed with poison. That state is the āvirbhāva (manifestation) of one's own nature or svabhāva. It also includes the rapture of divine communion

and of eternal service unto Lord who is full of all divine qualities. It is the final goal of all human beings.

Some others divide the above-mentioned objects of valid knowledge (prameya) into four groups. They are heya (fit to be left or abandoned), nivartaka (that which extinguishes them), hāna (abandoning) and upāya (the means).

But Kaṇāda divides the entire world of objects of valid knowledge into six or seven categories. This position of Kaṇāda is refuted, through repudiating separate existence of sāmānya (generality), viśeṣa (particularity) and samavāya (intimate relation)¹. Therefore dravya (substance), guṇa (quality) and karma (action) are the only three categories.

Further, like saṁskāra (tendency), karma also can be included among qualities. Therefore karma is not a separate category. So there are only two categories, namely, dravya and guṇa.

Even there guṇa and dravya are inseparables. Therefore, the division by guṇa and dravya is also not suitable. It is better to divide them as dravya and adravya (non-substance).

This type of discussion can become the proximate cause to apavarga. For the individual, who aspires for the final emancipation, Brahman is the only important object of valid knowledge to be discussed. That is why Bādarāyaṇa in his *Brahmasūtra* beginning from 'brahma jijñāsā' (1-1-1) investigated into nature of qualified Brahman. Other objects are prameya because they are the attributes of Brahman.

Some others divide the categories into three groups. That division is based on the *Vedas* viz., 'bhoktā-bhogyam, preritāram ca matvā' (*Śvetāśvatara*; 1-12). Even there, dravya that is discussed is qualified. So it includes adravya (non-substance) also.

1. It is samavāya which may be described as an intimate relation.
Outlines of Indian Philosophy, p: 235.

The same thing can be said of time also. Time is used with reference to objects. Therefore it is unnecessary to attribute a separate existence to time.

Therefore it may be said that Brahman is the only sum and substance of this universe. It is also possible to divide the categories into three groups as *cit* (individual soul), *acit* (inert matter) and *Īśvara* (God).

Some think that there are four categories. Some others hold that there are five categories. According to them, they are, *prāpya*, *prāptā*, *prāptyupāya*, *nivartya* and *phala*. With the inclusion of *sambandha* some say that there are six categories.

The entire world of categories may also be divided into two groups. One is *hita* (good) and another is *ahita* (bad or evil). In the matter of worldly good or evil, the *Āyurveda* and *Nītiśāstras* are authoritative sources. Our body should be properly kept to practise the yoga. In protecting the body, one should not transgress the rules of *Vedas* and *smṛtis*. To know the good and evil of the other world, the authoritative texts are *Vedas*. The *smṛtis* (law books), *itihāsas* (tradition) and *purāṇas* (history and legendary stories) are valid only when they are not contradictory to *Vedas*. The injunctions of the *Vedas* lay down what is good to each and everyone and actions forbidden by the *Vedas* are not good. In this context Deśika discusses an interesting topic.

It is pointed out by some that the *Vedas* sometimes prescribe *abhicāra* (witch craft) through which, one can kill his enemies. If *Vedas* are valid source of knowledge and lay down what is good, then these acts also should be good. But they are sinful because they involve violence. So they are not conducive to happiness. As a result, in that case the injunctions of *Vedas* should become invalid.

Deśika refutes this argument. He points out that, the

injunctions of the *Vedas* are of two types. One is vidhi (command) and another is niṣedha (prohibitive rule). This too, in turn, said to depend on the ability of the doer of the rites. That is why *Gītā* said that the *Vedas* are 'traiguṇyaviśayāḥ'. To one who wishes to become free from sins and desires to get happiness, *Vedas* advise the means and show how one can avoid anartha (evil) and possess the desired objects. Even for a rāgin (desirous) the optional rites are advantageous. The Kārīri-iṣṭi which is performed for the well-being of the whole world, also brings, merits to the performer. In the same way, abhicāra (employment of magical spells for malevolent purposes) is also permitted in *Vedas* for a desirous person. Abhicāras would not bring evil effects to the doer, because himsā (violence) is permitted in abhicāra, as in Agnīṣomīya sacrifice. Abhicāra brings evil because it involves the killing of an undesirable person. That is why this act is normally forbidden in our scriptures. But in exceptional cases abhicāra becomes a duty. That is why it is said, 'ṣaṭsvanabhicāraṇaṁ patet' (On six occasions abhicāra is a duty. One who does not discharge this is apt to fail in his duty).

Even for a mumukṣu (desirous of liberation), entering into politics becomes a duty¹ while anarchy prevails in the country. In fact, every act ordained in śāstras, should be performed in a disinterested way. Therefore all the injunctions in the *Vedas* bring happiness to human beings. That is why śāstras are compared to our parents. In reality, it is more than the parents. The affection that the śāstras bear towards us is more than the affection of thousand parents. That is why the great law-givers observe, "śāstraṁ hi vatsalataram mātāpitrśahasrataḥ". Therefore for every devotee the performance of the entrusted work is a duty.

1. *ataśca mumukṣorapi rakṣaka-kṣattriṇyūdyabhāve rākṣaśādyabhībhāve ca ātmarakṣaṇārtham abhicāraḥ kartavya eva 'sarvata evātmanāṁ gopāyeta' iti śāstrāt* Nyāya-pariśuddhi, p. 184.

We are all wandering in the beginningless river of saṃsāra by our own karma. This seed of saṃsāra, namely, karma can be destroyed through the knowledge of heya (fit to be abandoned) deeds and upādeya (acceptable) deeds. In addition to this, one should be lustful to enjoy the lotus feet of the Lord. Deśika uses the phrase—*mukunda-caraṇāra-vinda lampaṭasya*’. To live this type of life is the summum-bonum of the journey from birth to death. All our actions should be dedicated at the feet of the Lord with full devotion. This type of life is termed in *mokṣa-śāstras* as yoga. Lord says in the *Gītā* that to observe karmayoga is the easy way for your salvation—‘*matkarma-paramo bhava*’. Karma-yoga is easier because this can yield the results even though the person commits mistakes, while observing this yoga¹. While observing karmayoga, one should not think that karma alone can yield result independently. To get our karmas rewarded, one should take refuge at the feet of God. That is why the *Upaniṣads* declare—

sā kāṣṭhā sā parā gatiḥ |

The Lord will compassionately over-look the defective portions of our actions, if we fascinate Him through taking refuge at His feet. Rāmānuja says:

tasya ca vaśīkaraṇam taccharaṇāgatireva |

The befitting result of this type of life is liberation.

In the above explained way the knowledge of the Nyāya-vaiśeṣika categories may become an indirect means for liberation. But the knowledge of the pramēya of Viśiṣṭādvaita will become a direct means for liberation. That is why Deśika explained the categories of Nyāya-vaiśeṣika and Viśiṣṭādvaita.

1. *nehabhikramanāśo'sti pratyavāyo na vidyate* |

svalpamapyasya dharmasya trāyate mahato bhayāt || *Gītā* 2-40.

Nyāyaśāstra is a science of pramāṇās. To show the goal of these pramāṇās, here the prameyas are discussed. Vātsyāyana defined the word prameya "yo'rthaḥ tattvataḥ pramīyate tat prameyam" (1-1-1). That object which is known through valid knowledge is prameya. Gautama enumerated them as twelve, naming them ātma, śārīra, indriya, artha, buddhi, manaḥ, pravṛtti, dveṣa, pretyabhāva, phala, duḥkha, apavarga (*Gautama*, 1-1-9). The pramāṇas should be used to know the reality of these above-mentioned prameyas.

In *Nyāya-pariśuddhi*, Deśika dealt elaborately with the pramāṇas. In the end, he also gave a summary of the final aim of the knowledge of these prameyas. The final aim is the realisation of devoted action life, which culminates in complete surrender at the feet of the Lord. In *Nyāya-siddhāntajana*, he examines the prameyas (the object of the valid knowledge) which he hinted in the prameyādhyāya of *Nyāya-pariśuddhi* in detail.

PRAMEYAS OF NYĀYA-SIDDHĀNTAJANA

JADA DRAVYĀS

Now what is this prameya that is discussed in this system? The answer is Brahman which is qualified by inert matter and sentient beings. Brahman is the only prameya that is to be known, though it is qualified by cits and acits, which are also real.

The great ācāryas of Viśiṣṭādvaita have urged all the aspirants of liberation to get a thorough knowledge of five factors before taking up any sādhana or means of liberation. They are: (1) The nature of Brahman who is to be attained. (2) The nature of jīvātman who has to attain Brahman. (3) the means of attaining Brahman. (4) The result of attaining Brahman. (5) The obstructions in attaining Brahman. These

five factors are called arthapañcaka and the knowledge of these factors is called 'artha-pañcaka-jñāna'¹.

To know the Paramātman who is the indweller of both cit and acit, the knowledge of the nature of cetana and acetana is essential. Even from the point of view of śarīra-śarīribhāva relation, (body and soul relation) the knowledge of jaḍa and ajaḍa is essential. Both cetana and acetana form the body of the Lord. Therefore the Brahman with both jaḍa and ajaḍa, forms the prameya of this system. Deśika in his *Nyāya-pariśuddhi*, which may be considered as the first part of *Nyāya-siddhāñjana* says "yadviṣayeṇa bhrameṇa saṁsārāmaha yadviṣayena tattvajñānena apavarjyamahi tadiha naḥ prakarṣeṇa meyam prameyam | (*Nyāya-pariśuddhi*, p. 183). "the knowledge of that which leads to liberation and the ignorance of which brings bondage, is called 'prameya'." Therefore the Paramātman with cit and acit becomes the prameya of this system.²

Deśika declares and brings out all the above said ideas in the very first sentence of *Nyāya-siddhāñjana*. "aśeṣa-cidacitprakāram brahmaikamevatattvam | tatra prakāra-prakarīṇoḥ mitho atyantābhedeḍi-viśiṣṭaikyādi-vivakṣayai-katva-vyapadeśaḥ |" "Brahman which includes the entire universe is one and it is the prameya, and that object of valid knowledge (prameya) is divided into two main categories as dravya (substance) and adravya."

DRAVYA, ADRAVYA—DEFINED

upādānam dravyam | atathābhūtamadravyam |

Nyāya-siddhāñjana, p. 2.

1. *prāpyasya brahmaṇo rūpam prāptuṣca pratyagātmanah |*

prāptyupāyam phalaṁ caiva tathā prāpti virodhi ca ||

Rahasyatrayasūtra, 4.

2. Refer also *tamevam vidvān*

(*Taittirīya Āraṇyaka*, 3-12).

The material cause is **dravya**. Things other than this are called **adravya**.

Upādāna, the material cause is that which has **avasthā** (states). Deśika says that this type of division is based on the experience. The experience says, that neither the quality nor the qualified can be denied. In addition to this one can experience the difference between them in day-to-day life.

POSITION OF BUDDHISTS

1. Buddhists (Saugata) deny the difference between the quality and the qualified and say that the qualities like **sparsā** (touch), **rūpa** (colour), **rasa** (taste), **gandha** (smell), are real and one may not accept the substratum for these qualities. We cannot accept any other **dharma** in them. Therefore the **dharma** (attributes) is real but not the **dharmin** (substratum).

We can put the same idea in a converse form. Here **dharmin** is real and **dharma** is not real. Dharmas like **sparsā**, **rūpa**, **rasa**, etc., are erroneous conceptions. Therefore, the division namely **dravya** and **adravya** is incorrect.

2. Buddhists say that the entire universe is momentary and therefore **transitory**. On the basis of transitoriness and momentariness of things, the division namely **dravya** and **adravya** is untenable. Though they accept the so called **dravya**, some of the Buddhists say that it is not permanent. It is momentary. This position may be established on the basis of inferential evidence also. Accordingly,

yat sat tat kṣaṇikam |

yathā meghamaṇḍalam (or) ghaṭaḥ |

Whichever is **sat** is not permanent. It is momentary, as it is in the case of clouds. Clouds remain for some moments and after sometime they disappear. Therefore clouds are **sat**. In the same way all visible things are of the nature of **sat**. Therefore they too are momentary.

3. In the third place Buddhists argue that even on the basis of *pratyabhijñā-pratyakṣa*, the permanency of things cannot be established.

Pratyabhijñā is a form of perception. Sometimes we recognise things as 'so'yam,' "that is this". In philosophy this type of perception is named as *pratyabhijñā* (recognition). The *siddhāntin* uses this perception to establish the permanency of objects. According to *siddhāntin*, in this experience, the word 'saha' (he) mentions the thing which has the relation to the past time. The word 'ayam' (this) explains the thing which has the relation to the present time. The common case that is used in both these words is *prathamā-vibhakti*. (nominative case). *Prathamā-vibhakti* of both these words indicates the identity of the thing mentioned by these two words. Therefore the *siddhāntin* says that things are permanent. But Buddhists argue that the above mentioned experiences of *pratyabhijñā* might have proved the permanency of objects, in case it was a valid knowledge. But this perception is based on illusory knowledge. Because recognition depends upon *saṃskāra* (disposition). The knowledge which depends upon *saṃskāra* is an illusory knowledge. This fact is evident in the famous example of illusory knowledge viz., shell and silver. In that place the knowledge 'idam rajatam' is produced in a shell by *rajata-saṃskāra* which is produced by *rajatānubhava* (the experience of rajata). In the same way the above explained *pratyabhijñā* must be an illusory knowledge. Therefore everything is momentary and nothing is permanent.

The buddhists establish the momentariness of objects through proving illusoriness of *pratyabhijñā-pratyakṣa* in a different way. They say *pratyabhijñā-pratyakṣa* cannot prove the identity. It may be illustrated with the help of an example. The seed which is stored in a granary cannot sprout. If it is sown in the field, it sprouts. Here it is

admitted that seeds kept in a granary have no capacity to sprout. But this capacity is present in the seed sown in the field. This sāmāthyā (ability) and asāmāthyā (incapacity) cannot be said to be present in a single object viz., the seed. On the basis of pratyabhijñā-pratyakṣa, if identity is admitted, then one has to accept these contradictory dharmas (asamāthattva and samāthattva) in a single object. But it is incompatible, because, what is samārtha cannot become asamārtha. Therefore it stands proved that the seed in the granary must be different from the seed sown in the field and hence the momentariness of object is once again established.

BUDDHIST'S POSITION EXAMINED

Now the siddhāntin examines the objections raised against the demonstrated division viz., dravya and adravya. Buddhists accept two pramāṇas (valid sources of knowledge). They are perception and inference. To refute these objections the siddhāntin uses these two pramāṇas. No sensible person can deny the perception 'rūpavān ghaṭaḥ'. Here, the pot is ādhāra and the colour is āśrita. This relation is called āśraya-bhāva. Even the buddhists cannot deny this experience because they too accept the validity of perception. Therefore the dravya and adravya division in this system is irrefutable.

Deśika next examines the argument of the Buddhists which is based on the inference viz., 'yat sat tat kṣaṇikam yathā meghamaṇḍalam', which means everything is momentary. The siddhāntin refutes this inference in the following way. In this inference bhāvaḥ (bhāva padārtha) or 'sat' is pakṣa. Here if sat means the entire world, then there will be no difference between pakṣa and hetu and dṛṣṭānta. If the entire world excluding meghamaṇḍala or ghaṭa is pakṣa, then they cannot become dṛṣṭānta. Because kṣaṇikatva is

not experienced in them. So this inference is invalid¹.

Further the siddhāntin refutes the buddhist position that pratyabhijñā is an illusory knowledge. The permanency of things can be established on the basis of pratyabhijñā. No doubt pratyabhijñā, as Buddhists explain, is produced by saṃskāra². Though it is accepted as valid one, it is not correct to say that all knowledge caused by saṃskāra is illusory. Memory which is produced by saṃskāra is accepted as valid experience.

Therefore one cannot argue that all knowledge caused by saṃskāra is illusory. In the case of shell and silver illusion, the knowledge 'idaṃ rajatam' will be sublated by the subsequent knowledge 'nedaṃ rajatam'. Therefore it is an illusory knowledge. Since the validity of the above stated pratyabhijñā-pratyakṣa cannot be denied, the permanency of object (dravya) is established.

Deśika also examines the position of Buddhists that the pratyabhijñā-pratyakṣa cannot prove the identity of objects. Further he answers that the seed in the granary was not asamartha to sprout. It could not sprout in the granary because it lacked many accessory causes like soil, water, air etc. But it had the svarūpayogyatā (potentiality) to sprout. Therefore sāmānyatā cannot be denied to the seed that is in the granary. Hence to admit identity proved by pratyabhijñā-pratyakṣa does not lead to any contradiction.

1. *bhāvaśabdena viśvapakṣikāre pakṣahetu drṣṭāntabhedā-siddhiḥ, ghaṭavyatirikta-pakṣikārepi ghaṭasya kṣaṇikatvāpratipatter drṣṭāntatvāyogaḥ* | *Nyāya-siddhāntajana*, p. 12.

2. *tallakṣaṇam tu indriya sahaḥkṛta saṃskāra janya jñānam* *Lakṣaṇāvali*.

According to the followers of Sri Ānandatīrtha memory is produced by manas and not by saṃskāra.

(Refer *Pramāṇa-paddhati* of Jayatīrtha. MS., p. 9).

This conclusion strengthens the view that objects are permanent. Therefore kṣaṇikavāda is not compatible¹.

SIX FOLD DIVISION OF DRAVYA

Dravyas are divided into different groups. It may be grouped as jaḍa (inert matter) and ajaḍa (sentient beings). It may also be grouped under the heading of pratyak and parāk. Dravyas also may be subjected to six fold divisions². They are prakṛti (matter), kāla (time), jīva (individual-self), Īśvara (Lord), nityavibhūti (abode of the Lord) and dhar-mabhūtajñāna (attributive knowledge).

DIFFERENT VIEWS ON DIVISION

There are six dravyas in this system. This six fold division of dravya can be brought into the fold of two-fold division. The jaḍa includes prakṛti and kāla. The remaining four come under ajaḍa type of dravya.

Once again the six fold division can be brought under the heading pratyak and parāk. Pratyak dravya includes jīva and Īśvara. Parāk dravya includes the remaining four dravyas.

In some of the works of the system three-fold division is mentioned. Now the six-fold division contradicts the three-fold division of dravya, submitted by some ācāryas of

1. tāni ca dravyāṇi sthīrāṇyeva, kṣaṇabhange pramāṇābhāvāt |

Nyāya-siddhānta, p. 8.

Deśika giving all the above arguments against kṣaṇikavāda concludes 'evam dravyaṇaṃ sthīratvam siddham |'

Nyāya-siddhānta, p. 15

2. dvedhā jaḍā jaḍatayā pratyak taditaratayāpi vā dravyam |
śoḍhā triguṇāneho jīvetvara bhoga-bhūti-mati bhedāt |

Nyāya-siddhānta, p. 15.

Refer also Tattvamuktā-kalāpa, verse 6 and Sarvārtha-siddhi.

the school¹. The idea behind the tripartite division is this. Three dravyas are cit (sentient), acit (non-sentient) and Īśvara (God). In every place the viśeṣya (qualified) is important. The viśeṣaṇa (quality) is given the secondary importance. Above mentioned three dravyas viz., cit, acit and Īśvara are the viśeṣyas. The remaining three are viśeṣaṇas. Whenever the viśeṣya is mentioned it includes the viśeṣaṇa also.

Therefore the six-fold division is not improper. On the whole there are two jaḍa dravyas and four ajaḍa dravyas or two pratyak dravyas and four parāk dravyas.

The dravyas which cannot reveal for themselves and shine with the help of some other thing, are called jaḍa dravyas. '*parata eva bhāsamānam jaḍam*' (Nyāya-siddhāñjana, p. 16). It is the definition of a jaḍa dravya. Dravyas other than the above mentioned dravyas are named ajaḍas—'*tadanyat ajaḍam*'. (Nyāya-siddhāñjana, p. 16).

PRATYAK AND PARĀK DRAVYAS DEFINED

The dravya which can grasp the self and shines independently is called pratyak dravya. '*svasmai bhāsamānam pratyak*.' (Nyāya-siddhāñjana, p. 16). Jīva and Īśvara can grasp themselves. Therefore both of them are pratyak dravyas.

Dravya which shines for others alone, in other words, which is always known as "this" not 'I' is called parāk dravya. Prakṛti, kāla, nityavibhūti, dharmabhūta-jñāna are dravyas which shine for the purpose of jīva and Īśvara. Therefore they are parāk dravyas.

1. *dik kāla bhoga bhūti avivakṣitvā guṇādi rūpatvāt dehātmesābhidārthaṁ tredhā tatvaṁ vivincate kecit*

Nyāya-siddhāñjana, p. 16.

Refer also Rangarāmānuja's commentary.

PRAKṚTI AND ITS DEFINITION

Among above mentioned six dravyas prakṛti¹ comes first. She possesses three guṇas, namely sattva, rajas, and tamas. Therefore she is called 'triguṇa'. Prakṛti may be defined in three ways. First is 'rajoguṇakatva'. A dravya which possesses rajoguṇa by the relation of inseparability (apṛthak-siddha) is called prakṛti. Second definition is 'tamoguṇakatva'. A dravya which possesses tamoguṇa by the relation of inseparability is called prakṛti. But to define prakṛti as 'sattvaguṇakatvam' is wrong, because then this definition commits the fallacy of overlapping (ativyāpti) in nityavibhūti.

The third definition is 'mahadādyavasthārhatvam'. This may be illustrated with the example of ghaṭatvāvasthā (the stage of pot) and pinḍatvāvasthā (the stage in which the mud is in the shape of ball). Here the thing possessing pinḍatvāvasthā is the cause of the thing having ghaṭatvāvasthā. In the same way, that which causes the thing which contains ahankāra and mahatva (the second of the twenty-five elements) is called prakṛti.

To establish the existence of a thing the definition and the valid pramaṇas (valid source of knowledge) are necessary. We have the experience of 'ghaṭa' 'paṭa' etc. They are triguṇa dravyas. So they are known by perception.

1. *sattva rajas tamasāḥ sambhūtaḥ*

Sāṅkhyasūtra, I-1.

According to advaita, prakṛti is of two types namely māyā and avidyā

Nyāyakośa, p. 519.

According to the followers of Ānandatīrtha also, prakṛti is of two types—One is cit prakṛti (Lakṣmī). Second one is the world with all immovable things.

Refer Ānandatīrtha's commentary on *Brahmasūtra* 1-4-24, 25.

According to Vallabha it is the part of the Lord and is of the nature of inertness

Nyāyakośa, p. 519.

The invisible 'mahat and ahankāra' etc., are known by *Vedas*¹ (verbal testimony). Prakṛti is pervading in all directions except in the upward direction. Nityavibhūti is in upward direction. It is full of śuddha sattva. The *Vedas* say 'ādityavarṇam tamasaḥ parastāt', beyond the prakṛti there is śuddha sattva.

The third definition of prakṛti states 'mahadā-dyavasthārhatvam'. Prakṛti, which is triguṇa, is the material cause of the thing containing mahatva and ahankāra. In some places, māyā is explained as the material cause. In some other place, avidyā is said to be so. Then how to solve this contradiction? To solve this, Deśika says the names like 'māyā', 'prakṛti', 'avidyā' refer to triguṇa according to the works performed by them. Triguṇa is called 'māyā', while it becomes the instrument for the creation of the universe². Because it transforms it is prakṛtiḥ, 'vikāram prakarotīti'.³ Because it obstructs knowledge it is called avidyā, 'vidyā-virodhādibhiravidyādisūcyate'.

Prakṛti is always transforming. When prakṛti is in a state of equipoise—'trayo guṇānām sāmyāvasthā'—the like produces the like. When the sāmyāvasthā is disturbed, the guṇas mix with one another. Where there is impropportionate mixture of sattva (that quality of prakṛti which is observable in steady condition of balanced motion and calm conscious life), rajas (that quality of prakṛti which represents its highly active condition full of enlivening and aggressive energy) and tamas (that quality of prakṛti which makes matter dull and immobile and inert) portion, the transformation of prakṛti is impropportionate.

Prakṛti has no holes. It is 'nīśchidra'.

1. *ajām ekām lohita śukla kṛṣṇām* | *Śvetāśvataropaniṣad*, 4-5.
2. *tacca vicitra-sṛṣṭyunmukhatvāt māyā*. *Nyāya-siddhāñjana*, p. 16.
3. *Nyāya-siddhāñjana*, p. 16.

TRANSFORMATION OF PRAKṚTI

This prakṛti transforms into twenty-four fundamental principles. They are: mūla-prakṛti, mahat, ahaṅkāra, six jñānendriyas including manas, five karmendriyas, five tanmātras and five bhūtas.

mūla-prakṛti	-	1
mahat	-	1
ahaṅkāra	-	1
jñānendriyas	-	6
karmendriyas	-	5
tanmātras	-	5
bhūtas	-	5

Among these twenty-four tattvas, mūla-prakṛti is the matrix of all the material things found in the universe. Mūla-prakṛti is 'samatraiguṇya mūla-prakṛtiḥ' (Nyāya-siddhāṅjana, p. 30). In it, triguṇas are mixed in a proportionate way.

This mūla-prakṛti is of four types, according to the slight changes in its avasthas (states), they are: 'avyakta, akṣara, vibhaktāvibhakta-tamasa' (vibhakta tamas and avibhakta tamas) 'avsthāḥ tūṣṭayamāmananti' (Nyāya-siddhāṅjana, p. 30).

Mūla-prakṛti can be compared to the seeds that are in the granary. Mahat is the output. The avibhakta tamas can be likened to the sowed seed and vibhakta tamas can be compared to the seed which has started upward growth from the soil. Akṣara can be compared to the seed which is breaking its parts on account of soaking in the water. Avyakta can be compared to the seed which is swollen through the contact of the air, soil and water.

MAHAT

Mahat is the dravya, which is the very next avasthā

to avyaktāvasthā. It is also predeceasant avasthā to ahaṅkāravasthā. Mahat is so called because it is the biggest of all the twenty-two principles beginning from ahaṅkāratattva.

The Sāṅkhya philosophers say '*adhyavasāyo buddhiḥ dharmojñānam virāga aiśvaryam*' (Sāṅkhyakārikā 23) that mahat-tattva is a manovṛtti called adhyavasāya. But it is not correct, because adhyavasāya is a state of knowledge. Mahat is not a conscious one. Therefore, the 'adhyavasāya' which is the characteristic feature of a conscious thing cannot become a dharma of an inert element, namely mahat.

Mahat tattva has three divisions. They are 'sāttvika, rājasa and tāmasa'. The portion of mahat in which sattva-guṇa is dominant is called sāttvika. Where rajoguṇa is dominant, it is called rājasa. Where tamoguṇa is dominant, it is called tāmasa.

AHAṆKĀRA TATTVA

The previous avasthā of indriyatvāvasthā is called ahaṅkāravasthā. Here once again the Sāṅkhya philosophers say that ahaṅkāra is abhimāna—'*abhimānohaṅkāraḥ tasmad divividhaḥ pravartate sargaḥ*' (Sāṅkyakārikā, 25).

This view of sāṅkya can be refuted on the ground that the dharma of a 'cetana' cannot become a definition of an 'acetana'.

In *Vedāntaśāstra*, ahaṅkāra is the cause of erroneous knowledge, namely mistaking the body which is 'anaham' for 'ātman' or 'aham', "*sa ca anātmani dehe ahambhāvākāraṇa-hetutvamātrāt ahaṅkāra-śabda vācyaḥ*! (Nyāya-siddhāntjana, p. 33).

As in the case of mahat, ahaṅkāra also has three divisions: sāttvika-ahaṅkāra, rājasa-ahaṅkāra, and tāmasa-ahaṅkāra. From the sāttvika-ahaṅkāra, eleven indriyas are produced, and from the tāmasa-ahaṅkāra the śabda-tanmātra

(the subtle element of sound) is produced. Rājasa-ahankāra is 'ubhayānugrahaka'. It helps in the production of indriya as well as the tanmātras.

In sāstras sāttvika-ahankāra is named vaikārika, rājasa-ahankāra is named taijasa and tāmasa-ahankāra is named bhūtādi.

VIEW OF BHOJARĀJA AND ITS EXAMINATION

Bhojarāja divides ahankāra-tattva into three groups¹. According to him, ahankāra-tattva is of three types. They are: jīvana, samhrambha and garva. Among eleven indriyas, only the manas (mind) is born from rājasa-ahankāra. The tanmātras are born from tāmasa-ahankāra.

This view of Bhojarāja is against the views of Vedas. In *Vedārtha-saṅgraha* Śrī Rāmānuja says that according to the followers of scriptures, eleven indriyas are born out of 'vaikārika'² (sāttvika ahankāra). Deśika following the footsteps of Rāmānuja disagrees with the views of Bhojarāja. He says that Bhojarāja's view is against the views of purāṇas also. Wherever there are slight differences in some purāṇas regarding this tattva, they should be interpreted in the light of the statements of Parāśara³ and such other great sages. He is the author of *Viṣṇupurāṇa*. Sudarśana, the author of the celebrated commentary on *Rāmānuja*, elaborately explains the greatness of Parāśara in his work *Viṣṇupurāṇa* in *Śrūta-prakāśika*.

1. *syāt trividhohankarāḥ jīvanasamhrambhagarvarūpeṇa sambhedā-dasya sataḥ viśayo vyavahāryatāmeti*

Quoted in *Nyāya-siddhāntajana*, p. 34.

2. *vaikārika ahankārāt ekādaśa indriyāṇi jāyante iti vaidikāḥ*

Vedārtha-saṅgraha p. 68.

3. *taijasāni indriyānyāhuḥ devāḥ vaikārika daśa*, *ekādaśam manaścātra devā vaikārika smṛtāḥ* || *Viṣṇupurāṇa* 1-2-46, 47.

INDRIYAS

Indriyas are defined¹ as those which are different from *prāṇa*, *apāna*, *vyāna*, *udāna* etc. Indriyas are helpful in the activities of recollection. It works residing in the particular organs like ears, eyes, nose, tongue and skin of the body. It is the general definition of indriyas.

VIEWS OF DIFFERENT THINKERS AND THEIR EXAMINATION

Varadaviṣṇuśrī defines² indriyas differently. He says indriyas which are *dravyas* are supported by the vital parts of the body and thus help the *ātman*. This definition of Varadaviṣṇuśrī refers only to the *prākṛtendriya*, not to *aprākṛtendriya*.

But Sāṅkhya thinkers define indriyas as 'sāttvikāhaṅkāropādānaka', that is, that which is caused by *sāttvikāhaṅkāra* is called indriya. This definition of Sāṅkhya thinkers commits the fallacy of *avyāpti* (partial inapplicability), because the *aprākṛtendriya* is not produced by *sāttvikāhaṅkāra*.

According to Vaiśeṣikas³ indriyas (except *śrotrendriya*) are not the substratum of *udbhūta-viśeṣagūṇa* (perceptible special properties) like colour smell etc. The *śrotrendriya* is nothing but *ākāśa*. *Ākāśa* is the substratum of *śabda*. Hence, *śrotrendriya* is exempted. In their system *udbhūta-*

1. *prāṇādyananyatvesati hṛtkarṇa-cakṣurādi-śarīra pradeśa-viśeṣāvacchinna-vyāpāratayā tattatkārya-viśeṣa śaktamindriyam* |

Nyāya-siddhānta-jana, p. 34.

2. *aśarīraṁ prāṇadhāryameva yaddravyaṁ puruṣopakāraṁ tadindriyam* |

Nyāya-siddhānta-jana, p. 34.

3. *udbhūta-viśeṣa-guṇānāśrayatve sati jñāna kāraṇa-manassamīyogāśrayatvam indriyatvam* |

Nyāya-siddhānta-mañjarī, p. 197.

Refer *Śītikanthīya* for the same *Vākyavṛtti* (M.S.)
tacca pratyakṣa pramāṇa mityucyate | *Tarka-kaumudī* p. 3.
Pramāṇādīpadārtha-prakāśika, p. 11.

viśeṣaguṇas¹ (perceptible special qualities) are rūpam (colour), gandha (smell), rasa (taste), sparśa (touch), sneha (fluidity), sāmsiddhikadrava (natural viscosity), buddhi (cognition), sukha (pleasure), duḥkha (pain), icchā (desire) dveṣa (dislike), prayatna (volition).

According to them indriyas are the substratum of conjunction namely the conjunction between indriyas and manas, which in turn is the cause of perception. In this system perception is produced² by the saṁyoga of manas and indriyas. Saṁyoga (conjunction) exists in two objects. So indriya also is one of the substratum of conjunction. Thus Vaiśeṣika defines and explains indriyas.

But this definition can be easily applied to jñāncndriya (cognitive sense organs), like śrotra, carma, cakṣu, rasanā, ghrāṇa. But this is not applicable to karmendriya (conative sense organs), like vāk, pāṇi, pāda, pāyu, upasthā. So it commits the fallacy of partial inapplicability (avyāpti).

PRĀKṚTA-APRĀKṚTA DIVISION

Thus defined indriyas are two groups. They are prākṛta (belonging to prakṛti) and aprākṛta (not belonging to prakṛti). Prākṛtendriya is the substratum of guṇatraya (sāttvika, rājasa and tamasa).

Some ācāryas opine that even the prākṛta, aprākṛta division even among āstika, nyāya and ahankāra.

Prākṛtendriya³ is born simultaneously with śabda-

1. rūpam gandho rasasparśaḥ snehasāmsiddhiko dravaḥ |
buddhyādi bhāvanāntāśca śabdo vaiśeṣikā guṇāḥ ||

Bhāṣa-paricceda, p. 370.

2. ātmā manasā saṁyujyate | mana indriyeṇa | indriyamārthena |
tataḥ pratyakṣamutpadyate |

Muktāvali, p. 195.

3. śabdatanmātra-sahabhāvatva-sāttvikāhankāra upādānadavyat-
vādi prākṛtendriya lakṣaṇam |

Nyāya-siddhāntajana, p. 35.

tanmātra (the subtle element of sound). The material cause of prākṛtendriya is sāttvika-ahankāra.

JÑĀNENDRIYA AND KARMENDRIYA DIVISION

(Sense Organs and Motor Organs)

Once again the indriyas are divided into two groups. They are—jñānendriya and karmendriya. Between these two that which helps the expansion of knowledge is called jñānendriya, “jñānaprasaraṇa śaktamindriyam jñānendriyam” (*Nyāya-siddhāñjana*, p. 35.)

It is of six types: manas, śrota (ear), tvak (touch), cakṣus (vision), rasanā (tongue) and ghrāṇa (nose). This type of division is admitted by great ācāryas like Bhatta Parāśara in *Tattvaratnākara*¹. In that work he says that jñānendriyas are six in number. It is an internal sense. But this division is not admitted in Nyāya-vaiśeṣika school. This school groups them into internal (āntaram) and external (bāhya), sense organs. The first one namely internal sense is manas and the second namely external is nose, eyes etc. Thus says Gautama: ‘ghrāṇa, rasanā, cakṣu, tvak, śrotrāṇi indriyāṇi’ (*Gautama Sūtra*, 1-1-12).

Sāṅkhya philosophers include manas among karmendriyas, because it is the cause of all activities. Sāṅkhyās say² that buddhīndriyas (jñānendriyas) are cakṣu, śrotra, ghrāṇa, rasanā, tvak and vāk. Pāda, pāṇi, pāyu, upasthā are karmendriyas. Manas is considered to be both jñānendriya and karmendriya. But manas cannot be a karmendriya; because the definition of karmendriya does not apply to

1. *uktaścaivam vibhāgaḥ tattvaratnākare bhatta parāśara pādaiḥ |
tacca śoḍhā ityupakramya āntaram manaḥ ityantena |*

Nyāya-siddhāñjana, p. 35.

2. *buddhīndriyāṇi cakṣus-śrotra-ghrāṇa-rasanā-tvagādīni; vāk-pāda-
pāṇi-pāyūpasthaṁ karmendriyāṇyāhuḥ; ubhayātmakamatra
manaḥ’*
Sāṅkhya-saptati, 26.

manas. Karmendriya is that which is the cause of karma, and which does not take the help of knowledge. Manas is an indriya which causes karma with the help of knowledge. If manas is considered as karmendriya on the ground that it causes karma, then it becomes necessary to include even cakṣus among karmendriyas, because it also causes karma. But it is undesirable. Therefore manas cannot be a karmendriya. It is a jñānendriya.

MANAS

Manas is defined and understood in different ways by different thinkers in Indian philosophy. Generally manas is translated as mind. But Prof. M. Hiriyanna does not agree with this. He says that "this is atomic and eternal; but, unlike the first four dravyas, it does not give rise to any product. Each self has its own manas, which is merely an instrument of knowing and is therefore as inert as any other senses. It is consequently incorrect to translate it as 'mind' " (*Outlines of Indian Philosophy*, p. 111).

The Nyāya-vaiśeṣika philosophers explain the nature of manas in the following way. A self experiences both pleasure and pain only by a sense, which is designated as manas, and manas is a sense-in-itself. Being a sense-in-itself it is also accessory to other senses in external perception. Though there is the contact between the senses and the objects, if there is no manas, there will be no knowledge and knowledge arises only if there is manas.

This definition given by the Nyāya-vaiśeṣika gives ample opportunity to a student of psychology to explore the hidden secrets of

1. *ātmā-indriya-ārtha-sannikarṣe jñānasya bhāvo abhāvaśca manasolingam.* *Vaiśeṣika-sūtra*, 3, 2, 1
nisparśamāṇu *Nyāya-siddhānta-mañjari* 1-14.,
Vaiśeṣika-darśanam 7-1-23.
and *Gautama-sūtra-vṛtti*, 1-1-16.

the manas. Gautama¹ says that the successive nature of our knowledge is the indicator of the existence of manas. He gives preference to the psychological analysis. According to Annambhaṭṭa², manas is the substance which is active and is without touch. His definition does not describe the psychological aspect of the manas. The existence of manas is known by inference. That is why both Gautama and Kaṇāda use the word 'līṅgam' in their aphorisms. As there are countless souls there are innumerable manas. They are different from self to self. Unlike the self manas is atomic in size. Manas is also eternal.

The Mīmāṃsā school accepts manas as different from ātman and as the substratum of the conjunction which is the 'asamavāyikāraṇa' of jñāna.

The followers of māyāvāda³ say that manas is the substratum of pleasure and pain. It is an antahkaraṇa containing saṅkalpavṛtti and vikalpavṛtti.

According to Śrīmadānanda Tīrtha⁴ manas is produced by buddhitattva. It is of the form of tattva and indriya. The indriya type of manas is grouped into nitya and anitya.

Deśika explains manas, according to Rāmānuja and divides it into prākṛta and aprākṛta. Prākṛta manas is included in the group of prākṛta indriya. Deśika defining the manas, takes into account the day to-day experience and psychological aspect of it also. To that extent Deśika has followed Nyāya-vaiśeṣika system. In addition to this he adds that there is prākṛta and aprākṛta division regarding manas.

1. yugapat jñānānutpattir manasolīṅgam |

Refer Vātsyāyanabhāṣya 1-1-16, Gautama-sūtra, 1-1-16.

2. sparśa rahitatvasati kriyāvattvam |

Tarka-saṅgraha, 13.

3. Refer Nyāyakośa, p. 644.

4. Refer Hindū-darsanasāra, p. 278.

He says that it is an indriya. It is made up of rajoguṇa and tamoguṇa. It helps the jīva in the perception of five sense objects (śabda, sparśa, rūpa, rasa and gandha). This is the first definition of manas¹.

The second definition of manas is 'smṛtikaraṇendriyatvam'. The indriya which is an extraordinary cause of smṛti (recollection) is manas.

It always resides besides the heart: 'tacca hṛtpradeśa-mātrādhiṣṭhānam' (Nyāya-siddhāṇjana, p. 36). Even for other senses (indriyas) the heart is 'kanda-sthāna' (bulbous root). But during the time of action, they stand in their respective places and act. Even the soul resides in the heart. ācārya Rāmānuja also in his *Bhāṣya* says that 'manas resides in such a place in our body which is the pivotal place of all indriyas. Therefore its place is not the visual organ'.²

Manas is the only internal sense organ. Determination, desire, etc., are born by the different activities of manas. Therefore, there is no multiplicity of internal sense organ namely manas. Even this position is clearly explained by Rāmānuja. He says³ 'determination, desire, etc., are born out of the different activities of manas and therefore there is no more than one internal sense organ'. This is clearly stated by sūtrakāra, "pancavṛttir manasopodīsyate!" (Brahma-sūtra, 2-4-11.)

Therefore the view of the philosophers, that is,

1. *aśuddha-sattvesati pañca-viśaya sādharmaṇendriyatvam smṛti-karaṇendriyatvam ityādi prakṛtamanolakṣaṇam* |

Nyāya-siddhāṇjana, p. 36.

2. *sarvendriya-kandabhūta-sthāna-viśeṣe vṛttiriti cakṣuṣi nāva-sthānam* |

Śrībhāṣya, p. 298.

3. *adhyavasāya-abhimāna-cintā-vṛttibhedāt mana eva buddhya-hankāra citta śabdairvyavahryate iti ekādaśendriyāni* |

Śrībhāṣya, p. 603. (Also refer *Bṛhadāraṇyaka*, 3-5-3)

'antahkaraṇaṁ trividham' (there are three internal organs) is invalid.

PRĀKṚTA ŚROTRA

Among five sense objects (śabdādīpañcaka) the sense which can know the sound is called prākṛtaśrotram. For human beings, this śrotra is in the orifice of the ear, (karṇa-śāskuli). But for snakes, it is in their eye-balls.

The sound is grasped by śrotra. Sound is a dharma (property) of element namely ākāśa¹. Śruti is the effect of vaikārika ahaṅkāra. Sound, which is in ākāśa, that has the conjunction with śrotra is grasped by śrotrendriya. The problem, whether the sound is dravya or adravya, will be discussed in adravya chapter. Whether the śrotra goes to the place where the sound is and grasps it, or the sound itself comes to the śrotra, will be discussed in the same adravya chapter.

PRĀKṚTA TVAGINDRIYA

Prākṛta tvagindriya (the sense of touch) does not produce the śabda-sākṣātkāra (the perception of sound) but it produces the sākṣātkāra (perception) of the touch, as well as its substratum.

This sense is pervading the entire body. The feeling of touch is different according to different parts of the body. We do not experience the touch (sparśa) in our nails, teeth and hair (respectively) nakha, danta, and keśa, because the prāṇavyāpti is little in them compared to other parts of the body.

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1. The above idea is summarised in this kārīkā.

*śabdasya-bhūta dharmatvāt śrutervaikārikatvataḥ |
saṁyuktanīlayo योगाḥ sa tayā sampratīyate |*

Nyāya-siddhāñjana, p. 38.

PRĀKṚTA CAKṢURINDRIYA

Prākṛta cakṣurindriya (the sense of vision) grasps only the colour among five sense objects commencing from sound. Colour is grasped by our eyes, through its (saṃyukta) conjuncted substratum.

Here one may ask, that how the face which is on our neck, is grasped through the mirror. In this perception, the face is not in connection with our eyes. Deśika answers¹ that the reflection is not a separate entity. When the rays of visual organ starting from its substratum fall upon the clear object, then they return to their original place from the object. In the process they get contact with the face and grasp it. While the rays return from the object to the original place viz., face, due to the speed, the intervening distance between the face and mirror is un-noticed. That is why we mistake our face to be in the clear object such as mirror, crystal, glass etc. The mistaken face in the mirror is taken for reflection. Therefore there is no contradiction in eyes perceiving the face.

CAKṢURINDRIYA IS PRĀPYAKĀRIN

Deśika considers colour as a prāpyakārin², that is the cakṣurindriya grasps the places where the objects lie and after grasping it returns to its original place. But objects never enter the visual organ. In that case how the huge objects like mountains, earth etc., can enter such a small organ?

1. *pratibimbagrahaṇeṣu svacchadravya-pratihatasya nāyanamahasaḥ pratisrotah prasarādīmūlakatvam bhrāntyadhikaraṇa pūrvapakṣe abhihitam* |

Nyāya-siddhānta, p. 39.

2. Refer Kumārila's *Śloka-vārtika*

sannikṣṣāgrāhitvam

Rāmarudri, 1, p. 79.

viśaya-deśam gatvā viśaya prakāśakatvam |

Nyāya-kośa, p. 591.

In visual perception light is an accessory cause. Light itself cannot make objects or their reflections to enter into our visual organ. The qualifying knowledge namely dharma-bhūtajñāna itself comes out through the sense organs and gets the contact with the external objects and reveals them to the perceiver.

In this process the light helps the perceiver only to the extent of removing the obstruction namely darkness (āṇḍha-kāra). But light itself does not reveal the objects. Rāmānuja endorses this position on many occasions. Commenting on the *Bhagavadgītā* 'jyotiṣāmapita jyotiḥi' (13-17), Rāmānuja says¹ lamp, sun and precious stone etc., are known by us through our cakṣus. Light only removes the obstacle viz., darkness.

The eye-power may be increased by applying collyrium to the eyes. That is why the deposits hidden in the ground are found out by such application.

PRĀKṚTA RASANENDRIYA AND GHRĀṆENDRIYA

Prākṛtarasanendriya (the sense of taste) and the prākṛtaghrāṇendriya (the sense of smell) grasp respectively taste and smell.

The result of the entire discussion about indriyas (senses) is this. Among these senses the manas, touch and eyes grasp both dravya and adravya. The śrotra, rasanā and ghrāṇa grasp only adravyas like śabda, rasa, gandha; or it may also be said that all the six indriyas grasp both dravya and adravya. Each sense grasps its objects with the time in which it exists. Time is an adravya. Viṣṇucittārya, a great

1. *deepādityādīnāpi ātmaprabhārūpam jñānameva prakāśayati* |

Bhagavadgītā Bhāṣya of Rāmānuja, 13-17.

na tad bhāsayate sūryaḥ |

Bhagavadgītā Bhāṣya of Rāmānuja, 15-6.

predecessor of Deśika, says that the 'time' is not dravya. It is adravya. Being a vastudharma, time is grasped in every experience¹.

Deśika after elaborately discussing the jñānendriyas begins to discuss karmendriyas. 'Prākṛta karmendriya'² is that which helps the ātman in the activities like, pronunciation, talking, walking and removing the bodily dirt and enjoying. The sense which helps any of these actions, being itself a sense, is called karmendriya. It is of five types. They are, vāk (the speech), pāni (hand), pāda (the foot) pāyu (the anus), upasthā (the genital organ).

The sense, which is an extraordinary cause for uttering varṇa is called vāk. Vāgindriya resides in hr̥t (the heart), kaṇṭha (neck), jihvāmūla (the root of the tongue), tālu (the tongue), danta (the tooth), oṣṭha (the lip), nāsa (the nose) and mūrdha (the forehead).

Birds other than parrots, lack the capacity of utterance, because they do not possess the necessary eight causes, such as kaṇṭha, tālu, etc., parrots possess some of these causes. That is why they utter ~~some~~ in a distorted fashion.

The sense which helps in the writing, stitching, etc., is called pāni. For human beings, this indriya is in the fingers. For elephants, it is in the trunk.

The sense which helps the body to move is called pāda (foot). This indriya resides in feet for human beings. For snakes and birds, this indriya resides in chest and wings respectively. That is why they are called uragas and pannagas.

1. *uktam ca prameyasāṅgrāhe śrī viṣṇucittāryaiḥ sanmātra pratyakṣa-nirākaraṇaprasaṅgena kālasya vastudharmatayā sarvapratītyantarbhāvāt na prthag rūpatvam iti* Nyāya-siddhāṅjana, p. 40.
2. *uccāraṇādiṣu anyatamakriyāhetutvaṁ tallakṣaṇaṁ | tat pañcadhā vāgādi bhedāt* Nyāya-siddhāṅjana, p. 42.

Pāyu is an indriya which helps in throwing out the mala (waste). For some particular type of birds like mandhāla it is in the mouth. This is stated in 'karaṇa-pāda aṣṭamādhikaraṇa'¹. The sense which is the cause of a special type of happiness, is called upasthā. The adhiṣṭhāna (substratum) of this indriya is the genital organ.

APRĀKṚTA KARMENDRIYA

Aprākṛta karmendriya is eternal. Even for nityas, muktas and Īśvara, karmendriya is necessary. They are complementary to the beauty of their bodies. The existence of aprākṛta karmendriya for muktas, nityas and Īśvara is stated in *Nityavibhūti-pariccheda*²—'Muktas posses five sense organs. These indriyas act according to the needs and desires of nitya and mukta. Even the substratums of these indriyas are like that of karmendriyas'. So there is no contradiction in accepting karmendriya for the nityas, muktas and Īśvara.

Apparently, this view contradicts with the view of *Chāndogya Upaniṣad*³ which says the individual self, until it is in the state of embodiment, it cannot escape the experience of pleasure and pain. But one who is devoid of body and is liberated, the main instrument of these experiences will become destroyed and having risen from this body shines in his original form. According to this statement there are no karmendriya for mukta, nitya and Īśvara. But the students of the Upaniṣad should understand

1. *yathā māndhālādīnām āsyena viṣmūtra visargaḥ* |

Quoted in *Nyāya-siddhāntajana*, p. 43.

2. *iyam ca pañcopaniṣat pratipādyā pañcabhūtendriya mayī nitya mukteśvarāṇām icchānurūpa-śarīrendriya viśaya-prāṇarūpeṇa avatiṣṭhate* | *Nyāya-siddhāntajana*, p. 240.

3. *na ha vai saśarīrasya sataḥ priyāpriyayoḥ apahatirasti* | *aśarīrah vā vasantaṁ na sprśataḥ* | *asmāccharīrāt samutthāya parañ jyotirūpasampadya svena rūpeṇābhiniṣpadyate* | *Chāndogya* 8-12-1.

the real meaning of this Śruti with sufficient care. This passage of Upaniṣad denies only the prākṛta karmendriya to nityas and muktas. That is why Bādarāyaṇa establishes this fact in Abhāvādhikaraṇa, in seven aphorisms beginning from "abhāvam bādarirāhahevam" (Brahmasūtra 4-4-10).

In the same chapter Rāmānuja and his celebrated commentator Sudarśana Bhaṭṭārya elaborately discuss this point and give the same answer.

So in siddhānta there are eleven indriyas¹. But in some places, in our śāstras² lesser number of indriyas is stated. In some other places more number of indriyas and their different origin is stated. But wherever the number is in excess, we have to understand that it is due to the enumeration of the functions of the mind, that is manovṛtti, like adhyavasāya (determination), abhimāna (pride) and cintā (reflection). The idea behind stating lesser number of indriyas is due to the enumeration only of those indriyas which follow the self, after its departure from the gross body.

This position is admitted by Rāmānuja in Śrībhāṣya³ in saptagatyadhikaraṇa. The basis of Śruti and smṛti that there are eleven indriyas. Wherever there is enumeration of more number of indriyas, it is to be construed, that it is due to different manovṛtti. Wherever lesser number of indriyas are counted there it should be understood, that only the indriyas which follow the ātman during the time of final departure is opined.

1. *daśeme puruṣe prāṇāḥ ātmaikūdaśaḥ* | *Bṛhadāraṇyaka* 5-9-4.
(Here ātma means manas).
2. *saptavai śrīṣanyāḥ prāṇāḥ dvāvancau* | *Yajus* 7-3-10.
3. *ityādiśruti-smṛti-siddhendriya sankhyasthitā* | *adhikasankhyā-vādaḥ manovṛttibhedābhiprāyāḥ* | *nyūnavyapadeśastu tatra tatra vivakṣita-gamanādhikriyā viśeṣaprayuktāḥ* | *Śrībhāṣya* p. 603.

NATURE OF INDRIYA

Indriyas are very subtle. But they are not atomic in their nature. Rāmānuja's attribution of atomic nature of indriya, is only to mention, their subtlety. It is clear in his commentary on the aphorism 'anavaśca' (*Brahmasūtra*, 2-4-6). While the jīvātman departs from the body, the indriyas also accompany him, but this departure is not perceived by the people who are sitting by the side of the dying man. So they are subtle. In this sense, they are stated to be atomic in nature.

All indriyas assist the jīvātman. In giving their assistance they are all equal. That is why *Vedas*¹ say 'that these indriyas are equal and they are innumerable!' Here 'samāḥ' means equal. The word 'ananta' does not mean the all pervasive nature of the indriya. It means only that the activities (manovṛtti) are innumerable. That is why they are possessing limited and wonderful or variegated dimension. This vikāra (change) of indriya is evident in ants and elephants. While the indriya in the body of an ant departs to the body of an elephant, it becomes bigger and vice-versa.

Indriyas are not defective by their nature. If their substratum is defective, then they are known as defective. That is why if a blind man enters the other's body or a dead-body, by the power of 'parakāya praveśa vidyā' (secret of entering into other's body), he need not remain a blind man. On the other hand, he will be having the wide eyes, which can perceive its objects. Due to 'adrṣṭa' (invisible cause) the power of indriya is obstructed in the state like suṣupti (sound sleep) and mūrchā (state of unconsciousness). In some other cases, due to the good adrṣṭa, Gandharvas and Yogis know the objects which are very subtle and beyond the perception of an ordinary man.

1. *ete sarva eva samāḥ sarva evānantāḥ* | *Bṛhadāraṇyaka*, 3-5-13.

Though the indriyas of a particular jīva assist him even in the time of parakāyapraveśa, according to some other thinkers, the indriyas of other jīvas may become the apparatus to a jīva, who has entered the living new body. This is due to the peculiar adṛṣṭa. But in reality, jīva will be assisted by his own indriyas and not by the indriyas of the others. This view of Deśika is also endorsed by the *Bhagavadgītā*¹. Accordingly the jīva, the ruler of the body, travels from one body to another taking the senses and the subtle parts of the bhūtas with him, as the wind moves along taking away perfumes from their place. Rāmānuja also explains this stanza in the same way. But Ānandatīrtha differs in interpreting this stanza. According to him the word 'Īśvara' in this śloka means the lord himself.

While the body is destroyed, the indriyas become weak, due to lack of āpyāyakas (causes of fullness). In another body, they become strong, because of the āpyāyakas of that body. The āpyāyakas are the parts of five elements.

HOW LONG THE INDRIYAS FOLLOW THE JĪVĀTMAN

These indriyas will continue to assist the jīva until final emancipation. Either another jīva will take up these indriyas as his instrument at that time, or they remain in prakṛtimaṇḍala, without being an instrument to anybody until mahāpralaya (the total annihilation of the universe at the end of the life of Brahman, who is in prakṛtimaṇḍala), when they are destroyed. Therefore, they are eternal in the sense that they remain until mahāpralaya.

VIEW OF YĀDAVAPRAKĀŚA

Against this view, Yādavaprakāśa accepts the destruction of indriyas at the time of death.

1. *śaṭīraṁ yadavāpnoti yaccāpyutkrāmatīśvaraḥ |*
grhītvaitāni samyāti vāyurgandhānīvāśayāt || Bhagavadgītā 15-8.

VIEW OF RĀMĀNUJA

At the first sight Rāmānuja also seems to have accepted the view of Yādavaprakāśa. Deśika at first supports this view, giving evidences from *Vedāntasāra* and *Bhāṣya* of Rāmānuja. He quotes from *Vedāntadīpa*¹ also a very clear evidence which supports the view of Yādavaprakāśa. In *Vedāntadīpa* Rāmānuja says that the senses like śrotra, cakṣu etc., move with the ātman when he goes from one body to another. But the senses namely speech, hand etc., are produced and destroyed with the birth and death of the body respectively. Therefore Rāmānuja's position regarding indriyas, is same as that of Yādavaprakāśa.

VIEW OF DEŚIKA

Vedānta Deśika carefully examines these two positions, and arrives at correct conclusion. For this purpose, once again, he quotes the statements of Rāmānuja. Discussing the sūtra 'prāṇagateśca' (*Brahmasūtra*, 3-1-3) Rāmānuja quotes *Śruti* which are against the views of Yādavaprakāśa. The *Śruti*² says, that when the ātman moves from this body, the vital parts of the body (prāṇa) also accompany him. At the same time other indriyas also follow the prāṇa, which is accompanying the ātman. Rāmānuja never goes against the *Vedas*. This view is firmly established in the *Bhāṣya* on 'saptagatyadhikaraṇa' (*Brahmasūtra*, 2-4-4+5)

1. *dīpetu vyaktamevoktaṁ tatra śrotrādīni jīvena saha śarīrāntarāga-manepi gacchanti | vāgghastādīni karmendriyāṇi tu sthite śarīre tenaiva saha utpattivināśa-yogīni upakārakāni ityādi | athaḥ yādavaprakāśavat karmendriyāṇām pratiśarīramutpattivināśau bhāṣyakārābhimate |* Nyāya-siddhānta, p. 46.

2. *tamutkrāmantam praṇonutkrāmati |*
prāṇamanutkrāmantam sarve prāṇa anutkrāmantī ||

Bṛhadāraṇyaka, 6-4-2.

There Rāmānuja has accepted the movement of vāgindriya. Deśika asks, if the movement from one body to another is accepted in the case of vāk, what prevents to extend the same gamana (movement) to other indriyas also? This position becomes clear in *Vedāntasāra* and *Vedāntadīpa*.

In the *Vedāntasāra* Rāmānuja says¹ that only seven indriyas follow the ātman. The idea behind stating 'only seven' indicates the importance of those indriyas in the body. The same idea is explained in *Vedāntadīpa*² also. Therefore, the above discussion shows, that Rāmānuja admitted the movement of eleven indriyas with the jīvātman when he moves from one body to another.

TANMĀTRAS

In the philosophy of Sāṅkhya, tanmātras are produced from tāmasāhankāra, and they are the subtle forms of five elements. This position is not admitted in Viśiṣṭādvaita. So, Deśika begins to discuss tanmātras, the five subtle bases of the five bhūtas.

DEFINITION :

The immediate subtle form of a bhūta is called tanmātra. The above definition of tanmātravasthā³ may be well understood with the following example. Every one knows that there are two stages when the milk transforms itself into curds. They are—ksīratvāvasthā and dadhitvāvasthā. In between these two stages there is an intermediary

1. *saptānām gatiśśravaṇam viśeṣaṇam ca teṣām pradhānyāt*

Vedāntasāra p. 509.

2. *saptānāmeva gatiśśravaṇam yogakāle viśiṣṭatvaṁ ca jñānendriya-
ṇām manasaḥ tatpravṛttirūpa-buddheśca pradhānyāt*

Vedāntadīpa p. 65.

3. *bhūtanamavyavahita-sūkṣmāvasthā-viśiṣṭam dravyam tanmātram*

Nyāya-siddhānta-jana, p. 49.

state, which is the end of kṣīratvāvasthā and the beginning of dadhitvāvasthā. This avasthā is called madhyamāvasthā. In the same way, from tāmasāhankārāvasthā five bhūtatvāvasthās are produced. Here the intermediary avasthā is produced, and that avasthā is known as tanmātrāvasthā¹. These tanmātras are the material cause of five elements. But it is not as Sāṅkhya put it that the properties like sound etc., are the causes of pañcabhūtas. The substance which is related to tanmātra is also called tanmātra. It is the material cause of all the five elements (bhūtas).

Sāṅkhya thinkers say that the bhūtas are produced by qualities like sound etc. They say that all tanmātras are produced by tāmasāhankāra. Among them śabda-tanmātras produces ākāśa without the help of other tanmātras. But other tanmātras like sparsa, gandha produce vāyu, pṛthvī, etc., with the help of previous tanmātras².

This view of Sāṅkhya goes against the Śruti "ākāśād vāyuh | vāyoragniḥ | agnerāpaḥ | adbhyaḥ pṛthivī |". "This passage explains that ākāśa produces vāyu, vāyu produces agni, agni produces āpaḥ or jala, jala produces pṛthvī. Therefore the explanation of Sāṅkhya goes against the Vedas.

The substance which possesses utkaṭāvasthā (prominently visible stage) and which is also the substratum of 'śabdaguṇa' is called bhūta. As in the case of indriyas, there are divisions like, prākṛta-tanmātra and aprākṛta-tanmātra, prākṛta-bhūta and aprākṛta-bhūta.

There are five tanmātras. They are: śabda-tanmātra,

1. *dadhirūpeṇa pariṇamamānasya payaso madhyamāvasthāvat bhūtarūpeṇa pariṇamamānasya dravyasya tataḥ pūrvam kācit avasthā tanmātra | tadviśiṣṭamapi dravyam tanmātramityucyate | tadeva ca bhūtaupādānamiti na śabdādiguṇamātrāt bhūtasṛṣṭiḥ |*

Nyāya-siddhānta-jana, p. 49.

2. *pañcabhyaḥ pañcabhūtāni |*

Sāṅkhyakārikā, 22.

sparśa-tanmātra, rūpa-tanmātra, rasa-tanmātra and gandha-tanmātra.

In the same way bhūtas are also five. They are: ākāśa, vāyu, agni, jala and pṛthvī.

The substance which is the material cause of ākāśa is called śabda-tanmātra, of vāyu is called sparśa-tanmātra of agni is called rūpa-tanmātra, of jala is called rasa-tanmātra and of pṛthvī is called gandha-tanmātra.

ĀKĀŚA

Among the five bhūtas, the bhūta which is devoid of sparśa (touch) and which possesses the sound with utkaṭāvasthā (prominently visible stage) is known as ākāśa. This bhūta is an āpyāyaka (complimentary) for śrotrendriya. Ākāśa helps the substance, which is sparśavat (the substance with touch) to be moved, by giving space.

PERCEPTIBILITY OF ĀKĀŚA

In Nyāya-vaiśeṣika and Viśiṣṭādvaita the existence of ākāśa is known by inference. In Viśiṣṭādvaita ākāśa is perceptible. It is so because when we open our eyes, at the very moment, we say, 'here is light'. This knowledge is experienced by one and at the same time one should not mistake light for ākāśa. It is known that this experience is the experience of light and therefore the light itself is ākāśa, then, how to account for the experience 'here is darkness', 'here is light', in one substratum? Light and darkness are contradictories. But this experience cannot be disproved. So ākāśa is different from light.

Here there arises another problem regarding the

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1. Refer *Muktāvalī*, p. 148 and 149, *Vaiśeṣikasūtra*, 2-1-27; *Vaiśeṣika-upaskara* 2-1-27; *Tarkakaumudī* 1, p. 7.

ākāśa satve pramāṇamanumānam! *Siddhāntachandrodaya* 1-9.

perceptibility of ākāśa. Our eyes can know substances, which are with colour. But ākāśa, being a colourless substance it cannot be known by our eyes. Therefore, the doctrine of perceptibility of ākāśa is invalid.

Deśika rebuts this argument giving the example of kāla (time), which is colourless but perceived by visual organs. Every sense knows its object with kāla. This is explained in the chapter of indriyas. Accordingly kāla must be perceived by our eyes also. Because the colourless 'kāla' is perceived by our eyes, we have to modify the definitions of cākṣuṣa-pratyakṣa, which is caused by the colour of the object. Accordingly colour is the cause of cākṣuṣa-pratyakṣa except in kāla- pratyakṣa (perception of time). This position should be accepted regarding kāla-cākṣuṣa. The same thing can be said of ākāśa also. Excepting the visual perceptions of the ākāśa and the kāla, in other places, the colour is the cause of visual perception. Therefore ākāśa can become an object of visual perception though it is colourless.

The perceptibility of ākāśa may be proved by the pañcīkaraṇa method also. According to pañcīkaraṇa method, even ākāśa is having colour. The method of pañcīkaraṇa would be discussed subsequently. Therefore ākāśa can become an object of the visual perception. *Prameyasāṅgraha*¹ explains the same in clear terms. It says that kāla is the vastudharma (the property of an object). It is grasped in every experience. That is why it is not a separate entity. Both ākāśa and dik are having colour by trivṛtkaraṇa method.

Though there is no colour in the akasa and in the kāla, they are perceived by our eyes, because they are always in conjunction with the colourful objects.

1. *kālasya vastudharmatayā sarvapratītyantarbhāvāt na prthag-rūpatvam* | *gaganasya diśām ca trivṛtkaraṇena rūpavattvam* |

Now, if the same pañcikaraṇa prakriyā is applied to vāyu, then it becomes necessary to admit the visual perceptibility of the vāyu. But it is against our experience. Vāyu is known by touch. Deśika says that there is no udbhūtarūpa in the vāyu. So it is not perceived by your eyes. In addition to it, the experience "ākāśamasti śyāmalam" (the sky is blue) also proves its perceptibility. Therefore ākāśa is the object of perception.

SPARŚA-TANMĀTRA AND VĀYU DEFINED

Sparsa-tanmātra is born out of ākāśa and produces vāyu. Vāyu is defined in four different ways. Firstly it is defined as the substance which is the substratum of udbhūta-sparśa (the touch capable of being perceived). Secondly it is defined as the substance which is known only by our sense of touch. Third definition of vāyu is, that it is the substratum of the touch, which is neither hot nor cold (anuṣṇa śīta-sparśa). The fourth and the last definition is that the substance which is known only by the touch and not known by the sense of vision (cakṣuṣa) is called vāyu.

VIEW OF NAIYĀYIKA

Nyaya thinkers do not admit the perceptibility of the vāyu. They say that the tactile perception necessarily contains some colour. For example ghaṭa, paṭa and such other objects are perceived by the tactile perception also. All those objects invariably possess some colour. If vāyu is the object of tactile perception then it also must possess colour. But it has no colour. Since vāyu has no colour, it is not perceptible. Therefore vāyu is known by inference¹. Vāyu is inferred by sparśa-śabda-dhṛti and kampa. Existence of vāyu is inferred from its special touch, its special sound, its

1. *sparśaśca vāyoḥ*

Vaiśeṣikasūtra, 2-1-9.

Refer *Siddhānta-chandrodaya*, p. 8.

holding aloft of grass etc., and its shaking of branches etc. Therefore vāyu is known by the help of inference¹.

The heart of Naiyāyika is, that in vāyupratyakṣa, the sparśa alone is known, but the substratum is not perceived. The substratum is known through inference. This position of imperceptibility of vāyu is, the view held by old school of Naiyāyikas (Prācīna Naiyāyikas). But according to Navya-Naiyāyikas vāyu is known by perception².

NAIYĀYIKA VIEW EXAMINED

The siddhāntin raises the objection against this argument and says if vāyu is inferred by the sense of touch, then the knowledge of agni (fire), jala (water), and pṛthivī (earth) must become inferential. Because even in their perception one can perceive only their qualities, namely touch. Their substratum should become the object of inference. But this goes against experience. There is an experience that 'the pot is known by the sense of touch'. In the same way, the perception of the vāyu should be accepted on the basis of the experience namely "I perceive the vāyu by the sense of touch". Perception of one's own experience is more powerful than any other means of knowledge. Therefore vāyu is known by tactual perception.

MOVEMENT OF VĀYU

The movement of vāyu is horizontal. It is due to Īśvara saṅkalpa (the fiat of the Lord). That fiat is in the form of 'Let there be horizontal movement in vāyu, while there is no striking to it by either earthen object or by other different

1. *vāyurhi sparśa-śabda-dhṛti-kampuiranumīyate vijātīya-sparśena, vilakṣaṇa-śabdena, tṛṇādīnāṃ śākhādīnāṃ kampanena ca vāyoranumānāt* | *Nyāyamuktāvalī*, p. 145.

2. *navyāstu vāyuh pratyakṣaḥ ityaṅgīcakruḥ* | *Tarkaprakāśaḥ. Refer Nyāyakośa.*, p. 738.

vāyus'. This position is accepted even by Kaṇāda¹. When there are such striking, the upward motion and downward motions are formed in the vāyu.

Vāyu is of different types. If its movement is obstructed either by the earthen substance or by the substance of water, then it becomes standstill, known as stambhībhāva (motionless stage) which is seen in bellows and rubber balls.

NATURE OF VĀYU

Vāyu is odourless and possesses the touch which is neither hot nor cold (anuṣṇa-śīta-sparsa). Sometimes we experience vāyu possessing sparsa, like śīta (cold) or uṣṇa (hot) and smell like saurabha (good smell). But these are all due to its contact with, water, sunlight, flowers etc.

VIEW OF ĀYURVEDA THINKERS AND ITS EXAMINATION

According to the thinkers of Āyurveda², vāyu possesses the śīta-sparsa. The cold touch of the vāyu, is not its special character. It is the quality of the water,

In the body, the cold substance, water, increases the vāyu therein. Therefore, according to this statement, the vāyu is increased or decreased by the amount of water, that is in the body. Therefore vāyu is not in the category of the substance like jala³.

This position of Āyurveda thinkers is rebutted by accepting 'anuṣṇa-śīta-sparsa' in vāyu. In addition to the foregone argument it may be supported with an experience also. That experience says that 'vāyu is not cold', when there

1. *vāyu sammūrchanam nānātvaliṅgam* | *Vaiśeṣikasūtra*, 2-1-14
Refer "evam śabda dhṛtikampa api vāyu liṅgāni jñeyāni!"
Vaiśeṣika-upaskara 2-1-9-10.
2. *dehastha dhātu viśeṣaḥ iti bhiṣaja āhuḥ* | *Nyāyakośa* p. 738.
3. *urddhiḥ samānaiḥ sarveṣāṃ viparītaiḥ viparyayaḥ* |
Nyāya-siddhāntajana, p. 60.

is no contact between jala and vāyu. When there is contact between jala and vāyu, the experience will be as, 'vāyu, is cool'. If the vāyu belongs to the category of jala, then, it should not have been the case. It should have got the touch of cold for all time. Therefore the above said statement, "vṛddhiḥ samānaiḥ sarveṣāṃ" etc., is not an universal statement. An increase or decrease of a substance is not due to sajātiya (belonging to the same category) substance or vijātiya (belonging to different category) substance. Therefore, vāyu is different substance from jala and possesses the anuṣṇa-śīta-sparśa.

Vāyu helps all beings, having four forms. The vāyu which helps the sense of touch, being identical with it, is called indriyāpyāyaka (complementary to tvagindriya).

VĀYU GETS DIFFERENT NAMES ACCORDING TO ITS ACTION

The second form of vāyu is prāṇa. It helps all embodied beings. It is the prime supporter of the body.

The prāṇavāyu, though it is one, gets different names in accordance with the activities it performs¹. Thus says Bādarāyaṇa

pañchavṛttirmanovadyapadiśyate | Brahmasūtra 2-4-11.

According to this sūtra, the prāṇa, the apāna, the vyāna, the udāna and the samāna are different activities of prāṇa itself. Though the word "prāṇa" covers all these activities, it is also specially used in vṛttiviśeṣa² (special state).

1. In Nyāyavaiśeṣika school also prāṇa is one, but its activities are different. "prāṇastveka eva hṛdādi nānāsthānavasāt, mukha nirgamādi kriyāvasāt ca nānāsañjñāṃ labhate |"

Nyāyasiddhānta-muktāvalī, p. 247.

2. According to Śrī Ānandathīrtha prāṇa is Parabrahman.

"parabrahma (Viṣṇuḥ) prāṇaśabdavācyam iti vedāntinaḥ |

Nyāyakośa, p. 588.

Refer Mādhva-bhāṣya on Brahmasūtras, 1-1-23, 28.

This idea is brought out in the *Chāndogya-vājasaneyā Śruti* (7-5-1) "*yasmin utkrānte idam śarīram pāpiṣṭhatara-miva drśyate, etasyaiva sarve rūpamabhavan*".

This passage says that our body becomes useless when it is separated from *prāṇavāyu*. The other *vṛttis* are the forms of *prāṇa* itself. Rāmānuja commenting on the *Sūtra* "*bhedaśrutervailakṣanyācca*" (2-4-16), Admits this position. Therefore the *mukhyapṛāṇa* is the supporter of the body and *indriyas*.

IMMOVABLE MATTERS POSSES PRĀṆA.

Prāṇa-vāyu resides in immovables like trees. Otherwise the water which is poured at the roots would not reach its branches, buds, flowers, fruits and leaves. So they too possess the *prāṇa*. Rāmānuja explains this in his *Bhāṣya* on the *sūtra* "*na tu dr̥ṣṭāntabhāvāt*" (*Brahmasūtra* 2-1-9).

There he says that though there is *prāṇavāyu* in immovable, it has not five *śūlakṣaṇas* to support¹ it (body). Nāthamuni says in *Viśiṣṭādvaita* that there is *prāṇa* in nails, tooth, hair also. *Prāṇa* is in them. So, the sensation of touch is also in them.

The control of *prāṇavāyu* in three ways is named as *recaka*, *pūraka* and *kumbhika*. It is called *prāṇāyāma* in *Yogaśāstra*. A detailed explanation regarding this can be had from *Āyurveda* and *Yogaśāstra*.

DIFFERENT TYPES OF VĀYU

So far two types of *vāyus* are discussed. The third type of *vāyu* is different from the other two and is the material cause of the body. In the formation of such bodies it takes the help of other four *bhūtas*. This type of body is stated

1. *sthāvareṣu hi prāṇasambhavepi tasya pancadhā avasthāya śarīrasya dhāraṇārthatvena avasthānam nāsti* | *Śrībhāṣya*, p. 557.

to exist in vāyuloka. This type of body in vāyuloka, is admitted by Nyāya-vaiśeṣika¹ also.

The fourth vāyu is different from the prāṇavāyu, āpyāyaka-vāyu and the vāyu in the form of a material cause of the body. This is known as viṣayavāyu. The hurricane, the air coming out of fan, etc., are example of this vāyu.

TEJAS—AGNI

From the vāyu, rūpa-tanmātra and therefrom the agni is produced. *Taittirīya* says “vāyoragniḥ” (*Ānandavalli*, 1). The agni was produced from the vāyu. Here the word ‘agni’ implies tejas—light.

MATERIAL CAUSE OF AGNI DISCUSSED

Now the question is, whether the vāyu is the material cause or the instrumental cause to agni. In the statement ‘vāyoragniḥ’, the pañcamī vibhakti implies the instrumental cause but not the material cause. This type of interpretation is accepted (to imply the instrumental causality) in the sentence like ‘kulālādghaṭaḥ’. Therefore, one has to accept the vāyu, as an instrumental cause but not the material cause.

Another objection to admit vāyu as a material cause is, that it is against the perceptual evidence. In our experience it is seen that the substance belonging to pṛthvī like a piece of wood, grass, and dried leaf turning into fire. But vāyu turning into fire is not seen. Vāyu may assist the agni, while the above mentioned articles are consumed by it. Therefore, vāyu is the instrumental cause of the agni.

To solve the above problem, present statement ‘vāyoragniḥ’ should be viewed in the light of previous sentences. There it is cited that ‘ātman is the material cause of ākāśa and ākāśa is the material cause of vāyu.

1. *śarīram vāyuloke*

tasmādvā etasmādātmana ākāśassambhūtaḥ |

ākāśādvāyuḥ |

Taiittiriya-ānandavalli, 1.

In all these previous sentences, the case pañcami implies the material cause. The sentence 'vāyoragniḥ' is stated among the sentences which imply the material causes. So the occasion itself suggests that vāyu is the material cause of the agni.

Secondly, the effect always merges with the upādana-kāraṇa (material cause) when it is destroyed. During the time of the universal destruction, everything merges with its material cause. But not with instrumental cause. When a pot is destroyed, it merges with the mud which is the material cause. But not with the instrumental cause that is potter. On that occasion, it is stated that the light merges with the vāyu; hence it is very easy to conclude that vāyu is the material cause of light.

The pūrvapakṣin had said that the agni is produced by the material substances like wood, grass and dry leaves. But this is not a correct argument. According to pañcikarāṇa prakriyā, everything is made up of five elements. So, even in the above mentioned material substances, there is light in small quantity. The small quantity in them produces agni in big quantity. Therefore, the material substance is not the cause of the light. There is no question of vāyu becoming an instrumental cause. Deśika puts all these ideas in the following śloka which is hidden here and there is experienced when it gets associated with the same type of objects. Here Deśika quotes the statements of great sages²: 'The puruṣa resides in the body as the Agni sleeps in the piece of wood and as oil is in the sesame seed.

1. *tadevaṃ tatra tatra līna eva agniḥ saḥakāri viśeṣāt adṛṣṭādyupanīta sa-jātiya-avayavayogācca udbhūta upalabhyate |*

Nyāya-siddhānta-jana, p. 62.

2. *kāṣṭhe'gniriva śerate | dāruṇyagniriyathā tailaṃ tile tadvasasau pumān |*

Nyāya-siddhānta-jana, p. 62.

INDRIYAS BELONGING TO TEJAS

The substance which possesses the hot touch and the colour of brilliance is called light. Light is the pūraka (complementing) and āpyāyaka (causing fullness) to indriyas like the vāk (speech) and the cakṣus (eye). This is evident in the śruti¹: 'That this vāk is made up of light. The sun is in the form of cakṣus. He is present here with his rays'.

TEJAS IS NEEDED FOR PERCEPTION

Light is necessary for the perception of things. For those who apply collyrium to the eyes, too much light is not necessary. Even for owl, light is not needed for the perception of objects. Light is necessary in the perception of everything, except in the perception of darkness. Because the darkness is known in the absence of the light. The light which helps indriya to work efficiently, is called indriya-āpyāyaka-tejas.

TYPES OF TEJAS

The next form of the tejas (light) is vaiśvānara (the fire of digestion in the stomach). Vaiśvānara digests the food and drinks with the help of prāṇa, apāna, etc.

The third type of tejas is the material cause of the taijasa (full of light) type of body. This type of body is in the world of Agni and Sūrya. In producing these bodies the light gets mixed with other four bhūtas (elements).

The fourth type of tejas is different from all the three groups mentioned above. It is called viśaya-tejas. This type of tejas helps the beings in the form of moon-light, sunshine, lightening and earthly fire.

1. *tejomayī vāk | ādityaḥ cakṣuṣi bhūtvā akṣiṇī praviśata |*
raśmibhireṣo'smin pratiṣṭhitaḥ | *Bṛhadāraṇyaka, 7-5-1.*

KṢAṆIKATVA OF LAUKIKA AGNI

Among these four types of tejas, the laukika-agni, which is of the form of flames, is transitory because the laukika-agni is destroyed when its āśraya is destroyed. Therefore this type of agni is kṣaṇika (transitory). The experience of the same flame in the lamp even after a lapse of long time is due to erroneous pratyabhijñā (recognition) which identifies the object, present before, with the object which is already perceived, on the basis of similarity in both.

This kṣaṇikatva (transitoriness) is different from the kṣaṇikatva of Buddhism. Here the siddhāntin opines that the kṣaṇikatva means 'āśutara vināśitvam' (lasting only three or four minutes).

In a lamp, the oil, and the wick are the material of the flame. Each one of them produces different flames. But one has to accept, that they all are destroyed after a while. If it is not so, then one should have perceived many different flames. But the difference among the produced flames is evident. This fact is admitted by Nāthamuni. He says¹ in *Tattva-ratnākara*: 'The movement of flames in a lamp is perceived like the movement in water'. Though there are different flames, they are known as one. It is due to erroneous identity. The difference among the flames is visible for a careful observer.

Some philosophers like Śaṅkara who are influenced by Buddhist kṣaṇikavāda argue that the flames are destroyed without a cause. This position is not correct, because this leads us once again to the refuted kṣaṇikavāda of Buddhism. In this world nothing is destroyed without a cause. Adṛṣṭa and Īśvara are the causes of everything. In fact, the destruction is not a negative aspect of a thing. It is bhāva-rūpa

1. *nipuṇanirīkṣaṇe ca jalaveṇikāvat juālāsañcārāṇaṃ dṛśyate* |

Quoted in *Nyāya-siddhāntajana*, p. 63.

(positive). The substance which is of bhāva-rūpa cannot be produced without a cause. In Viśiṣṭādvaita nāśa is nothing but the subsequent avasthā occupying the antecedent avasthā. Since it is bhāva-rūpa, it must have a cause.

DIVISIONS OF TEJAS ACCORDING TO NAIYĀYIKA

Some philosophers¹ group the viśaya type of tejas (light) into four different categories, namely, *bhauma*—belonging to the earth (fire); *divya*—light of the sun; *audarya*—digestive fire and *ākaraṇa*—products of mine, pearls, gold, silver etc.

DIVISION OF TEJAS ACCORDING TO VIŚIṢṬĀDVAITA

Tejas may be divided into two groups in another way. They are prabhā (radiance) and prabhāvat (that which possesses the prabhā). Here the prabhā is defined as² the substance which expands and contracts with the presence and absence of the obstruction respectively. The expansion of the prabhā depends upon the presence or the absence of an obstruction. If there is an obstruction, the expansion of prabhā is limited. Otherwise, it is unlimited. It also depends on its speed.

Prabhā comes into being while its āśraya is born, and becomes extinct while the āśraya is extinguished.

The tejas which possessed this prabhā is called prabhāvat. '*tadviśiṣṭam tejaḥ prabhāvat*' (Nyāya-siddhāntajñāna, p. 65). Pearls, sun, lamps, etc., are the examples of it.

1. Nyāya-vaiśeṣikas say "viśayaścaturvidhaḥ | *bhauma*, *divya*, *audarya*-*ākaraṇa* *bhedāt*!" *Tarkasaṅgraha*, p. 16.

2. *āvaraṇa-sadasadbhāvādinā-saṅkocavikāśaḥ yathā vegaśaktya-dhiṣṭhāna-deśādhikadeśaprasāri tejoviśeṣaḥ prabhā* | *Nyāya-siddhāntajñāna*, P. 64.

THE NATURE OF TEJAS

The work (drying, burning, etc.,) done by these tejodravayas is according to their nature. The colour of the substance tejās is red and brilliance. The experience of different colour in it is, due to its contact with water or some other things. Even Vedas attribute the same colour to tejās. 'yadagne rohitam rūpam...' (Chāndogya 6-4-1).

RASATANMĀTRA

Rasa-tanmātra is born out of tejās. There from āpaḥ (water) is born. It is defined as¹ the substance which possesses cold touch and which is devoid of any sort of smell. It possesses a peculiar type of taste.

JALA: DEFINITION AND ITS NATURE

The natural colour of the water is white. The taste is sweet, and the coldness is its natural touch. The experience of different colour, touch and taste in the water is due to its contact with different objects. They are not its natural qualities. Fluidity is the special characteristic of the water. Experience of hardness in hail, is temporary. After a short time, it gets back its fluidity. Water itself takes the form of hails for some time and gets hardness.

TYPES OF JALA

The jala is of four types. They are: prāṇa-āpyāyaka, rasana-āpyāyaka, śārīra and viśaya.

The śārīra which is formed of jala, is in Varuṇaloka. Therefore, it is the material cause of the body, which is in the world of Varuṇa. Tanks, rivers and oceans are the examples of viśaya.

1. śītasparśavattvam, nirgandhatve sati viśiṣṭarasavattvam ityādi tallakṣaṇam |
Nyāya-siddhānta, p. 66.

GANDHA TANMĀTRA

From the jala, gandha-tanmātra is born and from there the pṛthvī comes out. Its definition¹ is—"The substance which possesses smell as its special property and possesses taste and touch."

PṚTHVĪ: DEFINITION AND ITS NATURE

In the pṛthvī, at first, there was saurabha (good smell), mādhyura (sweetness) and kṛṣṇarūpa (black colour). The touch of anuṣṇāśīta (neither hot nor cold) continues to be there. Śīta-sparśa or uṣṇasparśa is attributed to pṛthvī, while it gets contact with jala or tejas. The existence of the black colour in the pṛthvī is stated in the *Veda* also: "*yatkṛṣṇam tadannasya*" (*Chāndogya*, 6-5-4). But different colours are experienced in the earth because of pāka² (change under heat).

INDRIYA AND VIṢAYA OF PṚTHVĪ

Pṛthvī is āpyāyaka of mana-indriya and ghrāṇendriya. The material cause of the bodies of the human beings, the animals and immovables is the pṛthvī.

The viṣaya pṛthvī is of the type of mud, stones plants and tamas (darkness).

DRAVYATVA OF DARKNESS DISCUSSED

It is a disputed fact, to accept darkness as a dravya in many schools of philosophy. According to siddhānta, darkness is a dravya and is included in the viṣaya group of pṛthvī. But it cannot be. Because darkness means the

1. *viśiṣṭagandhavattvam | rasavattve sati viśiṣṭa-sparśavattvam ityādi tallakṣaṇam |*
Nyāya-siddhāntajana, P. 67.

2. *annamayam hi saumya manaḥ | āpyāyante ca te nityam |*
(*Chāndogya*, 6-5-4).

negation of the light, which finally amounts to dravya-abhāva. In this condition how to accept darkness as a dravya?

Deśika answers darkness is a dravya. Because the definition stated for dravya includes darkness also. The definition is "avasthāvatvam" (possessing states). There is nīlarūpa (dark blue) calana (movement), etc., in the darkness. There is also para, apara-vibhāga (the division of proximity and remoteness in the darkness). So tamas is a dravya¹.

Vedas² also establish dravyābhāva to tamas: "tamassasarja bhagavān" (*Mahābhārata*). Here the creation of the tamas is stated like the creation of other elements. If the darkness is the negation³ of the light (ālokābhāva), then, how is it that the Śruti speaks of the merger of both darkness and light in some other substance? That passage of Śruti explains that there was no tamas and tejas. "nāśīttamo jyotirabhūnna cānyat!"

In addition to this, the *Antaryāmi Brāhmaṇa*, which explains the immanence of the Brahman in the universe, says, *yasya tamaḥ śarīram*, that the darkness is the body of the Brahman. Both the tejas and the darkness are stated to be the body of the Brahman. If the ālokābhāva is darkness, then the Śruti would have stated otherwise.

The Bhāṣya of Rāmānuja on this passage confirms this explanation. Rāmānuja says⁴ that in the same way water, fire, ether, air, direction, the moon, stars, darkness and light are the bodies of the Parmātman. Therefore tamas is dravya.

1. *kinca tejasa iva tamaso api śarīratva āmnānāt*

Sarvārtha-siddhi p. 197.

2. *yasya tamasśarīram.*

Bṛhadāraṇyaka 5-7-17.

3. *ālokābhāvastama iti kāśyapīyāḥ.*

Tattvaratnākara quoted in *Ānandadāyini*, p. 571.

4. *evam ambvagnyantarikṣa vāyavāditya-dikcandra-tārahākāśa tamastejassu*

Śrībhāṣya, p. 299.

The great Mīmāṃsaka like Kumārila and the great logicians like Udayana have written much on the *tamas* and have held the different view on *tamas*. According to Kumārila Bhaṭṭa, Sāṅkhyas and Kandalīkāra, *tamas* is a separate *dravya*. According to them it possesses colour. Kumārila explains, although light is needed in the visual perception, in the perception of *tamas*, its assistance is not necessary. Because the nature of *tamas* is such. According to Vaiśeṣikas¹ *tamas* is not a separate *dravya*. It is only the negation of light. According to Prabhākara, non-perception of colour is *tamas*. Rāmamiśra II (refer introductory chapter), seems to have held the view, that *tamas* is not *dravya*. According to him *tamas* is the non-perception of colour. The colour of objects are not known while eyes are closed and that itself is *tamas*. Deśika opines that this view is against the Bhāṣya, Śruti and smṛti.

CONTRADICTION OF TATTVARATNĀKARA SOLVED

Even a passage in *Tattvaratnākara* appears to have held the view that the *tamas* is *mūlaprakṛti*. There the author says: “*atra tattvavidāḥ prāhuḥ sthūlasūkṣmādinā sthitā | daivī guṇamayī māyā bāhyāntaratamo matā*”. Therefore *tamas* cannot be the *pārthiva-dravya*. *Tattvaratnākara* is the work of Parāśara Bhaṭṭāraka who is pre-Vedānta Deśika Viśiṣṭādvaita ācārya. (Refer Introduction-Chapter 1). Regarding *tamas*, the great thinkers opine that it is in the form of *sthūla* (gross) and *sūkṣma* (subtle). It is of the form of both internal and external *tamas*.

Deśika after discussing this stanza, elaborately, concludes that, here *andhakāra* is not the *mūlaprakṛti*. The author of *Tattvaratnākara* refers only *prākṛta-tamas* which is opposed to the light. This explanation is coherent with

1. *udbhūtarūpavadyāvattejassamsargā bhāvastamaḥ |*

Vaiśeṣika-upaśāra, 5-2-20.

the view entertained by Deśika. Therefore, the view that the darkness is a pāṛthiva-dravya remains unaffected. Therefore, there are only twenty-four tattvas.

CONTRADICTION BETWEEN TAITTIRĪYA AND CHĀNDOGYA REGARDING THE PROCESS OF CREATION

In *Taittirīya Upaniṣad*, creation is explained in a different way. There the creation begins from ākāśa. “*ātmana ākāśassambhūtaḥ*” (*Taittirīya Ānandavalli*, 1-2). It does not say anything about mahat and ahankāra. Even the *Chāndogya Upaniṣad* says: “*tat tejo'srjat*” (6-2-3). According to this, creation begins from “tejas”. Here the creation of ākāśa and vāyu is not explained. So, to say, that there are twenty four tattvas, is not correct and is against the Vedas.

CONTRADICTION SOLVED

Though these Vedic passages do not mention the creation of vāyu, ākāśa, etc., they are not against the process of creation explained above. For example milk transforms into curd. Though there are many stages between the stage of curd and milk, The usage of milk is formed by milk'. This does not deny the intermediate stage¹. In the same way the Vedic passages have mentioned only the important stages. Therefore it is correct to hold that there are twenty-four tattvas in this system.

CATEGORIES OF ŚAIVĀGAMA DISCUSSED

The thinkers of Śaiva school hold the view that there are thirty-six tattvas. But these extra tattvas can be included in the accepted tattvas. And so they are not stated separately. In addition to twenty-four fundamental tattvas of the Viśiṣṭādvaita system, the Śaiva school accepts twelve more.

1. *kṣīrādidam tata idam ca tato dadhīti | kṣīrāddadhīti vadatām
hila ko viśeṣaḥ |* Nyāya-siddhāñjana, p. 75.

They are: māyā, puruṣa, śiva-tattva, śakti-tattva, sadāśiva-tattva, Īśvara-tattva vidyā-tattva, kalā-tattva, niyati, kāla, vidyā and rāga.

Among them, the twenty-four tattvas beginning from prakṛti are already accepted in the Viśiṣṭādvaita system. In addition to them, the Īśvara and Jīva elements make the number into twenty-six. If kāla is accepted as a separate principle, then, the number becomes twenty-seven. However, Deśika points out that among these twenty-six or twenty-seven (including kāla) tattvas, the remaining Śaivāgama tattva can be accommodated.

Māyā and puruṣa come under triguṇa dravya and jīva respectively.

The five tattvas beginning from śiva-tattva are timeless. Therefore, they all come under one tattva but not different tattvas. This position is accepted by thinkers of the Śaiva school also. Deśika quotes their own sayings. He says, that Śaiva philosophers themselves have stated¹ this in clear words. Because the five tattvas beginning from śiva-tattva are timeless, they all belong to one tattva. But the division is made in śāstras only according to their activities. Further, there is only one tattva viz., śiva-tattva. The Īśvara-tattva is not śiva-tattva, but on the basis of several scriptures, it should be admitted that it is Nārāyaṇa-tattva. He is the Sarveśvara. He is different from Śiva. He is the soul of both cit and acit. This position of Upaniṣadic thinkers will be explained in detail in *Īśvara pariccheda*.

Among the remaining five tattvas, rāga is not a different tattva, because, it is one of the states of knowledge.

1. *tathā hi tairevoktam, pañcānāmapyēṣām na hi kramo'stīha
kālarahitatuāt | vyāpāraśāśādeṣām vihitā khalu kalpanāśāstre ||
tattvaṁ vastuta ekam śivasatījñām citra śakti khacitam tat |*

Nyāya-siddhānta-jana, p. 77.

The vidyā-tattva is considered by Śaiva thinkers as the cause of knowledge. But Deśika says, it is unnecessary to accept vidyā-tattva as a separate tattva because the indriyas like manas and others are sufficient causes in the production of knowledge. Therefore it is not a separate tattva.

KALĀTATTVA ACCORDING TO ŚAIVĀGAMA AND ITS EXAMINATION

According to the thinkers of śaivāgama school, kalā is a separate tattva which wards off the mala (the dirt), namely, pāpa and punya (merits and demerits) of the jīva. It produces karṇ-śakti in him and so becomes the cause of the effect, namely, beginning from the mahat to prthvī.

Deśika says that there is such a thing, which produces the mahat, etc., in the above explained way, then it is not different from the akṣarāvasthā, which is the cause of avyaktā-avasthā (the stage of unmanifest). The same tattva can be called as kalā or by some other name. But we cannot attribute the karṇ-śakti-vyāpakaṭva to it. Karṇ-śakti is produced in the jīva by the knowledge produced by our senses and our karma which is in the form of merits and demerits. Therefore, kalā is not a different tattva.

NIYATI OF ŚAIVĀGAMA

The conventional interpretation of the niyati, according to the Śaiva school is that it controls the world. This meaning of the word 'niyati' can be explained in three ways. If it means the niyanṭ-śakti (capacity to control the world) of the Lord, then, it is not different from his saṅkalpa, the will of the almighty.

If it means the power of niyama to produce the results, it is nothing but karma, which is of the form of pāpa and punya and not a different tattva.

If it means that "this cause¹ produces this effect and not others", type of power which controls the effect, then this is a power which resides in the cause itself. So then also niyati cannot become a different tattva apart from the accepted tattvas. The *Pāñcarātra* and *Ahīrbudhnyasamhitā* enumerate niyati as an entity. But they only mean that it is the power of objects and not as separate entity.

KĀLA ACCORDING TO VIŚIṢṬĀDVAITA

The thinkers of śaivāgama say that kāla is produced by māyā. To accept kāla as a created element is to accept its beginning. In *Viṣṇupurāṇa* (1-2-26), Parāśara says: "anādirbhagavān kālaḥ nānto'sya dviḥ vidyate" that kāla is anādi and it is 'ananta' also. It has neither beginning nor end. This āgama goes counter to the accepted position of śaivāgama thinkers. So kāla is not a separate entity in the sense in which it is explained by them.

ETERNALITY OF KĀLA AND ITS PRESENCE IN NITYA-VIBHŪTI

Kāla has neither sṛṣṭi nor praḷaya. But without kāla to think of sṛṣṭi and praḷaya is impossible.

In nitya-vibhūti or the supreme world of eternal glory, there is kāla. Here it is not independent. It is dependent on the objects that exist in nitya-vibhūti. That is why it is said "na kālastatra vai prabhuḥ" (*Mokṣadharmaparva*, 198-9). Time is not the controller in nitya-vibhūti. In nitya-vibhūti every thing is nitya (eternal). To accept kālasambandha to an object is to accept perishability to it. In that sense kāla is not prabhu or the controller in nitya-vibhūti. If we don't accept kāla in nitya-vibhūti, then Śruti 'sadā paśyanti sūrayaḥ' (The eternal always perceive the Lord's abode) becomes falsified.

1. tattat svakārya karaṇādi vivakṣāyām | *Nyāya-siddhāntajana*, p. 79.

TRANSFORMATION OF KĀLA

Kāla, excepting itself, is an instrumental cause for everything. It is the material cause for its own different transformations like, kṣaṇa, lava, dina, pakṣa, māsa, ṛtu, ayana and saṁvatsara.

Both khaṇḍa-kāla (small time) and mahā-kāla (big time) are all-pervasive: Because both of them are known as viśeṣaṇa (qualifications) when the object is known.

This kāla itself transforms into kṣaṇa, lava, etc. This position is well established by the Śruti "*sarve nimeṣā jajñire vidyutaḥ puruṣādadhī! kalā muhūrtāḥ ksthāścāhorātrāśca sarvaśaḥ*" (*Taittīrīya Nārāyaṇa*, 2). "All minutes and other dimensions of time were born out of that great puruṣa who is of the colour of lightening".

VIKĀRA OF PARTLESS OBJECTS EXPLAINED

Now one may doubt the transformation of the kāla into different parts. Because kāla is a partless thing. A partless thing cannot transform. To settle this position we have to understand the word 'vikāra' in a clear manner.

Vikāra is that, which pertains to the janya-dharma which is capable of having a different name. This type of vikāra is admissible for the objects which are partless as well as objects with parts. For example, mṛtpiṇḍa (lump of clay) could not have the new name ghaṭa, if it had not got the janya-dharma, namely ghaṭattva.

This type of transformation is seen in kāla also. Kāla gets the new names like kṣaṇa, saṁvatsara, etc., when it gets the janya-dharma, namely kṣaṇatva, saṁvatsaratva etc.

The same explanation must be adopted towards the transformation of jīvātman and Paramātman though they are partless.

The above discussion makes it clear, that vibhudravayas (the object of all pervasive nature) also transform into different things. Among vibhudravayas there is no 'avayava-parivartana' type of vikāra; but there is 'avasthāntara-prāpti' (getting different stage) type of vikāra. If this position is not admitted in vibhu-dravyas, they have to lose their vibhutva itself.

The very meaning of the word 'vibhu' namely 'sarvamūrta-dravya-saṁyogitva', conjunction with all limited things, indicates vikāra. Here saṁyoga indicates vikāra. If there is no saṁyoga then, how can it become a vibhu-dravya, which has the saṁyoga with all 'mūrta-dravya' (things having finite measure).

Vibhutva and vikāritva are not contradictories. Therefore, both of them reside in kāla as well as in Īśvara without any contradiction. Vedānta Deśika quotes Rāmānuja, accepting vikāritva for kāla in his *Vedārtha-saṅgraha*¹.

Nārāyaṇārya in his *Nītimāla*² accepts vikāritva for kāla. Kāla is anādi and ananta. Kāla is always transforming into minutes, days, nights etc.

Like Prabhākara school, Viśiṣṭādvaitin also accepts that kāla is perceptible to our six senses. Whenever an object is grasped, kāla is also known with it, as an attribute. Though kāla is known by āgama, it must be perceptible, because of its perception by a common man who does not know āgama. Kāla is also vibhu. Because it is known as an attribute of

1. *nimeṣa-kāṣṭhā-kāla-muḥūrtādi-parārdhaparyanta-aparimita-
vyavaccheda-svarūpa-sarvotpattisthiti-vinaśādi-sarvaparīṇāma-
nimittabhūta-kālakṛtaparīṇāmāsprṣṭānantamahāvibhūtiḥ* |

Vedārtha-saṅgraha p. 48.

2. *kālo'nādyanantaḥ aśasrakṣaṇa parīṇāmi muḥūrtāhorātrādi-
vibhāgavān parīṇāma-parispanda hetuḥ* |

Nyāya-siddhāntajana, p. 83.

a perceived object, *kāla* is not enumerated as an independent tattva.

According to Sāṅkhya philosophers *kāla* is not a separate substance. It is included in *śūnya*. Raghunāthaśiromaṇi the author of the great work namely, *The Dīdhiti* opines that both time and space are not different from God¹.

Nyāya-vaiśeṣika philosophers admit² that *kāla* is one and vibhu (all-pervasive). It is also atīndriya. That is why *kāla* in this school is admitted as inferential.

The great mīmāṃsaka like Prabhākara says that *kāla* is perceived by our six sense organs.³

Thus excluding *kāla*, if tattvas are enumerated from avyakta to prthvī, jīva becomes the twenty-fifth element and Īśvara becomes the twenty-sixth element. If akṣara-tattva and tamas are also added to it, the number of tattvas also increases. All these different ideas are admitted in Śruti itself. "tam saḍvimsakamityāhaḥ sapṭavimsamathāpare" (Mantri Upaniṣad, 2-4.)

But sattva, rajas and tamas are not separate principles, because they are not 'dravyas'. They are 'adravyas'. Vedavyāsa gives the correct picture of the statements which say that there are only twenty five tattvas with the inclusion of jīva, in *Mokṣadharmaparva* of the *Bhāṣya*. "anyaśca rājan sa parastathānyāḥ pañcaviṁśatiḥ tatsthatvādanupaśyanti hyeka eveti sādhaḥ".

Rāmānuja has clearly stated in *Śrībhāṣya* also that *kāla* is not an independently perceivable thing: "kālasya padārtha viśeṣaṇatayaiva pratītestasyā prthagastitva-nāstitvādayaḥ na vaktavyāḥ" (11-2-31).

1. Refer *Nyāyakośa*, p. 232.

2. *saca kālaḥ ekaḥ vibhuḥ nityaśca*

Vaiśeṣikasūtra, 2-2-6-9.

3. *prabhākaraśca kālaḥ saḍīndriya vedyāḥ*

Nyāya-siddhānta-manjarī-prakāśaḥ, p. 65.

The Nyāya-vaiśeṣika school discusses elaborately the *kāla* and includes it in the group of substances. The substance which is the special cause of the day to-day usage, namely to-day, tomorrow etc., is called *kāla*. According to Annambhaṭṭa the substance '*kāla*' is the cause of *vyavahāra* (a kind of temporal usage): Annambhaṭṭa says: "*atītādi-vyavahāra-hetuḥ kālaḥ*" (*Tarkasaṅgraha*, p. 11.)

But to Viśvanātha¹ time is the cause of things that are produced, and is considered to be the substratum of the universe. Further he explains a perception such as "now there is the jar" takes into consideration the motion of the sun and so on. When this happens, one has to accept that there is same relation between the jar etc., and the motion of the sun and so forth. Now that relation cannot be conjunction etc. So time alone is assumed to be the relation between them. In this way *kāla* is considered to be the substratum of the universe.

Viśvanātha gives another proof also. The extraordinary cause of the motion of priority and posterity is time. *Kāla* is converted into a moment, a day, a month, or a year etc., owing to its limiting adjuncts. *Kāla* is known by inference. "*aparasmīnnaparam yugapacciram kṣipramiti kālalingāni*" (*Vaiśeṣikasūtra*, 2-2-6.)

Though there are innumerable objects in the universe, how is it correct to say that there are only twenty-five *tattvas*? Deśika says that we should not count all the objects that are in *vyāpti-srṣṭi* and those objects of *vyāpti-srṣṭi* will be included in the *pṛthvī-tattva*. Therefore, the number of the *tattvas* will not increase as the number of objects increases.

These *tattvas* transform into their next states only in

1. *janyānām janakaḥ kālo jagatāmāśrayamataḥ* |

Bhāṣa-paricceda, 45.

portion but not in their entirety because the cause must continue in the effect also. The characteristic feature of cause is āvarakatva and kārya-vyāpakatva. Otherwise there should exist only one tattva, namely prthivī, because the preceding tattvas become succeeding tattvas and nothing more remains, and so that all the other tattvas should become invisible.

Regarding "tanmātras" (the subtle element) the transformation takes place in their entire parts, because for pañca-tanmātras the above said āvarakatva and kārya-vyāpakatva are denied. According to some other thinkers, the transformation of tanmātras is only partial, because our body is stated to be formed by twentyfour tattvas. If tanmātras are transformed in their entirety, then, it should have been stated that our body is formed out of nineteen tattvas. Deśika justifies both these positions.

PAÑČIKARAṆA

The Sarveśvara creates all these tattvas by His own will at the time of creation, having the preceding tattvas as his body. Being immanent in them, He creates the succeeding tattvas in the aspect of *śarīra*. Then He gives them nāma and rūpa of the *vyāpī* through 'pañčikaraṇa'.

A man who wants to erect a wall at first, he collects the necessary things, such as bricks, gravel, sand, mortar and water separately. But this is not sufficient for the construction of the wall. The collected materials should be mixed in a proportionate manner. Further the builder uses his intelligence and his physical strength. The combination of all these materials enables the mason to construct the wall. In the same way, the Lord also, for the well being of cetana, wills to create the entire universe with its objects. For this, He gets ready prakṛti, mahat, ahankāra, etc., separately, and then mixes them in a proportionate way. Without this proportionate mixture the sṛṣṭi is impossible.

The process adopted to get the proportion is called 'pañcīkaraṇa' (quintuplication).

The process of pañcīkaraṇa can be explained in the following way. In the beginning the Lord divides all the five elements into two parts. Further he takes one part out of them and divides it into four parts. All these four parts are added into other four halves, excluding their own other half.

For example, we can apply the above explained process to ākāśa. In ākāśa there is one half of itself and another half which is made up of one-eighth of the remaining four elements, which constitutes one-fourth of the other half. The result of this process is called ākāśa. The remaining bhūtas are formed in the same way. Though the five bhūtas are mixed, in each bhūta, the preponderance of a particular bhūta, is the cause of its name and usage. On account of the same reason one bhūta is not called by the name of the other bhūta.

Having completed this pañcīkaraṇa process, the almighty, being an antaryāmin (the immanent one) to all jīvās, makes them to experience their past karma. For this purpose, He makes jīvas to enter into the objects of prakṛti and prākṛta. He also creates brahmāṇḍa (the cosmic egg) which consists of seven āvaraṇatattvas. In that brahmāṇḍa, He creates manas, cakṣus, vāk, śrotra, nāsika and nābhīkamala. In one of these seven places the Lord creates the caturmukha (four-faced) Brahman out of his prasāda. Out of His krodha (anger) He creates Rudra. This explanation is based on Śruti, which says, that Nārāyaṇa was only one in the beginning of creation and there was no Brahma or Īśvara. From Nārāyaṇa the four-faced Brahma was born and then the three eyed Śiva who had trīśūla in his hand was born¹.

1. *eko ha vai nārāyaṇa āśīṇna brahma neśānaḥ | tatra brahmā caturmukho jāyata | tryakṣaḥ śūlapāṇiḥ puruṣo'jāyat ||*

Nārāyaṇopaniṣad says that, "Brahma is born from Nārāyaṇa. From Nārāyaṇa Rudra is born" etc.¹

Afterwards, being the antaryāmin to Brahma, God instructs him in all the *Vedas* and endows him the power to create the universe. In this way, the Lord, through caturmukha, becomes a mediate cause and being an antaryāmi becomes the direct centre of this universe. In the same way the Lord instructs Rudra also in *Vedas* and gives him jñāna and śakti to perform the action of saṁhāra. Because He is the antaryāmi, He also performs this action. Deśika says that this idea is brought out in the *Bādarāyaṇa sūtra* (2-4-17) which also states that the agent of both trivṛtkaraṇa and nāma-rūpa-vyākaraṇa is identical.

DIK OR DIRECTION

The nyāya school admits dik (direction) as a substance. Vedānta Deśika refutes this position, stating that dik can be included in ākāśādi dravya or in saṁyoga.

But in *Vedas* dik is stated to be separate tattva apart from ākāśa. It says, that pṛthvī and dik are created by the feet and the ear of the Paramātman respectively. "*padbhyāṁ bhūmirdiśaśśrotrāt*" (*Puruṣasūkta*)

While explaining the pralaya, the *Vedas* say that dik goes back to the śrotra. These two instances establish dik as a separate substance. Deśika answers this problem by pointing out that the Vedic passage refers to only the abhimāni-devatā (the special deity) or upādhi (adjunct) but it does not say the dik itself. Though the separate creation is referred to in *Vedas*, the process which is followed in the case of prāṇa, should be admitted. There, the Śruti says that from this Brahman, the prāṇa, manas, and indriyas

1. nārāyaṇādrudro jāyate | nārāyaṇādbrahmā jāyate |

Nārāyaṇopaniṣad, 1.

are born¹. It looks as though *prāṇa* is a different *tattva*. But *sūtrakara* says: “*na vāyukriye pṛthagupadeśāt*!” (*Brahmasūtra*, 2-4-8.) “Though the separate creation is stated to *prāṇa*, it is nothing but *vāyu viśeṣa* itself.” So the same method should be followed in the case of *dik* also.

Once again this position of *Deśika* contradicts the statement of *Prameya-saṅgraha*, which says, both *ākāśa* and *dik* are having colour because they are created by *trivṛt-karaṇa*². *Deśika* explains this statement by pointing out that *dik* is created by a *bhūta* which is formed by *pañcīkaraṇa*. Anyhow, *dik* is not a separate entity.

Thus beginning from *brahmāṇḍa* to *stamba* (a clump of grass) the world is made up of *pañcīkaraṇa*. Though every object contains the content of other objects, the predominance of a particular *bhūta* becomes the cause of the usage. Here *Deśika* quotes the authority of *Brahmasūtra*, which gives the above meaning “*vaiśeṣyāttu tadvādastadvādaḥ*!” (*Brahmasūtra*, 2-4-19.)

The way in which *pañcīkaraṇa* is explained, *Deśika* says ‘*saptīkaraṇa*’ and ‘*aṣṭīkaraṇa*’³ also are accepted. *Deśika* says, that *bhāṣyakāra* opines that *kṣetra* (body) is formed out of eight substances. Commenting on *Gīta*, *Rāmānuja* says, the five *mahābhūtas* (from *pṛthvī* to *ākāśa*) *ahankāra*, *buddhi* and *avyakta* are the causes of this *śarīra*, which is called as *kṣetra*⁴. Therefore, our body is caused by

1. *etasmājjāyate prāṇo manassarvendriyāṇi ca* | *Muṇḍaka*, 2-1-3.

2. *gaganasya diśām ca trivṛtkaraṇena rūpavattvam* |
Quoted in *Nyāya-siddhāntjana*, p. 92.

3. *aṣṭadravyopādānāni-prakṛti-mahad-ahankāra
pañcabhūtātmatmakāstadravyopādānāni ityarthah* |
Rangarāmānuja bhāṣya on *Nyāya-siddhāntjana*, p. 94.

4. *mahābhūtānyahankāro buddhiravyaktameva ceti kṣetrārambhaka
dravyāṇi* |
Gītābhāṣya, 13-5.

aṣṭa-dravya. They are, prakṛti, mahat, ahaṅkāra and five bhūtas. But our senses are dependent on the body, and are separate substances. They are not the portions of the body. Here Deśika gives the consent of Rāmānuja, who says eleven indriyas, and their objects are dependents of kṣetra¹. According to *Gitābhāṣya*, the kṣetra is formed out of eight substances. This position of Rāmānuja indicates that the transformation of tanmātras (subtle elements) is not partial, but it is complete. In this way the entire universe is created, which is called brahmāṇḍas.

The brahmāṇḍas of this type are innumerable in the body of Paramātmān. The details about them have to be collected from the purāṇas.

The brahmāṇḍa is created for jīvas to experience the results of their past karmas. According to his past karma a jīva gets divine body or human body or the body of animals or the body of immovables².

DEFINITION OF ŚARĪRA (BODY)

In the previous section we saw how jīva gets different bodies according to his past karmas. This makes it necessary to understand the exact nature of the body.

To know an object in its exactness, one should know its definition, which presents the desired object, differentiating it from other objects.

Different scholars have defined the śarīra in different

1. *indriyāṇi dātāṅkaṁ ca pañca cendriyagocarāḥ | iti kṣetraśrītāni tattvāni*.. *Gitābhāṣya* 13-5.

2. *tadya iha ramaṇīya caraṇāḥ ramaṇīyām yonim āpadyeran brāhmaṇa yonim kṣattriya yonim vaiśya yonim vā | atha ya iha kapūya caraṇāḥ abhyaśo ha yatte kapūyām yonimāpadyeran* | *Chāndogya* 5-10-7.

Refer also *Gautama-smṛti* 2-11, 12, 13.

ways. The Nyāya-vaiśeṣika school also defines śarīra in its own way. All schools of Vedānta critically examine the definition given by the Nyāya-vaiśeṣika school and finally give their own definition. So does Vedānta Deśika also.

DEFINITION OF ŚARĪRA OFFERED BY NYĀYA-VAIŚEṢIKAS AND ITS EXAMINATION

The Nyāya-vaiśeṣika school defines śarīra as "*ceṣṭendriyārthāśrayaḥ śarīraḥ*" (*Gautama-nyāyasūtra*, 1-1-11.)

From this definition we can deduce three different definitions. They are: *ceṣṭāśrayatvam*, *indriyāśrayatvam*, *bhogāśrayatvam*

For all these three definitions, they add another *daḷa* (piece) in the body of definition¹. That *daḷa* is 'antyāvayavitva' (the final state or whole of the effect). All these definitions can be applied in the case of our body.

Our body includes limbs like hands, legs, etc., They are *antyāvayavas*. Our body is also a locus for all types of movements. This explanation shows the applicability of the first definition.

As our body is the substratum of the senses, the second definition, i.e., 'indriyāśrayaḥ' becomes applicable to śarīra.

Body of birds, animals and human beings experience the pleasure and pain. So it is the *bhogasthāna*. Therefore the third definition is also applicable.

Deśika refutes all these definitions, showing different fallacies committed by them.

The first definition, namely, 'ceṣṭāśrayatva' commits the fallacy of 'ativyāpti' (being too wide), because *ceṣṭā* means

1. *ceṣṭāvadantyāvayavi vṛtti draṇyatva vyāpya jātimatvam
antyāvayavi mātra vṛtti ceṣṭāvadurtti jātimatvam vā tat*

Nyāya-siddhānta-muktāvalī, p. 123.

action, *kriyā*. Even inert matters like pot, jar, etc., are *ceṣṭāśrayas* because there are also *kriyas* like birth, being (*sthiti*), transformation, development, decay and death, so that this definition does not differentiate the *śarīra* from other things.

This definition of *śarīra* also commits the fallacy of 'avyāpti' (being too narrow). Ahalya, the wife of Gautama, due to the curse of her husband, had assumed the body of stone. Though there was no movement in that body, yet, it was called a *śarīra*.

According to the first definition it should not be called *śarīra*. Deśika vehemently criticises the other part of the definition viz., 'antyāvayavitva' also. He says, 'antyāvayavitva' in the body of definition is like 'lotus of the sky', which is non-existent¹.

According to Nyaya school 'antyāvayavi'² is that whole, which does not produce the *avayavi* of its type. For example, the 'pot', the final whole does not produce another *avayavi*. So is our body. Deśika says that the pot is not an *antyāvayavi*, because we may build walls by the mud of a pot. The same thing can be said of our *śarīra*. The *śarīra* which is the locus of youth, produces the *śarīra* of our old age. Therefore how to explain *antyāvayavitva* in *śarīra*? So the first definition is invalid. The second definition, i.e., 'indriyāśrayatva', is also not valid, because it commits the fallacy of 'ativyāpti'. The *indriyas* are the substratum of *indriyas* through the relation of inseparability.

1. ...*sarvatrāpi tathāprasangāt anārambhakāśakorakāyitamiti sādhu tadviśeṣitam lakṣaṇam* | Nyaya-siddhāṇjana, p. 104.

2. *avayava janyatve satyavayavyajanakattvam* |

Siddhānta-candrodaya, 6.

dravya anārambhaka dravyatvenetyarthaḥ | Dinakari, p. 118.

Deśika adds another objection to this definition in addition to the first one. The dead body is called śarīra, though it is not indriyāśraya. According to the second definition the dead body should not be called śarīra.

Deśika next proceeds to examine the third definition, i. e., "bhogāyatanatva" of Nyāya school. In the definition the word 'āyatana' is used. What does this word 'āyatana' mean? If it means cause, then whichever is the cause of experience of our bhoga (sukha or duḥkha) becomes śarīra. According to this interpretation of the definition, our body is the śarīra. But it commits the fallacy of 'avyāpti' (being too narrow) because the bodies of muktas (eternals) can experience only the sukha and not duḥkha and yet their body is śarīra. Then this definition cannot be applied to the śarīras of the muktas.

To avoid this fallacy, if it is said that only 'sukhāyatana' is called śarīra, then it excludes the bodies of narakins (residents of hell) by which it commits avyāpti.

If only duḥkhāyatana is śarīra, then it commits once again the fallacy of 'avyāpti' in muktā-mukta-śarīra and the śarīra of human beings and animals, etc.

In addition to this, the bhoga-sāmagri (the cause of bhoga) like buildings and vehicles also should be called śarīra, because they are also causes of our bhoga. So the third definition is also fallacious. So far, the definitions given by nyāya and vaiśeṣika thinkers, are examined. A definition should be devoid of fallacies like 'avyāpti', 'ativyāpti' and 'asambhava'. It should also include all objects that are desired to be covered. It should also be in accordance with scriptures. Then it becomes a sallakṣaṇa (perfect definition). Deśika says, that Rāmānuja in his *Śrībhāṣya* gives such a definition which is untouched by such fallacies.

THE PURPOSE OF DEFINING ŚARĪRA IN VEDĀNTA

Now the pūrvapakṣin may ask what is the propriety

of defining śarīra in *Vedānta* which can be known by our day to-day experience? Such objects which are not known correctly by our experience should be defined and discussed in the *Vedāntasāstra*. The character and nature of śarīra may be known by our experience. So *Vedāntasāstra* need not discuss the definition of śarīra at all.

Deśika answers this question in the following way. The objects which we come across in our day to-day life can be defined very easily, because they all are having the common shape and generality. 'Gotva' is common to all go-vyaktis. The individuals who possess gotva are all having the same shape. The same thing can be said of mahiṣatva, ghaṭatva, paṭatva. All the individuals who possess these asādhāraṇa dharma are having an asādhāraṇa ākāra or shape.

The same thing cannot be said of śarīra. Wherever 'śarīra', is used, the common shape in them is not found. The word 'śarīra' is used of quadrupeds, birds, insects, human beings, monkeys, snakes and aquatic animals etc.

The word 'śarīra' is also used of bhūmi, jala, tejas, vāyu, ākāśa, ahaṅkāra, mahat, avyakta, akṣara, tamas, ātma, and mṛtyu, etc. But we don't find an extraordinary shape in them, which is denoted by the word 'śarīra'. But such a shape must exist to explain the pravṛtti of the word 'śarīra'. As it is not known by perception or direct cognition, Rāmānuja has endeavoured to show it through the śāstras.

According to Rāmānuja, the liberation of jīva, from the cycle of birth and death, is possible only when he knows the śarīra-śarīri relation, which exists between the Lord and himself and the world. In fact, the entire world is the body of the Lord. To know that relation, the knowledge of śarīra is very essential. So the definition of śarīra has received an adequate treatment from the hands of the vedāntins of Viśiṣṭādvaita school.

DEFINITION OF ŚARĪRA ACCORDING TO VIŚIṢṬĀDVAITIN

Deśika after establishing the necessity for the discussion of śarīra in this context, quotes from the *Śrībhāṣya*, wherein Rāmānuja defines śarīra. Śarīra¹, is that which is always controlled, supported and is used to his own satisfaction by a cetana. The definition of śarīra given by Udayanācārya, the greatest logician of 8th century A.D. in his *Nyāya-kusumāñjali* (5th stabaka) also resembles this definition: “*prayatnavadadhiṣṭeyatvaṁ śarīratvaṁ*”

Rāmānuja commenting on *Brahmasūtra*, raises several objections against śarīra-śarīribhāva in the sūtra: “*apītau tadvatprasāṅgādasamañjasam*” (2-1-8). In the very next sūtra itself namely, “*na tu dṛṣṭāntabhāvāt*” (*Brahmasūtra*, 2-2-9) he criticises the objection of pūrvapakṣin and establishes, the śarīra-śarīribhāva relation between the world, which is cetana-acetanātmaka and the Sarveśvara. In that context Rāmānuja gives the above mentioned definition which is based on Upaniṣadic teachings. This is based on the statement of *Brhadāraṇyakopaniṣad* which says, He who dwells in the earth and is within the earth, whom the earth does not know, whose body the earth is, who controls the earth from within, He is your self, the inner controller, immortal². Deśika says only this definition is in accordance with the *Śruti*. He says, this definition alone is universally applicable and is intended by Rāmānuja³.

1. *yasya cetanasya yadrūpam sarvātmanā svārtheniyanturṁ dhāray-
itum ca śakyam taccheṣaṭaikasvarūpam ca tat tasya śarīram* |

Śrībhāṣya, p. 457.

2. *yaḥ pṛthivyām tiṣṭhan pṛthivyā antaro yaṁ pṛthivī na veda yasya
pṛthivī śarīram* |

Brhadāraṇyaka, 5-7-7.

2. *sarvapravayogānugūṇam idameva śrūtisiddham vyāpakam
lakṣaṇamiti bhāṣyakārabhipāyaḥ* |

Nyāya-siddhāñjana, p. 99.

According to some ācāryas, this śārīra lakṣaṇa contains only one definition. Some other ācāryas think that there are three definitions. Deśika sides with the second group of ācāryas. Here he gives the evidence of Bhaṭṭa-Parāśara, who says in *Adhyātma-khaṇḍadvaya-vivaraṇa*; that both sentient, and non-sentients are the body of the Lord. Because he uses them according to His whims and fancies. Therefore this definition may be applied to the corporeal bodies also¹.

Therefore there are three definitions. Deśika elucidates those definitions in the following way²: 'Any substance which is a sentient self can completely control and support for its own purposes and which stands to the self in an entirely dependent relation, is called its śārīra'. (*Philosophy of Viśiṣṭādvaita*, p. 241). This is the first definition of śārīra.

According to this definition, the śārīra must be inseparable from the śārīri. It is aprthaksiddha. The śārīra acts according to the dharmabhūtajñāna of the cetana. The corporeal body fulfils this condition. This world which is cetana-acetanātmaka, and different from the Īśvara though it is aprthaksiddha from Him, is the body of Sarveśvara. This world also acts according to dharmabhūtajñāna of Īśvara. Therefore this definition of śārīra is applicable in the world which is cetana-acetanātmaka. This definition states the relation of controller and controlled or the body and the self (niyāmya-niyāmakabhāva).

1. *cetanācetanayoraviśiṣṭam taṁ prati śārīratvam | svecchayā niyacchatū bhagavatā vyāpyatvāviśeṣāt. idameva bhautikasya śārīrasyāpi śārīratvam ityekasya lakṣaṇatayā upapādanāt |*

Nyāya-siddhāntjana, p. 100.

2. *tatraivaṁ lakṣaṇatrayaṇiśkarṣaḥ | yasya cetanasya yadavasthaṁ dravyaṁ yāvatsattamasambandhānārhaṁ suaśakye niyantaurya-svabhāvaṁ, tadavasthaṁ tasya śārīram ityekaṁ lakṣaṇam |*

Nyāya-siddhāntjana, p. 100.

The second definition is, 'A substance which supported with its attributes by a cetana is the śarīra of that cetana'¹.

This second definition of śarīra shows the relation of ādhāra-ādheya-bhāva, that exists between śarīra and śarīri. The ādhāra-ādheya-bhāva relation exists between two things. In the example "bhūtaḥ ghaṭavat", bhūtaḥ is ādhāra (container) and ghaṭa is ādheya (contained). Here ghaṭa the pot, depends on bhūtaḥ. It may be illustrated with another example also, namely "rūpavān ghaṭaḥ". In this example, rūpa is ādheya and ghaṭa is ādhāra, because rūpa (colour) depends on ghaṭa (the pot) for its existence. In the above two examples, the relation that exists between them is ādhāra-ādheya-bhāva.

This relation can be seen in our bodies also. The existence of our body depends on the cetana who resides inside. So our body is ādheya and cetana is ādhāra. This relation exists between them until the body exists.

In the same way, the entire world is the body of Īśvara; because the cetana-acetana-ātmaka prapañca depends on Īśvara for its existence. So the prapañca is ādheya and the Īśvara is ādhāra. The prapañca is aprthaksiddha (inseparable attribute) of Īśvara. Therefore, prapañca is the śarīra of the Lord.

The third definition of śarīra is, 'that substance which is always a śeṣa, with its attributes to cetana is the śarīra of that cetana'². According to this definition, the substance

1. *yasya cetanasya yadavasthaṁ dravyaṁ yāvatsattam dhāryaṁ tadavasthaṁ tasya śarīramiti dvitīyaṁ lakṣaṇam* |

Nyāya-siddhāntajana, p. 102.

2. *tathā yasya cetanasya yadavasthaṁ dravyaṁ yāvatsattam aśeṣatānarhaṁ tadavaśyaṁ tasya śarīraṁ iti tṛtīyaṁ lakṣaṇam* |

Nyāya-siddhāntajana, p. 102.

which is śeṣa (which is used for the satisfaction of others) is śārīra. Then what is this śeṣatva? Rāmānuja defines śeṣatva like this¹: The object which exists for the fulfilment of others' purposes is śeṣa. Śeṣi is the person who uses these objects.. They do not exist for their own sake. Our body exists for the fulfilment of the purposes of the cetana. They exist for the sake of cetana. This is śeṣatva of śārīra. This śeṣatva cannot be obliterated from it. Our body is aprthak-siddha (inseparable) from the cetana. Therefore, the third definition of śārīra also is applicable to our body.

This definition may also be applied to the world of cit and acit which exists for the fulfilment of God's purposes. They do not exist for their own sake. Therefore, the entire universe, according to this definition, forms the śārīra of the God. Deśika says, in the above explained way, Rāmānuja clearly has stated three definitions for śārīra. For the easy understanding of ordinary people, fourth definition may also be given which follows from the above three definitions. This definition is also accepted by Rāmānuja. The fourth definition is 'A substance which, as an inseparable property with its attributes to cetana, is the śārīra of that cetana'². Here 'aprthaksiddhatva' means³, 'inseparability'. That is continuance of attributes until their substratum continues to exist. Ādheyatva, vidheyatva and śeṣatva are also the different parts of aprthaksiddhi. On the whole, this definition means that śārīra is that substance which cannot exist without the cetana. Śārīra is the ādheya (container) vidheya

1. *paragatātīśayādhānecchayā upādeyatvameva yasya svarūpaṁ sa śeṣaḥ paraḥ śeṣī* |
Vedānta-saṅgraha, p. 167

Rāṣyaātraya-sāra, Chp. 3.

2. *yasya cetanasya yadavastham aprthaksiddhaviśeṣaṇaṁ dravyaṁ tat tasya śārīraṁ iti* |
Nyāya-siddhānta-jana, p. 102.

3. *yāvatsattam asambandhānarhatvam* | *Nyāya-siddhānta-jana*, p. 102.

(instrument) and śeṣa (existing for the fulfilment of others purposes) to the cetana¹.

He gives another² definition which is the quintessence of the previous four definitions, i.e., excepting the Īśvara and His dharma-bhūta-jñāna, the remaining entire universe is called śarīra. From this we can deduce that prakṛti and all its transformations, kāla, nityavibhūti and jīva are called śarīra.

THE DIVISIONS OF ŚARĪRA

Thus defined, śarīra is of two kinds. They are nitya-śarīra and anitya-śarīra. Prakṛti and its transformations, kāla, jīva, divyamaṅgaḷa vigraha (śarīra) of Paravāsudeva and the bodies of eternal and liberated souls are called nitya-śarīra. Because they are the śubhāśraya of Paravāsudeva.

The *Viṣṇupurāṇa* explains these bodies in details³. The anitya śarīra is of two types. One is not formed of karma and another is made up of karma. The twenty-three tattvas beginning from mahat to pṛthvī, excluding Paravāsudeva, Saṅkarṣaṇa, Pradyumna, Aniruddha, the bodies of twelve mūrtis like Keśava, Mādhava, etc., (they are called 'vyūhāntaramūrtis') the innumerable incarnations like Rāma and Kṛṣṇa, are all impermanent bodies worn by the Lord

1. *tribhirupalakṣitasyaiva cetanāpṛthaksiddhasya pravṛttinimittatvāt na kaścidadpai doṣaḥ |*
Nyāya-siddhāntajana, p. 103.
2. *īśvara tadjñāna vyatiriktaṁ dravyaṁ śarīramiti vā taṭastha lakṣaṇam |*
Nyāya-siddhāntajana, p. 103.
3. *samastāḥ śaktayaścaitā nṛpa yatra pratiṣṭhitāḥ |*
tadviśvarūpavairūpyaṁ rūpamanyaddharermahat ||
samastaśaktirūpāṇi tat karoti janeśvara |
devatiryāṅ manuṣyākhyāḥ ceṣṭavanti svalīlayā ||
śubhāśrayaḥ sacittasya sarvagasyā calātmanah |

Viṣṇupurāṇa, 6-7-70, 71, 76.

by His own will. In the same way, the bodies, taken now and then, by eternal and the liberated souls, on earth, are impermanent bodies. All these bodies are not formed of karma.

The body made up of karma also is of two types. The former is formed by karma, and the saṅkalpa (will) of cetana. To this group belongs the body of Saubhari.

Saubhari was a great sage. He married fifty daughters of the emperor Māndhātā. To enjoy the pleasure of the body, he assumed fifty bodies at a time by his own will and hence those bodies are known as saṅkalpakṛta śarīras. The bodies of human beings and animals, etc., belong to the group of kevala karmakṛta bodies.

Once again, we can divide the body into two groups. They are jaṅgama and ajaṅgama (movables and immovables). The piece of wood and stones also belong to the ajaṅgama group of bodies.

In *Viṣṇu-purāṇa*, immovables are divided into five groups i.e., vṛkṣa (tree), gulma (bush), latā (creeper), vīrut (spreading creeper), tṛṇa (grass). All these groups are given five signs respectively. They are tamas, moha, mahāmoha, tamisra and andhatāmisra. The piece of wood and stone belong to vīrut type of immovable bodies. Daṇḍa says that the incident of Ahalya shows that even stones possess jīvātman. Therefore grass, bush, stones etc., possess the individual soul. In support of this he quotes from the *Vedārtha-saṅgraha* which clearly explains the above position. There Rāmānuja says¹

1. ato devo, manuṣyaḥ, yakṣaḥ, rākṣasaḥ, pakṣi, vṛkṣaḥ, latā, kṣāṭham, śilā, tṛṇam, ghaṭaḥ, paṭaḥ ityādayaḥ sarve prakṛti-pratyayayogena abhidhāyakataya prasiddhāḥ śabdāḥ loke tattadvācyatayā pratīyamānā tattatsamsthāna-vastumukhena tad-abhimāni-jīva-tadantaryāmi-paramātma-paryantasyaiva vācakāḥ.

Vedārtha-saṅgraha p. 18.

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that every word, formed by the combination of prakṛti and pratyaya, such as deva, manuṣyaḥ, yakṣaḥ, rākṣasaḥ, pakṣi etc., are the denotations of jīvātman and finally the Paramātman.

Rāmānuja in his commentary on *Gīta* points out that the jīva gets the lower bodies because of his karma. This is clear in the Bhāṣya on the stanza; “*ūrdhvaṃ gacchanti sattvasthāḥ*” (*Gītā*, 14-18). Those who follow the righteous path go to the heaven.

The jaṅgama group of bodies is of four types. They are deva, manuṣya, tiryak and nāraki.

The asura, yakṣa, rākṣasas belong to the different deva groups. Human beings who live in bhūloka belong to manuṣya group. They are bound by the rules of śāstras. Even devas have to follow these śāstras, because the śāstras prescribe expiatory rites like sacrifice, penance and reception of Brahmanavidyā for them also. Animals, birds and serpents belong to tiryak group of jaṅgamas.

The bodies of nāraki is famous in hell, like raurava. Their bodies are the locus of miseries only.

The jaṅgama type of bodies once again can be divided into two groups. They are yonija and ayonija. Bodies of deva, manuṣya and tiryak belong to these types of bodies. Among devas the body of the four-faced Brahma and the body of Madhukaitābha which are born of nābhikamala and the will of almighty respectively and even the bodies of sages like Sanaka, Kardama, Nārada, Pulāsa, Atri etc., are ayonijas. Among human beings the bodies of Dhṛṣṭadyumna, Draupadi are ayonijas. Among tiryaks the bodies of Airāvata, Uccaiśravas etc., are ayonijas. The yonija type of bodies among these three groups are well known. The bodies of nārakins also is ayonija because those bodies are taken by jīvas only to reap the results of their evil-deeds.

The pañcāgni-vidyā of *Chāndogya Upaniṣad* (5-9-1) metaphorically states that dyuloka, parjanya, pṛthvī, puruṣa and yoṣit are five fires in which the five oblations are offered, viz., śraddhā, soma, vṛṣṭi, anna and retas. Here the fifth agni is yoṣit. This jīva wears the body and is called puruṣa only after offering the fifth oblation, i.e., retas (vitality) in fifth agni viz., yoṣit. It is called pañcama āhuti. The rule of pañcama āhuti applies only to the bodies which belong to yonija type of bodies.

Jīvātman gets only the conjunction of ākāśa, vāyu, dhūma, abhra (megha) and, finally vṛṇhi (corns), before he gets into the body of the male. Jīvātman comes out very soon from the above-mentioned things before he enters the vṛṇhi or corns. After coming out from the vṛṇhi, the process becomes slow. After the fifth oblation the development as detailed above and transformations therein, can be known from *Āyurveda* and *Yogabindu*.

Śarīra may also be categorized into jarāyuja (womb-born), andaja (egg-born), uḍaja (seed-born) and svedaja (sweat-born).

In vyāṣṭi sṛṣṭi, the bodies of jīvas are also the bodies of Īśvara through jīva. This has been seen in the writings of Rāmānuja in many places¹.

Deśika says that every jīva assumes the body of Īśvara at all times without any break (directly). But the acit becomes the body of jīva according to his karma. This body remains until that particular karma lasts.

ŚARĪRA-ŚARĪRI BHĀVA EXPLANATION

According to Viśiṣṭādvaita philosophy, both cit and acit

1. *jīvadvarā paramātmani paryavasyanti | cidacitoḥ paramātma-
śarīratvāt | evameva hi jīvātmanah svaśarīrasambhandhaḥ |
evameva paramātmanah sarvaśarīritvena sarvaśabdavācyaṭvam |*

Refer Śrībhāṣya on Sūtras 2-1-8, 9.

are the bodies of Īśvara. Brahman is the śarīrin or inner-self of all other entities, whether it is sentient or non-sentient entity. This idea is the fundamental special concept of Viśiṣṭādvaita philosophy and is called "pradhāna-pratitantra" (distinguishing differentia) of this system. This concept of śarīra-śarīri bhāva is not an invention of Rāmānuja. This concept is deduced from the infallible scriptures and the experiences of great sages and reason. There are two types of scriptures. One is bheda-śruti, which establishes the plurality of entities. Another is abheda-śruti, which establishes simple unity. This apparent contradiction is not solved satisfactorily either by the school of Advaita or Dvaita. But Rāmānuja solves this contradiction by making Brahman the śarīrin of all beings, and by this concept the school of Rāmānuja binds all plurality into unity.

In sadvidyā, the Upaniṣadic passage '*sadeva saumya idamagra āsīt ekameva advitīyam...*' (*Chāndogya Upaniṣad* 6-2-1) affirms in unmistakable terms that the universe is rooted in Brahman. *Chāndogya Upaniṣad* (6-9, 10) expounds by means of various similes, the inner unity between Brahman and the jīva. The *Antaryāmi Brāhmaṇa* of the *Bṛhadāraṇyakopaniṣad* clearly establishes¹ the truth of śarīra and śarīri relation. These passages of the Upaniṣad are called ghaṭaka (reconciliatory) śrutis, as they reconcile the extremes of advaita and dvaita. Thus the truth of śarīra-śarīribhāva is proved by scriptures. Rāmānuja explains this Upaniṣadic philosophy in detail in many places².

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1. *yasyāpaḥ śarīram*, 5-7-8; *yasyākāśaḥ śarīram*, 5-7-16; *yasyaprāṇaḥ śarīram*, 5-7-20; *yasyaprthivī śarīram*, 5-7-7; *yasya tamaḥ śarīram*, 5-7-17; *yasya ātmā śarīram*, 5-7-30.

yasyāvuyuktaḥ śarīram

Subalopaniṣad 7.

2. *sarvaṁ cetanācetanam prati brahmaṇaḥ ātmatvena sarvaṁ sacetanam tasya śarīram bhavati* | *Śrībhāṣya* 1-1-13.

The jīva and the remaining world do not become the body of the Paramātmān, due to karma, as the body is in the case of the jīvātman. The world is inherently the body of Īśvara. The body of the jīva changes from birth to birth. At the time of liberation the relation between jīva and the body is completely severed. But the world is not related to Brahman, like this. The universe is inseparably related to Brahman. It cannot exist at any time apart from it.

Though the universe is related to Brahman in the above explained way, each substance retains its distinctive nature. Though the universe is the body of the Brahman, Brahman is not tainted with the pleasure or pain of jīva or the impurities of acetana. The experience of pleasure or pain is only on account of karma. But the Paramātmān has no trace of karma what so ever. Therefore it is far removed from evil. The defects of the body, such as, deafness, blindness etc., and dharma, such as, birth, death, etc., do not touch the self. In the same way Brahman is not tainted with the imperfections of the jīva.

This concept of body-soul relationship proved by the Vedic passages definitely reconciles the apparently contradictory texts. Rāmānuja condenses the Vedārtha-saṅgraha, that the 'śarīra śarīri bhāva' reconciles Vedāntic doctrines like those of bhāva-abheda and bheda². Further Rāmānuja says in the same work that this relation of śarīra-śarīri bhāva proves the eternality of the name

1. *evam ca sati paramātmānāṁ sarva śarīratayā anvayāt jīvagata dharmāḥ paramātmānāṁ sprṣanti yathā śarīragatā bālatva yuvatva sthāviraśūnyatayā dharmā jīvaṁ na sprṣanti*

Śrībhāṣya, p. 245.

2. *sarva śarīratayā sarvaparakāram brahmaiva avasthitamiti abhedasamarthitah | ekameva brahma nānābhūta cit-acit-vastu prakāram nānātvena avasthitamiti bheda-bhedau | Vedārtha-saṅgraha, p. 90.*

of Brahmanavidyā as śārīrakamīmāṃsā. (Enquiry in to the inner-self¹).

Deśika explained the concept of śārīra all-comprehensively and it holds good for any kind of śārīra. The substance which is supported, sustained and used by a cetana for his satisfaction only, is called śārīra. This concept is based on the scriptural passages and experience. To establish this spiritual relationship Vedānta Deśika explained the concept of śārīra according to Naiyāyika school and examined it.

CONCLUSION OF JAḌA-PARICCHEDA

Vedānta Deśika thus has explained the jaḍa padārthas in a vital way. The proper understanding of the world also leads the individual self to liberation. The Upaniṣad declared "yāthātathyato arthān vyadadhāt śāśvatībhyaḥ samābhyaḥ" (Iśhaopaniṣad, 8). One who understands the world as it is he gets freedom from bondage.

Gautama brings out the essence of Upaniṣads in the "Nyāyasūtras" when he says "duḥkha janma pravṛtti mithyājñānānām uttara uttara apāye tad-anantara-apāyād apavargaḥ" (Nyāya-siddhānta, 1-1-2). That apavarga (liberation) follows when erroneous knowledge is destroyed. If the five causes of sorrow viz., pain (duḥkha), birth (janma), effort (pravṛtti), faults (doṣa) and erroneous knowledge (ajñāna or mithyājñāna) are destroyed².

The right knowledge expels the erroneous knowledge.

1. *atha evedam parambrahma adhikṛtya pravṛttam śāstram śārīrakamityabhiyuktair abhidhīyate* | Śrībhāṣya, p. 246.

2. Dr. Radhakrishnan says: "All the systems have for their ideal complete mental poise and freedom from the discords and uncertainties, sorrows and sufferings of life, a repose that ever is the same, which no doubt disturb and no rebirths break into".

Indian Philosophy II, p. 26.

The elimination of erroneous knowledge puts an end to our desires. When desires are lost, the effect ceases, for there is no more desire to induce him. With the cessation of effort, the cycle of birth and death comes to an end, for there is no adṛṣṭa which is caused by effort. When the series of birth ends, there will be no more pain, because the self is separated for ever from the body which is the seat of all miseries. Thus according to the Nyāya-vaiśeṣika school, liberation (mokṣa) is the complete cessation from pain. It is the goal of all human beings.

In Vedānta śāstra, also, the clear understanding of the prakṛti and her transformations is very essential for a seeker for Brahman. Rāmānuja says in his gadya¹, that prakṛti allures us, covers our intelligence and obstructs the realisations of the atman and Paramātman. Prakṛti misleads us. She instigates us not to relish the bliss of ātmasākṣātkāra and Paramātmasākṣātkāra. Due to her, jīva is in bondage. Therefore, jīva should become free from prakṛti to enjoy the bliss of liberation. This freedom from prakṛti cannot be attained without the knowledge of character and nature of prakṛti. Therefore, Vedānta Deśika has given the clear picture of the prakṛti and her transformations in jaḍa-pariccheda. Deśika says, prakṛti is the abode of Lord's līla-vibhūti. During the time of pralaya, prakṛti acts like a consort of Paramātman: and she is also the yoganidrā of Īvara. He describes her figuratively that the eternal juggler, the Lord, uses prakṛti as a feather of a peacock to create this wonderful universe. In Vedānta, prakṛti is called 'avidyā'. The Śruti says "ajāmekāṁ lohitaśuklakṛṣṇāṁ" (Śvetāśvatara, 4-5).

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1. *bhagavatsvarūpa tirodhānakarīm svaviśayāyāśca bhogyabuddher-jananīm dehendriyatvena bhogyatvena sūkṣmarūpeṇa cavasthitām guṇamayīm māyām* |

The entire prakṛti is the body of the Lord, which possesses different qualities, colours, such as lohita (red), śukla (white) sattva and kṛṣṇa (black) tamas. Therefore, understanding or the knowledge of the body of the human (Viṣṇu) is very essential.



Chapter III

JĪVA

GENERAL-INTRODUCTION

Vedānta-Deśika, after dealing elaborately with prakṛti and kāla, in the jaḍa-pariccheda, now begins to deal with ātman which is the **pivotal** problem of all the philosophical systems in India. **The subject ātman**, has been widely discussed in all systems of Indian Philosophy.

In fact, all systems aim at ātmāvalokana. We are told to seek Paramātman through ātmāvalokana. The final goal of Karmayoga, Jñānayoga, Bhaktiyoga is to realize this reality i.e., ātman.

Then, what is **this ātman**? Viśiṣṭādvaita psychology of jīva is founded on **the authority** of the Upaniṣads, sūtras and the *Gītā* and **the ātmānubhava** or experience of the self. Therefore it should **define the character** and nature of the ātman and in doing so, **it should demonstrate** the peculiar nature of the ātman **adopted in this system**.

In the philosophy of Viśiṣṭādvaita the ātman is not merely one of the **prameyas**, but the sole prameya (object known by the valid **source of knowledge**). The introductory stanza of this work **states**—“prameyamabhidmadmahe”. Therefore, the discussion of ātman in this context is appropriate.

DEFINITION OF ĀTMAN ACCORDING TO VIŚIṢṬĀDVAITA

Accordingly, Deśika at first **defines** ātman (jīvātman). He says: “*alpa-parimāṇatve sati jñātrtvam | śeṣatve sati jñātrtvam, ityādi tallakṣaṇam* |” (*Nyāya-siddhāñjana*, p. 113).

According to the system of Viśiṣṭādvaita, the ātman is atomic in size and also the substratum of knowledge by the relation of *apṛthaksiddhi*. Īśvara also possesses knowledge but he is not atomic in size. In the first definition, if the first piece or *daḥa* is not added, then it commits the fallacy of overlapping in Īśvara. Because He also possesses *jñāna* and hence He is also a *jñāta*. Therefore Īśvara becomes the substratum of *jñāna*. If the first part is added to the body of the definition then, the fallacy becomes warded off, because Īśvara does not possess *alpa-parimāṇa*. He is *Vibhu*. If the second part, i.e., "*jñātṛtva*" is not added in the body of definition, then it commits the fallacy of overlapping in *trasareṇu* (triad), because triad also possesses atomic size.

Here in this definition the word '*jñātṛtva*' means the possession of knowledge which is intended to be in ātman, by the relation of *apṛthaksiddhi* (inseparability). Otherwise, it commits the fallacy of '*ativyāpti*' in objects, like *ghaṭa* (pot) *paṭa* (cloth), etc., because whenever an object is known, the known object becomes the *jñāna-āśraya* (locus of knowledge) by the peculiar relation, i.e., *viśayatva*. *Viśayatā* exists in the known object. Therefore, to avoid this fallacy, *jñātṛtva* must be attributed to ātman by the relation of *apṛthaksiddhi*.

The second definition states that the substance which possesses the *śeṣatva-dharma* (existing for the fulfilment of God's purposes) and *jñātṛtva-dharma* by *apṛthaksiddhi* is called ātman.

As it is in the case of first definition, here also the first piece stands for eliminating '*ativyāpti*' in Īśvara, whereas the second piece of definition stands for the same (eliminating *ativyāpti*), in *ghaṭa* (pot) and *paṭa* (piece of cloth). In *Ghaṭa* and *paṭa* etc., there is *śeṣatvadharma*. Because they exist for the purpose of others.

After defining ātman in the above mentioned manner, Vedānta Deśika, proceeds to distinguish the individual ātman from the rest of objects¹. He begins to examine the other systems regarding the nature of ātman which according to him go against the Upaniṣadic philosophy.

The great Yāmūnācārya propounds the distinguishing attributes of ātman in his *Siddhitraya* in the following way: ātman² is different from the deha, indriya, manas, prāṇa, buddhi. Ātman is svayamprakāśa-tattva and he requires no other instruments for his manifestation.

He is eternal and all-pervasive. The jīvātman is different from body to body. He is of the nature of ānanda. Deśika's description of the self, differentiating it from body, sense, mind, etc., is in one way a commentary on the above śloka of Yāmūnācārya. At the outset, ācārya Yāmūna has stated that the ātman is different from our body. So Deśika also at first takes up this issue for a detailed discussion.

ĀTMAN IS DIFFERENT FROM BODY

According to the materialists, ātman is not different from the body. Their arguments can be summed up in the following way. Our body is an aggregate of several parts. Jñāna or consciousness might be attributed either to any of them or to each of them. The part which possesses the caitanya or consciousness may be called the 'ātma-tattva'. This is their first argument. Deśika examines the above argument stating that it cannot be said that either a part

1. The concept of ātman is more easily explained by what it is not than by what it is and by a criticism of the negative definitions, the positive meaning may be reconstructed.

Philosophy of Viśiṣṭādvaita, p. 275.

2. *dehendriya-manahprāṇadhībhyo'nyonanyasādhanaḥ |
nityo vyāpti pratikṣetram atma bhinnah svataḥ sukhī ||*

Siddhitraya, p. 17.

or the aggregate of parts is ātman. It cannot be argued, that there are a number of 'selves' to guide the body. The experience says that our actions are done by our body in unity, not in diversity. If it is admitted that the aggregate of several parts is ātman, then how to answer the above objection? Then the unity of purpose becomes impossible, because of the presence of a number of souls in a single body. Deśika offers the same objections to dehātmavādin in his *Tattvamuktā-kalāpa*. "*pratyekaṁ cetanatve bahuriha kalaho vītarāgo na jātaḥ*" (2-1). Ācārya Yāmuna also offers the same objections: 'If caitanya is admitted in every atom of the body, then in a single body, the dehātmavādin has to accept innumerable souls. "*pratyekaṁ paramāṇuṣu caitanyānupalabdheḥ tadabhyupagame ca eka śarīra eva anekasahasracetanāpātāt*" (*Siddhitraya*, p. 21).

In the same way, it cannot be accepted that any one of these avayavas of our physical body is the self, because the loss of anyone of the part of the body should mean the death. Even after the loss of any part of the body, we possess the pratyabhijñā of the type "so'ham" (He I am). This experience would become impossible if a part of the body is identified with the soul. In our daily transactions, we experience, 'my hand' 'my head', 'my legs', 'my eyes', etc. These experiences imply difference between the 'I' and the 'mine'. Deśika in his *Tattvamuktākalāpa* says "*yo me hastādivarṣmetyavayava-niyamād bhāti bhinnassa ekaḥ*" (2-1), that ātman experienced in this way is one.

To overcome this objection, the dehātmavādin gives the second explanation in which he says, that caitanya is not admitted either in each part of the body or in a single part of the body. Consciousness is accepted in the avayavi, which is different from the avayavas.

Deśika points out that it is ridiculous to state that

consciousness exists in **avayavi**. Because the Cārvāka himself does not accept **avayavi** apart from **avayavas**. The Cārvāka philosophers agree that the cluster of triads (*trasareṇu*) transform themselves into various objects of the universe. Therefore the **avayavi** never exists apart from the **avayavas**.

Even taking for granted that the existence of **avayavi** cannot prove **dehātmavāda**, because the **avayavi** cannot be composed of the qualities different from those found in the parts only, the qualities found in the parts may be found in the whole. Therefore the objections raised before holds good here also.

Dehātmavādin may argue that there is no rule that the qualities found in the parts alone must be seen in the effect. The *pūrvapakṣin* takes recourse to the 'pitarapākavāda' of Naiyāyika.

The Vaiśeṣikas are the followers of *pīlupākavāda*. 'Pīlu' means the atom. *Pāka*¹ is the conjunction with the peculiar *tejas*, which changes the colour, smell, etc., of the thing. According to these thinkers, the *pāka* begins in *paramāṇus*, (atoms). The change in colour is produced in parts through the action of fire.

Opposed to this view some other Naiyāyikas hold the view that *pāka* does not begin in parts. It is in 'pitara' **avayavi**. The black pot burnt in fire turns into red pot. This adventitious redness did not exist in parts before it turned into red. So it proves that the view that the qualities of the parts alone should be found in the whole, is not correct. Therefore, to admit that the body as an **avayavi** possesses the consciousness is not wrong.

1. *rūpādiparāvṛtti phalakeḥ tejassamyogaḥ* |

Dinakari, p. 395.

*rūpa rasa gandha sparśānām nāśam pratitu yeka jātīya eva agni
samyogaḥ kāraṇam iti sparśa nāśakāle rūpanāśaḥ āvaśyakaḥ iti
Gadādhara-ya-caturdaśa-lakṣmī, Lakṣaṇa 1*

Deśika states that the above argument is fallacious. The pāka happens not only to avayavi but also to the component parts. In the same way, consciousness should also be present in the avayavas, because consciousness is found in the avayavi. Thus the previous objection remains unshakable.

Deśika points out to the famous saying of the Cārvāka: "tebhyaścaitanyaṁ kiṇvādibhyo madaśaktivat", i.e., 'Caitanya arises in the body and disappears when the body disintegrates'. Cārvāka compares consciousness to the intoxicating quality which arises by the mixing up of the ingredients such as yeast etc., in the preparation of wine. These ingredients do not possess the quality of intoxication separately, is a pralāpa (non-sensical talk).

The Cārvākas, in order to establish their theory, that the aggregate of avayavas produce the consciousness, take shelter behind this analogy and conclude that the intoxicating power in wine is produced by the ingredients of the component parts.

Deśika refutes this argument on the ground that the existence of a quality in the avayavi presupposes its existence in the component parts. So the defects pointed out in this view cannot be escaped.

The principles that the quality which is non-existent in the component parts cannot be found in the avayavi, may be exemplified as follows.

1. In a multi-coloured cloth different colours of its material cause, viz., tantu (thread) alone is found. Because the colour of the cloth and the thread cannot be different.

2. Even in the mango the sweetness or sourness of its component parts alone is experienced and those tastes are not produced newly in the mango.

3. The smell of mango fruit is attractive when it is in good condition. When it gets foul-smell it is repellent. In both the cases the good smell or the bad smell which exists in its component parts become the causes.

4. In the plantain-leaf the hard-touch or the soft-touch which is experienced, is due to only hardness or softness of its component parts.

5. Lastly in a tree, smallness or largeness which is experienced is due to the size of its component parts viz., branches, stem etc.

In all the above examples only the qualities which are existent in the parts alone are found in the whole. Therefore even in the example of Cārvāka the qualities experienced in avayava alone are experienced in the avayavi and hence Cārvāka has to admit consciousness in every 'avayava' of the body and thus commits the fallacy of ātma-anavasthā in a body.

Cārvāka further argues that though the avayavi of the component parts (avayava) cannot be accepted as the ātman, consciousness can be attributed to a product, resulting out of the five elements, which is a dhātuviśeṣa (an essential ingredient of the body). This dhātuviśeṣa which is the result of the five elements may be called 'ātman'. To this 'dhātuviśeṣa' the speed also is attributed, as Naiyāyikas attribute the speed for mind. Now there is no incompatibility in experience of pleasure and pain at the same time. So the peculiar dhātuviśeṣa inside the body is ātman. Deśika points out that this position is conceded by Vedāntin in part, as according to this view ātman transcends the body. Such an ātman is bound to be eternal and blissful.

Therefore ātman is neither the product of five elements nor a mere dhātuviśeṣa. It is super-physical, eternal, atomic, blissful, self-luminous and the śarīra of Paramātmān.

According to the strict followers of Veda, the 'dehātmaikya-jñāna' can be expelled only by āgama. Deśika quotes here the authority of ācārya Yāmuna, according to whom, śrotriyas desire to know ātman by āgama¹ (scriptures).

THE ĀTMAN IS DIFFERENT FROM THE EXTERNAL SENSE ORGANS

There is another school of thought that identifies the self with the external sense organs. Their contention is that our external sense organs are ātman. Everyone experiences consciousness in the waking state, because then the senses are active. In deep sleep one cannot experience the caitanya because then senses are undergoing rest. Therefore the upalabdhi (perceptibility) and anupalabdhi (non-perceptibility) of consciousness depends upon the sense organs. The perceiver must be the knower. He is ātman. Our senses perceive objects. Therefore it is better to identify ātman with our senses.

In addition to this, the experiences like "aham sakalaḥ" (I am perfect) and "aham vikalāḥ" (I am defective) with reference to good or bad conditions of sense organs, also prove that our senses are ātman. Therefore, our senses alone are ātman.

Deśika raises the same objections which were raised by him against the dehātmavāda. The indriyātmavādin cannot rebut the objection viz., the maintenance of unity in the body is incompatible. As there are many senses, there are many ātmans and there must be many opinions, as a result no action can take place.

In siddhānta there is no such problem. Because the experiencer is one and the same. Further in indriyātmavāda

1. *ānumānikīmapi ātmasiddhim aśraddhadhānāḥ śrautīmeva tām śrotriyāḥ saṅgirante* |
Yāmuna's *Ātmasiddhi*.

the ātman who is of the form of cakṣurindriya cannot hear. In the same way the ātman who is of the form of śrotrendriya cannot see. Because one sense cannot perform the action of another sense. But in our body the same ātman performs all actions. The ātman hears, tastes and touches. The pot which is seen is touched by same person. This action is not possible in indriyātmavāda.

Another important incompatibility in indriyātmavāda is this. Experience and recollection require the same substratum. One who experiences alone can remember. For example a particular thing or person seen by Chaitra may be remembered by Chaitra alone. Maitra cannot remember what is experienced by Chaitra. Indriyātmavādin cannot explain this principle, because he has to admit many souls as there are many indriyas. As a result the experience like 'I touch the pot that I had seen' remains unexplained.

The aggregate of senses also cannot be identified with the ātman because we do not have such type of experience as "samudayo'ham" (I am the collection of indriyas).

Further, everyone experiences the dream. In the dream experiencer sees a tiger. However in the dream state the senses are taking rest. Then who else perceives the tiger in that state if not the ātman? Therefore, ātman is different from the senses.

The experiences like "sakalo'ham", "vikalo'ham" etc., are due to the false identification of ātman with the senses or those experiences tell that "I possess the good or bad body" respectively. Therefore the sense like cakṣus, śrotra, etc., are not ātman.

ĀTMAN IS DIFFERENT FROM MANAS AND PRĀṆA

Now the mentalist argues that the mind is the ātman. All our experiences would end in confusion if there was no

unifying factor like mind. So the mind itself is ātman.

The manas (mind) is known by Śruti. The same Śruti says: "*manasā hyeva paśyati*". That the mind is the extraordinary cause of our experiences. Even from the inference the mind is known as an instrument, not as an agent.

All our experiences are produced by either of our senses. Feeling happy is also an experience. The eyes and ears are incapable of conveying that experience. As a residue the mind must be the cause of that experience. Therefore mind is not an agent, but it is an extraordinary cause.

An extraordinary cause viz., karaṇa is always different from kartā (agent). When the woodcutter cuts the wood by his axe the axe becomes an instrument to the wood-cutter. Here the wood-cutter and the instrument viz., axe are different. In the same way one has to admit the difference between the manas (karaṇa) and the ātman (kartā). Further, according to the statement of purāṇa, the mind is produced by sāttvika-ahankāra¹. Therefore, it is non-eternal. So it cannot become the ātman.

Now the prāṇātmavādin argues that the activities of body, sense, and manas, depend on the five vital parts of prāṇa. Death or birth is decided on the presence of prāṇa. Therefore prāṇa alone is ātman. Deśika refutes this view stating that the objections pointed out in dehātmavāda also apply to prāṇātmavāda².

Non identity of ātman with prāṇa is well established in *Bṛhadāraṇyakopaniṣad*, 4-1-15 in a very interesting way.

1. *taijasānīndriyāṇyāhurdevā vaikārikā daśa! ekadaśaṁ manaścātra devā vaikārikāsmṛtāḥ |*
Viṣṇupurāṇa, 1-2-46, 47.

2. *nāpi prāṇaḥ tasyāpi dehokta yuktisāmyāt |*

Nyāya-siddhānta, p. 116.

Bālāki who was born in Gārgya-gotra having studied all the lores of Vedas and Vedāṅgas went to Kāśi to meet Ajātaśatru who was a brahmavid. Bālāki being defeated by Ajātaśatru in brahmavidyā requested Ajātaśatru to impart spiritual knowledge to him (Bālāki). Ajātaśatru took Bālāki to his palace and in his presence called the name of a person who was in sound sleep. He called him by four different names. But that person did not wake up. Then the king shook his body by his hand and as a result that person woke up. The intention of the king Ajātaśatru was this. The king knew that Bālāki was definite that ātman is different from body, sense and manas. He wanted to teach Bālāki, that ātman is different from prāṇa and hence he woke up the sleeping person. Thus the Upaniṣad clearly demonstrates that ātman is different from prāṇa.

ĀTMAN IS DIFFERENT FROM BUDDHI

The Buddhists deny the existence of the self and describe buddhi as the self.

We observed that deha, indriya, manas and prāṇa cannot be identified with ātman. But the Buddhists argue that buddhi can be accepted as ātman. The existence of buddhi cannot be denied by pūrvapakṣin and siddhātin. In spite of admitting an extra entity like ātman, it is lāghava to admit buddhi as ātman. This type of lāghava-nyāya is also accepted by the Mīmāṃsā school which¹ says that it is easier to accept adjectives than the substratum. Therefore buddhi alone is ātman.

Deśika refutes this position. He says, “nāpi dhīḥ jñātṛdharmatayā naśvaratayā ca sphuraṇāt sa evāhamiti pratisandhānānupapatteḥ!” (Nyāya-siddhāntajana, p.117), that

1. dharmikalpanāto varan dharmakalpanāḥ

Nyāya-siddhāntajana, p. 116.

buddhi means knowledge, which is the dharma (adjectival nature) of ātman. It can never be a dharmi (substantive). We always say 'I have got knowledge and I have lost knowledge'. This experience shows the non-eternality of the buddhi. So how can it become an eternal self? The self is eternal and is a substratum of consciousness. In addition to this, the recognitional experience 'He I am' must become an illusion, because there is no continuity of the self. This pratyabhijñā experience cannot be sublated like other illusory knowledge. Therefore the recognition 'He I am' must be a valid one. This kind of pratyabhijñā experience cannot be refuted by Buddhist. Inferential arguments like, "yat.sat tat kṣaṇikam yathā jaladharapaṭalaḥ" whatever exists in momentary just as a piece of cloud etc., are already refuted¹.

Even though we accept the illusory nature of recognition, it proves the eternality of the self, because pratyabhijñā is produced by reminiscences, impressions (saṃskāra) of the previous experience. Memory and recognition, etc., are possible only when we accept the sāmānādhikarāṇya of anubhava and saṃskāra. The locus of saṃskāra, memory and recognition must be the same one namely an eternal one. The Nyāya maxim says, "anubhavasamskārasmaranānām ekādhikarāṇyam", that experience, disposition and memory arise in the same person. It means a person who experiences alone remembers. Nobody can remember anything on the basis of other's experience. This maxim also establishes and proves the eternality of the self. If the self is non-eternal as it is held by Buddhists, then there is no scope for memory and recognition.

Further, the Buddhists argue that anubhava, saṃskāra and smaraṇa need not necessarily be found in the same substratum. The example 'kārpāse raktatā yathā' also proves

1. Refer *Tattvamuktā-kalāpa* from 1-25 to 31.

this. Cotton seeds cured in a particular manner yield red coloured cotton. Here the *saṁskāra* and its result is found in different substratum. Therefore there is no necessity of admitting an eternal entity. Deśika rebuts this argument 'tadapyasat'. The Buddhists example is not tenable and unfavourable to him alone. The curing process pervades every part of the seed and cured parts continue till the time of cotton turning into red. So the above example proves that *saṁskāra* yields the results in one and the same locus.

The other arguments of the Buddhists like *jñānasantānaikyavāda*, *citta-vijñāna-vāda*¹ and *ālaya-vijñāna-vāda*² are not tenable because of the non-admittance of the eternal self.

The contention of '*santānaikyavāda*' is this. Buddhists, to overcome the arguments of reminiscent impressions, argue, that the consciousness is produced by way of cause and effect. Consciousness arises like a continuous flux. The former consciousness flows into the present consciousness with its *vāsanās* and causes memory, pleasure and pain. This argument is further strengthened by an analogy. With the connection of scented cloth, the unscented cloth also gets fragrance³. In the same way the *vāsanā* or the *saṁskāra* of previous *vijñāna* flows into the succeeding *vijñāna* and hence there is no incompatibility of *amarāpa* or *pratyabhijñā*, even though the eternal *ātman* is not admitted by Buddhists.

But this *santānaikyavāda* can be explained only when '*sānvayavināśa*' is admitted. When we say that something is destroyed, it means only the destruction of attributes and

1. *tat syāddhi citta vijñānam yannūlōdikamullikhet* |

Tattvasūddhi, p . 288.

2. *tat syadālaya vijñānam yadbhavedahamāspadam* |

Tattvasūddhi, p. 288.

3. *mṛgamadavāsanā vāsita vasana iva* |

Nyāya-siddhānta-muktāvalī, p. 164.

not of the substratum. Though the state of seed is lost in the seed, when it grows as a tree, the substratum continues and it is true with the consciousness also. But Buddhists do not admit the permanency of the substratum. Because Buddhists are called 'Niranvayavināśa-vādins'.

Deśika states that the philosophy of yogācāra does not stand to reason. The philosophers of that school accept that consciousness itself is the self¹. It is grasped as though differentiated into jñāna, jñeya and jñātā. In fact this is not so. Buddhist philosophy admits the series of consciousness as the self. It does not attribute eternality to it. As a result of this there should be unconnected consciousness, and therefore buddhist cannot explain memory and recognition. Deśika, therefore says that the ātman is different from the body, the sense organs, the mind, the vital airs, and consciousness, though it uses all these as its instruments.

JÑĀNA-SVARŪPATVA AND JÑĀNA-GUṆAKATVA OF ĀTMAN

After examining kṣaṇika-vijñānātmavādin, Deśika examines the school of nitya-vijñānātmavādin. He calls the latter school 'Bauddha-gandhi-vedāntin'². The objections pointed out in Buddhist school themselves will disprove the arguments of nitya-vijñānātmavādin.

According to the school of Advaita, the selfhood is attributed to pure consciousness or anubhūti. These philosophers hold the view¹ that anubhūti, the undifferentiated

1. *avibhāgo'pi buddhyātmā viparyāsitatadarśanuiḥ |
grāhyagrāhaka samvitti bhedaṁniva drśyate ||*

Nyāya-siddhāntajana, p. 118.

2. *etena bauddhagandhi vedāntināmapī siddhānto'pakrāntaḥ |*

Nyāya-siddhāntajana, p. 119.

3. *paramārthato nirasta samasta-bhedavikalpa-nirviśeṣa-cinmātrai-
karasa-kūṭastha-nitya-samviveda-bhrāntya-jñātṛjñeya-jñāna-rūpa-
vividha-vicitra-bhedāt-vivartate |*

Śrībhāṣya, p. 47.

knowledge, is self-luminous and inexplicable. Therefore, the advaita thinkers are of the view that the entire universe is superimposed on Brahman or ātman, which is undifferentiated knowledge. This Brahman is without a second. Advaitavādin further argues that the jñātṛtva may be attributed to antaḥkaraṇa by illusion and the same is superimposed on ātman. Advaitin argues further that the incompatibility of jñātṛtva may be avoided by the explanations of cicchāyāpatti.

Deśika refutes all these positions. He now asks 'can there be a knowledge without an object? Can mere knowledge become the self? Knowledge is possible only through the subject-object-relationship. Consciousness presupposes a knower of which it is an attribute. Knowledge is not identical with the knower, but it cannot be separated from the knower. Knowledge cannot be nirviśaya (objectless). Knowledge being a dharma and as a quality, cannot exist without a dharmin. We cannot deny either dharma or dharmin. The denial of the one amounts to the denial of the other also.

We studied that pratyabhijñā (recognition of the type 'He I am') becomes impossible in Buddhist school, because it denies the eternal ātman. The same defect may also be said to be true of advaitin. Rāmānuja points out this defect, in Śrībhāṣya. On the ground of compatibility of pratyabhijñā, one has to admit the jñātṛtva to the ātman¹. This jñātṛtva of ātman is natural and not superimposed. Superimposition is "tadabhāvavati tatprakāraṇa jñānam" (Tarkasaṅgraha, p. 34) attributing the dharma of one object to another object. Attributing the snakehood to a rope is a familiar example, given in this context. Jñātṛtva is an extraordinary character

1. anubhuterātmatvābhyupagame tasyaḥ nityatve'pi prati-
sandhānābhāvaḥ tadavasthaḥ pratisandhānam hi pūrvāparakāla-
sthāyīmananubhoktāramupasthapayati. Śrībhāṣya, 1-1-1.

of ātman. It is not found anywhere else. So to say that jñāṭṛtva is superimposed in ātman is not a valid argument. Jñāṭṛtva is real in ātman.

Advaitavādin further argues that the jñāṇṛtva, though not found anywhere in reality, may be ascribed to antaḥkaraṇa by illusion, and the same is superimposed on ātman.

This argument of the advaitin leads him to infinite regress, because the advaitin does not admit jñāṭṛtva anywhere in reality. The illusion of jñāṭṛtva ascribed to antaḥkaraṇa, causes the jñāṭṛtva-jñāna in the self, which is erroneous. So the fallacy of infinite regress occurs. If the infinite regress is not a defect as in the case of 'bījavṛkṣa' then, the same thing can be applied in the case of avidyā also. There to avoid the fallacy of infinite regress, the advaitin has attributed the anāditva (beginninglessness) to avidyā.

Further, if this fallacy is not a demerit, then it is useless to hold the view, as the advaita system does, that the substratum of the superimposition is real. So if infinite regress is not admitted to be demerit, then it harms the theory of beginningless illusion and the theory of real substratum. Finally this argument leads the advaitin to the fold of śūnyavāda.

Now the advaitin tries to explain the above jñāṭṛtva-bhrānti in different ways, following the thought of the Sāṅkya school. According to the Sāṅkya theory, kartṛtva belongs to antaḥkaraṇa and cetanatva belongs to the self. When both of them unite, jñāṭṛtva is possible. Owing to the shadow of cit on antaḥkaraṇa, caitanya is superimposed there. It is called cicchāyāpatti. The familiar analogy given here is the reflection of the face in the mirror. On the basis of this analogy, the advaitin holds the theory of superimposition of jñāṭṛtva in antaḥkaraṇa.

But this analogy is not appropriate. In this example the face and the mirror are real, and visible objects, whereas the ātman and the antaḥkaraṇa are formless. So there is no question of any reflection. Further, the substratum of the superimposition in advaita school is real. So antaḥkaraṇa becomes real, and caitanya unreal.

Now the advaitin tries to explain the jñātṛtva-bhrānti with the help of another analogy, i.e., 'red hot iron ball'. The iron becomes hot and turns into red when it gets the contact with fire. Here the heat of the fire is superimposed in the iron, due to its contact with it. In the same way, the jñātṛtva-bhrānti in the inert antaḥkaraṇa, is due to its contact with cit (citsamparka).

To follow this analogy is to accept the jñātṛtva in cit. In this analogy the real hot material is responsible for the illusion of heat in the iron ball. In the same way to produce the jñātṛtva-bhrānti in antaḥkaraṇa there must be real jñātṛtva in 'cit'. If advaita does not admit jñātṛtva in both antaḥkaraṇa and cit, to explain superimposition of jñātṛtva becomes impossible.

Further the advaitin tries to explain the same with the analogy of palm and the rays of the sun. If we stretch our palm before the rays of the sun, it appears, as if our palm is the locus of those rays. Our palm acts like an abhivyañjaka. In the same way, the antaḥkaraṇa acts like an abhivyañjaka and thus appears to manifest caitanya in it.

This argument is also untenable, because knowledge is self-luminous. So it needs not the outside illuminator. Hence the illumination (abhivyañjakatva) of knowledge by the inert antaḥkaraṇa is ridiculous. Here Deśika quotes Yāmunamuni¹:

-
1. śāntāṅgāra ivādityam ahankāro jaḍātmakaḥ |
svayaṁ jyotiṣaṁ ātmānaṁ vyanaktīti na yuktimat ||

Siddhitraya, p. 94.

who says that the ahaṅkāra which is inert, cannot illuminate the ātman just like the coal which cannot illuminate the sun. Further, he concludes that vyañjya-vyañjaka-bhāva¹ is untenable because of many contradictions. If the knowledge is illuminated by antaḥkaraṇa then ātman becomes non-experiencer like pot. Therefore Deśika says, the ātman alone is the locus of jñāṭṛtva and ahamartha. He also gives several reasons in support of admitting ātman as the real meaning of aham-pratyaya.

1. Ātman is the self-luminous pratyak principle.
2. The experiences like 'I am a jñātā' (I am the knower) etc., proves that 'ahamṭva' and 'jñāṭṛtva' are in the same locus.
3. The yearning for liberation is possible only if 'ahamartha' continues for all time.
4. The scriptures say that the liberated² souls, the supreme³ and mumukṣus⁴ are having the experience of ahamartha.
5. A person in the morning after a deep sleep says 'sukhamahamasvāpsam' (I had sound sleep). If antaḥkaraṇa is the ahamartha, then this experience would have been impossible.
6. The experience 'mām nājñāsiṣam' (I did not know myself) does not deny the jñātā. It only shows that during

1. *vyañkṛt-vyaṅgyatvamanyonyam na ca syāt prātikūlyataḥ |*
vyaṅgyatve'nanubhūtitvam ātmani syādyathā ghaṭe |

Nyāya-siddhāntajana, p. 121.

2. *ahamannamahamannamahamannam |*
ahamannādo'hamannādo'hamannādaḥ | *Taittirīya Upaniṣad.*
3. *hantāhamimāstisrodevatā anena jīvenātmanānupraviśya |*
Chāndogya Upaniṣad, 6-3-2.
4. *tvam vā ahamasmi bhagavo devatā ahamasmi vai tvamasī |*

the deep sleep he could not recognize his manuṣyatva, brahmatva, etc.

7. Generally after sleep people continue their work which was left by them. It proves the continuity of ahamartha.

Deśika summarizes all these arguments in a stanza and says¹, for the above explained reason, ātma is different from ahankāra and it is eternal.

JÑĀTRTVA OF ĀTMAN

Jñātrtva is the natural character of ātman. it is not an adventitious one. This is pointed out by sūtrakāra in the sūtra '*jñota eva*'².

To Rāmānuja, the soul is a knowing subject and unique experiencer. He discusses this in his commentary on the same Vedānta sūtra '*jñota eva*' (2-3-19) He raises the question of the soul's essential nature. At first he criticises the view of Sāṅkya philosophers, who admit that the essential nature of ātman is mere intelligence. In the same way he repudiates the view of Vaiśeṣika, that the knowledge is only an adventitious quality of ātman. Finally Rāmānuja establishes the view, that the self is essentially a knower and he supports his view by reference to scriptural texts³.

1. *pratyakvādupalambhaḥ; mama mukham bhāviti mokṣecchayā
muktabrahma-mumukṣuḥ; nāsti sūptahamityukthitah |
mām nājñāsisamityapi; anuparadyajñānamātrāśrayāt
svāpa prācyanijakriyā; anuparadyajñānamāthasthirah. ||*

Nyāya-niddhāṇjana, p. 112.

2. *vijñātāramare kena vijñāyāt jñātyevāyam puruṣaḥ |*

Bṛhadāraṇyaka, 2-4-14.

*eṣa hi draṣṭā sraṣṭā śrotā ghrātā rasayitā mantā boddhā kartā
vijñānātmā puruṣaḥ |*

Praśnopaniṣad, 4-9.

3. Refer *Chāndogya*, VIII-12-4 and 5; *Bṛhadāraṇyaka*, V-13-7; *Praśna*, V-9, VI-5.

yo vijñāne tiṣṭhan |

Bṛhadāraṇyaka, Kāṇvapāṭha, Antaryāmi Brāhmaṇa, 6-7.

vijñānaṁ yajnaṁ tanute | karmāṇi tanuteṇ |

Taittirīya Ānandavalli, 5.

jñānasvarūpamatyanta nirmalam paramārthataḥ |

Viṣṇupurāṇa, 1-2-6

Knowledge like 'aham jānāmi' (I know) also establishes the jñātṛtva in ātman. But this experience cannot be an erroneous one. Because superimposition of certain dharma in a thing requires the presence of the superimposed dharma somewhere in reality. To mistake a shell for the silver, one must have seen the silver somewhere. Otherwise he cannot have the rajata-bhrānti of the form 'idaṁ rajatam'. In the same way to superimpose jñātṛtva in some place one should have experienced the real presence of jñātṛtva somewhere. Except in ātman no where jñātṛtva is experienced. Therefore jñātṛtva is a natural dharma of ātman.

Knowledge or jñāna is the peculiar attribute of the jīva. This jñāna is called dharma-bhūta-jñāna or attributive knowledge. It is a self-luminous substance.

Dharma-bhūta-jñāna is conceived to be both dravya and guṇa (substance-attribute). Because it possesses contraction and expansion, it is dravya. It is guṇa because it is necessarily dependent on a dravya namely jīva and Īśvara.

According to Nyāya-vaiśeṣika, knowledge is known by another knowledge namely anuvyavasāya. In this system of Rāmānuja, though knowledge is knowable, it is so, by itself and not by anuvyavasāya because it is self-luminous. But it is not self-conscious. Though dharma-bhūta-jñāna is common to both jīva and Īśvara, in the case of Īśvara attributive consciousness is eternal and all-pervasive, (nitya and vibhu). In the case of the individual selves it is obscured.

Therefore in this system jñāna is of two types. viz., dharmi-bhūta-jñāna and dharma-bhūta-jñāna. Dharmi-bhūta-jñāna is the ātman itself. Dharma-bhūta-jñāna reveals all objects excepting itself. We can know the nature of other ātman by our dharma-bhūta-jñāna. This knowledge is common to all jīvas and they know the world through this knowledge. It has contraction and expansion. While jīvātman is in bondage, it is in the state of contraction. At the time of liberation it expands.

According to the will of paramapuruṣa, the self is endowed with agency. Jīvātman has to experience the results of his good and bad deeds. This position is clear in the *Brahmasūtras* "kartā śāstrārthavatvāt | (2-3-33), parāttu tatcchruteḥ | (2-3-40)" and their bhāṣya.

Sūtrakāra explains in the above two sūtras that the ātman has the responsibility as an agent. In Vedas several injunctions like performing 'yāga' are stated. The puruṣa can get the result of these yāgas only when he is the agent of that action. Even that agency comes to him by the will of Paramātman.

Īśvara is the ~~sāmānya kārana~~ or general¹ cause of all, like time, space which are causes of all actions. Otherwise, it becomes inevitable to attribute partiality (vaiṣamyanairghṛṇya) to God. Sūtrakāra explains this in the sūtra, "vaiṣamyanairghṛṇye na ~~sādhyaḥ~~ tathā hi darśayati" (2-1-34), that in the matter of creation of deva and manuṣya etc., the Lord is only the ~~sāmānya kārana~~ like water to seed. The important cause is their karma.

1. puṇyaḥ puṇyena karmaṇā bhavati pāpaḥ papena karmaṇa |

Bṛhadāraṇyaka, 6-4-5

nimitta mātramevāsau sṛjyaṇām sarga karmaṇi |

pradhāna kāranaibhūtā yato vai sṛjya śaktayaḥ ||

Viṣṇupurāṇa, 1-4-51.

If kartṛtva is not admitted to the self, the vidhi niṣedha śāstras become futile¹. Vedas say "*antaḥ praviṣṭaḥ śāstā janānām*" (*Taittirīya Āraṇyaka*, 3-11), "God controls the world being immanent in it". Even this kartṛtva comes to the ātman from Paramātmān. The svayamprakāśatva (self-luminosity), nityatva (eternality), anekatva (plurality), aṇutva (atomic nature), niravayavatva (partlessness) etc., of jīvātman cannot be denied. These characteristics are proved by the Śruti itself.

THE SVAYAMPRAKĀŚATVA OF ĀTMAN

Deśika says that the self-luminosity of ātman is known by the Śruti: "*atrāyam puruṣaḥ svayam jyotirbhavati*." The self is of the nature of consciousness. The external objects like jar, pot, etc., are known through consciousness. In ātman, there are two types of consciousness. One is dharmi-bhūta-jñāna (substantive knowledge) by which the ātman knows himself. Second is the dharma-bhūta-jñāna (attributive knowledge) by which everything other than itself is known. Even nityatva, nānātva of ātman are known by the attributive consciousness. The svarūpa-jñāna shines independent of dharma-bhūta-jñāna. The ātman shines with qualifications², i.e., ekatva, pratyaktva and ānukūlyatva.

There are several apparent contradictions regarding the svayamprakāśatva of ātman. But they may be solved in the following way. If ātman is svayamprakāśa, then why the ātman who is in the body of others is not known by direct perception? On the other hand ātman in the body of others is inferred by the 'ceṣṭa' (action) of the body. But this objection is not tenable, because 'svayamprakāśatva' of ātman means that ātman is so, for himself but not for other ātman.

1. *jyotiṣṭomena svargakāmo yajeta | na kalañjam bhakṣayet | nanṛtaṁ vadet aharahassandhyāmupāśīta |*

2. *ahamiti pratyaktvaikatva viśiṣṭatayā tu svaprakāśatā sarvadā |*

Further the philosophy of Viśiṣṭādvaita accepts *anūtvā*, *śeṣatva*, *nityatva*, *niyāmyatva* etc., in *ātman*. Because of the *svayamprakāśatva* of *ātman*, none entertains the doubt regarding his ownself. On the same reason there should not have been doubt regarding the '*anūtvādi dharma*' of *ātman*. But there are several doubts of the type, *ātman* is *anu* or *vibhu* or *śarīra* *parimāṇa*? Whether *ātman* is *svatantra* or *paratantra*? etc. Therefore *ātman* is not *svayamprakāśa*.

This objection may be rebutted in the following way. To know the *ātma-svarūpa*, the *ātma-svarūpa* itself is a sufficient cause. It needs not the assistance of *dharma-bhūta-jñāna*. That is why *ātma-svarūpa* is *svayamprakāśa*. But in knowing the *ātma-svarūpa* with *anūtvā*, *nityatva* etc., the assistance of *dharma-bhūta-jñāna* is essential. Because those *dharma*s are known by *dharma-bhūta-jñāna*. For example when the size of a mango is perceived by eyes at the same time we don't have the experience of its sweetness. Because sweetness is not grasped by visual organs. In the same way, though *ātman* is *svayamprakāśa*, his *dharma*s like *anūtvā* are not *svayamprakāśa*.

In the state of *samādhi*, for the practitioner of yoga, the *ātma-svarūpa* shines with *anukūlatva*, *anūtvā*, *nānātva*. It is called *ātma-sākṣātkāra* by *śāstrakāras*. The same is stated by Yāmunācārya.

evamātmā svatassidhyamāgamenānumānataḥ |

yogābhyāsabhuvā spṛṣṭam pratyakṣeṇa prakāśyate ||

Ātmasiddhi, p. 222.

Just like attributive knowledge, the substantive knowledge (*dharma-bhūta-jñāna*) also is self-luminous. But on the same ground it cannot be argued that this substantive consciousness should perceive things other than *ātman*. Because the attributive knowledge, when it shines, it reveals objects other than itself, in addition to its own revelation.

The jīvātman who is the substratum or dharmi knows the objects—jar, pot, sun, moon etc., through his attributive knowledge. Therefore, he is called pramāta. Jīva is called prameya because his svarūpa is also known like any other things. The nature of dharmin, i.e., jīva is also of the form of jñāna. Hence it is called pramāṇa. Therefore Deśika says: *mātṛ-meya-manarūpo'yamātma*, (*Nyāya-siddhāñjana*, p. 125.)

In this context he quotes from *Prajñā-paritrāṇa* of Varadanārāyaṇa Bhaṭṭāraka¹, who says that ātman is pramāta, prameya and pramāṇa. Therefore pramātr̥tva, prameyatva and pramāṇatva are in jīvātman. The last two are in dharma-bhūta-jñāna. In objects like ghaṭa there is only prameyatva.

JĪVĀTMAN IS JÑĀNASVARŪPA

Here the pūrvapakṣin questions the jñānasvarūpatva of ātman. He says that the Śrutis referred to in support of the view that jīva is jñānasvarūpa, state that brahman is jñānasvarūpa. In the scriptural statement “*satyaṁ jñānāmanantam brahma*” (*Taittirīya Upaniṣad*, 2-1), the word ‘jñāna’ means Brahman, not jīva. The statement of *Bṛhadāraṇyaka* “*sa yathā saindhavaghano udake prāstaḥ udaka mevānulīyeta na hāsyodgrahaṇayaiva syāt*” (*Bṛhadāraṇyaka*, 6-5-13) also means that the jīvātman is the locus of consciousness, but not jñānasvarūpatva. To make it clear the Śruti gives the example of the lump of salt which is thrown into water, and could not be seized again. But whenever one drinks the same water it tastes salt, even so, this great being, infinite, is only a mass of consciousness.

No doubt, a statement in *Ānandavallī* of *Taittirīya*,

1. *pramātā ca prameyaśca pramāṇaṁ ca bhavet pumān* |
pramā meyā ca dhīreva meyā eva ghaṭādayaḥ ||

Quoted in *Nyāya-siddhāñjana*, p. 125.

"*viññānaṃ yajñāṃ tanute*" appears to hold the view that ātman is jñānasvarūpa. But it is not the correct interpretation of the passage. Even as the word 'ānanda' is used to mean Brahman, the word 'viññāna' means that the jīva is only the locus of the jñāna which is the preponderate quality in him. The sūtrakāra is also of the same opinion. "*tadguṇasāratvāttu tadvyapadeśaḥ*" (*Brahmasūtra*, 2-3-29). He says, because of the preponderance of knowledge jīva is understood to be jñāna-svarūpa. Therefore ātman is not jñāna-svarūpa.

Deśika says, though the jñānasvarūpatva is not proved by the above quoted scriptural statements it is well established by the statement "*eṣa hi dr̥ṣṭā spraṣṭā śrotā ghr̥tā rasayitā mantā boddhā kartā vijñātmā puruṣaḥ*" (*Praśnopaniṣad*, 4-9).

In this statement, the word 'boddhā' means ātman in general. Next, six words, 'dr̥ṣṭā, śrotā etc., state the special jñātṛtva of ātman. After describing the jñātṛtva in its special and general forms the Śruti once again says that ātman is 'vijñānātmā'. To interpret this piece also, to mean jñānāśrayatva once again serves no purpose. Therefore, this word should mean the jñānāśvarūpatva of ātman. In the light of this passage of upaniṣad, we have to interpret the passage of *Taittirīya Upaniṣad*, and *Brahmasūtra*.

The self-luminosity of ātman is proved only when jñānasvarūpatva is admitted to the self¹. To prove svayam-prakāśtva of ātman, Śrīviṣṇucitta puts it in the form of inference. That inference is of the form namely that ātman is self-luminous², because it possesses jñānatva. Wherever there is jñānatva, there is svayam-prakāśatva and this is evident in dharma-bhūta-jñāna.

1. *citsvarūpatā hi svayam prakāśatā* |

Śrībhāṣya

2. *ātmā svayamprakāśaḥ jñānatvāt dharmabhūta jñānavat* |

Nyāya-siddhānta-jāna, p. 126.

On the analogy of dharma-bhūta-jñāna, it cannot be argued that the ātma-svarūpa-jñāna (the substantive consciousness) can illumine other things besides itself. Jñānatva is common to both substantive and attributive consciousness. But the experience says, that the substantive knowledge illumines itself, where as the attributive knowledge illumines other things besides itself, just like a light and its luminosity. Though both the light and its luminosity possess the common characteristic of tejasṭva, both of them are different. Light is dharmi and the prabhā (luminosity) is dharma. Accordingly the function is also different. The light illumines itself, whereas luminosity illumines itself as well as other objects. Therefore, there is no paraprakāśatva in the svarūpa-jñāna¹. Deśika says there is concomitance between jñānatva and viśayāśrayavaiśiṣṭya. That means jñāna invariably includes object and substratum of it. It is evident in dharma-bhūta-jñāna. But this is not admitted in the case of svarūpa-jñāna. In advaita, jñāna is said to be viśayāśraya-sūnya. In viśiṣṭādvaita, ātman is not nirviśeṣa, because it is qualified² by real attributes, such as jñānatva, jñānadavyāśrayatva, jñānadavyatva, nityatva, aṇutva, niyāmayatva, ādheyatva, śeṣatva and paratantratva.

ĀTMAN IS ETERNAL

The eternality of the self is affirmed in scriptures, as well as in the *Gītā*. The śloka "*avināsi tu tadviddhi yena sarvamidaṁ tatam | vināśamavyayasyāsyā na kaścit kartumarhati ||*" (2-17), which explains the eternality of the ātman mentions two things. The whole of the universe and something

1. *svasyaiva bhāsako dīpah svātmano'nyasya ca prabhā |
evam bhedo'sti samye'pi jñānayordharmadharminoh |*

Nyāya-siddhāntajana, p. 127.

2. *viśayāśraya-vaiśiṣṭya-nirbandho-dharmabhūtajñāne |
dharmijñānānasyāpi viśiṣṭatvāt paramatūdatirekah |*

Nyāya-siddhāntajana, p. 129.

else which is said to pervade it. The thing which pervades is also, here, said to be indestructible, while that which is pervaded is conceived to be destructible. Here destruction means not annihilation. It only means a marked change from condition to condition. As between the pervader and the pervaded, the pervaded is destructible. Because it undergoes mutation. The pervader is indestructible because it is incapable of undergoing mutation.

Now the question is, is the whole universe really pervaded by the soul? And, if so, is that soul one or many? These questions are very important, the above śloka distinctly states that the whole universe is pervaded by the ātman (soul). "*cetanasamudāyena acetanasamudāyaḥ tila taila dāru vahnyādivat vyāptaḥ ityārthaḥ*" (Tātparya-candrikā, p. 46). Here in this śloka two epithets are attributed to ātman. They are avināśi and avyaya. They are used in singular number. Therefore the school of advaita thinks, that those two epithets imply, that what pervades the whole universe is only a single soul. But the epithet is in singular need not necessarily imply the single soul or indicate the unity of the pervading soul.

In sanskrit, there is the use of what is called the jātyekavacana. According to this the whole of a collection of things of the same kind may be expressed by means of a singular noun for example 'janah, dhānyam, indriyam' etc. Then the singular use of words which denote the soul may imply plurality of souls. Therefore the stanza of *Bhagavadgītā* affirms the eternality and plurality of ātman.

Rāmānuja commenting on this point of *Gītā* says, the entire acetana-tattva is pervaded by ātmatattva. Nothing can destroy this ātman because it is very subtle¹. Rāmānuja

1. *tadātmatattvamavināśīti viddhi | yena ātmatattvena idamacetana-tattvaṁ sarvaṁ tataṁ vyāptam | vyāpakatvena niratiśaya-sūkṣmatvādātmanah tadvyatirikto na kaścīdapi padārthaḥ vināśaṁ prāptumarhati |* Gītabhāṣya, p. 9

has based his bhāṣya on the *Śruti* which establishes the eternality of ātman¹. If the eternality of the self is not admitted, it leads to the incompatibility of akṛtābhyāgama and kṛtapranāśa. It means if the ātman is not eternal, then it should enjoy the result of the work which is not performed by him. In the same way he should not reap the fruit of the work which is performed by him. Therefore the ātman is immutable.

ĀTMAN IS ANUSVARŪPA

On the basis of scriptures, Rāmānuja accepts that ātman is atomic² in nature. These scriptures say that the self is not all pervasive. If it was vibhu, then we should have experienced the ātman in our entire body. We experience its presence only in our heart. The śāstras speak of 'utkrānti'³—going to svarga and coming back—of ātman. If ātman is vibhu, all these statements become invalid.

Though in some scriptures⁴ vibhutva appears to be admitted, they should be interpreted to mean that the nature or capacity of ātman is such that it can penetrate into any object itself or through dharma-bhūta-jñāna. The same explanation should be offered to the term 'vyāpī' used by Yāmūnācārya in *Ātmasiddhi* 'nityo vyāpī'. Rāmānuja comments upon this term, in the above explained manner⁵.

1. *na jāyate mriyate vā vipaścit* | *Kaṭha*, 1-2-18
nityo'nityānām | *Kaṭha*, 2-5-13
avināśi va'yamātma |
2. *eṣo'ṇurātmā cetasa veditavyaḥ* | *Muṇḍaka*, 3-1-9.
ārāgramātro hyavaro draṣṭaḥ vālāgrasatabhāgasya śatadha
kalpitasya ca | *bhāgo jīvassa vijñeyah...* | *Śvetāśvatara*, 5-8, 9.
3. *utkrānti gatyā gatīnām* | *Śrībhāṣya*, 2-3-20.
4. *nityassarvagataḥ sthāṇustadvajīvo nabhopi ca* |
yathā kṣetrajñāśaktissā veṣṭitā nṛpa sarvagā || *Viṣṇupurāṇa*.
5. *atisūkṣmatayā sarvacetanāntaḥpraveśa svabhāvaḥ* |
Śrībhāṣya, 1-1-1.

In the aphorism "*utkrāntigatyāgatīnām*" (*Brahmasūtra*, 2-3-20) the sūtrakāra admits the atomic nature of jīvātman. Utkrānti is admitted in the Śruti¹. The gati² and agati³ (going and coming back) are compatible only if aṇutva is admitted to jīvātman. Though the ātman resides in the particular part of the body like the heart, it is capable of knowing the pleasure or pains in other parts of the body through the dharma-bhūta-jñāna. Saubhari, who was a yogi, took fifty bodies at a time by his yogic power through dharma-bhūta-jñāna. This story supports the theory of the atomic nature of the ātman. Deśika says that the sūtrakāra with all these ideas stated

guṇādvā lokavat!

Brahmasūtra, 2-3-26.

pradīpavadādeśastathā hi darśayati!

Brahmasūtra, 4-4-15.

It cannot be admitted that the ātman has the proportion of the body. Then how is it that the ātman, in the body of an elephant, can enter into the body of an ant, without any loss to its parts? Deśika says; therefore ātman is atomic in nature.

Ātman is nirvikāra. So contraction or expansion in the nature of ātman cannot be admitted while it transmigrates. Sūtrakāra refutes this idea (change in ātman) in his aphorism "*evam cātmā kārtsnyam! na ca paryāyādappya virodho vikārādibhyaḥ!*" (*Brahmasūtra*, 2-2-32, 33) for the same reasons.

In this context Vedānta Deśika tries to solve the

1. *tasya haitasya hṛdayasyāgram pradyotate tena pradyotenaiṣaḥ
ātmā niṣkrāmati cakṣuṣo vā mūrdho vā anyebhyo vā śari-
radeśebhyaḥ!* *Bṛhadāraṇyaka*, 6-4-2.
2. *ye vai kecāsmallokāt prayānti candramasameva te sarve gacchanti!*
Kauṣītaki Upaniṣad, 1-2.
3. *tasmallokāt punaretyāsmāi lokāya karmaṇe!* *Bṛhadāraṇyaka*, 6.

contradiction to the statements of Varadaviṣṇumiśra and Parāśara. Varadaviṣṇumiśra appears to have accepted the contraction¹ and expansion in the the nature or svarūpa of ātman. At the time of bondage, dharma-būta-jñāna also gets contraction and expansion. But at the time of liberation both attributive consciousness and substantive consciousness get all-pervasive nature. Therefore jīvasvarūpa is also changeable.

The work named *Mānayāthātmya-nirṇaya* of Varadaviṣṇumiśra, interprets the statement of *Ātmasiddhi*, namely 'nityo vyāpi' in the same sense. But Deśika states that this explanation, contradicts the sūtras "*pradīpa-vadadeśaḥ tathāhi darśayati*" (*Brahmasūtra*, 4-4-15), "*guṇādvālokaḥ*" (*Brahmasūtra*, 2-3-26).

In these sūtras Bādarāyaṇa admits the atomic nature of ātman. Being atomic in nature, though ātman, resides in a particular part of the body, he pervades the body through dharma-bhūta-jñāna, just like lamp, which is in a particular place, reveals objects through its effulgence. Therefore, Deśika says that those statements are vaibhavaḥ, (aupacārika) and not literal (metaphorical).

Further, Deśika resolves the apparent contradictions in the statements of Rāmānuja. Rāmānuja in the commentary on the śloka "*anādimatparam brahma na sattannāsaducyate | sarvataḥ pāṇipādaṁ tat sarvato'kṣiṣiromukham ||*" (13-12, 13) in his *Gītābhāṣya* states: "*brāhma brhatvaguṇayogi śarīrādarthāntarabhūtaṁ svataśśarīrādibhiḥ paricchedarahitaṁ kṣetrajñātattvamityarthaḥ | sa cānantyāya kalpate*

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1. *varadaviṣṇumiśraistu saṁsāradaśāyām svarūpajñānayoḥ saṅkocāt anuparimāṇamātmavarūpam | mokṣadaśāyāṁ tu sarvagatam, sarvavyāpi, jñānaṁ ca vistārnatayā prakāśate....kṣetrajñākhyā tathāpare iti | ityādina jīvasyāpi saṅkoca-vikāśayogitvamuktaṁ |*

iti sruteḥ | (13-12) and “*dehādi-paricchedarahitataya sarvagamityarthaḥ*” (13-13).

That ātman is bṛhat, which gets expansion. Neither he is body nor he is of the dimension of the body. He is endless. He is imprisoned in this body due to his past karma.

Further, Rāmānuja says that ātman becomes ananta, when it is freed from its karma. Once again, commenting on *loke sarvamāvṛtya tiṣṭhati* (Gītā 18-13), he says that ātma-tattva being unlimited by body etc., is all-pervasive.

The same interpretation is given in the commentary on “*acaram carameva ca*” (Gītā, 13-15). There he says the ātman, by nature is immovable, but while he is in embodied state he moves. In some other places also Rāmānuja says: “*anavacchinnaṁ jñānaikākāram*”.

All the above explanations confirm that Rāmānuja admitted the all-pervasive nature to the jīvātman. Deśika however points out that all those statements establish the same all-pervasiveness of the dharma-bhūta-jñāna, after liberation. In *Vedāntasāra*¹ and *Bhāṣya*², Rāmānuja comments on the same line, while interpreting “*sacānantyāya kalpate*”.

In *Vedānta-dīpa* Rāmānuja clearly states that ātman is of atomic nature. He confirms, that sūtrakāra admitted, atomic nature to ātman: “*pratyagātmano'ñutvameva svarūpamiti sūtrakāra-matam*” (p. 128).

Therefore, Vedānta Deśika concludes that the sūtrakāra

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1. *ekadeśasthitasyāpi svaprabhārūpa jñānavyūptyā sarvānubhava-ssidhyat* |
Vedāntasāra, p. 538.
 2. *yathā pradīpasya ekasmin deśe vartamānasya svaprabhayā deśāntarāveśaḥ tathā ātmanaḥ api ekadeśasthitasyaiva svaprabhārūpeṇa caitanyena sarvaśarīrāveśo nānupapannaḥ* |
Śrībhāṣya, p. 882.

and bhāṣyakāra are of the firm conviction, that the ātman is of atomic nature: “ataḥ sadā aṇureva jīvaḥ iti sūtrabhāṣyakārādīnām siddhāntaḥ” (*Nyāya-siddhāntajana*, p. 134).

PLURALITY OF ĀTMAN

In Viśiṣṭādvaita, the plurality of ātman is admitted. Each body possesses a different self, excepting the body of Saubhari.

This truth is also known by our experience. The pleasures, pains, memory and recognitions are different from one man to another.

If there was only one self in all bodies, then every body should have experienced the pleasure or pain of somebody else. If one person becomes blind everyone should become blind. Everyone should die if one person is dead. If one person is liberated, then all persons should become free from saṁsāra. All these logical arguments confirm the plurality of the self. Nyāya philosophers¹ as well as Sāṅkya² thinkers have realized this truth and accordingly have admitted the plurality of the self in their respective systems.

Deśika further explains the significance of the various scriptural statements preaching unity of the self. There are many passages in the scriptures, stating the oneness of the self³. In all these statements ‘prakāraikya’ (unity of the

1. *nānātmāno vyavasthātāḥ* |

Gautama-nyāyasūtra.

2. *jananamaraṇakāraṇānām pratiniyamādayugapat-pravṛtteśca* |
puruṣabahutvaṁ siddhaṁ traiguṇya viparyayaiva |

Sāṅkhyakārikā, 18.

3. *yadanyo'sti paraḥ ko'pi mattaḥ pārthivasattama* |
tadaiṣo'hamahaṁ cāntyo vaktumevamapiśyate |
tasyātmaparadeheṣu sato'pyekamayam hi yat |

Quoted in *Nyāya-siddhāntajana bhāṣya*, p. 135.

attribute) is intended. Every self is invariably qualified by *aṇutva*, *śeṣatva*, *jñānānanda-svarūpatva*, *nānātva*, etc. All different selves possess this similarity of attributes. Therefore they are said to belong to the one category. Deśika says assertion of oneness is possible under five circumstances: "*avirodhāntaraṅgatva jātibhogādyabhedataḥ | ekokti-raprthaksiddhe deśakāladaśādibhiḥ |* (Nyāya-siddhāntjñāna, p. 135).

1. *Avirodha*: When two warring groups give up their differences in their opinion and unite, in that sense the statement 'they are one' is possible.

2. *Antaraṅgatva*: If two people have mutual trust and confidence, then they possess 'antaraṅgatva'. In this sense, the term 'aikya' (unity) is used. In *Rāmāyaṇa* when Śrī Rāma and Sugrīva become friends the ṛṣi says, "*rāma-sugrīvayoraikyam devyeṣu samajāyata*" (5-35-52), that they were united. Here the bodily unity is not intended. It only means the unity of their ideas and unity of their heart.

3. *Jāti*: If two things belong to the same jāti, then also the vyavahāra of 'aikya' is possible. Example: "*eko vrīhiḥ*". Though there is a heap of paddy the usage is one 'vrīhiḥ' (paddy).

4. *Bhogabheda*: When two people have the same bhoga (enjoyment), it is called 'bhogaiikya' (unity of experience). Example: "*brahmavid brahmaiva bhavati*". (*Muṇḍaka*, 3-5-9). The Vedic passage says one who knows the Brahman becomes Brahman itself. Here the sameness of bhoga is intended.

5. *Ekokti*: Expression of unity is found, when two things are having an inseparable relationship at all times in all places and in all stages.

This equality of attributes is admitted in the philosophy of Rāmānuja. Though there is difference in blossoming of dharma-bhūta-jñāna, of the selves in saṁsāra, in the state

of liberation, there is equality in the all pervasive nature of attributive consciousness (dharma-bhūta-jñāna). Due to the karma of the ātman, the difference is seen in their jñāna and ānanda during the saṁsāra. Deśika says¹ all these selves regain their svarūpa and svabhāva in the state of liberation.

If the plurality of the self is accepted, in this system, then what is the fate of the statements which negate the difference and which declare unity between jīva and Paramātman, in clear terms?

Deśika rebuts the above argument as follows. Those statements which negate the difference namely '*neha nānāsti kiṁ ca na*' only do so regarding the śārīradharma, such as devatva, manuṣyatva², etc. Therefore the plurality of selves cannot be denied. If it is denied, then the liberation of the individual soul cannot be explained satisfactorily. The advaita system cannot satisfactorily explain the difference between the state of saṁsāra and liberation, because in their system the liberation or mokṣa is the 'pāramārthika-avidyābhāva' (negation of avidyā). This amounts to saying that 'pāramārthika-avidyā-sadbhāva' (presence of the avidyā) is saṁsāra. According to the system of advaita, avidyā is not real. Therefore there is also 'pāramārthika avidyābhāvaḥ' (negation of the avidyā), in the state of bondage, which is the characteristic of the state of mokṣa, in that system. Therefore, no difference is found in between these two states.

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1. *sāmyam ca sarvajīvānām svarūpataḥ muktyavasthāyām guṇato'pi ceti śruti-smṛtyādisiddham* | *Nyāya-siddhāntajana*, p. 135.
nirañjanaḥ paramaṁ sāmyamupaiti | *Muṇḍaka*, 3-1-3.
mama sādharmyamāgatāḥ | *Bhagavadgītā*, 14-2.
 2. *caturvidho'pi bhedo'yam mithyājñānanibandhanaḥ* |
devādibhede'padhvaste nasyevāvaraṇo hi saḥ |
Nyāya-siddhāntajana-bhāṣya, p. 135.

The statements like “*śuko muktaḥ*”, “*ūmadevo muktaḥ*” etc., support the theory of plurality.

The theory of Bhāskara also fails to explain the fact of bondage and release. Their school admits, both unity and diversity by means of a real uniting adjunct. They do not separate jīva-svarūpa from Brahman. Due to the contact of adjuncts like śarīra, antaḥkaraṇa and indriya, there is the vyavahāra of jīva. The difference between them is not real. Therefore the contact of adjunct to Brahman is called saṁsāra and the separation from it is known as liberation.

Deśika says, it is ridiculous to admit upādhi to Brahman, which is heyapratibhaṭa, sarvajña and anādi.

It is a fact of experience that the objects like jar, pot, etc. take with them the ākāśa within them, when they are moved from one place to the other. They leave the ākāśa of the previous place then and there. This is same with adjuncts and Brahman. Therefore, the contact and release, which take place, amounts to bondage and liberation to Brahman in every moment. Therefore, to explain bondage and liberation, even Bhāskara has to admit the plurality of selves.

The system of Yādavaprakāśa, which admits ‘svābhāvikabhedābheda’ between three entities of cit acit and Īśvara, also fails to explain the fact of bondage and liberation. Deśika attacks these systems in the light of the scriptures and gives a satisfactory solution. But according to Viśiṣṭādvaita, the destruction of karma is a positive factor. This avidyā-nāśa results in achieving the rapture in the divine communion. In this state, the dharma-bhūta-jñāna of jīva becomes vibhu¹ (all pervasive).

1. *asmākam avidyāniṣṭtirnāma bhāvāntaram bhaviṣyatyeva | tacca dhīviśeṣavikāśādirūpam | prīyamāna-paramapuruṣa-parigrahādiśca |*
Nyāya-siddhāntjana, p. 137.

All these extraordinary changes (like avidyā-nāśa, achieving the rapture in the divine communion, dharma-bhūta-jñāna becoming vibhu etc.) are not found in the state of saṃsāra. Therefore according to Viśiṣṭādvaitin, the difference between mokṣa and saṃsāra is not incompatible. Because there is śarīra-śarīribhāva relation between the jīvātman and Brahman in Viśiṣṭādvaita, the statements such as "*brahmaid brahmavia bhavati*" (*Muṇḍaka* 3-5-9) were explained differently in this system.

The advaita thinkers are opposed to this explanation of the passage. According to them indeclinable 'eva' is used to emphasize the identity of jīvātman with Brahman. Therefore, the Viśiṣṭādvaitic explanation is not satisfactory.

Deśika realising the force of this objection to some extent offers another explanation which is given in *Nyāya-sudarśana*¹: According to this explanation the indeclinable 'eva' does not explain the identity. It explains only the equality. This meaning is admitted by lexicographers².

Invariably we have to admit this position to explain a passage of Śruti³, in 'paśuyāga' where the indeclinable 'eva' only means equality. A person who is encircled by challenging opponents, is suggested to perform paśuyāga. The Śruti states that the reward of that sacrifice, is that the performer of that yāga becomes Viṣṇu, 'Viṣṇureva'. Here adepts in Mīmāṃsā interpret the indeclinable 'eva' to mean equality. The same meaning may be adopted here also. Accordingly jīvātman attains equality with Brahman and attaining the

1. *nyāyasudarśane tu uktam eva śabdaḥ sām्यavāci* |
sāmye caiva kvacichabdaḥ iti nighaṇṭūkteḥ ||

Nyāya-siddhāntajana, p. 138.

2. *sāmyevadvaivameveva* |

Vaijayanṭi-kośa.

3. *vaiṣṇavaṃ vāmanamālabheta spardhamāno viṣṇureva bhūtvemān lokānabhi jayati* |

Yajurvedasamhitā, 2-1-3.

divyamaṅgala vighraha, gets eight fold qualities. "eśha ātmā apahatapāpmā vijaro vimṛtyuḥ viśoko vijighatso'pipāsaḥ satyakāmaḥ satyasankalpaḥ" (*Chāndogya*, 8-1-5). They are 1. Free from sin 2. Age-lessness 3. Deathlessness 4. Grieflessness 5. Free from hunger. 6. Free from thirst 7. Wishes becoming true. 8. Purposes becoming true.

Therefore, on the basis of prakāra-sāmya (equality of attributes), the vyavahāra of abheda between jīva and Brahman is admitted in this school. So, to explain saṁsāra and mokṣa according to scripture, inevitably one has to accept infinite number of finite selves and their difference from Brahman.

This ātman is by nature ānanda-svarūpa and also the substratum of joy. So it is called 'svatassukhi'. "svatassukhī cāyamātmā | upādhiṣāt saṁsarati" (*Nyāya-siddhāñjana*, p. 138). Though the ātman is 'ānanda-svarūpa', due to his past karma his svarūpa is enveloped, and he does not know it. This upādhi (karma) is the root cause of his bondage.

CLASSIFICATION OF JĪVĀTMAN

In this system jīvātman is of two types. They are, saṁsāri and asaṁsāri. First one is bound by karma whereas the second one is free from karma. They are nitya-saṁsāri and bhāvi-saṁsāraviraha¹ (one who becomes free from saṁsāra). Even asaṁsāri group of jīva are divided into nitya and mukta.

In this saṁsāra which is beginningless, every man can hope to attain his liberation. If such is the case, how to accept nitya-saṁsārins, who are destined to remain in this saṁsāra forever? Some ācāryas accept the existence of nitya-

1. *svasamānādhikaraṇya svapūrvatva ubhaya sambhandhena saṁsārābhāva viśiṣṭa saṁsāravān ityārthaḥ*

Ratnapetika, p. 219. Refer *Nyāya-siddhāñjana*, p. 129.

saṁsārins who are destined to be bound by their past karma for all time to come. It is due to their excessive sins, which drive them into lower and lower strata. In this regard, these ācāryas quote from the *Gītā*: “*tānaḥ dviṣataḥ krūrān saṁsāreṣu narādhamāṇāḥ kṣipāmyajasramaśubhān āsurīśveva yoniṣu* ||” (16-19), which says that people who hate God in themselves and others, would be driven into lower and lower strata of births. They will be born again and again in this world. They will not get salvation at any time due to obstacles, they have themselves created. These obstacles may be looked upon as the punishment awarded to them by God for their willful wrong-doing. Naraka is really birth in evil wombs (āsurī yoni).

The statement of Parāśara also supports their view point. He says that these haters of God never get salvation. All these sayings confirm the eternality of the līlāvibhūti¹ and continuance of some worst sinners in this world of bondage.

Deśika sides these ācāryas and points out, on the scriptural evidences also one has to admit the existence of nitya-saṁsāri. Deśika in his *Tattvamuktākalāpa* and *Sarvārtha-siddhi* points out that both positions (acceptance and non-acceptance of nitya-saṁsāri-jīva) are valid. In *Dayāśataka* (stanza 79) he opines, that everyone will be attaining the lotus feet of the Lord one day or the other. The careful study of all these aspects, makes one to conclude, that the contention of Vedānta Deśika is, the saṁsāra (this universe which is the līlāvibhūti of the lord) is eternal. But everyone in it can get liberated one day or other. The līlāvibhūti will not become exhausted of jīvas because there are innumerable jīvas in this saṁsāra.

1. *nīśeṣātmāpavarge viraṭaviharaṇo viśvakartā tadā syāt* |

Tattvamuktā-kalāpa, 28.

But there are some other ācāryas who explain these statements in a different way. According to them, the haters of God would remain for a very long time in this līlāvibhūti, and a time would surely come when even such great sinners would be released from the shackles of bondage by the kṛpā¹ of the Lord. These ācāryas argue, that if this cannot be the case, then nobody would try to become free, doubting² himself a nitya-saṁsāri. Here one may doubt that from the times immemorial, the jīvātman is wandering in the saṁsāra and so what surety is there of his liberation in future? This doubt is cleared by pointing out that when the time ripens and the compassion of the Lord dawns on him, the jīva is liberated³ from bondage. The sayings of brahmavids "brahmavid brahmaiva bhavati" (Muṇḍaka, 3-2-9) (One who knows brahman becomes Brahman itself) is also an evidence for it.

Among these saṁsārins the merited people reach the heaven through bhūma⁴, rātri, aparapakṣa, dakṣiṇāyana, śaṁmāsa, pitṛloka, ākāśa and candra. They descend through ākāśa, vāyu, bhūma, abhra, megha, etc. In the scriptures the sufferings of demerited people is elaborately explained⁵.

1. tvadupasadanūdadya ~~īva vā mokṣapūlaye'pi~~ vā vitarati nijam
pādāmbhojam ~~vṛṣcalatāśharabhi~~ : Dayāśataka, 79.
2. anyathā mokṣasādhane ~~sa kimāham~~ iti sandehāt apravṛt-
tiprasaṅgāt | Nyāya-siddhāntarjana, p. 129.
3. karmāvidyādicakre pratipuruṣam ihānādi-citrapravāhe tattatkāle
vipaktirbhavati hi vividhā sarvasiddhāntasiddhā |
Tattvamuktā-kalāpa, 2-25.
4. atha ya ime grāme iṣṭāpūrte dattamityupāsate te dhūmamabhi-
sambhavanti..... | yavatsampātamuṣitvā athaitamevādhvānam
punarnivartante yathetamākāśa..... | meghe bhūtvā pravarṣati |
Chāndogya, 5-10-3 to 6.
5. saṁyamane tvanubhūyetaṣamārohaṁvarohau tadvati darśanāt
smaranti ca | Brahmasūtra, 3-1-13.

Deśika says "*smāryamāṇamapi kaḷebaram kadambagolāyayati*" (*Nyāya-siddhāñjana*, p. 140), that mere memory of them will fill the mind with fear and breaks the heart.

There are two types of *asaṁsāri jīva*. They are *nityas* and *muktas*. The *nityas* or *eternals* never had the bondage of *karma*. They are enjoying the bliss with the Lord from the *anādikāla* (times immemorial). The *muktas*, after the completion of their *karma*, cast off their mortal body, and enjoy the eternal bliss with *nityas* in *nityavibhūti*, the abode of the Supreme. Everyday thousands of people are attaining liberation, though the *saṁsāra* will not come to an end. "*pratidinam sahasrapuruṣamokṣe'pi na saṁsārātyanta vilāpaḥ*" (*Nyāya-siddhāñjana*, p. 141).

This position¹ is maintained by Rāmānuja in *Vedārtha-saṅgraha*. The number of *nityas* is more than that of the *mukta* and *baddha-jīvās*. Some thinkers do not admit the existence of *nityas*. But this view goes against the vedic passage: "*sadā paśyanti sūrayaḥ*" (*Rgveda*, I-5-22-20; *Subālopaniṣad*, 6). These innumerable *nityas* enjoy the service of the Lord in different ways.

Though there is some distinction between the *eternals* and *liberated souls*, on account of their contact and non-contact with *saṁsāra*, there is no difference in the enjoyment of the divine bliss, because the love of Lord for both of them is the same.

MEANS OF LIBERATION

Now Deśika enters into the discussion of the means of liberation. According to the school of *advaita*, the mere knowledge of Brahman leads to liberation—"vākyārtha-

1. *brahmājñānapakṣādapi pāpīyanayam pakṣaḥ | aparimita duḥkhasya pāramārthikatvāt, saṁsāriṇam anantatvena dustaratvācca |*
Vedārtha-saṅgraha, p. 73.

jñānānmuktiḥ". But this vākyaṛthajñāna is only an accessory to upāsana, because without vākyaṛthajñāna, the upāsana is not possible.

Scriptures ordain that one should attain the knowledge of brahman through upāsana. If mere vākyaṛthajñāna¹ was the means of liberation, Then there would have been no need for this imperative. This position is accepted by the great sage Āpastamba, who says that mere vākyaṛthajñāna cannot lead to the final emancipation². Deśika vehemently attacks advaita view³ and declares that bhakti alone is the means to liberation. This bhakti is a form of jñāna and is called upāsana, vedanā, dhyāna etc. Sūtrakāra also opines the same: "āvṛttirasakṛdupadeśāt" (Brahmasūtra, 4-1-1) "āprayānat tatrāpi hi dṛṣṭam" (Brahmasūtra, 4-1-12).

Bhakti is the constant remembrance of the svarūpa, rūpa and guṇas of the Paramātman. This is what is prescribed in the scriptures as 'nididhyāsana' (Bṛhadāraṇyaka, 3-2-4-5). 'dhruvā smṛtiḥ' (Chāndogya, 7-26-2). Rāmānuja further states that the upāsana or dhruvānusmṛti⁴ are identical and therefore the bhaktirūpānupāsanajñāna alone is the means of liberation. Karma, either independently or mixed with knowledge is not the cause of liberation, because the scriptures state "tameva viditvātimṛtyumeti | nānyaḥ panthā

1. na tāvadvākyaajanyajñānam | tasya vidhānamantareṇāpi vakyādeva siddheḥ | Śrībhāṣya, 1-1-1.

2. yoprabuddhe kṣemaprāpaṇam tacchāstrairvipratiṣiddham buddhe cet kṣemaprāpaṇam ihaiva na duḥkhamupalabheta | Āpastamba-sūtras, 2-9-21-14, 15, 16.

3. satyadhīrmama satyena tava satyādasatyadhīḥ | satyādasatyadhīrveti nāsatyāt satyadhīrbhavet ||

Nyāya-siddhāntajana, p. 143.

4. evaṁ rūpa dhruvānusmṛtīreva bhaktiśabdena abhidhīyate | upāsanaḥ paryāyatvāt bhaktiśabdasya | Śrībhāṣya, 1-1-1.

ayanāya vidyate!" (*Śvetāśvatara*, 3-8.) that *vedanā* alone is the means of liberation and others are not.

But if *karma* becomes means to attain *vedanā*. Then there is no objection. Thus it will not become an independent means. *Karma*¹ helps the *jīva* in acquiring *cittaśuddhi* and to get control over the senses which ultimately leads to *mokṣa*. Residing in the holy places² and serving the devotees also becomes the indirect cause of liberation. *Deśika*, after elaborately discussing the place of *Karmayoga* and *Jñānayoga* according to *Rāmānuja*, comes to the final conclusion that *bhaktiyoga* alone is the means of liberation. For a person who is incapable of ascending to *bhaktiyoga*, the '*ātmāvalokana*' (realisation of the self) is necessary to get eligibility to *bhaktiyoga*. The *jñānayoga* and *karmayoga* are the means to attain *ātmāvalokana*. Between these two means, *jñānayoga* is '*antaranga*' (nearer means) to the realisation of his own self. But it is very difficult to practise *jñānayoga* for a beginner. Therefore, *Deśika* advises, that one who is incapable of *jñānayoga* should practise *karmayoga*, which has the same result. Though a person is capable of following *jñānayoga*, he too is advised to follow *karmayoga*. Otherwise, the society will become chaotic. *Karmayoga* produces the capacity to follow *jñānayoga* in a weak-minded man. After attaining sufficient strength to follow *jñāna* one may give up *karma*. Capability or incapability to follow *jñānayoga* is due to the *karma* of the self.

Therefore, it is indisputable that *bhakti* alone is the means of liberation and the spiritual³ perfection is attained

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1. *kaṣāye karmabhiḥ pakve tato jñānam pravartate | avidyayā mṛtyum tīrtva.... |* *Īśāvāsya*, II and refer *Rahasyatraya-sāra*, 9.
 2. *Nyāya-siddhāntajana*, p. 144.
 3. *paramātmopāśanameva tatkratunyāyāt tatprāptyupāyaḥ | jīva-jñānam karmānuṣṭhānam ca tannivartakatvena paramparaya upāya iti bhāvaḥ ||* *Tātparya-candrikā*, 7-1.

through bhakti, which is termed as dhyāna or upāsana. According to Deśika, bhaktiyoga is greater than the other two yogas, namely Karmayoga and Jñānayoga. "*tuśabdena karmayoga-jñānayogābhyāmapi asyādhiḥkṛyaṁ vivakṣitam*" (Tātparya-candrikā, 9-1; Refer *Rahasyatraya-sāra*, Ch. 9.)

THE PLACE OF BHAKTI IN VIŚIṢṬĀDVAITA

R̥gvedasamhitā¹, Upaniṣads have glorified the greatness of meditation with love upon the Supreme Brahman, as the only way of attaining the salvation. The jñāna which is transformed into supreme love towards Lord, is called bhakti. Therefore bhakti is thus acclaimed from the earlier times as the sure means to mukti. *Rāmāyaṇa*, *Mahābhārata*, *Bhāgavata* and other *purāṇas* expound the greatness of bhakti. Ālvārs of the south have wonderfully shown the way of salvation in their *pāsurams* which are full with love of God.

The great ācāryas like Śrī Śāṅkara² and Śrī Ānanda-tīrtha³ have recognised the importance of bhakti⁴ as the means to mukti. The great Yāmunācārya prays God to grant him bhakti, with which he can attain Him; and declares that bhakti alone is the means to mukti. In *Mukundamāla*, Kulaśekhara⁵ prays for bhakti, the wonderful boat, by which one can cross the ocean of saṁsāra. The works of ācārya Rāmānuja are full of devotion, and they are the expression of his love for God. All cults of bhakti in India have drawn inspiration from Rāmānuja.

1. Refer *R̥gveda*, III-14-2 and X-133-6.

2. *mokṣa sādhana sāmāgryāṁ bhakti reva garīyasī* |

Viveka-cūḍāmaṇi, 32.

3. *amalā bhaktiśca tatsādhanam* |

Siddhāntatraya-saṅgraha, p. 3.

4. *bhagavan bhaktimapi prayacca me* |

Stotratatna, 54.

5. *bhaktipoto narāṇāṁ* |

Mukundamāla, 12.

Deśika explained, defined and interpreted the great teachings of Rāmānuja. The synthetic spirit of Rāmānuja regarding bhakti is clearly presented by Deśika in his works. Therefore, bhakti has a unique place in Indian philosophy in general and particularly in Viśiṣṭādvaita.

Bhakti is a continuous love for the supreme. It is love of God. Love and devotion towards adorables is bhakti¹. The term bhakti comes from the root 'bhaj' which means service. Bhakti is of the nature of love (prema). The *Bhagavadgītā* describes the meaning of Bhakti and its greatness. While commenting on śloka "*manmanābhava madbhaktaḥ* (9-34), Rāmānuja explains very clearly the meaning of bhakti. It is an unceasing and loving meditation upon the supreme person, who is the ocean of all auspicious qualities and who is untainted with imperfections. Rāmānuja puts this as: "*sarva svamini tailadhārāvāt avicchedena niviṣṭa manā bhava*" (*Gītā-bhāṣya*, 9-34).

Bhakti is thus a constant remembrance of bhagavat-svarūpa. This continuous flow of bhagavadanubhava is likened to the stream of oil poured from one vessel to another. In scriptures this is called nididhyāsana, dhyāna, dhruvāsmṛti etc.

Nārada defines bhakti as intense love of God and says "*sā tvasmīn parama premarūpā | amṛta svarūpā ca | yal-labdhva puman siddho bhavati | amṛto bhavati | tṛpto bhavati | yatprāpya na kiñcidvāñchati | na śocati | na dveṣṭi na ramate notsāhibhavati*" (*Nārada-bhaktisūtra*, 2-3-4-5). "A man who loves God has no wants or sorrows". To the man who finds delight in Him, who is self-controlled and even-minded, for him the whole universe is full of bliss.

1. *mahanīyasya prītirbhaktiḥ* |

Nyāya-siddhānta, p.49.

Also refer *Rahasyatraya-sāra*, 9; *Īśāvāsya*, 11 and *Viṣṇupurāṇa* 6-6-12.

Neither the position of Brahma nor that of Indra will be attractive to the real devotee. For such a person both pain and pleasure become equal. Kulaśekhara Ālvār says "*divi vā bhuvi vā mamāstu vāsaḥ*" (*Mukundamāla*, 6) "Oh God put me wherever you like; either in the heaven or hell. But you don't make me forgetful of your lotus feet." As fire kindled in to a blaze burns the faggots to ashes, so, bhagavat-prema completely consumes all evil¹.

Without this bhagavat-prema, virtues and learning are unfruitful. The heart of bhakta is made pure and his heart melts in joy. The ānanda, which the bhakta experiences by love of God is so intense that he forgets himself and his surroundings. He sometimes weeps profusely, or laughs or sings or dances². The life of great Ālvārs is a good example of this life of devotion.

Gold melted by fire gives up its dross and becomes pure, so all evil is washed away from the god-loving man. By thinking of objects of sense, one becomes attached to them. By absorbing in the love of God everyone can expect his salvation.

The same bhakti gets the name of parābhakti³ in different stage. The word 'bhakti' is used also in stuti (prayer) and namaskāra (prostration) etc., because of the contact of bhakti⁴ in them. This bhakti has taken thirty-two forms in Vedānta and is known by different names. They are,

1. *yathā madviṣayā bhaktiḥ uddhavanāmsi kṛtsnaśaḥ* |

Bhāgavata, 11-14-19

Also refer *Bhāgavata*, 11-14-12, 13, 14.

2. *Bhāgavata*, 11-14-24, 25.

3. *parabhaktirnāma prītirūpāpanno darśanasamānākāro mokṣa-jñānaviśeṣaḥ* | *Nyāya-siddhānta*, p.149 in *Rangarāmānuja-bhāṣya*.

4. *śravaṇam kīrtanam viṣṇoḥ smaraṇam pādasevanam | arcanam | vandanam dāyam sakhyamātmanivedanam* || *Bhāgavata*, 7.

sad-vidyā, akṣara-vidyā, ākāśa-vidyā, nyāsa-vidyā, paryāṅka-vidyā, etc. Bhakti is suggested for those who are strictly observing the varṇāśrama-dharma. Even devas and asuras are permitted to enter into Bhaktiyoga. Women and widowers are advised to perform meditation and fasting, which are accessories to bhakti. They too are eligible for brahmavidyā. But those who have deviated from the naiṣṭikatva, who have fallen from their duties and vows, are not eligible for it because they are rejected by śiṣṭas, and the scriptures¹ ordain their non-eligibility. Even the expiatory acts conducted by them will not make them eligible for brahmavidyā. Sūtrakāra explains these details in the sūtra: “*bahistu-bhayathāpi smṛterācārācca*!” (*Brahmasūtra*, 3-4-43).

Here one may ask though bhakti is limited to the three varṇas, how is it that gopikas (the women folk of Gokula) who did not belong to these three varṇas, were eligible to mokṣa? Deśika discussing this problem says that the gopikas had taken their birth due to their prārabdha-karma. In their previous births, they had already performed the upāyānu-ṣṭhāna. The birth in which liberation is attained does not count much. This is the same with Vidura and Dharmavyādha also².

Then what is the meaning of the episode of Jānaśruti³ and Raikva? There Raikva, the spiritual guru, address Jānaśruti as ‘śūdra’—“*ājahāremāḥ śūdra*!” (*Chāndogya*, 4-2-5.)

1. *ārūḍho naiṣṭikam dharmam yastu pracyavate narah |
prāyaścittam na paśyāmi yena śudhyet sa ātmahā ||*

Āgneyapurāṇa, 165-23.

2. *dharmavyadhādayo'pyanye pūrvābhyāsājjugupsite |
varṇāvaratve samprāptāḥ saṁsiddhiṁ śramaṇi yathā ||*

Quoted in *Nyāya-siddhāntjana*, p. 150. *Viṣṇudharma*, 10-2-29.

3. Refer *Nyāya-siddhāntjana*, p. 151.

This episode establishes that, one who belongs to last varṇa is also eligible for brahmavidyā. But that passage should be studied with sufficient care. There Raikva addresses Jānaśruti as 'śūdra' because the latter's repentance for non-acquisition of spiritual knowledge. Etymologically the word 'śūdra' means one who repents for his ignorance—"śocatīti śūdraḥ". Sūtrakāra also is of the same opinion. "*śugasya tadanādaraśravaṇāt*" (*Brahmasūtra*, 1-3-33). All these arguments make it clear that upāsanas are not ordained in scriptures for one and all. The traivarnikas who strictly follow the āśramadharma are alone advised to follow the path of upāsana. The cause of liberation, namely, upāsana, should be performed in higher¹ births. The result of it, namely mokṣa, may be had in any birth higher or lower.

But what about the last varṇa. They are advised to perform the duties of their station in life developing devotion towards God by means of which they attain salvation. Because they are preoccupied with the duties of the life, Śruti compassionately equates their devoted work, which is performed as the service to God, to bhakti itself. In *Mahābhārata* Vidura, *Dharmavyādha* etc., and in *Bhāgavata* Gopikas, Akrūra, Mālākāra and such others, attained mukti by the grace of Lord, though they were born in the last varṇa. Therefore to do one's duty in life, surrendering the fruit of action to God, definitely will bless one with the circumstances that are favourable for practising Bhaktiyoga, in course of time. Deśika in *Dayāsataka* (stanza 65) quotes examples from both *Rāmāyaṇa* and *Bhāgavata* and says, that Guha, Sugrīva, Hanumān, Śabari, Kucela, Kubjā and Gopikās attained mukti, though all of them did not practice Bhaktiyoga. Really, the practice of bhakti is a very difficult process. In this process one should get complete control over

1. The words like higher or lower also refer to the states like ripeness or rawness of the individual in the field of *Vedānta*.

his sense-organs. Bhaktiyoga should be practised as long as this body continues. Therefore with immeasurable compassion this difficult path of salvation was not suggested for those, who are performing their duty of their station in life. *Bhagavadgītā* endorses this view, saying: "*tepi yānti parāṅgatiṃ*" (9-32.)

Ladies, businessmen and people who are engaged in the duties of life also attain salvation, if they perform their duties as the 'kainkarya' of Paramātman.

NYĀSAVIDYĀ OR ŚARAṆĀGATI

Śaraṇāgati śāstra is as old as Vedas. Vedas declare that for the upliftment of the individual, love of God is very essential. Vedas say that to man God is everything. Ṛgvedic hymns are pregnant with devotion and self-surrender. God is described there, as a friend and a near relative of all men. Vedas¹ assert that none other than God is able to protect the jīvātman from the ocean of saṃsāra. Vedas advocate the very essence of śaraṇāgati or prapatti. Though these words are not used in *Vedas* (saṃhitā) one can decipher the philosophy of prapatti in these portions. There fore these infallible Vedas suggest, that prapatti is the means of spiritual salvation.

All *Vedāntas* derive their inspiration from Upaniṣadic philosophy. Upaniṣads teach in unequivocal terms that prapatti is the means of self realization. *Īśāvasya*²,

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1. *agne naya supathā rāye asmān....* | *Ṛgveda*, I-189-1.
ayāmi te nama uktim juṣasva.... | *Ṛgveda*, III-14-2.
tvam jāmirjanānām agne mitro asi priyaḥ | *Ṛgveda*, I-75-4.
 2. *agne naya supathā rāye asmān viśvāni deva vayanāni vidvān* |
yuyodhyasmajjuhurāṇamenō bhuyiṣṭām te nama uktim vidhema ||
Īśa, 18.

*Śvetāśvatara*¹, *Chāndogya*² and *Muṇḍaka*³ declare the greatness of Nyāsavidyā.

In *purāṇas* and *itihāsas* there are countless references to śaraṇāgati. *Bhagavadgītā*⁴ which is the essence of upanishadic philosophy declares prapatti as the surest means of emancipation.

Tamil prabandhas of Ālvārs (which are called *Tamil Veda* by Deśika) are full of the philosophy of self-surrender. Nammālvār has shown the way of self-surrender in his *Tiruvoyamoli* (1-10-10). The entire *Rāmāyaṇa* is considered by the ācāryas of Viśiṣṭādvaitic philosophy as the 'Śaraṇāgati Veda'.

Nāthamuni and Yāmunaṁṇi otherwise called āḷavandār have followed prapatti as the means to attain the kṛpā of Śrīmannārāyaṇa. In this way prapatti is an ancient sampradāya preached and practised by the great ācāryas of Viśiṣṭādvaita.

Rāmānuja, in his *Gadyatraya* declares⁵ that prapatti is the only means to attain the lotus feet of Śrīmannārāyaṇa. Though Rāmānuja accepts that bhakti is also the surest means of mukti, he admits the extraordinary efficacy of prapatti⁶ as a direct path to salvation.

1. *mumukṣur vai śaraṇamaham prapadye* | *Śvetāśvatara*, 6-17.

2. *indram śaraṇam prapanno'bhavam* |
prajāpatiṁ śaraṇam prapanno'bhūvam | *Chāndogya*, 2-22-3, 4.

3. *praṇavo dhanuḥ śaro hyātmā brahma tallakṣyamucyate* |
apramattena veddhavyaṁ śaravat tanmayo bhavet ||

Muṇḍaka, 2-2-4.

4. *sarvadharmān parityajya māmekaṁ śaraṇam vraja* | *Gītā*, 18-66.
tameva śaraṇaṁ gaccha... | *Gītā*, 18-62.

5. *tatprāptaye ca tat pādāmbujadvaya prapatteranyannāme kalpakoti*
sahasreṇāpi sādhanam astīti manvānaḥ | *Vaikuṇṭha-gadya*.

6. *tasya ca vaśīkaraṇam tacchāraṇāgatireva* | *Śrībhāṣya*, 1-4-1.

Śaraṇāgati was not an invention of Rāmānuja. *Śruti*, *smṛitis* and *purāṇas* and the observation of Śaraṇāgati by great ācāryas like Nāthamuni and Yāmuna, will bear ample evidence to its antiquity. Rāmānuja was himself a great prapanna and initiated thousands of his disciples to the secrets of śaraṇāgati and thus showed the way of salvation to the majority of human beings who were unable to follow the difficult disciplines of Bhaktiyoga.

Vedānta Deśika following in the foot steps of Rāmānuja explained and established the doctrine of prapatti on firm grounds. He established the greatness of prapatti, on the authority of *Vedas*, *purāṇas*, *āgamas*, *Divyaprabhandhas* and observation of the ancient ācāryas, in his *Rahasyatraya-sāra*, which work is a land-mark in the history of Viśiṣṭādvaita philosophy. Vedānta Deśika wrote a work in sanskrit namely *Nikṣepa-rakṣā* in defence of prapatti.

After Rāmānuja there emerged two sub-schools viz., Vaḍagalai and Teṅgalai. Both these schools were originated during the time of Rāmānuja himself. Both these schools were preaching the great teachings of their guru, Rāmānuja. The Teṅgalai school was established by ācāryas like Pillai Lokāchārya and Varavaramuni, who based their exposition mostly on Tamil prabandhams whereas Vedānta Deśika was the chief exponent of Vaḍagalai school. In addition to the prabandhams of Āḷvārs, Deśika based his expositions, on scriptures, *Purāṇas*, *itihāsās*, *āgamas*, and the writings of ancient ācāryas of the school.

Regarding prapatti, the Teṅgalai ācāryas advocate prapatti is complete dependence on the grace of the Lord. If jīvātman does not obstruct the grace of the Lord, that itself is prapatti. Unless the Lord gracefully desires to protect the individual self, the efforts of the jīvātman to get liberation becomes futile. In the redemption of the individual soul the 'nirhetukakṛpā' of the Lord alone is the resort.

But Vaḍagalai school points out that the submission of one's own self at the feet of the Lord is prapatti and only thus the kṛpā of the Lord will be evoked. Unless the child cries for its mother she may not pay her attention to it. In the same way the individual self also should pray for the divine communion and thus he should discharge his part of duty. It is not mere 'pāratantryajñāna', as the other school advocates. Śāstras enjoin certain rules for jīvātman to seek redemption from the Lord. Śāstras imperatively say 'śaraṇam vraja' (Gītā, 18-66) and 'śaraṇam gaccha' (Gītā, 18-62). 'Seek protection at the feet of the Lord. If the non-obstruction with the grace of the Lord itself brings mukti, then even inert matters should get liberated. Because they too do not obstruct His grace. Therefore prapatti should be performed at the feet of the Lord by one and all.

Nyāsavidyā or prapatti is the bed-rock of Viśiṣṭādvaita philosophy. It means surrendering oneself to Lord Nārāyaṇa with his divine consort Mahālakṣmī. *Nyāsa-vimśati*, *Nyāsa-daśaka*, *Nyāsa-tilaka*, *Śaraṇagati-dīpikā*, *Nikṣepa-rakṣā*, *Abhayapradāna-sāra* and *Rahasyagranthas* in Tamil are written on the same subject by Vedānta Deśika.

There are two types of prapannas. One is ārta, who cannot bear any separation from the Lord. He possesses intense love for the Lord. Another is dṛpta, who is patient and not in a hurry. Emancipation is the aim of both ārta and dṛpta. Dṛpta though he is patient and is slow still enjoys the Archā form of the Lord in this world.

Śaraṇagati does not require other conditions like ātma-darśana or Jñānayoga as in the case of Bhaktiyoga. But it has five aṅgas which are essential for prapatti. They are :

1. Ānukūlya saṅkalpa (determination to do whatever is agreeable to the Lord). This aṅga makes the aspirer to know that he exists only for the satisfaction of the Lord.

2. *Prātikūlya varjana* (abandoning such actions which bring displeasure to Him).

3. *Kārpaṇya* (helplessness). It means the aspirant should feel that he is incapable of observing any means like karma, jñāna, or bhakti. Here the prapanna feels that God alone is his mentor and can help him to attain salvation.

4. *Mahaviśvāsa* (supreme faith). The living faith in the grace of God is very essential for prapanna.

5. *Gopṭṛtvavaraṇam* (praying for the protection). It is also a very important āṅga of prapatti. One can get whatever one desires, only when one seeks for it. In the same way mokṣa can be attained only when one seeks for it from the Lord¹.

If *ātmanikṣepa* is included among these, then the āṅgas are six in number. *Ātmanikṣepa* means surrender of the self. Of these, *ātmanikṣepa* is considered as an āṅgi (main factor), for which the five others are āṅgas (accessories). That is why prapatti is called *ṣaḍāṅga yoga*. This yoga namely prapatti should be performed only once with all these āṅgas. The action of a prapanna is compared in the Upaniṣads², to the clever archer who shoots the arrow at the object in a moment. The praṇava is the bow, the ātman is the arrow, Brahman is the target. It must be hit taking the aim with great care. For this purpose one should have keen concentration.

The conviction, 'that the Lord with his consort is the

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1. Vedānta Deśika summarises this quoting from *Ahirbudnya-saṁhitā*: *ānukūlyasya saṅkalpaḥ prātikūlyasya varjanam | rakṣiṣyatīti viśvāsaḥ gopṭṛtva varaṇam tathā | ātmanikṣepa kārpaṇye ṣaḍvidhā śaraṇāgatih ||* *Rahasyatraya-sāra*, Ch.11.
 2. *praṇavo dhanuḥ śaro hyātmā brahma tallakṣya mucyate | apramattena veddhyam śaravat tanmayo bhavet ||*

Muṇḍaka, 2-2-4.

redeemer of every cetana', is Nyāsavidyā¹. Prapatti, śaraṇāgati, nikṣepa are all different names of nyāsavidyā. Though Viśiṣṭādvaita admits Nyāsavidyā as a separate means to liberation, there is no contradiction with the Vedic statement. 'nānyaḥ panthā ayanāya vidyate' (*Puruṣa-sūkta*), states that knowledge alone is the cause of liberation. Nyāsa or prapatti is also a kind of knowledge. Nyāsa is also a state of bhakti². Bhakti and prapatti are the two ways of awakening divine compassion. Jīva also on his part has to offer sincere prayer for his redemption. The human endeavour, which is adopted for awakening of Divine grace is of two types. They are bhakti and prapatti³.

Both bhakti and prapatti are inter-related. They are not contradictory to each other. Sometimes bhakti is included in prapatti and in some other times prapatti is included in bhakti. Prapatti is called 'sādhya-bhakti' and bhakti is called 'sādhana-bhakti'. The devotees who hold that prapatti is the sole means of liberation, adopt sādhya-bhakti. Those who look upon prapatti as an auxiliary means to perfect bhakti, adopt sādhana-bhakti. Bhakti can destroy the heap of karma excepting the prārabdha-karma, whereas sādhya-bhakti, namely prapatti, can destroy even prārabdha-karma⁴.

Bhakti is to be performed as long as one remains in this mortal body. But it is not the case with the prapatti.

1. *adhyavasāyadiviśeṣaviśiṣṭā nyāsavidyā* |

Nyāya-siddhāṇjana, p. 152.

2. *bhaktiviśeṣatvacca* |

Nyāya-siddhāṇjana, p. 152.

bhaktiā tvananyayā... | ityadibhiḥ.

Gītā, 11-54.

3. *bhaktiprapattibhyāṁ tadvaśīkaraṇam* |

Nyāsa-vimśati 17, Also refer *Rahasyatraya-sāra* p. 200.

4. *upāyabhaktiḥ prārabdhavyatiriktāghanāśini sādhya-bhaktistu sūhantrī prārabdhasyāpi bhūyasi* |

Sātyaki-tantra, quoted in *Nyāya-siddhāṇjana*, p. 152.

Prapatti is to be performed only once in lifetime. Therefore, prapatti is ordained to be a separate means of liberation, though prapatti is considered to be the state of bhakti.

Here this point must be borne in mind. The result of prapatti and bhakti is the same. Prapatti is a means easily accessible to one and all. Bhakti is a difficult discipline. Then what is the use of prescribing a gurūpāya (bhakti) when there is a laghūpāya (prapatti)? Deśika answers that prapatti is also a difficult discipline, because to get such firm faith, namely, 'the God alone is my redeemer' is very difficult¹. Prapanna (one who has surrendered to God) is stated to be sevākṣama². A person who is nearer to the king will not be punished severely though he commits mistakes³. If antaraṅgasevā of king is thought of as difficult to practice, then it is the same with prapatti also. Bhakti is called upāya-bhakti and prapatti is called sādhyā-bhakti.

In upāya-bhakti it is necessary to discharge the karmas like nitya, naimittika and kāmya as auxiliary to bhakti. Those karmas should not be performed independently. Abandoning the forbidden acts is the same to both bhakti and prapatti. But in sādhyā-bhakti the kāmya type of karmas should be abandoned in toto. But the performance of nitya type of karma is obligatory.

Deśika here clears certain doubts regarding the behaviour of a prapanna. Some people think that a prapanna can lead a life of his fancies, because he has surrendered

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1. *tathoktam prapattiprakarāṇe upāyaḥ sukarasso'yam duṣkaraśca mato mama* |
Nyāya-siddhāñjana, p. 153.
 2. *na prāgvat buddhipurvāghe na cātyantamanugrahaḥ* |
laghurdaṇḍaḥ prapannasya rājaputrāparādhavat |
Rahasyatraya-sāra, 18.
 3. *kṣudreṣu skhaliteṣu sahyate mahatsvapi alpadaṇḍo bhavati* |
Nyāya-siddhāñjana, p. 153

unto God. In this connection, they quote the examples of Samvarta Bharata and Vidura who were spiritually evolved people. They even go to the extent of quoting the Śruti, “pāṇḍityaṁ nirvidya bālyena tiṣṭhāset” (*Bṛhadāraṇyaka*, 5-5-1). One should live like a child.

But this position does not seem to be very correct. The statements such as “bālyena tiṣṭhāset” “jaḍavallokaṁ mācāret” (one should conduct himself in this world as though he knows nothing), “satām mārgamadūṣayan” (without deviating from the path of righteous people) etc., advise the seekers after Brahman not to exhibit their knowledge and their greatness before others. These scriptures do not mean to allow such people to be a *kāmacāra*. Only during the time of extreme difficulty, to retain his vital breaths one is advised to take food, wherever he likes. Sūtrakāra is also of the same opinion¹, and he says that the devotee or prapanna, should not transgress the *vidhis* and *niyamas* of scriptures. If this interpretation is not admitted, *Śrūtis* and *smṛtis*² such as ‘persons who follow the dictates of Veda upto the last breath of life, attain *Brahmaloka*’, ‘one cannot realise the Brahman if one is not chaste in life’, ‘only those who perform the entrusted duties in their life, they alone can satisfy the Lord’,—would be meaningless. Therefore the contention of the scriptures is that even a brahmavid becomes sinner if he commits sinful deeds. Then, what about the statements which declare that the sins committed by a brahmavid will

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|---|------------------------------|
| 1. <i>anāviṣkurvannanvayāt</i> | <i>Brahmasūtra</i> , 3-4-49. |
| <i>sarvānnānumatiśca prṇātyaye taddarśanāt</i> | <i>Brahmasūtra</i> , 3-4-28. |
| <i>śabdaścāto kāmākāre</i> | <i>Brahmasūtra</i> , 3-4-31. |
| 2. <i>sa khalvevaṁ vartayan yāvadāyusaṁ brahmalokamabhisampadyate</i> | <i>Chāndogya</i> , 8-15-1. |
| <i>nāvīrato duṣcaritāt</i> | <i>Kaṭha</i> , 1-2-24. |
| <i>varṇāśramacāravatā</i> | <i>Viṣṇupurāṇa</i> , 3-8-9. |

be destroyed like an 'iṣṭkātūla' thrown¹ in the fire?

This is answered in this way. The brahmavidyā will destroy all karmas excepting such as prārabdha, bhuktaphala (result of which are already experienced) and kṛtaprāyaścitta (which are warded off by expiatory rites). The sins committed by him inadvertently would not stain him. It is not at all likely that a prapanna, who is guided by the scriptures will offend the Lord by committing deliberate sins. Sometimes due to his prārabdha-karma, and due to the adverse circumstances he may commit certain sins. It should be borne in mind, that even such a prapanna will not be discarded by the Lord who is a kṛpāsāgara. By the same grace of God, he prays for the expiation of that sin also. If by mistake he does not perform prāyaścitta, then the sin begins to bear its fruits before the prārabdha-karmas are ended. But these sins, do not become the cause of re-birth. However, if there is any curse or any sinful deed, which ought to cause re-birth, then it will inevitably be so. Though the effects of prapatti will not be destroyed, prapatti itself becomes effective only after the anubhava of the fruits of that sin. But the process of committing such sins and enjoying their fruits will not continue further. Otherwise, the upāsana or prapatti itself becomes useless. Deśika points out that all these ideas are brought out by the sūtrakāra in "*evam muktiphalāṇīyamastadavasthāvadhr̥testadavasthāvadhr̥teḥ*!" (*Brahmasūtra*, 3-4-51). He says that sometimes even the rituals performed by an individual, with the intention of getting worldly objects will not yield fruits. In the same way brahmavidyā also liberates a person in a different birth if there is such an obstruction, for mukti, in this birth.

For a prapanna even puṇya (merit) is considered like pāpa (demerit) because puṇya also is not favourable to

1. *tadyatheṣṭkātūlmagnau protam pradūyeta evaṁ hyasya sarve pāpmānaḥ pradūyante* | *Chāṇḍogya*, 5-24-3.

mokṣa¹. Therefore, the puṇya also is destroyed during the time of liberation. Statements such as “nābhuktaṁ kṣīyate karma” (*Brhṁmavaivarta-prakṛti-kāṇḍa*, 26, 70.) ‘unless the results of the actions are enjoyed, those actions will not diminish’ will not apply to brahma-vid or prapanna. The results of prārabhda-karma must be experienced by one and all, and in the end, such persons attain mukti². Therefore the movement of karma is beyond the imagination of our mind. *Gītā* declares “gahanā karmaṇo gatiḥ” (4-17), that it is very difficult to understand the karma of the prapanna. So one cannot say in which birth he gets liberated. But he who yearns for the loving service of the Lord, at the end of the present birth itself³, attains mokṣa. The *Śruti* which says “asmāccharīrātsamutthāya” (*Chāndogya*, 8-3-4), that the seeker attains the liberation in the end of the present birth itself, indicates the mokṣa-prāpti in antima-śarīra (last birth). That is why the sūtrakāra said, even the great sages like Vāsiṣṭha attain mokṣa after completing their prārabdhādhi-kāra⁴. Further, it is proved that for the prapanna, after the completion of antima-śarīra, there is no restriction of time or place to attain liberation. Generally death should not take place during night and dakṣiṇāyana etc., But for a brahma-vid it is not the rule. This rule applies only to abrahma-vid⁵.

1. itarasyāpyevamasamśleṣaḥ | *Brahmasūtra*, 4-1-14
sadyastyajanti varadaḥ twayi baddhbhāvāḥ.... |
kārāgrhe kanakaśrīṅkalayāpi bandhaḥ | *Varadarāja-pañcāśat*, 29.
2. bhogena tuitare kṣapayitvātha sampadyate | *Brahmasūtra*, 4-1-19.
3. etaddehavasāne mām tvatpādam prāpaya svayam |
Nyāsa-daśaka, 4.
4. yāvadadhikāram avasthitiḥ ādhikārikāṇām | *Brahmasūtra*, 3-3-31.
5. niśi neti cenna sambandhasya yāvaddehabhāvitvāddarśayati ca |
ataścāyane’pi dakṣiṇe | *Brahmasūtra*, 4-2-18, 19.
Restrictions such as ‘divā ca śuklapakṣeṇa uttarāyaṇameva ca |
mumūrṣatām praśastāni viparītāṁ tu garhitāṁ |

Quoted in *Nyāya-siddhānta-jana-ñikā*, p. 157.

Thus both puṇya and pāpa are impediments in achieving mokṣa-puruṣārtha. However, they do not stain a prapanna. But the question is, then, what becomes of such pāpa and puṇya? Deśika explains on the basis of scriptures that the friends and foes of the brahmavid or prapanna will receive his puṇya and pāpa respectively, during the time of his departure from the mortal body. This point is clear from the Śruti "*tat sukr̥taduṣkṛte dhūnute | tasya priyā jñātayaḥ sukr̥tamupayanti | apriyā duṣkṛtam |*" (*Kauṣītaki*, 1-4) and "*tasya putrādāyamupayanti | suhṛdaḥ sādhuḥkṛtyāṁ, dviṣantaḥ pāpākṛtyāṁ |*" (*Śātyāyanaka*).

Rāmānuja also commenting on the sūtra "*ato'nyāpi hyeṣāṁubhayoḥ |*" (*Brahmasūtra*, 4-1-17) says, that friends and foes of a prapanna get his puṇya and pāpa respectively¹. Here one may ask how is it that the fruits of an action done by some one go to somebody else who is not their agent? Deśika answers² that the puṇya and pāpa are nothing but the prasāda and kopa of the Lord. Therefore, the Lord directs his kopa and prīti towards the foes and friends respectively of the prapanna. That is why the Śruti said "*tasmādātmjñāṁ hyarcayedbhūtikāmaḥ |*" (*Muṇḍaka*, 3-1-10) that one should be very careful and should not incur the wrath of a prapanna.

Nyāsa vidyā can destroy prārabdha-karma also, but it retains a part of his desires to live up to the end of this śarīra and to undergo the ensuing misery from it. If the prapanna practices the strict asceticism, prapatti destroys even that retained part of desire and its result. Such lovers of God are called ārtaprapannas, and the others are called dṛpta prapannas.

1. *vidyaya aśleṣavinaśaśśrutiśca tadviṣayā |*

Śrībhāṣya on *Brahmasūtra*, 4-1-17.

2. *sā ca śaktirbhagavatkopaprītiviśeṣātmikā |*

Nyāya-siddhānta, p. 160.

Gītā says “*yaṁ yaṁ vāpi smaran bhāvam*” (8-6), that a cetana becomes that object on which he meditates during the time of his departure. Therefore the scriptures prescribe antima-smṛti to upāsakas. But for prapanna, even this is not necessary because the Lord himself remembers him at that time: “*aham smarāmi madbhaktam*”. (*Varāha-carama-śloka*). Therefore Deśika says “*asyām ca vidyāyām antima pratyayāpekṣāpi na vidyate*!” (*Nyāya-siddhāñjana*, p. 161) that in this Nyāsa-vidyā a prapanna need not have the antima-smaraṇa during the time of his final departure, as the Lord himself remembers him, at that time.

Every upāsaka or vidvān or prapanna departs from this body through the vein, namely, ‘brahmanāḍi’ easily, and continues his blissful journey towards the abode of the Lord, through the world of ātivāhikas, “Arci, Āhas, Sitapakṣa, Udagayana, Aṣṭa-marut, Arka, Indu, Vidyut, Varuṇa, Indra, Prajāpati” and being worshipped by them, finally he would be taken to Brahma by ‘amānava’ whose form is made up of lightening. This way by which the prapanna reaches the Lord is called ‘arcirādigati’.

Deśika gives the evidence of *Śruti*¹ in which the word sambhūti means arcirādigati. Vināśa means the destruction of karma. So the idea is, that the prapanna crosses the ocean of saṁsāra after freeing himself from the fetters of karma, enters the abode of the Lord by the arcirādigati and finally enjoys the bliss of servitude of the Lord in nitya-vibhūti. Deśika further describes the journey of a prapanna and says that the knowledge and ānanda go on increasing as he journeys through the arcirādigati. He becomes mukta from the time he is touched by the hands

1. *sambhūtim ca vināśam ca yastadvedobhayam saha |*
vināśena mṛtyum tīrtva sambhūtyā'mṛtamaśnute | *Īśāvāsya*, 14
terciṣamabhisambhavanti, etāmitaḥ pretyābhisambhavitāsmi
brahmalokamabhisambhavanti | *Chāndogya*, 4-15-5.

of amānava. Then he reaches paramapada, the abode of the Lord and gets eight qualities¹, such as apahatapāpmatva, satyasaṅkalpatva, etc., which are common both to him and the paramapuruṣa also. This is the original state² of the jīva. Afterwards, he never comes back to this saṁsāra. The cessation of saṁsāra, going through the path of arcirādi, having the aprākṛta-divyamaṅgala-vigraha, sālōkya, sāmīpya, sārūpya and sāyujya, all are connoted by the word 'mokṣa'. Here sālōkya means getting into the Lord's abode. Sāmīpya is reaching the vicinity of Lord's abode. Sārūpya means having the eight divine qualities. Because jīva is an eternal entity, it cannot become identical with Brahman. Therefore Deśika says, that the interpretation of some vedāntins, that sāyujya means identity, does not stand to reason. The Śruti and also the smṛti³ should be interpreted to mean complete equality between the jīvātman and the Brahman during the state of liberation.

Prapanna thus liberated gets freedom from saṁsāra for ever and enjoys the Lord who is ānandasāgara, and devoid of any type of duḥkha. Therefore Deśika says, "*sa ca nirduḥkha-niratisāyanandarūpa bhagavadanubhavātmaka iti siddham*" (Nyāya-siddhāñjana, p. 167) that the attainment of intrinsic glory by jīva consists in realising its dependence (pāratantrya) on God who is nirduḥkha, ānanda-svarūpa and svatantra.

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1. *eṣa ātma apahatapāpmā vijaro vimṛtyuḥ viśoko vijighatso apipāsaḥ satyakāmaḥ satyasaṅkalpaḥ* | *Chāndogya*, 8-1-5.
 2. *parañjyotirupasampadya svena rūpeṇābhiniṣpadyate* | *Chāndogya*, 8-12-2.
sampadyāvīrbhāva svena śabdāt | *Brahmasūtra*, 4-4-1.
 3. *paramaṁ sāmīyamupaiti* | *Muṇḍaka*, 3-2-8.
mama sādharmyamāgataḥ | *Gītā*, 14-2.
brahmaivid brahmaiva bhavati | *Muṇḍaka*, 3-2-9.

MOKṢA SVARŪPA IN VIŚIṢṬĀDVAITA

The desire for emancipation is implanted in the mind of human-being. It is this desire which makes man to aspire and to know the final goal of life. When he realises, that the fruits of rituals are limited in their scope, naturally his mind begins to think about the final release, which is nitya and ānandarūpa. Such a person, in Vedāntasāstra, is called mumukṣu. Ācārya Śaṅkara prescribes¹ this desire for mokṣa as a pre-requisite to become mukta.

According to advaita thinkers mokṣa consists in the annihilation of the 'I' ness. But Rāmānuja says that a man would turn away from mokṣa if mokṣa means 'annihilation' of 'I' ness. He asks for himself, when he himself perishes, of what value is such a release or mokṣa for him?

Rāmānuja writes in Śrībhāṣya that the annihilation of the self is not mokṣa. Mokṣa is said to consist in the attainment of the Lordly qualities similar to those of the supreme person 'Śrīmannārāyaṇa'. Rāmānuja further writes, that the soul in all its states is imperfect. When the jīvātman reaches the Paramātman, he should be far from imperfections. He should possess all blessed qualities², and be higher than everything else. Release consists in attaining the servitude of parama-puruṣa and enjoying the divine-bliss in the communion of the Lord. Following the ideas of sūtrakāra, Rāmānuja in Śrībhāṣya establishes that mukti is not only the direct perception of the Lord but also the progressive attainment of Brahmaloaka. The advaita exposition of the two muktis viz., 'krama-mukti' and 'jīvanmukti' are not accepted in Viśiṣṭādvaita.

1. *ucyate | nityānitya vastuvivekaḥ, ihāmutra artha bhoga virāgaḥ, śamadamādi sādhana sampat, mumukṣutvaṁ ca |*

Brahmasūtra-bhāṣya of Śrī Śaṅkara, 1-1-1.

2. *Śrībhāṣya, 4-4-1, p. 839.*
Chāndogya, 8-12-1.

Jīvātman, who was bound hither to by his karma, becomes free from it, and gets equality with Parabrahman¹. This means that mukti is self-manifesting itself in its own form. Mukti is fullest blossoming of ātman.

Rāmānuja commenting on the *Brahmasūtra*: 'ātmā prakaraṇāt' (4-4-3), says that by the 'self manifesting itself in its own form in the state of mukti', is meant the self as possessing the guṇāṣṭaka āvirbhāva and freedom from all evil and sin and so on. These are the essential characteristics of ātman. This original nature of ātman was obscured in the state of saṃsāra, through ajñāna (nescience). Therefore at the time of mukti these essential qualities get themselves, expressed. These guṇas only manifest, but not originate. The great sage Śaunaka² says that even as the lustre of a gem is not created by the act of washing, so the guṇaṣṭakas manifest in the ātman by putting off karma-vāsanā. When the well is dug, the digger finds water. The water is not created by the action of digging. It was existent and became visible in the well. Thus all divya-guṇas only manifest in ātman through the kṛpā of Śrīmannārāyaṇa. They are not produced.

Rāmānuja following these authorities comes to the conclusion, that the essential qualities of ātman, which are obscured and contracted by the karma, get expansion, when

1. *ataḥ karmaṇā sambaddhsya param jyotirūpasampadya bandha niṣṛṭtirūpa muktiḥ svenarūpeṇa abhiniṣpattirucyate* |

Śrībhāṣya, p. 870.

2. *yathā na kriyate jyotsnā mala prakṣālanān maṇeḥ |
doṣa prahāṇāt na jñānam ātmanaḥ kriyate tathā ||
yathodapāna karaṇāt kriyate na jalāmbaram |
sadeva nīyate vyaktim asataḥ sambhavaḥ kutaḥ ||
tathā heya guṇa dhvamsāt avabodhādayo guṇāḥ |
prakāśyante na jāyante nitya evātmanohite ||*

Viṣṇudharma 104-55, 56, 57.

the ātman attains the lotus feet of the Lord and becomes free from the bondage¹ of karma.

Deśika strictly following the writings of Rāmānuja establishes, that the attributive knowledge (dharma-bhūta-jñāna) is fully blossomed at the time of liberation. This expansion of dharma-bhūta-jñāna is eternal². Deśika further says that with this expanded dharma-bhūta-jñāna, the muktātman enjoys the servitude of the Lord for ever and this itself is mukti³. Though generally, servitude is considered to be undesirable one, muktātman enjoys the kainkarya of the Lord. The service of wicked people results in suffering and misery. But the kainkaryas of the Lord, who is full of all auspicious qualities yields ānanda for ever⁴. According to Viśiṣṭādvaita school this expansion of the attributive consciousness, the manifestation of eight auspicious qualities, and the servitude of the Lord, who is 'sakala kalyaṇa guṇākara' is mukti and the original state of ātman.

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1. *ataḥ jñāna ānandādī guṇānām karmaṇā ātmani sankucitānām parañjyotirupasampadya karmarūpa bandhakṣaye vikasarūpa avirbhāvaḥ nānupapannaḥ iti susthūktaṁ sampadyāvairbhāvaḥ iti |*
Sribhāṣya, p. 872.

trayanta nīṣṭhastu... jñānādī karmarūpa avidyā tirohitasya avidyocchedapūrvaka sabbhāvika paramātmānubhavameva mokṣmācakaṣate |
Sribhāṣya, p. 291.

2. *sannakādyukta nitya, śāntāśāparādhe na ca bhavati punaḥ tatra saṅkoca hetuḥ |*
Tattvamuktā-kalāpa, 2-61.

3. *niravadhisukha brahmabhuktistu muktih |*
Tattvamuktā-kalāpa, 2-64.

4. *ayambhāvaḥ | karmopādhikasevā hi karma vaicitryād pratikūla udāsīna kiñcidanukūla ca syāt | iyantu nirupādhika svāmīsevā yathāgamam niravadhika sukhārūpeti |*

Sarvārtha-siddhi p. 312. (Also refer *Nyāya-siddhāntajana*, p. 167; *Adhikaraṇa-sārvaṇī* 520, 521; and *Adhikaraṇa-chintāmaṇi*).

KAIVALYA

Deśika here discusses kaivalya which is also admitted as mokṣa by some thinkers. This kaivalya is the result of one of the brahmavidyās, namely, pañcāgni-vidyā. Kaivalya is that state in which the jīvātman enjoys the bliss of mere self. Compared to bhagavadanubhava, the experience of the self is very inferior type of enjoyment. It is therefore discarded by all ācāryas. On the basis of the statements of Yāmūnācārya¹ some ācāryas think that there is a mokṣa called 'kaivalya' near Vaikuṇṭha or the abode of Viṣṇu. Further, they again quote from Yāmūna which also appears to establish kaivalya kind of mokṣa. Rāmānuja commenting on *Gīta* says², that the seeker enjoys the bliss of self-realization. Deśika quotes from Rāmānuja and says that Rāmānuja appears to have admitted the arcirādigati for both the seekers, namely, kaivalyārthi and mokṣārthi. Just like the mokṣārthi, even the kaivalyārthi never comes back. Therefore Deśika presents this pūrvapakṣa (prime facie) that kaivalya is conventionally admitted by our ancient ācāryas.

After elaborate explanation of the view held by some ācāryas, regarding kaivalya, Deśika begins to examine that view with the same vigour. He begins his refutation with this statement. The kaivalya type of mokṣa is not at all admitted by Rāmānuja. This is clear in *Śārīraka Bhāṣya*³.

1. *aiśvaryākṣara-yāthātmya-bhagavaccharaṇārthinām |
vedyopādeyabhāvānam aṣṭame bheda ucyate ||*

Gītārtha-saṅgraha, p. 12.

2. *jijñāsuḥ prakṛtivyuktātmasvarūpavāpticchuḥ | Gītā-bhāṣya*, 8-12.
caturvidhā bhajante mām... | Gītā, 7-16. (refer bhāṣya).
*sarvadvārāṇi samyamya ityadervyākhyāne..... prakṛtivyuktam
matsamānākāramapunarāvṛttimātmānam prāpnotītyarthaḥ iti
cokteḥ | Nyāya-siddhānta*, p. 170.

3. *atrocyate | na tāvadayam mokṣaḥ bhāṣyakārābhīmataḥ |
śārīrakabhāṣye vyaktamuktatvāt | Nyāya-siddhānta*, p. 170.

In the *Vākyaṇvayādhikaraṇa*¹, Rāmānuja states that ātmānubhava is not same as mokṣa. Ātmānubhava is needed for the knowledge of Brahman, which is in turn, the means of liberation. But it is not an independent means. The statements in *Vedārtha-saṅgraha* also proves that kaivalya is not the same as mokṣa. There he says: that the adept in *Vedānta* admit, that mokṣa is Paramātmānubhava, experienced by the jīva, through the destruction of avidyā.

The great ācārya, Varadaviṣṇumiśra, says² that kaivalya is not mokṣa because mokṣa is the enjoyment of the bliss of Paramātmānubhava. Kaivalya cannot give that ānanda. There the jīva can experience the ānanda of his own self. Bhaṭṭa Parāśara³ in the commentary on *Adhyātma-khaṇḍa-dvaya* equates aiśvarya (enjoyment of worldly pleasures) with akṣara (enjoyment of his own self) and says that both of them are different from mokṣa.

Though, the ānanda of svātmānubhava is very inferior to that of Paramātmānubhava, Deśika says, that the jīva begins to indulge in that ānanda, because it is superior to

1. *amṛtatvasya paramapuruṣa vedanaikopāyatayā prati-pādanāt | paramapuruṣa vibhūtibhūtasya prāpturātmanaḥ svarūpa-yāthātmya vedanām apavarga sādhanabhūta parama-puruṣa vedanopayogitayā āvश्यकam | na svata eva upāyatvenae*

Śrībhāṣya p-419.

and trayyantanīṣṇātāstu.... avidyocchedapūrvaka svābhāvika paramātmānubhavam eva mokṣamācakṣate | Śrībhāṣya, p. 291.

2. *amukta eva saḥ | mokṣasya paramātmānandānubhava rūpatvāt | tasya brahmānandānubhavābhāvāt svānanda mātṛānubhavāt | svānandānubhavasca 'yoginām amṛtaṁ sthānam svātmas-antoṣiṇasca ye' iti bhagavatparāśara vacanāt | muktivyatirik-tamanapāyiyogasādhyamaiśvaryam |*

Quoted in *Nyāya-siddhānta*, p. 173.

3. *anyeṣvaiśvaryaḥkṣarabhogeṣu anapekṣayā jugupsayā sādhiṣṭhānam |*

Quoted in *Nyāya-siddhānta*, p. 173.

the enjoyment of the worldly pleasures. This is the type of experience one has when 'sukhamahamasvāpsam' (I slept happily) which is experienced after a sound sleep¹. This state is named mokṣa because here, there are no indriyas and body which are the real cause of all types of misery. Deśika declares at first that the seeker after kaivalya reaches his destination through any path but not through arcirādimārga. Further kaivalya is not situated beyond prakṛti. Both arcirādimārga and going beyond prakṛti are prescribed for the seeker after Paramātmān² alone. If the seeker after the kaivalya also continues his journey, and makes such upāsana, by which he can realise Paramātmān, he is sure to reach paramapada and then becomes mukta. This is clear from the scriptures—"sa enān brahma gamayati" (Chāndogya, 4-15-5.)

The sūtrakāra refers to this in the sūtra "darśanācca" (Brahmasūtra, 4-3-12), which is explained as one who passes through devayāna, that is arcirādimārga, is sure to reach Brahman. The statement of Yāmuna quoted by some ācāryas in support of its mokṣatva also prescribes a separate path, namely, 'akṣara'³ to the seeker of kaivalya.

Rāmānuja makes this position clear in Śrībhāṣya⁴. Further, Rāmānuja denies⁵ the path of arcirādi to the

1. *suptotthitapratyabhijñānam sukhamahamasvāpsamityevam rūpam* |
Nyāya-siddhānta, p. 175.

2. *na tāvadarcirādigatiḥ prakṛteḥ parastāt vāsascāsyā yujyate paramātmopāsana prakaraṇeṣveva tayoh śravaṇāt* |

Nyāya-siddhānta, p. 175.

3. *samsṛtyakṣaravaiṣṇavādhuvasu nṛṇām* | Catuśśloki, 3.

4. In the commentary on "śrutopaniṣatkagatyabhidhānācca"

Brahmasūtra, 1-2-17.

apratikālabhanānnayati bādarāyaṇaḥ | Brahmasūtra, 4-3-14.

5. "namādiprāṇaparyanta-pratikālabhanānām tu ubhayaividha-śruti-siddhupāsanaḥ bhāvāt tatkratunyāyācca arcirādigatir-brahma-prāptiśca na vidyate" | Śrībhāṣya, p. 865.

jīvopāsaka in clear terms and says that different results¹ (kaivalya) follow from their upāsanā.

Other works, namely, *Vedānta-sāra* and *Vedānta-dīpa* of Rāmānuja also say the same thing. Therefore, the passages of *Gītābhāṣya* which were quoted in support of the views of some ācāryas must be interpreted in accordance with the statement of bhāṣya, sāra² and dīpa³ and solve the problem without any contradiction. Therefore, Deśika says that even the seekers after kaivalya will attain brahmānubhavānanda after some time⁴, like madhu-vidyāniṣṭha. They too never come back. They meditate upon Paramātman in that place itself and finally attain the ānanda of paramātmānubhava. However, according to Vedānta Deśika even kaivalya upāsaka⁵ passes through the arcirādimārga because he is also a brahmavid. He is called paramātmātmaka-svātmānusandhāta, who is mentioned in *pañcāgni-vidyā* of *Chāndogyaopaniṣad*.

Thus Vedānta Deśika has explained the nature, character and destiny of the individual soul, on the basis of *Śruti*, *smṛti*, *sūtras* and *bhāṣyas*. Deśika says that jīvātman

1. *viśeṣaṁ ca darśayati* |

Brahmasūtra, 4-3-15.

2. Refer *Vedānta-sāra* p. 536 (Anṇaṅgarācārya edition).

3. Refer *Vedānta-dīpa* p. 123 (Anṇaṅgarācārya edition).

4. Refer *Mannuril (Tiruvaimoli)*, 1-2-5.)

5. Raṅgarāmānuja in his commentary on *Nyāya-siddhāṅjana* discusses this and proves with scriptural texts, that the kaivalyopāsaka also reaches paramapada. Following the interpretation of Vedānta Deśika, he defines kaivalya as follows:—

“*kaivalyaṁ nāma archirādi margeṇa bhagavallokatasya brahmātmaka svātma-sākṣātkāra eva*”. Accordingly the jīvopāsaka also reaches the paramapada through the arcirādimārga. He is *paramātma-ātmaka-svātma anusandhāta*. For further details refer *Raṅgarāmānuja-bhāṣya* on *Nyāya-siddhāṅjana*, p-177.

is like a 'kaustubhamaṇi'¹ (a celebrated gem in the heart of Viṣṇu). Paramātmā receives the individual self, after he is freed from the bond of karma. This jīvātman enacts a beautiful drama, wherein he plays different roles by taking different births as deva, manuṣya, paśu and pakṣi, due to his own karma. He discriminates the upādeya from, the anupādeya, with the help of śāstra, and realises the sufferings of womb and finally adopts anyone of the brahmavidyās. By the enactment of this wonderful drama, the eternal Śrīmān (wealthy) Paramātmā is immensely pleased, and He graces the actor, i.e., jīvātman with prosperity, which is equal to his own state and makes him enjoy the bliss of his ever-lovable service².



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1. *maṇivara iva śaureḥ nityahṛdyopijīvaḥ
kaluṣamatiravindan kinkaratvādirājyam |*

Rahasyatraya-sāra, p. 13.

2. *kāntām prāpya vicitrakarmaracitām paryāyato bhūmikām
kenāpyadbhuta-nāṭakena kamapi śrīmāntamānandayan | kṛtvā
śāstramukhe manaḥ pratimukhaṁ garbhāvamarśāt param
vidyānirvahaṇena labdhavibhavo hṛdyeṣa vidyotate ||*

Nyāya-siddhānta, p. 179.

Chapter IV

ĪŚVARA

NATURE OF BRAHMAN

So far we studied prakṛti, kāla and jīvātman which are dependent on the omnipotent God. They all are ādheya (the supported) and śeṣa (one who exists for the purpose of the Lord). We also studied that the goal of human life is to attain mokṣa. Mokṣa is the communion with the Lord or Īśvara. So all these points make it necessary to understand the nature and character of that highest principle which is 'independent' 'śeṣi' and 'ādhāra' of this universe. It is the supreme principle. That is why that tattva is called Brahman.

In Viśiṣṭādvaita the word Brahman denotes the highest person Puruṣottama. He is free from all impurities and imperfections. He is 'ananta kalyāṇa guṇasāgara' that is, He is the ocean of innumerable auspicious qualities¹.

The term 'Brahman' is derived from bṛhat (big or great) and so means that which possesses the greatness of essential nature as well as of qualities, and as such is the Lord of all. "bṛhati brahmayati tasmāducyate param brahma iti niruktāt bṛhatvam brahmaṇatvam ca grāhyam | (Śrībhāṣya-darpaṇa, p. 7).

This Brahman is the goal of all adhyātmaśāstra. The Upaniṣadic statement "nāyamātmā pravacanena labhyo na medhayā na bahunā śrutena |" (Kaṭha, 1-2-23) that 'neither the mind nor speech can describe Brahman' does not mean

1. brahma śabdena ca svabhāvato nirasta nikhiladoṣo anavadhikāti-
śaya asanḥkhyeya kalyāṇa-guṇa-gaṇaḥ puruṣottamo abhidhīyate |

Śrībhāṣya, 1-11. p. 6.

that Brahman is unknowable. That statement means, that with our limited intellect we cannot completely know all about the Lord. The human knowledge is not complete. So the human beings cannot know him completely.

The fundamental authority for Rāmānuja's conception of Parabrahman is Upaniṣads. The Parabrahman is described as Śrīmannārāyaṇa. He is the creator, sustainer and destroyer of the world.

It is already mentioned that an object, to be known clearly, must be separated from other objects through the help of definition which is devoid of fallacies like avyāpti, ativyāpti and asambhava. Therefore Vedānta Deśika offers several definitions on the basis of *Śruti*, *sūtra* and *Bhāṣya*. He defines Īśvara.

- | | |
|---|--|
| 1. He is the Lord of all. | — <i>sarveśvaratvam.</i> |
| 2. He is vibhu and cetana. | — <i>vyāpakatve sati
cetanatvam.</i> |
| 3. He is sarvaśeṣi. | — <i>sarvaśeṣitvam.</i> |
| 4. He is adorned by
all activities (karma). | — <i>sarvakarma-
samārādhyatvam.</i> |
| 5. All results of actions
flow from Him. | — <i>sarvaphala-
pradatvam.</i> |
| 6. He is the substratum
of all. | — <i>sarvādhāratvam.</i> |
| 7. He is the cause
of all effects. | — <i>sarvakāryot-
pādatvam.</i> |
| 8. For Him, the entire
universe excepting his jñāna
and Himself is body. | — <i>svajñāna-svetara
samastadravya-
śarīrakatvam.</i> |
| 9. By nature He possesses
the auspicious qualities
like satyakāmatva and
satyasankalpatva etc. | — <i>svatassatyasankalpat
vādikatvam.</i> |

Here in the seventh definition, Īśvara is stated to be the cause of all effects. He is *ṣṛṣṭikartā* only. Hence it may be objected by pointing out that this definition appears to go against the definition given by *sūtrakāra*, which says that Īśvara is all, i.e., creator, protector and destroyer. "*janmādyasya yataḥ*" (*Brahmasūtra*, 1-1-2).

Deśika answers this objection, by pointing out that the *sūtrakāra* is not opposed to other definitions like "Īśvara is creator", "Īśvara is protector", "Īśvara is destroyer"; but he is of the opinion that **except** God, none else can do these works. With that idea, *sūtrakāra* has said that all the three functions are performed by God.

Another point is that there are certain thinkers who hold the view that **trimūrtis**, i.e., *Brahmā*, *Viṣṇu* and *Maheśvara* are all equal. The creation, protection and destruction has been attributed to them respectively. Those thinkers are called '**trimūrti-sāmya-vādins**'. To uphold the view that all the three functions are performed by only a single person, the *sūtrakāra* has given the definition which attributes all the three functions to Him. That is why the *sūtrakāra* describes the nature of Īśvara as the agent of destruction also. "*attā carācaragrahaṇāt*" (*Brahmasūtra*, 1-2-9). This *sūtra* attributes the function of destruction to the Brahman. *Rāmānuja* interpreting the above *sūtra* on the same line quotes from *Kaṭhopaniṣad* (1-2-25) and substantiates that the Brahman is the agent of destruction: "*cara acarasya kṛtsnasya attṛtvam hi tasyaiva sambhavati*" (*Śrībhāṣya*, p. 287.) In the *Kaṭhopaniṣad* there is a passage, which says that the *mṛtyu* is the *upasecana* (being itself eatable, that which helps other food to be eaten) of the Lord. That is with the help of *mṛtyu* the God undertakes the act of destruction and finally withholds *mṛtyu* also. Therefore Īśvara, is also the agent of destruction.

This type of interpretation is also resorted to while understanding the Śrutivākya “*satyaṁ jñānāmanantam brahmā*” (*Taittirīya Ānandavalli*, 1) where the word ‘ananta’ itself is sufficient to separate Brahman from other things. Yet there, the other words i.e., ‘satyam’ and ‘jñānam’ are not meaningless. In the Śruti, satyatva means that there is no vikāra or transformation in Brahman. The second word jñānatva says that the knowledge of Brahman is always all-pervasive. Therefore, here all words are equally important. Coming to the point, to say that Īśvara is the cause of all effects is not against the opinion of sūtrakāra.

BRAHMAN IS ONE

Brahman is only one. The Śruti says that “*ekamevādviṭīyam*” (*Chāndogya*, 6-2-1)—Brahman is one and second to none. “*na tatsamaścābhyadhikasca dṛsyate*” (*Śvetāśvatara*, 6-7)—There is nothing which is equal to or higher than Brahman and “*praśāsītāram sarveṣām*” (*Manu*, 12-122)—he is the protector of all. Brahman is absolutely unconditioned reality. It is beyond tripartite limitations (deśa, kāla and vastu). It is biggest of all; that is why it is called Brahman. All the names refer to him alone¹. The qualities attributed by the Śruti can be found nowhere else, except in Brahman. In the same way the word ‘Brahman’ also does not denote anybody else², because it possesses the quality ‘niratiśayabṛhatva’. That Brahman is Lord Nārāyaṇa.

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1. *satyaṁ jñānāmanantam brahmā* *Taittirīya Ānandavalli*, 1-9.
yo veda nihitaṁ guhāyām... *Taittirīya*, 2-1.
tasmādvā etasmādātmanaḥ *Taittirīya Ānandavalli*, 1.
 2. *vede bhūri-prayogaśca guṇayogaśca śārigini* *Garuḍapurāṇa* in *Tattvasiddhi* p. 401.
tasminneva brahmaśabdo mukhyavṛtto mahāmune *Garuḍapurāṇa* in *Tattvasiddhi* p. 401.

NĀRĀYAṆA ALONE IS THE SUPREME DEITY

Here we should bear in mind that the Śrutis¹ which maintain in different places that the universe was caused by different causes, refer to the Paramātman alone. Words like sat, asat, avyakta, Brahma, ātma, ākāśa, prāṇa, śiva, śambhu, refer ultimately to the primordial cause, Paramātman. Therefore, for the same reason, the pradhāna is not Brahman. The four-faced Brahma and Śiva also are not Brahman because they are² created by Viṣṇu and are bound by karma. They belong to jīva group. According to *Atharva-śikhā*, *Caturmukha-Brahma*, Viṣṇu and Śiva are created³ beings. But one might ask how is it compatible with the fact that Viṣṇu is not created? Deśika answers that Lord takes different births for his sport⁴. Śrutis and smṛti

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1. a. *sadeva saumyedamagra āsīt* | *Chāndogya*, 6-2-1.
 b. *asadvā idamagra āsīt* | *Taittirīya-ānandavalli*, 7-1
 c. *tadvedaṁ tarhyavayāktamāsīt* | *Bṛhadāraṇyaka*, 3-4-7.
 d. *brahma vā idamagra āsīt* | *Bṛhadāraṇyaka*, 1-4-10.
 e. *ātmā vā idameka eva āsīt* | *Itareya*, 1-1.
 f. *ākāśādeva samutpadyante* | *Chāndogya*, 1-9-1.
 g. *prāṇamevābhisaṁvīṣanti* | *Chāndogya*, 1-11-4, 5.
 h. *na sannacāśacchiva eva kevalaḥ* | *Śvetāśvatara*, 4-18.
 i. *śambhurākāśamadhye dhyeyaḥ* | *Atharva-śikhā* 17.
 j. *ekoha vai nārāyaṇa āśinna brahmā neśānaḥ* | *Mahopaniṣad*, 1
 2. *viśvakarmā hyajaniṣṭa devāḥ* | *Kṛṣṇa-yajussaṁhitā*, 4-6-8
sa prajāpatirekaḥ puṣkaraparṇe sambhavati | *tryakṣaḥ śūlapāṇiḥ*
puruṣo'jāyata etc.
 3. *brahmā-viṣṇu-rudrendrāste sarve samprasūyante* |
Atharva-śikhā, 3.
 4. *ajāyamāno bahudhā vijāyate* | *Taittirīya Āraṇyaka*, 3-13.
na me pārthasti kartavyam triṣu lokeṣu kiñcana | *Gītā*, 3-22.
dharmaśamsthāpanārthāya sambhavāmi yuge yuge | *Gītā*, 4-8.

also say that, though God is birthless, and has nothing to gain in this universe, still He takes different births to establish dharma, and root-out adharma. This is His līla. Rāmānuja says that this prakṛtiṇaṇḍala is His līlā-vibhūti.

Because He is devoid of all impurities, He is not born again and again. He does not become old with the old age of the body. This Paramātmān is free from sin, free from old age, free from death and grief, from hunger and thirst. His desires are the real. His will is the real.¹

Another Śruti passage specifically mentions that Nārāyaṇa alone is the creator, protector and destroyer of the universe and he is the Lord of goddess Lakṣmi. The Śruti specifically mentions the name of Lakṣmi who is the consort² of Śrī Nārāyaṇa. Therefore Nārāyaṇa alone is the object of Vedas.

Deśika says that wherever there is reference to different things as the cause of the universe, it is to be construed to mean the Lord Nārāyaṇa Himself. Every word ultimately means Nārāyaṇa Himself. In Viśiṣṭādvaitic terminology, this is called 'aparyavasānavṛtti'. Rāmānuja explains this elaborately in *Śrībhāṣya* and *Vedārtha-saṅgraha*³. Deśika declares that every word connotes Nārāyaṇa Himself. Every name through its jīva speaks of the Lord. This relation of the word and the meaning, is called 'aparyavasānavṛtti' in

1. *apahata-pāpmā divyo deva eko nārāyaṇaḥ* | *Nārāyaṇopaniṣad*.

2. *hrīṣca te lakṣmīṣca patnyau* | *Taittirīya-āraṇyaka*, 3-13.

3. *sākṣādapyavirodham jaiminiḥ* | *Śrībhāṣya*, 1-2-29.

jīvamukhyapṛāṇalingānneti cennopāsātraividya-dāśritatvōdihā tadyogāt.

Śrībhāṣya, 1-1-32.

vedavidagresara vālmīki parāśara dvaipāyana vacobhīṣca parasya ātmatvāvagamāt.... sarva cetanācetanaprakāram brahmaivābhīd-hīyate |

Vedārtha-saṅgraha, p. 80.

Viśiṣṭādvaita philosophy, and thus is considered to be the pradhāna-pratitantra (distinguishing differentia) of this system. This is the special conception accepted in Viśiṣṭādvaita. In some places even words like 'ākāśa' and 'Śambhu' etc., refer to Nārāyaṇa alone. The word ākāśa etymologically means that which shines in all directions and the word Śambhu means the person from whom all auspicious desires may be fulfilled¹.

Further if Rudra and Indra are not Brahman, then how is it that the Śruti says that Indra is prajñātma and you meditate upon it' (*Kauṣītaki Upaniṣad*, 3-1) In *Atharva-śiras*, it is said that Śiva is the cause of the universe and He is the highest principle. Deśika says these and such other passages should be interpreted to mean Brahman alone through aparyavasānavṛtti. Sūtrakāra himself answers these objections in the sūtra "*sūtradṛṣṭyātūpadeśo vāmādevavat*" (*Brahmasūtra*, 1-1-31.)

Vāmādeva after realizing the truth of antaryāmin says, "*tadvai tatpaśyan vāmādevaḥ pratipede | aham manura-bhavam suryaścāhaṁ kākṣṭvānṛṣirasmī vipra |*" (*Bṛhadāraṇyaka*, 3-4-10)—'I became Manu, and I became the Sun'. Sūtrakāra says that here Vāmādeva does not refer to himself. He is referring to the Brahman, the Lord Nārāyaṇa, who is immanent in everything. According to this sūtra, Paramātman can be meditated upon through cit or acit. Therefore the Śrutis which refer to Indra and Śiva as an object of meditation refer to Paramātman alone.

The foregoing arguments and explanations, Deśika says, are summarised by Varadaguru in *Tattvasāra*. *Tattvasāra* gives the above discussions in the form of question and

1. *para vidyāsu jīvoktiḥ niruktyādeḥ parāśrayā |
tallīngānanyathasiddhau tadviśiṣṭāvalambinī ||*

answer, and establishes that Nārāyaṇa is the Paramātman and the supreme¹. Therefore, Nārāyaṇa alone is to be meditated upon and He alone is the inner controller of the universe. Brahman, Paramātman, Parabrahman, parama-puruṣa, are all the names of Śrīmannārāyaṇa.

BRAHMAN IS PŪRṆA EVERYWHERE

Brahman pervades the entire universe from the atom to the mountain. Everywhere he is pūrṇa (full) in the bodies of Śiva and Brahma (created Brahman) He is pūrṇa, through the jīva therein¹. In the body of Viṣṇu, Brahman is pūrṇa without the medium of jīva.

Deśika here discusses the problem viz., how is it that the Brahman who is pūrṇa in one object can become pūrṇa in other object also? Now this objection may be understood in four different ways. This objection may be construed in the first place, to mean that the 'Brahman is not full here alone' (in the object before us).

But this argument is favourable to siddhāntin, because he too does not say that Brahman is pūrṇa in that place alone.

Secondly if the objection is to mean that Brahman here (in the present object) is not an object of our full knowledge, then the objection is not valid. To know an object (its nature) one has to possess suitable instruments, without which one

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1. *kastvaṁ tattvavidasmi vastu paramaṁ kiṁ tarhi viṣṇuḥ katham |
tattvedamparataittirīyakamukhatrayyanta-sandarśanāt |
anyāstarhi girāḥ katham guṇavaśād-atrāha rudraḥ katham |
taddṛṣṭyā kathamudbhavatyavataratyanyatkatham niyatām |*

Quoted in *Nyāya-siddhāṇjana*, p. 189.

2. *tataśca 'namo hiraṇyagarbhāya haraye śaṅkarāyaca' ityādau
hiraṇyagarbha saṅkaramūrtyorjīva viśeṣa dvārā bhagava-
ccharīratvam |*

Nyāya-siddhāṇjana-ṭīkā, p. 190.

cannot know it. In the absence of that instrument, if the nature of the desired object is not known, then the objection is not valid.

Thirdly, the objection may mean here (in the present object) it cannot produce effect in its fullness. Paramātmān who resides in this place should have produced all effects here.

Deśika points out that, this objection is also favourable to the siddhāntin. According to the siddhāntin all effects cannot be produced in a limited place. Therefore, the third interpretation is not correct.

Fourthly and finally, the objection 'that Brahman is not pūrṇa everywhere', may mean that here the Brahman is not present with all its qualities. This interpretation is also not tenable, because in the day-to-day experience, it is observed that śabda, sparśa, rūpa, rasa, etc., pervade their substratum. They are not in one part of the substratum only. In the same way, Paramātmān who is of an all-pervasive nature, exists with all his qualities in everything. So, to admit his presence along with his qualities in the object present before, commits no fallacy. Sūtrakāra himself has anticipated all these objections in the sūtra "*kṛtsnaprasaktirniravayavatva-śabdaprakopo vā*" (*Brahmasūtra*, 2-1-26.).

In this sūtra Bādarāyaṇa anticipates the objection, against the theory that Brahman is the cause of the universe. If the Brahman is 'sāvayava' then it goes against the *Śruti* which says that it is niravayava. If it is niravayava, then the entire Brahman becomes pūrṇa (full) in one object and hence the other object should become Brahman-less. Therefore Brahman is not pūrṇa everywhere.

Sūtrakāra solves this objection in the succeeding¹ sūtras.

1. *śruteṣu śabdāmūlatvāt | ātmani caivam vicitrāśca hi |*

In these sūtras and such others he answers the objection raised by the previous sūtras. There is 'avyāpti' (concomitant variation) between two dharmas viz., 'sāvayavatva' and 'bahubhavana' (becoming many objects). But this vyāpti cannot be applied to Brahman, because dharmas-like niravayavatva and bahubhavanatva are attributed to Paramātman by 'Śruti' itself. Hence in applying 'vyāpti' to these two dharmas, the Brahman must be exempted and as a result there is no incompatibility in Brahman becoming many things.

Moreover, all dharmas which are experienced in life cannot be applied to Brahman also. For example jaḍatva which is experienced in inert matters cannot be found in ātman. In the same way Brahman which possesses extraordinary powers and which is completely different from the rest of the world may not be the substratum of the dharmas which are found in cit and acit. Therefore though Brahman is niravayava (which does not possess the body as a result of karma), He is pūrṇa everywhere by his extraordinary power.

Further, Śrutis such as '*parāśya śaktiḥ vividhaiva śrūyate*' (Śvetāśvatara, 6-8) declare his unlimited power. Therefore though the Paramātman is 'niravayava' in the above explained sense, He is full everywhere by his extraordinary power. therefore Vedānta Deśika declares "*ataḥ yathāgamam sarvatra pūrṇa eva bhagavān*" (Nyāya-siddhāntajana, p. 193)—the Brahman is 'pūrṇa' everywhere.

BRAHMAN IS SAGUṆA

Deśika next proceeds to discuss the problem, whether the Brahman is saguṇa (possessing attributes) or nirguṇa (devoid of attributes). According to the school of Advaita, Brahman is nirguṇa. Deśika examines critically this view and comes to the conclusion that the nirguṇa brahmavāda of the advaitin cannot be accepted.

To accept nirguṇa-brahmavāda is to violate the conclusions of the scriptures which define Brahman as saguṇa. Upaniṣads¹ say that the power of Brahman is revealed in different ways, and the working of His knowledge and strength is inherent in Him! "He knows and perceives all". All these passages establish the saguṇatva of Paramātmān.

But there are also some vedic passages which deny saguṇatva to Brahman. Then how to reconcile the texts which declare saguṇavāda and the texts which declare nirguṇavāda? Equal validity to both the texts cannot be ascribed, as they are mutually opposed. Neither can we retain saguṇa type of texts and reject nirguṇa type of texts and vice-versa. In that case we have to reject the validity of either of them.

Here the *advaitin* argues that according to the principle of 'apaccheda' *saguṇavāda* gets cancelled by *nirguṇavāda*. This *apaccheda-nyāya* is well interpreted by Mīmāṃsā thinkers. There are two types of śāstras, one is vidhiśāstra which enjoins certain guṇas, and the other is niṣedhaśāstra which denies them. Vidhiśāstra is purvaśāstra whereas niṣedhaśāstra is paraśāstra. According to *apaccheda* principle, paraśāstra is stronger and more reliable. On the same basis, the saguṇa texts which are *pūrvaśāstra* may be rejected and retain the nirguṇa texts which are paraśāstra.

Deśika answers, in the first place the principle of *apaccheda* cannot be applied here. That principle cannot operate in an instance, where *paraspara-paurvāparya* (mutual order) and *paraspara-virodha* (mutual contradiction) are definite¹.

1. *svābhāvīkī jñānabalakriyā ca* | *Śvetāśvatara*, 6-3.
satyakāmaḥ satyasankalpah | *Chāndogya*, 8-1-5.
yassarvajñāḥ sarvavit | *Muṇḍaka*, 1-1-9, 2-2-6.
2. "taduktam | paurvaparyam virodhaśca pūrvaprāmāṇyam eva ca |
 niyamānnāsti tatrāsau apaccheda nayo bhavet 'iti' ||

In the present circumstance, two contradictory texts, i.e., *saguṇa* and *nirguṇa* are appearing in a definite order. Another point is the *saguṇa* texts and *nirguṇa* texts are not at all contradictory. Therefore, *apaccheda* principle cannot be applied here. Under the circumstances, the *Mīmāṃsā* principle applicable is the principle of 'śrutiliṅgādhikaraṇa'. The principle of *śrutiliṅgādhikaraṇa* says that if there is contradiction between any two of the following, i.e., Śruti, liṅga, vākya, prakaraṇa sthāna, samākhyā, then the *pūrva-pramāṇa* becomes stronger. Accordingly, in the present context, the *saguṇa* text becomes weighty and *nirguṇa* text becomes weaker. Thus both the types of statements become valid and complementary.

The *nirguṇa* texts point out that Brahman is devoid of all evils and imperfections. In other words, these texts affirm perfection in Brahman. In addition to this, the *saguṇa* texts affirm that Brahman is the ocean of all perfections. Therefore, Brahman is an abode of eternal and infinite good qualities like, *satyam*, *śivam*, and *sundaram*. The *Taittiriya-Upaniṣad* declares that the qualities viz., 'satyam', 'jñānam', 'ānandam', 'anantam', 'amalam' etc., are his *svarūpa-nirūpaka dharmas*.

The *Chāndogya Upaniṣad* clearly states "ya ātma *apahatapāpmā vijaro vimṛtyurviśoko vijighatso'pipāsaḥ satyakāmaḥ satyasankalpaḥ*" (8-7-1). That it does not become old. It is free from sin. Free from death and grief, from hunger and thirst and its desire and will are the real. It further says that Brahman is the abode of all auspicious qualities. The same method is to be followed to solve satisfactorily the opposition between *savikāratva* and *nirvikāratva* texts as well as *saśarīratva* and *aśarīratva* texts.

Brahman by nature is *nirvikāra*; but *savikāratva* is found in its attributes just like *ātman* (the individual self), who is *nirvikāra*, whereas its body undergoes change such

as childhood, youth and old age. But the vikāras of the body can never stain the ātman. In the same way, the changes found in prakṛti and the self which are the attributes or prakāra of the Brahman cannot touch the viśeṣya, i.e., Brahman.

The two types of texts, i.e., saśarīratva and aśarīratva also should be interpreted on the above lines. The saśarīratva states that Brahman gets embodied whenever it likes. But that body, which the Brahman takes in the embodied state is not the result of karma. The aśarīratva signifies that the Brahman is the master of karma.

After giving all these explanations, Deśika quotes from *Tattvasāra*¹, which supports his views: Therefore it should be understood that the nirguṇa texts state that Brahman is devoid of evil and imperfections whereas the saguṇa texts point out Brahman is the abode of all eternal, infinite and auspicious qualities. The same saguṇa texts declare that brahman is 'akhila-kalyāṇa-guṇākara',² 'kalyāṇaguṇagaṇa-vibhūṣita', etc. In Vedānta, these dharmas are called as ubhayalingatva of Brahman. This ubhayalingatva of Brahman is affirmed by sūtrakāra also. He states³ that nirguṇa texts say that the God is devoid of imperfections where as saguṇa texts affirm perfection.

1. *uktam ca tattvasāre 'yadbrahmaṇoguṇaśarīra-vikāra, janma, karmādigocara, vidhipratīṣedha vācaḥ | anyonyabhinnaviṣayā na virodha gandhamarhanti tanna vidhayah pratīṣedha bādhyāḥ' ityadi ||*

Quoted in *Nyāya-siddhānta*, p. 195.

2. Rāmānuja says "akhilaheyapratyanika-kalyāṇaikatānasvetarasamasta-vastuvilakṣaṇa, jñānānandaikasvarūpa"

Saraṇāgati-gadya.

svābhāviki jñānabalakriyā ca |

Śvetāśvatara, 6-3.

3. *na sthānato'pi parasyobhayalingam sarvatra hi |*

Brahmasūtra, 3-2-11.

By the above enquiry it also becomes clear that the nature of Brahman is opposed to that of avidyā which possesses the āvaraṇa-śakti and vikṣepa-śakti. Therefore Brahman is saguṇa.

ADHYĀSA IN BRAHMAN EXAMINED

Deśika rejects the advaitic view point that Brahman as nirviśeṣa cinmātram or pure consciousness, and the world is superimposed on Brahman. According to them, māyā is a property which is found only in sentient beings. It is a cētana-dharma. Māyā is a type of ignorance that is beginningless. Because it is a property, it requires a locus and must belong to something. Its locus is soul. But māyā is not eternal like Brahman. It is destroyed at the time of liberation.

Māyā has two-fold functions. Through one of them, māyā conceals the real nature of the object and through another it presents some other object. These are the two powers¹ of māyā. The power by which it conceals the object is called āvaraṇa-śakti and the power by which it shows some other object is called vikṣepa śakti. It conceals the nature of Brahman and shows up in its place the universe and number of souls. The function of māyā makes Brahman to appear as the empirical world. So the world is empirical and Brahman is real and nirviśeṣa.

This nirviśeṣavāda of advaitin is inconsistent. Here in this nirviśeṣavāda the pūrvapakṣin has to answer several questions. In the first place according to him Brahman is

1. It conceals the fact of shell and shows up silver in its place. To see silver where there is only shell, a necessary condition is the concealment of the shell. Suppression precedes substitution. These two aspects of it are respectively termed āvaraṇa or veiling and vikṣepa or revealing (*Outlines of Indian Philosophy* p. 353). Also refer Dr. Rādhākṛṣṇan's *Indian Philosophy*, p. 589.

the substratum of super-imposition. If the brahmasvarūpa in its entirety, is the object of it, then there cannot be super-imposition at all. Because the experience says that when the shell is shining no body will mistake it for silver. In the same way when the Brahman is shining there cannot be any super-imposition.

Secondly, if the Brahman is not at all known, then also the theory of super-imposition becomes meaningless, because when the substratum itself is not known, how can there be any adhyāsa (super-imposition)?

Thirdly, if super-imposition is said to be on a part of Brahman, then the other part remains unaffected. Then the Brahman becomes 'amśibhedasahita', and this makes the system of advaita 'saviśeṣa-brahma vāda'. In the example, i.e., shell and silver the nature of Brahman is 'śuktau idam rajatam' (knowing shell as silver). There are two aspects in that jñāna. One is 'idantva' which is sādharmaṇākāra and the second is sūktitva (shellness) which is asādharmaṇākāra. Because of these two viśeṣas, there is the possibility of rajata bhrama and its sublation. Unless the viśeṣa of the type of sādharmaṇākāra (general type) and asādharmaṇākāra (special type) in Brahman, is admitted, the prapañca-bhrama and its sublation becomes impossible. If they are admitted, Brahman becomes saviśeṣa and not nirviśeṣa. Deśika summarizing the above arguments says¹, that under both circumstances adhyāsa in Brahman cannot be explained.

Further, the Brahman is self-luminous. If this self-luminosity of Brahman is covered by avidyā, Brahman is losing its svarūpa which amounts to svarūpahāni. It is also not correct to argue that the svarūpajñāna of Brahman can

1. *adhiṣṭhānasya kārtsnyena bhāne'bhāne ca na bhramah |
bhātā bhātākṛtibhidā saviśeṣatvasādhikā |*

remove the erroneous knowledge; as the brahmasvarūpa is self luminous and eternal, there must be nitya-mokṣa and not saṃsāra at all. If the svarūpajñāna cannot remove the bhrāntijñāna, then it is inevitable to admit, eternal saṃsāra because no other knowledge can expel this bhrāntijñāna.

NIRVIŚEṢATVA AND MITHYĀTVA EXAMINED

Further, the advaitin proves nirviśeṣatva of Brahman by the sentence 'Brahma nirviśeṣam' Deśika examines this position and says¹ that if this sentence proves nirviśeṣatva of Brahman, then advaitin is admitting a dharma, i.e., nirviśeṣatva in it. On the other hand, if that sentence does not prove the nirviśeṣatva, then saviśeṣatva stands admitted.

Even the Śruti "*sattāmātram nirviśeṣam nirīham*" proves saviśeṣatva in Brahman. It only denies in Brahman the viśeṣa of the type of svarūpa and svabhāvavikāra that are in inert matters and svabhāva vikāra that is in the finite souls. Therefore, nirviśeṣatva of Brahman cannot be established by logic or by verbal testimony. Another point is that advaitin cannot also prove the mithyātva (unreality) of the world. In his inferential proposition i.e., "sarvaṃ jagat mithyā" the reason is Brahma-vyatiriktatva. Therefore, there (in the world) must be the sādhya, i.e., mithyātva. Now if the proposition which proves mithyātva itself is mithyā, then, satyatva or reality of the world becomes well-established.

If mithyātva is not admitted to the statement "sarvaṃ jagat mithyā" the fallacy viz., vyabhicāritva² occurs. Here in this inference 'sarvaṃ jagat' is 'pakṣa'—the subject (that

1. *brahmaṇo nirviśeṣatvamiti dharmo'sti vā navā* |
dvidhāpi saviśeṣatvaṃ tadyogatadayogajam ||

Nyāya-siddhāntajana, p. 199.

sadhyābhāvavadurttitvam |

Tarka-saṅgraha, p. 57.

in which something is inferred). Mithyātva is 'sādhya (the thing to be inferred). 'Brahma vyatiriktatva' is hetu (reason). There must be invariable concomitance between sādhya and hetu. If mithyātva is not admitted to that sentence and Brahma vyatiriktatva is admitted in the jagat, then it commits the fallacy namely 'vyabhicāra' (a fallacious hetu, that is— the presence of the hetu in the pakṣa without the presence of sādhya). Further, the advaitin may argue, on the basis of a different reason¹, i.e., 'drśyatvāt', he can prove the mithyātva of the world. Wherever there is the hetu 'drśyatvāt', there is the sādhya 'mithyātva'. In the shell-silver example, there is drśyatva. Therefore the sādhya, mithyātva also is there. Now the same process may be extended to the world also.

Deśika points out that here in this argument, the advaitin has to answer whether there is mithyātva in mithyātva (the probandum) or not. If the former position is admitted, the satyatva of the world becomes established. If the latter position is admitted, then the hetu (reason) namely drśyatvāt is not capable of proving the probandum i.e., mithyātva. Therefore, in that case also, satyatva of the world is established—"mithyātvādipratijñārthaḥ svapratijñāṁ sprśenna vā ādye svasyaiva vidhavaṁso dvitīye vyabhicāritā" (Nyāya-siddhāntajana, p. 203).

The advaitin may argue that mithyātva is brahmasvarūpa and hence it is bhāvarūpa (positive one). Hence the mithyātva of the world remains unaltered. Deśika answers, instead of admitting unknown mithyātva, which is bhāvarūpa-avidyā it is lāghava to admit satyatva to the world and say it is brahmasvarūpa.

Again, the pūrvapakṣin may pursue his argument,

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1. The inference is of the type "sarvam mithyā drśyatvāt yathā śuktiḥ"

stating that the world cannot become brahmasvarūpa, because the world is jaḍātmaka and the Brahman is ajaḍātmaka. For this objection, it must be answered that it is possible, in the way in which mithyātva (which is jaḍātmaka) becomes brahmasvarūpa (which is ajaḍātmaka) in advaita¹.

Further according to advaita in the experiences like 'ghaṭassan' 'paṭassan', the Brahman alone which has the adjunct, i.e., avidyā, is known. The hetu, i.e., dṛśyatva is also in the pakṣa (subject). Therefore Brahman also should become mithyā. According to advaita, the śuddhabrahman (Brahman without adjunct) and upahitabrahman (Brahman with adjunct) are identical. Therefore, if there is mithyātva in upahitabrahman, then there must be mithyātva in śuddhabrahman also. If advaitin admits satyatva in śuddhabrahman, then the upahitabrahman, i.e., prapañca, also must become satya. Therefore, advaitin cannot prove mithyātva to the world².

On the basis of the above arguments the Brahman is real of reals and it is saviśeṣa. On the basis of scriptural statements³, Deśika says that Brahman is knowable.

1. *yadi prapañcamithyātvaṁ sadbrahmaiveti sad bhavet |
prapañcaśca tathaiyeti sa satyo na katham bhavet ||
jaḍatvātsa na taccettat mithyātvaṁ ca na tad bhavet |
tattvenaiva tadanyatvāt na tat satyaṁ ca te bhavet ||*
Nyāya-siddhāñjana, p. 203.
2. *kiñca prapañca-tadbādhaka-pratyayabhyāmupahita-anupahitādi-
veśeṇa brahmaṇo'pi dṛśyatvādanaikantyam brahma mithyātvaṁ
vā syāt |*
Nyāya-siddhāñjana, p. 204.
3. *athāto brahma jijñāsā |*
brahma veda brahmaiva bhavati |
brahmavidāpnoti param
"ātmā vā are draṣṭavyo śrotavyo mantavyo nididhyāsitavyaḥ |
Brahmasūtra, 1-1-1. Muṇḍaka, 3-2-9. Taittirīya-ānandavallī, 1-24. Bṛhadāraṇyaka, 4-4-5.

According to some thinkers, on the authority of some Vedic texts like 'yato vāco nivartante' (*Taittirīya ānandavalli*, 9) and 'yadvācānabhyuditam' and others, Brahman is unknowable. Deśika carefully examines this position and repudiates it on the basis of scriptures which establish the knowability of Brahman. Really this is a paradox. This paradox in the scriptures is solved admirably in Viśiṣṭādvaita. So it must be understood that the scriptures which say that Brahman is unknowable, they only mean that Brahman is impossible to be known in its entirety. We cannot know Him with our limited capacity. The statements such as "One who knows the Brahman becomes the Brahman himself", 'the brahmavid gets the communion with the Lord', 'the ātman should be perceived, heard and should be thought upon', establish the knowability of Paramātmān. Therefore Brahman is knowable and is different from the world of finite souls.

Here the advaitin may argue that without admitting identity between Brahman and the world, the Viśiṣṭādvaitin cannot establish the Brahman as 'trividha-pariccheda-rahita' (beyond the limitation of vastu, kāla and deśa). The siddhāntin answers, because the Brahman is eternal and all-pervasive, there is no trouble in admitting 'trividha-pariccheda-rahitatva'.

Vastu-pariccheda is to possess small size. Deśa-pariccheda is to possess limited place. The second is caused by the first. To possess unlimited size is 'vastu-pariccheda-rahitatva'¹. The same interpretation is given by Vivaraṇakāra in *Vedārtha-saṅgraha*.

Varadanārāyaṇa Bhaṭṭāraka gives different interpretation in *Nyāya-sudarśana*. According to him, immeasurability

1. *vastu-paricchedo vastu-parimāṇam, deśa-paricchedaḥ taddhetukaḥ* |
Vivaraṇakāra quoted in *Nyāya-siddhānta*, p. 211.

of the *guṇa* and *vibhūti* is called 'vastu-pariccheda-rāhitya'¹. Nārāyaṇārya² also is of the same opinion. The explanations of Varadanārāyaṇa Bhaṭṭāraka and Nārāyaṇārya agree with Rāmānuja's *Śrībhāṣya*³. Vedānta Deśika⁴ sides with the second interpretation. Hence Paramātmān is unlimited in His qualities or *vibhūti*s. Though there are innumerable objects, they are all limited by place, time and object.

BRAHMAN IS THE ABHINNA-NIMITTOPĀDĀNA-KĀRAṆA

In *Chāndogya Upaniṣad*, the teacher Uddālaka, initiates⁵ his son Śvetaketu into this philosophy.

Here the teacher teaches his student that knowing the cause, one can know the effects, because the same substance enters into different states and assumes different forms. Here one may take the example of the clay and its different states. In this example, clay is the *upādānakāraṇa* (material cause) of all types of pots or pitchers of clay. If we know the clay, we can know all its effects of clay. In the same way, the Brahman is the material cause of the universe. Knowledge of this material cause (Brahman) includes the knowledge of all. Therefore Brahman is the *upādāna-kāraṇa* of the universe. This position of admitting Brahman as the material cause of the universe will not contradict the

1. *vastuparicchedo nāma iyadguṇaka iyadvibhūtimānityevamvidhaḥ | tadrahitam brahma.... |* Quoted in *Nyāya-siddhāntajana*, p. 212.

2. *guṇairiyattā rāhityād vastuna aparicchinnatvaṅca jñāyate |*
Quoted in *Nyāya-siddhāntajana*, p. 212.

3. *brahma vyatirikta vastvantara abhāvād |* *Śrībhāṣya*, p. 429.

4. *atra 'iyadguṇakah' ityādi pakṣa eva prāyaḥ ślaghyaḥ |*
Nyāya-siddhāntajana, p. 212.

5. *yathā saumya ekena mṛtpiṇḍena sarvam mṛtnmayam vijñātām syāt vācārambhaṇam vikāro nāmadheyam mṛttiketyeva satyam |*
Chāndogya Upaniṣad, 6-1-4.

nirvikāra-śruti. No doubt Brahman is nirvikāra. But savikāratva is found in viśeṣaṇa, i.e., prakṛti and individual self. Just as the vikāras of the body, such as childhood, youth or old age, never stain the self, similarly the vikāras of the primordial matter and the self do not touch the Paramātmān.

In the system of Viśiṣṭādvaita¹ the sūkṣma-cidacid-viśiṣṭa-Brahman becomes sthūla-cidacid-viśiṣṭa-Brahman. The former is the material cause and the latter is the effect. During the state of pralaya, Brahman exists with its viśeṣaṇa, cit and acit, which are in a very subtle state. It is the causal state. In the state of creation, Brahman wills to become many and like-wise becomes manifold². The result is this gross universe. It is the state of effect. The sthūla-cidacid-viśiṣṭa-brahman is caused by sūkṣma-cidacid-viśiṣṭa-brahman. Therefore Brahman is the material cause of the universe.³

Nyāya-vaiśeṣika, Patañjala and Śaiva schools accept Īśvara as the instrumental cause of the universe, because, it is observed in day-to-day experience, that the clay is the material cause and the potter is the instrumental cause of the pot. The nimitta-kāraṇa itself cannot become the upādāna-kāraṇa. Therefore Brahman must be the nimitta-kāraṇa of the world.

Siddhāntin answers this objection in this way. The

1. Śrībhāṣya, 11-1-5

2. *so'kāmayata | bahusyām prajāyeyeti | Taittirīya Ānandavalli, 6-2. tadaikṣata bahusyām prajāyeya | Chāndogya, 6-2-3.*

3. Śruti which declare upādānatva of Brahman |
brahma vanam brahma sa vṛkṣa āsīt | Taittirīya Brāhmaṇa, 2-8-7. tadātmānam svayamakuruta | Taittirīya Ānandavalli, 7. kartāramīśam puruṣam brahma yonim |

existence of Īśvara, the dharmi, cannot be proved by reason. It is known only through the scriptures. Sūtrakāra makes it clear in the chapter śāstrayonitvādhikaraṇa—"śāstrayonitvāt" (*Brahmasūtra*, 1-1-3).

Therefore, śāstras become dharmi-grāhaka-māna, (valid source of knowledge by which the dharmi is grasped). The same śāstra declares that Brahman is the material as well as the instrumental cause. Therefore, Brahman is abhinna-nimittopādāna-kāraṇa of the world.

Nyāya-vaiśeṣika school maintains the difference between samavāya, asamavāya and nimitta-kāraṇas. Because, the experience says, when a pot is produced the two kapālas (potsherds) are the samavāyi-kāraṇa and the conjunction of the two kapālas are asamavāyi-kāraṇa, and the potter is the nimitta-kāraṇa. This clearly shows the mutual difference among these kāraṇas. When such is the case, how the scriptures teach the identity between the samavāyi-kāraṇa and the nimitta-kāraṇa? Therefore, as in the place of 'ādityoyūpaḥ' here also the Śruti passages should be interpreted in the secondary sense of the term (gauṇa). Here they quote a Mīmāṃsā principle to substantiate their stand. In sacrifices, the sacrificial-post namely 'yūpa' is likened to āditya. Though both of them are different, the Śruti says—'ādityo yūpaḥ' (yūpa is identical with āditya). But adept in Mīmāṃsā decide that these passages imply only the 'gauṇārtha'. Nyāya-vaiśeṣika school, therefore argues, it is not correct to admit abhinna-nimitta-upādānatva of Īśvara and further such Śruti passages should be taken in the secondary sense, as in the case of 'ādityo yūpaḥ'.

Rebutting the argument of the Nyāya-vaiśeṣika, the Viśiṣṭādvaita says, that even Nyāya-vaiśeṣika school, in some places inevitably has to admit the identity between the instrumental cause and material cause (abhinna-nimitta-upādānatva). For example, in Nyāya-vaiśeṣika school, 'daṇḍa'

which is the instrumental cause for the pot, is also the material cause for its own rūpa (colour). In these places even Nyāya-vaiśeṣikas inevitably should admit the abhinna-nimitta-upādānatva of the daṇḍa. Therefore Naiyāyikas cannot prove the difference between these two types of causes.

Further in Nyāya-vaiśeṣika school itself the identity of nimitta and upādāna-kāraṇa may be proved in another way. According to them Īśvara is an all-pervasive dravya and as such He possesses the samyoga with all dravyas. In this type of samyoga, even Nyāya-vaiśeṣikas should admit the identity of upādāna and nimitta-kāraṇas. Here samyoga being a guṇa, Īśvara becomes its samavāyi and thus upādāna kāraṇa of it (samyoga). Because 'He' is the agent of the entire 'kāryavastu' He is also the nimitta-kāraṇa. Therefore even Nyāya-vaiśeṣika school inevitable has to accept the abhinna-nimitta upādānatva of Brahman. "Īśvarasyaiva kvacidviṣaye kartṛtvamupādānatvaṁ ca parairapi svikāryam | santihi samyogūdayo ghaṭādibhirīśvarasya |" (Nyāya-siddhāñjana, p. 227).

BRAHMAN IS KNOWN ONLY THROUGH THE SCRIPTURES

In the Nyāya-vaiśeṣika system the existence of Brahman is known by inference. They also say that Brahman is an intelligent cause. An intelligent cause cannot become the material cause. General experience shows that the same thing cannot become both material and the intelligent cause. Upādānatva of Brahman is known only by scriptures. It cannot be inferred. Hence the Nyāya school tries to prove instrumentality of God by the means of inference.

According to the system of Nyāya-vaiśeṣika the existence of Brahman or Paramātman is known by inference¹. For

1. *kāryā yojana dhṛtyādeḥ padāt pratyayataḥ śruteḥ | vākyāt sankhyā viśeṣācca sādhyo viśvajidavyayaḥ |* Nyāya-kusumāñjali, 5-1.

instance, effects such as the jar are caused by an agent. In the same way earth and the sprout of a tree etc., also are effects. They too must have some cause. Ordinary people like us cannot become their agents. Hence the existence of God is proved as their cause.

In proving the existence of God they take the assistance of scriptures also. This support of scriptural passages is only given secondary importance.

In answering this anumāna pramāṇa regarding *īśvarasiddhi*, Vedānta Deśika poses two questions. Does the Nyāya-vaiśeṣika school infer God, as an agent like the agent of pot, cloth, house etc., or does it infer God to be different from the worldly agent?

If the Nyāya-vaiśeṣika school admits the first position, then it has to admit that its God is ignorant, weak, bound by karma, embodied one like the potter and with limited capacity. But if the Nyāya-vaiśeṣika school admits that the God is omniscient, omnipotent¹ etc., on the basis of Śruti² also, then the school admits that the God creates the earth and heaven. He is the creator of the universe and the protector of the universe³.

If the second alternative is admitted, that is, that the God's agency is different from the potter's in capacity, then it becomes necessary to answer in which capacity is He different. If Nyāya school may answer that He is different from the potter in the possession of body, sense, etc., then this difference may also be applied in the case of knowledge and desire. In that case God becomes the possessor of only *prayatna* (effort).

1. *sarvasya draṣṭā sarvasya bhoktā sarvajñaḥ sarvānubhavī*

Vatsyāyana-sūtra, 1-1-9.

2. *dyāvā bhūmī janayan deva ekaḥ*

Rgveda, 10-31-3.

3. *viśvasya kartā viśvasya bhoktā*

Muṇḍaka, 1-1-1.

Nyāya school admits the knowledge and desire of the God, to be eternal. To deny them in God goes against their own system. Deśika therefore says¹, that Nyāya school is neither in a position of admitting God as an agent like the potter nor different from the potter, in capacity and such other qualities.

In concluding the refutation of Īśvarānumāna Vedānta Deśika says, many purposes are served in rejecting the proof of the existence of God by inference. In the first place, the fact is presented as it is. Suppose if someone says that the quality namely smell is grasped by ears, then such a confused man should be taught properly, and his confusion should be warded off. In the same way the God is known by verbal testimony alone. But Naiyāikas have taken this existence to be proved by inference. To give them correct understanding is the first purpose of the rejection of Īśvarānumāna.

The second purpose is this. Reasons which prove the existence of God, may also disprove his existence. Finally it may shake the faith in God of a person, who believes that God is proved. For such a person there is no other valid source of knowledge which can strengthen his belief in God. By rejecting Him to be known by inference and accepting Him to be known by scriptures serves the purpose of re-establishing the faith in such persons².

In the third place by rejection of Īśvarānumāna, 'ajñātārtha jñāpakatva' (making intelligible which is unknown) of śāstras is established. Otherwise śāstras become

1. *kṣityādikaṁ sakarthakam ghaṭavāditi cenna | yathopa-saṁhāra bādhat | anyathā jñānechayorapi tyāga prasaṅgāt | nitya jñānasya śarīrādineva nitya prayatnasyāpi jñānādinā nirapekṣatva vacanopapatteḥ |* Nyāya-siddhāñjana, p. 213.

2. *tataśca mandānām mateṣṭhura buddhinā prakṣobho na syāt |* Nyāya-siddhāñjana, p. 224.

only explanatory repetitive texts. Śāstras are valid only when they enlighten us about the unknown. If God is proved by inference, as Nyāya-vaiśeṣikas say, then, scriptures are enlightening us only the known object and as a result the scriptures lose their special characteristics viz., 'agnātārthajñāpakatva'.

Further Deśika says, in case the Īśvarānumāna is not rejected, then at the most, God may be proved as an instrumental cause. But the agent of the universe must be proved as both instrumental and material cause. The identity of both instrumental and material cause¹, cannot become proved if God is proved only as an instrumental cause. Through the scriptures² alone can one know that God is both material and instrumental cause. Therefore Vedānta rejects the Īśvarānumāna³.

It is the conclusion of Vedānta philosophy that the existence of the supreme being can be known only by śāstras, which declare that he is an ocean of auspicious qualities and he is the abhinna-nimittopādāna-kāraṇa (both material and the instrumental cause) of the universe.

ŚRĪ IN VIŚIṢṬĀDVAITA

The Viśiṣṭādvaita school includes 'Lakṣmī', the consort of Viṣṇu in the term 'Īśvara'. There is no difference between them in any aspect. Both of them are the locus of svāmitva⁴.

1. *nimittopādāna bhūteśvarāsiddheḥ* | *Nyāya-siddhāntajana*, p. 224.
2. *kimsvid vanaṁ ka u sa vrkṣa āśīd yato dyāvāprthivī niṣṭataksuḥ* |
Yajurveda Brāhmaṇa, 2-8-7.
sakṣacchobhayāmnānād |
Brahmasūtra, 1-4-25. (Refer *Śrībhāṣya*, 427 to 437.)
3. *Śrībhāṣya*, 1-1-3.
4. *śrīya saha tu dāmpatyaṁ śāśvataṁ tata eva tu* |
tayoḥ sāmāyika-śaktitva-tadvattvādigirāṁ gatiḥ ||
Nyāya-siddhāntajana, p. 228.

The Śruti says that both Lakṣmī and Nārāyaṇa are the lords of this universe.

asyeśānā jagato viṣṇupatnī | Kṛṣṇa Yajussaṁhitā, 4-4-38.

īśāno bhūtabhavyasya |

Kaṭha.

In every aspect, they are equal. Sometimes, the Śruti calls Lakṣmī as 'Viṣṇupatni'. The same Śruti calls Viṣṇu as 'śrīyaḥ patiḥ'. This fact establishes that both of them are having mutual svāmitva. Goddess Lakṣmi is equal¹ to Paramātmā in every quality like jñāna, ānanda and jagajjanakatva, śeṣitva, śaraṇyatva, prāpyatva, etc., the eternal couple is the locus of śeṣitva. In sacrifices like agnīśomīyam—"agnīśomīyam paśumālabheta" the presiding deity or devatā of that sacrifice are both Agni and Soma. Both of them are the locus of devatātva. In the same way, the dharma, namely, īśvaratva is in both Lakṣmī and Nārāyaṇa. In sacrifices, the oblation is offered to the presiding deity.

Surrendering at the feet of the Lord or prapatti is considered to be 'ātmayāga'. Even in ātmayāga, the oblation, i.e., ātman is offered to both Lakṣmī² and Nārāyaṇa who are the devatās of the sacrifice. She is called 'śakti' because, she assists and co-operates³ with Lord in his functions, such as, creation and protection, etc., 'Śrī is called Śakti'⁴. Therefore, Lakṣmī also is called śakti.

1. *naranārīmayo hariḥ* | *nārāyaṇatmikam devīm* |

Brahmaṇḍa-kaṣyapīya-purāṇa.

tvaṁ yādṛṣo'si kamalāmapi tādṛśīm te dārān vadanti yuvayorna tu bheda-gandhaḥ |

Śrīstava.

2. *asyā mama ca śeṣam hi vibhūtirubhayātmikā* |

Quoted in Nyāya-siddhānta-jana-ṭīkā, p. 228.

3. *yasya ulkāya mukhaṁ tadingitaparādhīno vidhatte'kḥilam* |

Śrīguṇaratna-kōṣa of Parāśara Bhaṭṭāraka.

4. *śivaśśaktyā yukto yadi bhavati* | *Saundaryalaharī of Śrī Śaṅkara.*

Though she is eternal, she gets embodied sometimes by her own free will or some times due to the will of her Lord. She became Sītā when Lord had taken the avatāra of Śrī Rāma and she assumed the form of Rukmiṇī when the God was in the form of Kṛṣṇa¹. Deśika quotes from *Ṣaḍārtha-saṅkṣepa* of Śrī Rāmamiśra who says, that in the world, the property of the husband is the property of the wife also. Therefore the divyadampati are the śeṣī². It means, that all sentient and non-sentient beings exist only for the fulfillment of the purpose of divyadampati. On the basis of the statement of Rāmamiśra and other great ācāryas, Deśika concludes that the divyadampati are the śeṣī of the entire world³.

The 'U' kāra in the praṇava stands for 'Śrī'. The praṇava consists of three letters⁴. They are 'A' 'U' and 'MA'. Among them 'A'kāra signifies the Lord Viṣṇu who is the Lord of the world. 'U'kāra signifies the goddess Lakṣmī who is the consort of Viṣṇu. Finally the letter 'MA' means the jīva who is the servant of both 'Viṣṇu and Lakṣmī'.

It may be argued that praṇava expresses the relation of jīva and Parameśvara in its 'U'kāra. Then how does 'U'kāra mean 'Śrī'? Deśika answers that the mantras

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1. *rāghavatu'bhavat sītā rukmiṇī kṛṣṇajanmani*
Viṣṇūpurāṇa, Indra-kṛta Lakṣmī-stuti.
 2. *paragatātīśayādhanecchayā upādeyatvameva yasya svarūpaṁ sa śeṣaḥ paraḥ śeṣī*
Vedārta-saṅgraha, p. 167.
patyuh patnyā aplī lokasiddham ubhayādhiṣṭhānaṁ caika śeṣitvam
Quoted in Nyāya-siddhāntajana, p. 230.
 3. *anena ca śrīrāmamiśravacasā dvandvamprati jagataḥ śeṣatai-karasatvamupapāditam*
Nyāya-siddhāntajana, p. 231.
 4. *akāreṇocyate viṣṇuḥ sarvalokeśvaro hariḥ | uddhṛtā viṣṇunā lakṣmīrukāreṇocyate tathā | makārāstu tayordāsa iti praṇava-lakṣaṇam*
Quoted in Nyāya-siddhāntajana, p. 232.

sometime admit different meanings and so is the praṇava. Hence there is no contradiction in interpreting praṇava in this way. It need not be construed to mean differently. Many Śruti passages declare that 'Śrī' also is the svāmini of this universe. "asyeśānā jagato viṣṇupatnī"—Lakṣmī is the supreme ruler of this universe. "Īśvarīm sarvabhūtānām"—Lakṣmī is the 'Īśvarī' of the entire universe. She is the supreme controller of all fundamental elements.

Here the former mantra according to some, tells 'bhūmi'. According to some others, it means 'dik' (direction). Deśika calls the second interpretation as 'kudṛṣṭi'. Both these interpretations are wrong because they contradict the 'Īśāna-Śruti' and the term 'Viṣṇupatnī'.

Bhagavān Parāśara also declares that both 'Śrī' and Nārāyaṇa are the substratum of śeṣitva¹. Indra praising the goddess Lakṣmī says 'O mother this entire universe is pervaded by both you and Viṣṇu'. She is all pervading like Viṣṇu who pervades the whole universe. Therefore, there is nothing beyond these two. The passages of Parāśara undoubtedly establish the all-pervasive nature of 'Śrī'. The *Bhagavacchāstra*, i.e., *Pāñcarātra*² declares in clear terms, that both of them are one entity. This entire universe is pervaded by the goddess Lakṣmī as it is pervaded by the Lord Nārāyaṇa. Both of them are the Lords of this universe which consists of sentient and non-sentient things. This world of sentient and non-sentient things exist for the līlā (sport) of Lakṣmī-Nārāyaṇa.

1. *tvayaitadviṣṇunā cām̐ba jagadvyāptam carācaram |*
yathā sarvagato viṣṇuḥ tathāiveyam divijottama |
nanayorvidyate param | Viṣṇupurāṇa.
2. *ekatattvamivoditau | lakṣmyā samasta-cidacit-prapañcaḥ vyāpyaḥ*
tadīśvarasya to sāpi sarvam | tathāpi sādharmaṇāmlīṣitvaṁ
śrīśrīśayordvauca sadaikaśeṣī |

Pāñcarātra quoted in *Nyāya-siddhāntajana*, p. 233.

All the above enquiry establishes that the Śrī is Īśvari or svāmini of this world. Because she is Īśvari, the entire universe becomes Her body, as it is in the case of Nārāyaṇa. Therefore, bhūmi which is included in jīvakoti is 'āṁśa' or part of Śrī. But they are not identical. Just as Viśvakṣena is a part of Saṅkarṣaṇa, so bhūmi is to Śrī.

Goddess 'Śrī' takes the body¹ which is suitable to the avatāra of the Lord. Therefore Deśika concludes that the entire world of cit and acit are attributes of both Śrī² and Nārāyaṇa.

Some other ācāryas of the Viśiṣṭādvaita school oppose these views. But Rāmānuja admits³ all these attributes and vibhūtis like vibhūtvā, śeṣatva, īśitatva, jagajjanakatva mokṣapradatva etc., to goddess Lakṣmī or Śrī.

Deśika on the basis of different Śrutis, smṛtis and the sayings of great ācāryas like Rāmānuja and Rāmamiśra, brought to light that Śrī, the consort of Nārāyaṇa, is also the Īśvarī and soul of the entire universe. Both Śrī and the Lord are not different tattvas. According to *Pāñcarātrāgama* or *Bhagavacchāstra*, which goes to the extent of saying, "ekatattvamivoditau"—they are single tattvas. Deśika takes special care to establish this truth. His entire Śrīstuti vividly depicts the glories of goddess Śrī. He addresses the 'divyadampati' as daivatam—"daivatam dāmpatā naḥ", (Śrī-stuti, 24.)

1. *rāghavatu'bhavat sītā rukmiṇī kṛṣṇajanmani |*
anyeṣu cāvatāreṣu viṣṇoreṣāṇapāyini | Viṣṇupurāṇa 1-9-146.
2. *ataḥ siddhamāśeṣacidacitprakāram brahma ekaḥ śrīmannārāyaṇa*
iti | Nyāya-siddhānta, p. 234.
3. *śīlarūpaguṇavilāsādibhirātmānurūpayā śrīyā sahāśīnam |*
bhagavatīm śrīyam devīm | Gadyatraya.
aśvāryamakṣaragatim paramampadam vā |
Śrīguṇaratna-kośa, 58.

In the same *Śrīstuti* Deśika expresses, how the divine energy pervades the entire world. No doubt the Vedic seers were wonder-struck at the divine beauty of the nature which is in the form of 'sandhyā' and 'uṣas'. But Vedānta Deśika asks us to enjoy the beauty of the divine energy which is inside our body. Our mind always identifies all types of prosperities with goddess Lakṣmī. Prosperity is nothing but divine energy.

Even in establishing the inseparability of 'Śrī' from Viṣṇu and her all-pervassivness, Vedānta Deśika intends to emphasize the importance of the grace of the Lord, in the redemption of the individual soul. It becomes evident from the study of *Dayā-śataka* of Vedānta Deśika that the divine grace is identical with 'Śrī'. She is the very essence of the Lord Nārāyaṇa. In *Śrīstuti* Deśika states that 'Śrī' is the cosmic force. He says all divine qualities of goodness, humility, beauty, prowess, power and virtues etc., are the aspects of 'Śrī'.

Deśika realising all these aspects of 'Śrī' on the statements of Rāmānuja and other ācāryas like Bhatta Parāśara, declared 'Śrī' to be the 'upāya' (means) in the redemption of the individual self and Īśvarī of this universe. Because both of them are identical 'ekatattva' there is no 'Īśvara-dvittva' (duality in Īśvaratattva) and 'upāya-dvittva' (duality of means).

According to him the first and intelligent cause of the universe is made up of Śrī and puruṣa i.e., Lakṣmī and Nārāyaṇa. "*mātā devī tvamasi bhagavān vāsudevaḥ pitā me*" (*Śrīstuti*, 25). They are our eternal parents.

Thus establishing the vaibhava of goddess 'Śrī', Vedānta Deśika has elevated the position of the woman to the godhood.



NITYAVIBHÜTI

Śāstras declare that the Lord is the Lord of ubhaya-hüti, i.e., līlāvibhüti and nityavibhüti. Nityavibhüti is said to be the abode of nityas, muktas and Īśvara. So it is necessary to study the nature and character of nityavibhüti. Nityavibhüti is the abode of the supreme being. It is here that nityas and muktas enjoy their original pure states. Prakṛti is made up of triguṇas viz., satva, rajas and tamas. Līlāvibhüti, where in the jīvas experience the puṇya or pāpaphala is made up of this triguṇa. But nityavibhüti is made up of śuddhasatva, that is, unmixed with rajoguna and tamoguna.

Deśika defines nityavibhüti¹ as a substance which is different from prakṛti and is in its essential nature and mode of sattvaguna, unmixed with rajas and tamas. It is self-luminous substance. It is the place where the jīvas come completely free from the fetters of karma.

Līlāvibhüti is the world of matter, wherein an infinite number of finite selves are fated to experience their karma-phala. It is composed of sattva, rajas and tamas. Prakṛti is said to expand on all sides except one side, where there is nityavibhüti or transcendental region. This transcendental region is composed of pure sattva.

triguṇadravyavyätirikṭatve sati sattvavatvam |

svayamprakāśakatve sati sattvavatvam |

tamoraहितatve sati sattvavatvam |

niśēṣāvidyānivṛtti deśavijātyānyatvam |

Nyāya-siddhāntajana, p. 236.

There are innumerable Śruti evidences to prove the existence of such a region. The *Puruṣa-sūkta* clearly states "ādityavarṇaṁ tamasaḥ parastāt" (*Taittirīya Āraṇyaka*, 3-12)—the nityavibhūti is situated beyond prakṛti and possesses the luster of sun. Further it describes that the devotees of the Lord will enter this region which is called 'nāka': "teha nākaṁ mahimānassacante | yatra pūrve sādhyāssanti devāḥ |"

There are innumerable Śruti passages which declare that the Lord resides in nityavibhūti¹. Though Paramātman is all-pervasive and exists every where, he resides in nityavibhūti with divyamaṅgala vigraha (body of the Paramātman is called divayamaṅgala vigraha), which is not tainted by prakṛti (aprākṛta), to make mukta and nityas blissful.

The existence of mukta and nityas in nityavibhūti is proved by the Śruti passage: "tadviṣṇoḥ paramam padam | sadā paśyanti sūrayaḥ". (*Yajus*, 6-5). Here the word 'sadā paśyanti' which means eternal seers, confirms the existence of nityas, mukta and nityavibhūti. The *Mahābhārata* in mokṣadharmā-parva (198-6) concretises this fact. "ete vai nirayāstāta sthānasya paramātmanah |"

Śuddhasattva is a nonsentient entity because its nature is different from jīva-tattva and Īśvara-tattva. Yet it is self-luminous and shines without the help of knowledge.

1. *sahasrasthūṇe vimite dṛḍha ugre yatra devānāmadhideva āste |*

Quoted in *Nyāya-siddhāntajana-tīkā*, p. 236.

hiraṇmaye pare koṭe virajaṁ brahma niṣkalaṁ |

tacchubhram jyotiṣaṁ jyotiḥ.... |

Muṇḍaka, 2-2-9.

padō'sya viśvā bhūtāni | tripadasyamṛtam divi |

yathā padodarastvacamuktaḥ |

Nyāya-siddhāntajana-tīkā, p-239.

kṣayantamasya rajasāḥ parāke | yo asyādhyakṣaḥ parama vyoman |

Yajus, 2-2-12.

Nityavibhūti is jñānātmaka (of the nature of knowledge). Deśika establishes this fact on logical grounds. The divyamāṅgala vigraha and the nityavibhūti are made up of pure knowledge.

Unlike triṣaṇa, nityavibhūti does not cause the contraction of knowledge. On the other hand, it becomes the cause of expansion of jñāna, śakti, bala, aiśvarya, vīrya and tejas of the ātman. It also undergoes modifications just like the world of matter according to the desire of Īśvara, the Lord. It is called as paramapada¹, imperishable region (akṣare parame). The Īśvara also is called paramapada, because he is the object of attainment. The jīvātman also is called paramapada in its pure state.

Though nityavibhūti is jñānātmaka, it is without object and without any locus just like the svarūpajñāna of ātman. Because it shines for the ātman alone, it is called parākdravya. Though our dharma-bhūta-jñāna is self-luminous, its self-luminosity is known only when the objects are revealed by it. The self-luminosity of nityavibhūti is in no way hampered, though it shines for muktas, nityas and Īśvara during the state of liberation. For baddhas, śuddhasattva is not self-luminous, due to their past karma².

Śuddhasattva or nityavibhūti forms the stuff out of which the bodies, indriyas and viśayas of god, the eternals and the liberated souls are formed. According to some, in nitya-vibhūti also there are twenty-four tattvas which are not subjected to transformation. Because, in Śruti, eternality

1. *katham trayāṇām paramaprāpyatvamiti cet, bhagavatsvarūpam paramaprāpyatvādeva paramapadam | itarayorapi bhagavatprāptigarbhatvādeva paramapadatvam | Vedārtha-saṅgraha, p. 190.*

2. *dhiyaḥ svayam prakāśatvam muktau svabhāvikam yathā | baddhe kadācitsamṛddhaḥ tathātrāpi niyāmyate |*

Rahasyatraya-sāra, p. 89.

of the body of nityas and muktas is established. The Śruti passages which deny the body for eternalists should be interpreted to mean the denial of karmakṛtaśarīra. Nityas and muktas are having aprākṛta-indriya which is not made up of karma. Rāmānuja has discussed in detail the problem of possession of body and indriyas by muktas in the sūtra “*abhāvam bādarirāha hyevam*” (*Brahmasūtra*, 4-4-10).

In the sūtra “*dvādaśāhavadubhayavidham bādarāyaṇ'o-taḥ*” (*Brahmasūtra* 4-4-12) Rāmānuja has proved that according to sūtrakāra, there are bodies and indriyas for muktas also. Deśika quotes the statement of Bhaṭṭa Parāśara and confirms this position.

On the basis of Śruti Bhaṭṭa-Parāśara admits that Īśvara, nityas and muktas possess manas¹. Bhaṭṭa Parāśara himself says that according to some ācāryas the manas in nityavibhūti which is stated by Śruti is buddhi. That is why the usages such as ‘buddhimān’ and ‘manasvī’ are synonymous.

Further those ācāryas opine that the word manas in the śruti passage, should be interpreted to mean buddhi because, there is a perception which says ‘kṣubhitam me manah’—my manas is disturbed, ‘praśastam me manah’—my manas is peaceful etc. If, therefore, manas is understood to mean indriya, then it contradicts this perception. Because manas being beyond the scope of indriyas cannot be known by perception. Therefore Bhaṭṭa Parāśara says, that those ācāryas concluded that the manas in nityavibhūti means only buddhi.

Rāmānuja states that there are, in nityavibhūti,

1. *yadyapyevam tarkaḥ svātantryeṇa svānta samarthana samarthaḥ, tathāpi āgamānugraheṇa prabhavati santi cāgamāḥ | manasaitān kāmān paśyan ramate....iti matāntaramuktam |*

Quoted in *Nyāya-siddhāntajana*, p. 240.

beautiful ornaments, weapons, retinues buildings and ponds etc.¹ In nityavibhūti, the changes in trees such as, sprouts, flower and fruits, are not due to time and karma. They are due to the saṅkalpa of Sarveśvara². Nityas and muktas assume the body for the kainkarya of the Lord. Even the Lord takes up his divyamaṅgala vigraha to please the nityas and muktas. This divyamaṅgala vigraha helps nityas and muktas to make upāsana. This is due to his will. Nityas and muktas possess the body sometimes according to the will of sarvasākṣī and sometimes on their own will which also acts according to the saṅkalpa of the Īśvara. Sūtrakāra brings out these ideas in the sūtras “*tanvabhāve sandhyavadupapatteḥ*”, “*bhāve jāgradvat*”. (*Brahmasūtra*, 4-4-13, 14). When the mukta wills to get embodied³, then he possess the body and enjoys the communion with the Lord. When he wills to enjoy communion with the Lord without the body, then he becomes bodyless. It means, that mukta is free to become ‘saśarīra’ or ‘aśarīra’. In the same way when the Lord wills body to the mukta, then mukta gets embodied and enjoys the Lord’s sāhacarya.

According to the philosophy of Viśiṣṭādvaitādvaita even the dreams of jīvas are real. During the dream the Lord creates peculiar bodies for jīva and makes him to enjoy the pleasure or pain. In the same way mukta also enjoys only pleasure with the help of the body created by the Lord⁴.

1. *viśayaścātra bhūṣaṇāyudhāsana-parivārāyatana udyāna-vāpikā-kriḍāparvatādayo'tivicitrāḥ nityāḥ* |

Quoted in *Nyāya-siddhānta*, p. 241.

For details see *Vaiṣṇava-gadyam* of Rāmānuja.

2. *santi hi tatrāpi taruṣu pallava-phala-kusuma-ādayaḥ pariṇāmāḥ | naḍīṣu phenatarāṅgādayaḥ kālakṛta-pariṇāmanāmātram hi teṣu niṣedhyaṁ na tu bhagavatsaṅkalpamātrakṛtamapi* |

Nyāya-siddhānta, p. 241.

3. *sa yadi pitṛloka kāmo bhavati* |

Chāndogya, 8-2-1.

4. Refer *Kaṭhapaniṣad*, 2-5-8.

Rāmānuja explaining all these ideas in Śrībhāṣya¹, further says, that mukta also, can enjoy the company of their parents even as the Lord enjoys the līlāvibhūti getting different parents like Daśaratha and Vāsudeva. The Lord enjoys the beauty of human life, even in nityavibhūti and makes mukta also to enjoy it. This interpretation of Rāmānuja heightens the value of human life and its greatness.

The *Chāndogyaopaniṣad* says that the mukta enjoys even beautiful bodies and chariots in nityavibhūti. But this enjoyment does not come in the way of bhagavadanubhava. Because these enjoyments of mukta are only in accordance with the will of the Lord.

In fact, this enjoyment of mukta in nityavibhūti is not for the fulfillment of his desire. Even the company of ladies in that place is used only to please the Lord, but not with the intention of selfish enjoyment². Another point is, for mukta who has realised the ātman and Paramātmān, there never arise desires of this type, Hence it is only the kainkarya of the Lord.

According to the passage of *Chāndogya* the mukta can get different bodies at the same time. But this statement goes against the philosophy of Viśiṣṭādvaita which admits atomic nature to the self. If the ātman is 'anu' then how can it occupy the different bodies? Rāmānuja solves this problem, in Śrībhāṣya (p. 882) by pointing out that though the nature of ātman is 'anu' it gets connection with different bodies at the same time, through its dharma-bhūta-jñāna

1. *parama-puruṣopi līlārthaṁ daśaratha vāsudevādi-pitṛlokādi-kamātmanāḥ sṛṣṭvā tairmanuṣya dharmā līlārasaṁ yathā bhunkte tathā* |
Śrībhāṣya, p. 881.

2. *sa tatra paryeti jakṣat kṛdān ramamāṇaḥ strībhirvā yānairvā jñātibhirvā....* |
Chāndogya, 8-12-3.

which becomes all-pervasive at the time of mokṣa. He gives the example of the lamp which being situated in a particular place, illumines other objects which are in distant places. Even in the bodies of baddha cetana the ātman being present in a particular place activates the different parts of the body through his dharma-bhūta-jñāna. The expansion of the dharma-bhūta-jñāna of baddha cetana is limited to the body in which he is present, whereas the dharma-bhūta-jñāna of muktātman is limitless and is all-pervasive.

According to the statement of *Muṇḍaka* (3-1-3), the muktātman enjoys complete equality with the paramapurusa. Then the question is whether the mukta undertakes the actions like creation and destruction also? Rāmānuja answers that the agent of these actions is Lord Śrīmannārāyaṇa alone. None else. Hence the statement should be interpreted to mean complete equality of mukta with the paramapurusa, excepting the work of jaganniyamana¹ (control of the world) and śrīyaḥ-patitva.

Deśika also discusses² the incompatibility of accepting nitya and anitya desires for mukta, nityas and Īśvara. He concludes that, because there are actions belonging to the past, present and future time, there are also nitya anitya type of desires and their resultant bodies for them (nitya, mukta and Īśvara). These desires are there only according to their will and not out of their binding karmas. Deśika says that all these explanations about nityavibhūti, mukta, nitya and Īśvara are implied by sūtrakāra himself.

To please his devotees and maintain the order of the world, the Lord assumes five svarūpas, i.e., para, vyūha,

1. *Śrībhāṣya*, p. 884.

2. *tathā ca sūtram tanvabhāve sandhyāvadupapatteḥ |
bhāve jagadvat iti |*

Nyāya-siddhāntajana, p. 242. *Brahmasūtra*, 4-4-13, 14

vibhava, antrayāmi and arcā, and all these forms possess all the six auspicious qualities like jñāna, bala, aiśvarya, vīrya, śakti and tejas¹. Among them the first svarūpa, i.e., para is in nityavibhūti. It is the transcendental form of God.

Vyūha is said to be in the ocean of milk where he becomes visible to Gods like Brahma and Indra etc. Vyūha is the operative form of God known as Vāsudeva, Saṅkarṣaṇa, Pradyumna and Aniruddha. Vibhava is incarnate form of the avatāras like Rāma, Kṛṣṇa, etc. Antaryāmi-svarūpa is that form through which he controls the entire world. By this form he resides in the hearts of cetanas and it is realized by yogins through meditation. The forms which we see in our temples and houses are arcāsvarūpa. These forms are assumed by God in accordance with the wishes of his devotees. Rāmānuja in his *Śrībhāṣya* (4-1-4) says, that whenever the devotee worships an image of a deity which is called pratīka, that worship is carried through meditation up to the supreme being. The Lord makes the image or arcā-form his special abode according to the wishes of the devotee.

Rāmānuja affirms this fact following the passage in the *Kaṭhopaniṣad* “*yamevaiṣa vṛṇute tena labhyaḥ | tasyaiṣa ātmā vivṛṇute tanūrṇ svāme*” (1-2-23) “He whom the self chooses, to him He condescends to manifest His divine form. Only those persons who possess living faith and love in Him, are chosen by Him. The saints, seers, the Ālvārs and the ācāryas are looked upon as those who are gifted with the divine eye (divya chakṣu). Those saints and seers, after beholding the divine form (aprākṛta divyamaṅgala vighraha)

1. *vṛddhi hrāsādyabhāvād sa hi bhavati sadā pūrṇaṣāḍguṇyaśālī |*
Tattvamuktā-kalāpa, 3-69.

sarveṣvapi bhagavattvam pūrṇattvam ca prakhyāpyate |

Sarvārtha-siddhi, p. 456.

communicate their ecstatic experience of the divine form of the Lord to other mortals.

Deśika's works are full of devotional songs. Especially in his stotras he praises the arcā form of god and makes the true devotee to enjoy the bliss of Vaikuṇṭha here on earth.

Just like the Lord, the divyamaṅgala vighraha also possesses wonderful powers. Rāmānuja explains clearly these powers in *Bhagavadgītā-bhāṣya*¹. Rāmānuja commenting on this stanza says, "Here Kṛṣṇa tells Arjuna that he succeeds in getting a vision of His Lordly form; he will not only see the whole universe but he will also get a direct vision of God. Further Kṛṣṇa says that whatever Arjuna may wish to see, he can see it. After Śrīkṛṣṇa showed his Viśvarūpa form, Arjuna saw in the Viśvarūpa the entire universe as the body of God. Arjuna saw in it whole of the universe with all its differentiation. He saw in it the evolutions and manifestation of the universe. He saw in Him the living cosmos which was a unity in diversity. Therefore Deśika says like the Lord, the divyamaṅgala vighraha also possesses unimaginable powers. The meditation on any one of these forms will lead us to liberation².

Thus scriptures, commentators and ācāryas have described nityavibhūti which is jñānasvarūpa, composed of pure sattva and ānanda. The pure knowledge itself has taken the form of nityavibhūti to serve Śrīmannārāyaṇa. This nityavibhūti cannot be conceived with impure mind. Because it is of the form of pure consciousness. It can dispel all

1. *tatraikasthaṁ jagat kṛtsnam paśyādya sacarācaram* | *Gītā*, 11-8.
tatraikatsthaṁ jagat kṛtsnam pravibhaktamanekadhā |
apaśyaddevadevasya śarīre pāṇḍavastadā | *Gītā*, 11-13.

2. *niśśreyasan tu vyāpakānusandhāyināṁ sarvatra hastāpaceyam* |
Nyāya-siddhānta, p. 248.

types of tamoguṇa which has followed the ātman from times immemorial. Deśika says that everyone should aspire to enjoy this nityavibhūti and he prays her (nityavibhūti) to stay voluntarily in his heart.

Rāmānuja has given the detailed description of nitya-vibhūti in his *Vaikuṇṭha-gadya* which fills the reader with ecstasy. Deśika has consolidated the statements of ancient ācāryas and has shown their coherence with scriptures. Thus explaining the nature and character of nityavibhūti, Deśika has served a delicious mental food for the erudite as well as the common people.



Chapter VI

BUDDHI

DEFINITION OF BUDDHI

It is through consciousness we know the world of objects and realize the self and Paramātman. In another words, we may call it an instrument. We can understand the objects, i.e., prameyas clearly only when the instrument, jñāna, is crystal clear. This fact necessitates the discussion on buddhi. So Deśika begins to analyse and examine buddhi. He defines buddhi, as a substance which possesses luminosity and is karmakāraka. It (jñāna) indicates the viṣayatā which is in the known object and also possesses jñānatva. "*sakarmakāvabhāsavattvam* !" (*Nyāya-siddhānta*, p. 249).

Jñāna means understanding. In the experience such as "ghaṭamaham jñāmi" (I know the pot), the verb is 'jñāmi' (to know). Here there are two parts, namely dhātu and pratyaya (suffix). The former i.e., dhātu, means understanding. In śāstras, it is called jñāna, prakāśa, avabhāsa and sphuraṇa, etc. This jñāna requires a substratum and an object. In the verb 'jñāmi' the suffix 'mip' indicates the substratum of the knowledge. The pronoun 'aham' which is in the nominative case indicates that it is that substratum. That which is known becomes viṣaya. The word 'ghaṭam' which is in the accusative case, is the viṣaya. It is called karmakāraka. It is different from jñāna. The viṣaya possesses viṣayatva. That viṣayatva is indicated (nirūpita) by jñāna. Therefore the definition sakarmakāvabhāsatva becomes well explained.

The second definition that is offered is "*sakaratrākāva-*

bhāsatvam" (*Nyāya-siddhāntajana*, p. 429). The locus of dharma-bhūta-jñāna is ātman. Therefore, it possesses the dharmāśrayatva. That āśrayatva (*kartṛtva*) is indicated by jñāna.

In addition to these definitions *Nyāyatattva* offers¹ four more definitions. The first definition is, that substance which possesses highest velocity is buddhi. There is nothing which can go faster than dharma-bhūta-jñāna. That is why during the state of liberation it gets into contact with the entire universe instantaneously.

The second definition is that it is very subtle.

The third definition of *Nyāyatattva* says that it is 'nirbhara' which means very light. Generally the light substances will have highest speed.

The fourth definition says that knowledge requires nothing else for its cognition. To know objects like pot, jar, etc., we need a lamp. But the lamp does not require another lamp for its revelation. It shines for itself. In the same way, the knowledge also does not require another knowledge for its revelation. In other words, it is called 'svayamprakāśatva' or self-luminosity of knowledge.

SELF-LUMINOSITY OF BUDDHI

The consciousness of baddhajīvas is also self-luminous. It is so only at the time of viśayaprakāśa² and that too for ātman alone. The consciousness of objects of the past and the future becomes the object of another consciousness. Therefore they do not possess self-luminosity. The conscious-

1. *atyantavegitātyantasaukṣmyaṁ nirbharatā tathā |*
svasattākālabhāvvyāptirjñāne lakṣmacatuṣṭayam |

Nyāya-siddhāntajana, p. 249.

2. *prakāśaṁ ca vyavahārānugūṇam tadāpādakatvam prakāśakatvam |*
Darśanodayaḥ, p. 209.

ness of others is known through inference. The consciousness of *nitya*, *mukta* and *Īśvara* is not so, because they perceive consciousness that are in *kālatraya* and in others through their omniscience. The *Naiyāyikas* and *Mīmāṃsakas* do not admit of self-luminosity to consciousness. In the perceptual experience '*ghaṭamaham jñāmi*' nobody doubts the objectivity of *jñāna*. The doubt is regarding '*viśayatānirūpakajñāna*' (the *jñāna* which indicates the *viśayatā*). *Naiyāyikas* solve this problem in the following way.

VIEW OF THE NAIYĀYIKAS

In the knowledge, '*ayam ghaṭaḥ*' (this is pot), the pot is the *viśaya* of that knowledge. The knowledge is the indicator (*nirūpaka*) of the *viśayatā* that is in the *ghaṭa*. This knowledge is called *vyavasāya*¹. After this stage, we experience another knowledge of the type '*ghaṭamaham jñāmi*' or '*ghaṭamaham sākṣātkaromi*' (I perceive that this is a pot).

In this latter knowledge, the previous knowledge, namely, '*this is a pot*', becomes the *viśaya*. It is *mānasa-pratyakṣa-rūpa*. This knowledge is called '*anuvyavasāya*'. Now on the basis of this explanation, *Naiyāyikas* argue that knowledge is known by *mānasa-pratyakṣa-jñāna*². Therefore knowledge is not self-luminous as stated by the *Vedāntins*.

VIEW OF MĪMĀMSAKAS

The thinkers of *Mīmāṃsā* school also do not admit the self-luminosity of knowledge. They offer their own explanation. After the knowledge, "*ayam ghaṭaḥ*" (this is pot) "*ayam*

1. *vyavasāyātmakam pratyakṣam* |
jñānaviśayabhūtam jñānam |

Gautama, 1-1-4.

Nyāyakośa, p. 825.

2. *sarvatra pratyakṣaviśaya jñāturindriyeṇa vyavasāyāḥ* |
paścāt mānasa anuvyavasāyāḥ |

Vātsyāyana, 1-1-4.

paṭaḥ" (this is piece of cloth), some atisāya (excellence) is produced in the known object, namely, ghaṭa or paṭa. This atisāya is called 'prākāṭya' by Mīmāṃsā thinkers. The objects like ghaṭa are not 'prakāṭa' (revealed) until their knowledge is produced. Therefore the atisāya which is formed in the known objects is known as 'prākāṭya'. It is the effect of the knowledge. Knowledge is the cause of atisāya or prākāṭya. Now Mīmāṃsakas argue that the knowledge is inferred by prākāṭya that is in the object. Though it can reveal all objects it cannot reveal itself, just like the tip of the finger¹, which can touch everything, except itself. Therefore, knowledge is not svayamprakāśa or self-luminous.

EXAMINATION OF NAIYĀYIKA VIEW

Deśika critically examines both the systems and refutes them one after the other and establishes the self-luminosity of the knowledge. First he examines the view of the Naiyayikas. The experience, namely, "ghaṭamaham jānāmi" (I know that this is pot), is not disputed by anybody, and the objectivity of knowledge here, is also not the object of dispute. But the heart of the problem is, what is that 'nirūpaka' by which we know the viśayatā that is in objectified jñāna.

Viśayatā is not known through mānasapratyakṣa. In the previous example 'ayaṁ ghaṭaḥ' there is viśayatā in the object, namely, ghaṭa, and viśayata is in the knowledge. The relation between them is known as viśaya-viśayābhāva. The viśayatā that is in ghaṭa is known only by the knowledge but not by anything else. Further in the subsequent experience 'ghaṭamaham jānāmi' the knowledge itself (ayaṁ ghaṭaḥ) becomes the object. The viśayatā that is in objectified

1. *aṅgulyagraṁ yathātmanāṁ nātmanā spraṣṭumarhati | svānīśen
jñānamapyevaṁ nātmanāṁ jñātumarhati |*

Quoted in *Tattva-suddhi*, p. 57.

knowledge is known by the above said knowledge but not by anything else. Therefore knowledge is *svayamprakāśa*, not known by something else.

If the Naiyayikas do not admit this position, they will have to deny the *sarvajñatva* of Īśvara which is admitted by them also. *Sarvajñatva* means perceiving everything¹ at all times. Īśvara who is a *sarvajña* must also perceive his *jñāna*. Otherwise, he cannot be a *sarvajña*. Therefore *jñāna* is a *svayamprakāśa-vastu*. It illuminates the objects like the *prabhā* (radiance of a lamp). *Prabhā* illuminates everything in addition to itself. It does not require another *prabhā*. In the same way, the knowledge which illuminates every object, also illuminates itself. The *mānasa-pratyakṣa-vāda* of Naiyāyika is refuted by another objection. The *sattā* (existence) and the *sattā-viśiṣṭa-vastu* (existent objects), are perceived by knowledge such as, 'ghaṭo'sti', 'paṭo'sti'. In the same way, we have the experience of the knowledge 'jñāna-masti'. Here 'jñāna' which is the object, is perceived by that knowledge. If perceptibility of that knowledge is not admitted then it becomes 'asat' and this leads one to admit all objects that are known by this knowledge as 'asat'. Therefore it is inevitable to admit *jñāna* as a *svayamprakāśa-vastu*. Deśika abridges all these arguments in following śloka.

dhiyaḥ svayamprakāśatve vedmītyādyupalambhanam |
mānasādyakṣabhaṅgādirapi mānamitiṣyatām ||
svadhīviśeṣaṁ sarvajñō'pyadhyakṣayati vā na vā |
ādye siddha svatassiddhiḥ anyatrāsarvaveditā ||
jñānamastīti vijñānaṁ svātmānaṁ sādhayen na vā |
sarvatra svaprakāśatvaṁ sarva siddhirato'nyathā ||

Nyāya-siddhāntajana, p. 250.

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1. *uktānuktāśeṣārtheṣu samāsa-vistara-vibhāga-viśeṣataśca*
tattvavyāpta-sadoditisiddhijñānaṁ sarvajñatvam |

Sarvadarśana-saṅgraha, p. 166.

EXAMINATION OF MĪMĀṂSAKA VIEW

After refuting the system of Naiyāyikas, Deśika examines the view held by Mīmāṃsaka. The Mīmāṃsakā has said that jñāna is not a self-luminous substance. The first defect in this view is that it violates the rule that hetu (reason) and sādhyā (probandum) must have a common substratum. We infer the fire by smoke in the pakṣa, i.e., mountain. Therefore, there is 'sādhya-hetvoḥ sāmānādhikaranyam'. But this sāmānādhikaranyā is not present in the inference by which the Mīmāṃsakā infers jñāna. Here prākāṭya which is the hetu is in outside substances. But jñāna which ought to be inferred is inside the individual. Therefore, how can we infer a līṅgi (sādhyā) by līṅga (reason) which is somewhere else?

Further, Mīmāṃsaka has to answer whether the prākāṭya is perceptible or imperceptible. If it is perceptible, then, it should be known by one and all, just like the colour and weight of every object. But according to him prākāṭya is known by the perceiver alone. To overcome this difficulty, if he says that it is imperceptible, then, there can be no inference at all, because in the famous 'vanhyanumiti (fire inference) we cannot infer the existence of the fire without the perception of hetu, that is dhūma. Accordingly without the perception of prākāṭya, inference of jñāna becomes impossible. Therefore, to say that jñāna is prākāṭyānumeya is untenable.

Deśika further says, that Mīmāṃsakā cannot prove prākāṭyānumeyavāda itself. Every knowledge requires several apparatus, such as, sense, object, their relation, light, time, place and adṛṣṭa, etc. These are common to all knowledge. Mīmāṃsakas add prākāṭya in this group and say that jñāna is inferred by it. However, according to them the apparatus produce the knowledge and knowledge produces the prākāṭya.

Now instead of saying knowledge is inferred by *prākāṭya*, if he says the apparatus of knowledge is inferred by *prākāṭya*, it becomes 'lāghava-jñāna-sahakṛta' (simplicity of reasoning). The adepts in *nyāya* say the same. "taddhetorevāstu taddhetutvam madhye kiṁ tena!"

On the whole *Mīmāṃsaka* will have to deny knowledge itself, if he accepts *prākāṭya-vāda*. But according to *siddhāntin* this is not a difficulty. Because, in his system, *jñāna* is *svayamprakāśa*. Therefore knowledge cannot be denied. Here the *siddhāntin* accepts the difference between the knowledge and the known, because knowledge is perceptible. But all apparatus are not so. Among the apparatus the '*adrṣṭa*' is not perceptible. If the perceived knowledge is denied, then, on the same basis, the entire universe may be denied. So *prākāṭyānumeyavāda* is untenable.

Mīmāṃsaka further may argue that the *vyavahāra* in our day-to-day experience is not compatible unless one accepts *prākāṭya*, because through this *prākāṭya*, one can understand the nature of the object. So it is beneficial to admit *prākāṭya-anumeya-vāda*. The *siddhāntin* answers that this *vyavahāra* may be done with the help of *jñāna* itself. So *prākāṭyānumeya-vāda* cannot stand to reason.

Another objection also can be leveled against the *Mīmāṃsaka*. According to him, *jñāna* is an instrumental cause of *prākāṭya* whereas the *viśaya* is the material cause of it. This can be explained in the *jñāna* which is in the present time. But the same cannot be said of the *jñāna* of past and future times, because we are not having the *viśaya* before us which is the *samavāyikāraṇa* (material cause) of *prākāṭya*. As a result of this there can be no knowledge at all regarding the objects of past and future times.

The *Mīmāṃsaka* in the beginning had given the example of '*āṅgulyagra-drṣṭānta*' viz., 'the tip of the finger which can touch everything except itself' to substantiate his position.

For this objection the siddhāntin answers, that the tip of the finger may not touch itself due to it's inability. But the same cannot be said of jñāna also which possesses extraordinary power. The knowledge need not be incapable as the tip of the finger is. This argument of Mīmāṃsaka is like saying that Yajñadatta must be black because Devadatta is black. On the other hand the siddhāntin gives the analogy of prabhā and substantiates his position. The prabhā which reveals other objects, also reveals itself. In the same way the knowledge reveals itself and other objects also. Hence dharma-bhūta-jñāna is svayamprakāśa.

Deśika summarises¹ the above and some other objections leveled against prākāṣyānumeya-vāda and says that this theory does not hold good. Further he says, therefore as a last resort, Mīmāṃsaka also has to accept the self-luminosity or svayam-prakāśatva of jñāna. The word 'prakāśa' in svayam-prakāśa² means anubhavādimatva which means jñāna-sambandha. Deśika here quotes Nāthamuni: "*anubhavā-dūratvaṃ smṛtinimittam*!" (*Nyāya-siddhāṇjana*, p. 252.)

The jñāna-sambandha may be in the substances which are udāsīna-padārthas. To avoid this, another dala piece, i.e., smṛtinimittatva is added in the body of prakāśa-lakṣaṇa.

The relation of jñāna with another jñāna and with objects will be produced without any obstruction. The relation of jñāna with another jñāna is tādātmya (identity). In between jñāna and other substances the relation is saṃyoga. The relation between jñāna and adravyas that are in dravyas is saṃyuktāśritatva. (That relation is between colour and jñāna.)

1. *kalpyaivadhīścet kalpyeta tatsāmagryeva lāghavāt pratyakṣāyāstā-tonyatva kluptau naivam prasajyate*! *Nyāya-siddhāṇjana*, p. 250.

2. *tadevapaśyatām sarvaśūnyatvādbibhyatām satām gatissvayam-prakāśatvādṛte nānyopalabhyate*! *Siddhitraya*.

Bhaṭṭa Parāśarapāda¹ gives the following reasons to prove the svayamprakāśatva of knowledge.

1. Jñāna is a perceptible object.

2. It cannot be perceived by any other means like indriyas. It is perceived by jñāna alone. Therefore it cannot be perceived by mānasa-pratyakṣa.

3. In the knowledge 'ghaṭamaham jānāmi', the object, knowledge and aham padārtha 'I'ness are known. Here the viṣayatā that is in jñāna is known by jñāna itself.

4. By inference 'jñānam svayamprakāśatvavat jñānatvāt yathā īśvarajñānam'. In this inference, the hetu i.e., jñānatva is in jñāna viz., the pakṣa. Therefore, there must be the 'sādhya', 'svayamprakāśatva' also. Their concomitant variation is proved in īśvariya-jñāna.

5. The jñāna-vyavahāra begins from the very next moment of its birth. If it was through mānasa-pratyakṣa or prākāṭya, there must have been delay in its vyavahāra.

6. We never doubt whether we have consciousness or not. If knowledge was not svayamprakāśa, then there must have been that doubt.

7. After perceiving a thing, we remember it after sometime. It is due to dhārāvāhika-jñāna. In dhārāvāhika-jñāna, the preceding jñānas generate succeeding jñāna. Thus it helps in producing memory. In dhārāvāhika-jñāna, the preceding jñānas are experienced as they produce the succeeding jñāna. It is not possible if jñāna is not svayamprakāśa.

8. In the middle of dhārāvāhika-jñāna, there cannot be anuvyavasāya type of knowledge (knowledge where

1. *dhiyaḥ pratyakṣabhāvatvāt paratastadasambhavāt |
pariśeṣyātstato bhānam pramāṇacca tatataḥ ||*

knowledge itself is the object). Otherwise, dhārāvāhika-jñāna loses its nature.

9. If knowledge was illumined by some other substance, then there must not be any difference between knowledge and object, like pot, which is illumined by some other things.

10. Scriptures also establish the self luminosity, "atrāyam puruṣaḥ svayaṁ jyotirbhavati!" "ātmaivāśya jyotiḥ, svena jyotiṣāste!" "ātmasaṁvedyaṁ tad jñānaṁ brahma-sañjñitam!" etc.

11. In śāstras, jīvātman is compared to gem, sun and lamp. In the same way, the dharma-bhūta-jñāna is compared to their radiance, i.e., prabhā. The Lord himself says¹, that just as the sun illumines this vast universe by his effulgence, the ātman also, though he is one in this body, illumines himself; and through his attributive knowledge, illumines the entire body.

12. There is no incompatibility in accepting jñāna as svayamprakāśa.

Deśika, discusses all these points in detail, one after another. Finally he raises or anticipates another objection against svayamprakāśatva-vāda of jñāna and refutes it.

Both knowledge and its object are mutually dependent substances. In the absence of object, there is no knowledge. In the same way, if there is no knowledge, we cannot know the objects. Therefore we have to admit that they are known simultaneously. This is called 'sahopalambhaniyama' in śāstras. This sahopalambhaniyama of both jñāna and its objects proves their mutual identity and leads us to buddhistic theory which denies the external world. The buddhists say—"sahopalambhaniyamādabhedo nīlataddhiyoḥ!"—there is complete identity between the known and the knowledge, because of their sahopalambhaniyama.

1. *yathā prakāśayatyekaḥ kṛtsnam lokamimam raviḥ |
kṣetram kṣetrī tatha kṛtsnam prakāśayati bhārata |* Gītā, 13-33.

This objection is met with in the following way. We need not admit the identity between the known and the knowledge, though the siddhāntin accepts the niyama of sahopalambha. There is an experience "ahamidam jānāmi". Here, 'idam' indicates karma and the verb 'jānāmi' indicates the knowledge. 'idam' is viśaya of the knowledge and jñāna indicated by 'jānāmi' is viśayi. Thus one can perceive clear difference between viśaya and viśayi through perception.

Further, pūrvapakṣin admits the identity between them through inference. But inferential knowledge becomes invalid when the perceptual knowledge is strong. The adepts in Nyāya say¹ that when an elephant is known by perception then there is no need to infer it by its "cītkāra". Therefore, svayamprakāśa-vāda will never lead to Buddhism. On the other hand, it proves² 'bhedavāda'. Therefore, knowledge is svayamprakāśa-vastu or self-luminous substance.

CONTRACTION AND EXPANSION OF DHARMA-BHŪTA-JÑĀNA OF JĪVA

Dharma-bhūta-jñāna of jīva can perceive everything that is in līlāvibhūti and nityavibhūti, but due to karma its power is obstructed in the stage of saṁsāra. Another point is that the jñāna of the jīva has to function through indriyas. therefore, there is parity³ in the expansion and contraction of the dharma-bhūta-jñāna of jīva. Though this jñāna is eternal, it is said to be utpanna and vinaṣṭa due to its

1. *na hi karṇi dṛṣṭe cītkāreṇa tamanumimate'numātāraḥ |*

Pakṣatā, Raghunāthaśiromaṇi, p. 1.

2. *svayam prakāśatve sahopalambhaniyamādabhedabhayamapi viruddhapratyakṣāvaruddha-sādhyatvaviruddhatvā-prayojakatva -prabhṛtibhīranumānadūṣaṇāt niśśeṣitam".*

Nyāya-siddhāntjāna, p-256.

3. *tamimamindriyadvārā jñānaprasāramapekṣya udayāstamayavya-
padeśaḥ pravartate |*
Śrībhāṣya.

prasaraṇa (expansion) through our senses. Knowledge possesses extraordinary speed. Hence it gets immediate contact with the objects which are in distant places. Because of its subtlety, knowledge gets contact with objects inspite of the presence of obstructions.

According to the system of Viśiṣṭādvaita the relation between jñāna and its objects is saṁyoga. In Nyāya-vaiśeṣika system, the relation between jñāna and dravyas is not saṁyoga. Because in their system jñāna is a quality. A quality exists in its substratum by samavāya-sambandha. But, according to siddhāntin jñāna is a substance. Rāmānuja commenting upon the sūtra, 'nābhāva upalabdheḥ' (2-2-28) accepts dravyattva of jñāna and saṁyoga as the relation between jñāna and its objects. That is why Vedānta Deśika enumerated jñāna among dravyas. Hence the relation between jñāna and its object is saṁyoga.

Dharma-bhūta-jñāna illuminates itself and the objects of nature. It is of the nature of substance-attribute¹ (dravya-guṇa). It is compared with prabhā. Prabhā illumines objects and hence is a quality. At the same time as the substratum of colour, it is a substance. Likewise jñāna also expresses essential attributes of the self. In that aspect it is attribute. It is substance because it has contraction and expansion.

THE PROBLEM OF DHĀRĀVĀHIKA-JÑĀNA

Any consciousness of an object that continues for a long time, without any interruption in the middle, is called 'dhārāvāhika-jñāna'. Here the doubt is whether this knowledge is made up of only one knowledge or jñāna or is it the flow of many jñāna-vyaktis. In the former instance, we can give

1. *sambandhaśca saṁyogalakṣaṇaḥ jñānamapihi dravyameva |
prabhā dravyasya pradīpaguṇabhūtasyeva jñānasya api ātmaguṇa-
bhūtasya dravyatvamaviruddham |* Śrībhāṣya, p. 540.

the example of dīpa (lamp) and its prabhā (radiance), where the prabhā reaches the object without any interruption. In the same way jñāna also reaches viśaya or object in a continuous way like a river. In the latter instance, we can have the example of dīpa in which every time wick and oil produce different new flames of the same type.

In *Prajñā-pratitṛṇa*¹, Varadanārāyaṇa Bhaṭṭāraka admits the former position. Some other ācāryas hold the second view, that is, dhārāvāhika-jñāna is of santatirūpa. Just like the wick and oil of the lamp produce different new flames, dhārāvāhika-jñāna carries continuous flow of consciousness. These ācāryas also prove their stand on the statement of Rāmānuja. Criticising the view of jñānātmavādin Rāmānuja says: “*kṣaṇabhāṅginyāssamvidāḥ ātmatvābhyupagame*” (*Śrībhāṣya*, p. 67).

This clearly indicates the produced knowledge must meet its vināśa either in the second moment or in the third moment. As such, it cannot be ekākāra (of the same type). Therefore, it must be santatirūpa. Scriptures also support this view. During the time of meditation, only one object is mediated upon continuously. At that time our knowledge gets detached from other objects. The knowledge of the same object continues for a long time. This continuity of knowledge is called ‘dhārākāra-jñāna’. This itself is called ‘dhyāna’. Therefore it becomes established by the smṛti¹, that dhyāna is of santatirūpa.

1. *dhārāvāhikadhīpanktiḥi svakālīnārthabhāsikā |
medhātirekasadbhāvāt nairapekṣyādapi pramā ||
stambhastambhastambha iti dhīrdhārāvāhikā matā |
dhārāvāhikavijñānamekaṁ jñānam matam hi naḥ ||*

Quoted in *Nyāya-siddhāntajana*, p. 258.

2. *tdrūpapratyaye caikā santatiścānyanispṛhā |
taddhyānam prathamaiśśadhirāṅgairniṣpadyate tathā ||*

Quoted in *Nyāya-siddhāntajana-tilkā*, p. 259.

Deśika also seems to hold the second view. Though the dharma-bhūta-jñāna is eternal, its momentariness (destruction in second or third moment) is due to its momentary contact with the objects. Here he quotes from Bhaṭṭa Parāśara: "saṅkoce'pi karaṇasamprayogāvadhika-sthairyā-bhyupagamāt" (*Nyāya-siddhānta*, p. 259).

Because samyoga is kṣaṇika, dhārāvāhika-jñāna must be of santatirūpa.

STAGE OF PRATYAKṢATVA

The contraction and expansion of jñāna in jīva is due to his karma. The difference in the apparatus of jñāna is the cause of different stages of jñāna like, pratyakṣatva, anumititva etc. When the consciousness expands through the senses, then senses are the apparatus. So this knowledge is called pratyakṣa.

According to Viśiṣṭādvaita philosophy the world is knowable. This system affirms the knowability of reality and also says that we can know the world of objects as they are. In every perceptive knowledge the self perceives the object. For example in the experience 'ghaṭam paśyāmi' (I see a pot), ātman with the help of jñāna perceives the object 'pot'. Here the object 'pot' is not mere sensation as some other systems say. The knowledge presupposes a knowing ātman and the object of thought. The objects in nature are not our mental creation.

In Advaita the antaḥkāraṇa reveals both itself and the objects of the nature. In Viśiṣṭādvaita this work is done by the dharma-bhūta-jñāna of the ātman. The knowledge of objects arises, when dharma-bhūta-jñāna gets contact with the object. Knowledge starts from the ātman and with the help of manas and indriyas reveals the object. Thus this system recognises the reality of jñāna, jñeya and jñātā. In

Advaita the world of object is the *vṛtti* of *avidyā*. But in this system objects have an existence independent of consciousness. In this way the theory of knowledge in this system establishes the reality of the *ātman*, *viśaya* and *jñāna*.

Further we must note another point in this context. *Dharma-bhūta-jñāna* being self illumined, illumines objects. It is also called *saṃvit*, *jñāna*, *matī*, *śeṃsuṣī* and *dhī*. This *dharma-bhūta-jñāna* is not self-realised like the *ātman*. It is only revelatory. It is like a lamp which can only show other things but cannot know itself.

In inference, the *hetu* with *vyāptijñāna* (concomitant variation) becomes the instrument. Therefore the *jñāna* takes the form of *anumititva*. Verbal testimony is produced by *śabda-jñāna*. Then the knowledge takes the form of *śabda*.

These are only three valid sources of knowledge admitted in Viśiṣṭādvaita and all these *pramāṇas* are different states of consciousness alone. But they take different names such as *pratyakṣatva*, *anumānatva* etc., because there is difference in their apparatus. Originally knowledge always will be in the form of *pratyakṣatva*. Knowledge gets different states only when it knows objects other than itself. When *ātman* itself becomes the object then knowledge will be in the form *pratyakṣatva* alone. Deśika in this present work has not discussed the *pramāṇas* in detail because he had discussed them elaborately in his previous work *Nyāya-pariśuddhi*.

The consciousness possesses extreme speed. That is why it gets the contact with the very distant objects within no time. Because it is very subtle, it can reach any object without any disturbance. The relation between *jñāna* and other substances is *saṃyoga*. *Samyoga* can take place only between two substances: "*dravyayoreva saṃyogaḥ*" (*Tarka-saṅgraha-dīpikā*).

Rāmānuja puts it in very clear terms: "*sambandhaśca samyogalakṣaṇaḥ jñānam ca dravyameva*". (Śrībhāṣya, 2-2-27.) This means that the relation between two substances is samyoga and the knowledge is dravya.

SEVERAL OBJECTIONS ANSWERED

Deśika next starts to answer twelve objections raised against consciousness.

Objections

1. What is the proof in the eternality of consciousness?
2. If the eternality of consciousness is admitted, then we have to accept its presence in deep sleep also. As a result of this, there must be no difference between the states of jāgrt (waking state) and suṣupti (deep sleep).
3. What is the proof in the theory, that the consciousness which is inside the body expands towards objects which are in the outside world?
4. Consciousness is like a quality to ātman. It cannot be a substance. In that case, the colour, touch, sound, smell which are qualities, also should be considered as substances.
5. Which is the clear pramāṇa to establish dravyatva of jñāna?
6. In our day-to-day experience, one can observe that sound, etc., does not take part from their substratum. If that is the condition how can the consciousness go out from its substratum, namely ātman?
7. According to siddhāntin consciousness sometimes gets contraction and at some other time it gets expansion. Contraction or expansion are compatible only regarding the objects which are with parts. Jñāna is a partless substance. Therefore it is incorrect to say that jñāna expands or contracts.

8. It is said that consciousness is related by saṁyoga-sambandha, with its objects outside. This is explicable only in objects which are in present time. The same cannot be said of the objects which were in past and will be in future times, because our consciousness cannot get contact with those objects. But it is evident that we are having their knowledge. Therefore, the relation between consciousness and objects cannot be the saṁyoga.

9. The relation between jñāna and its object is only saṁyoga, according to siddhāntin. Just as we know objects through our consciousness, we also know their qualities and actions through the same instrument. Therefore, they also may become the viśayas or objects to our consciousness. But one cannot admit saṁyoga as a relation in between them. Then what is the relation between them?

10. Our consciousness gets saṁyoga with very distant objects such as the sun and the moon, and we get the knowledge of those objects. At the time when our consciousness gets contact with the sun or moon, there is also contact with other things which are between our eyes and moon. Therefore, those other objects also should be known. But why are they not known?

11. In the system of Viśiṣṭādvaita, the consciousness of jīva becomes all-pervasive during the time of liberation. Now the question is, at that stage whether the knowledge gets contact with all objects simultaneously or it gets contact with them one after the other. The former alternative is untenable because we cannot admit saṁyoga simultaneously with objects which are nearer and objects which are afar. In the second alternative also, it is not possible because brahmāṇḍas are innumerable. So the entire future time is insufficient for the dharma-bhūta-jñāna to get contact with the objects therein.

12. The difference between mukta and baddha, lies in the contraction and expansion of their knowledge. In the state of liberation, this difference vanishes and they become equal. The dharma-bhūta-jñāna of baddha also becomes all-pervasive in that state. According to siddhāntin baddha can know the objects through his dharma-bhūta-jñāna only, but not on any account through the consciousness of others. In the state of liberation, dharma-bhūta-jñāna becomes all-pervasive. In the same way, there are innumerable fully expanded dharma-bhūta-jñānas of innumerable muktas. Each of them is having contact with another. It cannot be clearly stated which dharma-bhūta-jñāna belongs to whom. So there should not be any order in dharma-bhūta-jñāna of jīva during the state of liberation.

ANSWERS

All these twelve objections raised against consciousness may be answered in the following way.

First objection answered

The eternity of jñāna is known by scriptures. The great ācārya Yāmuna in his *Ātmasiddhi* has proved the eternity of jñāna on the ground that ātman is eternal, which in turn is based on Śruti, “*na vijñāturvijñāterviparilopo vidyate, na hi draṣṭurdrṣṭerviparilopo vidyate, avināśitvāt*!” (*Bṛhadāraṇyaka*, 6-3-30) which declares that the ātman and its knowledge are eternal. The great sage Śaunaka gives the analogy of gem¹. When a gem is washed, it shines with natural splendour. Then the splendour is not newly created.

1. *yathā na kriyate jyotsnā malaprakṣālanānmaṇeḥ |*
doṣaprahānān na jñānam ātmanaḥ kriyate tathā ||
yathā heyaguṇadhvaṃsādavabodhadayo guṇāḥ |
prakāśyante na janyante nitya evātmano hi te ||

Only the obstruction is removed. One cannot create it, but one can make it to manifest. In the same way, the gem, namely ātman, when cleaned by śāstras, shines with natural effulgence. Therefore the jñāna of ātman is eternal.

Sūtrakāra concretises the above position in the sūtras '*jno'ta eva*' (2-3-19) and "*yavadātmabhavitvāca na doṣastad-darśanāt*" (2-3-30.)

In the sūtra '*jno'ta eva*' the sūtrakāra says that the Śruti '*jānātyevāyam puruṣaḥ*' (*Bṛhadāraṇyaka*, 6-3-30) declares that ātman possesses jñāna and he is also of the nature of jñāna. There are many attributes in the ātman. Among them the jñāna is important. That is why it is called svarūpa-nirūpaka. This knowledge differentiates ātman from other things.

During the time of deep sleep knowledge is in the state of contraction. But when the ātman is awake this knowledge gets expansion. Therefore he perceives objects. Youth, old age etc., which are unmanifested during childhood, become manifested in youth and old age respectively. Likewise knowledge also which is in the state of contraction in suṣupti, becomes expanded in the state of waking. But here one may ask, if the perception and non-perception of objects is due to expansion and contraction of knowledge, then what purpose is served by sense organs like cakṣus and ear etc.? This question may be answered in this way. The indriyas are helpful in having the perception of objects. Knowledge should get contact with external objects. In getting that contact, the indriyas are helpful. Deśika's contention in quoting the sūtrakāra is to support his view that pratyakṣa and other knowledge are expansion of dharma-bhūta-jñāna. Therefore the eternality of consciousness becomes established beyond doubt.

Second objection answered

Prakṛti is composed of triguṇas, namely, sattva, rajas and tamas. Ātman is captured in prakṛti. So, when the quality of sattva becomes predominant in him, then the knowledge gets manifestation. This state is called 'jāgṛdavasthā'. If the quality of tamas becomes predominant in ātman, the consciousness gets contraction in ātman. We call this state by the name 'suṣupti'. In this state, consciousness is obstructed, but not destroyed. It is there in ātman. Therefore, the presence of consciousness in ātman during the state of suṣupti cannot be denied. It only gets manifested in the waking state, just as youth which is latent in childhood becomes manifested in young age. Sūtrakāra brings out this idea in the aphorism "*pumstvādivatvasya satobhivyaaktiyogāt*" (*Brahmasūtra*, 3-3-31).

Therefore, it may be concluded that when the buddhi or consciousness gets expansion, it is called waking state. The state in which it is contracted is called sleeping state or the state of suṣupti.

Third objection answered

During the time when our hands and feet get the contact with the external objects, our sense of touch also gets the contact with those objects. In the same way, consciousness also comes out of the body with indriyas and gets contact with such and such objects. Yāmuna is of the same opinion. Says Deśika: "*ata indriyeṇa saha caitanyamapi nissṛtya tenārthena sannikṛṣyate hastādineva tvagindriyam*". (*Nyāya-siddhāntajana*, p. 262).

Deśika proves this fact on the basis of Śruti also "*tadaḥśaraṁ tat saviturvareṇyaṁ prajñā ca tasmāt prasṛtā purāṇī*" (*Śvetāśvataropaniṣad*). The jñāna of cetana expands at the behest of Paramātmā who is seated in our heart.

Bhagavadgītā tells in clear terms knowledge gets expansion. “*indriyāṇāṃ hi caratām yanmano’nu vidhīyate | tadasyaharatiprajñāṃ vāyurnāvamivambhasi*” (2-67)—this śloka says, the mind or jñāna which work in obedience to the roving indriyas, carries away wisdom, as a stormy gale carries away a ship in water. *Manusmṛti* endorses this theory of expansion of knowledge. Manu says, “*indriyāṇāṃ hi sarveṣāṃ yadyekam kṣaratīndriyam | tenāsyā kṣarati prajñā dṛteḥ pādādivodakam* ||” (2,99). Among indriyas, even if one indriya becomes un-controllable, then other indriyas also loose their strength. With the indriya, which has become uncontrollable, the knowledge also leaks as water leaks from the vessel of leather which has a hole. Deśika quoting this śloka says that this smṛti also establishes the movement of knowledge through our sense organs.

Therefore, on the basis of logic, Śruti and smṛti, one should admit that the consciousness which is inside the body comes out and gets contact with the object outside.

Fourth objection answered

This argument is rejected in the following way. The radiance of a gem or a lamp is considered to be substance though it is the quality of its substratum. But on the same basis we cannot consider qualities like colour, taste, etc., as substances, because they are not the locus of avasthā (states) without which they cannot be called as dravyas. “*avasthā-śrayatvaṃ dravyatvaṃ*” (*Tattvamuktā-kalāpa*, p. 12).

But on the other hand, the consciousness which is in ātman, is a substance, as it fulfills the condition of dravya-lakṣaṇa. Rāmānuja gives the same example, namely, prabhā and prabhāvat in his bhāṣya¹.

1. *prabhā dravyasya dīpaḥ śrayatvabhūtasyeva jñānasyāpi ātmagūṇa-
bhūtasya dravyatvamaviruddham* | Śrībhāṣya, p 540.

Deśika says that we do not accept guṇas like Naiyāyikas. According to us, the guṇa is that which is the ādheya (dependent) by the relation of 'apṛthak-siddhi'. This definition of guṇa may also cover the guṇas of Naiyāyika. In that way, rūpa, prabhā and jñāna become qualities. But because there is avasthāśrayatva in jñāna and prabhā, we have to include them in the group of substances. Therefore, according to Viśiṣṭādvaita, there is some speciality in guṇas. There are some dravyātmakaguṇas¹ (guṇa as well as dravya) like jñāna and prabhā, etc., and kevala (mere guṇas) like sattva, rajas and tamas.

Therefore, jñāna is a dravya like prabhā.

Fifth objection answered

The clear pramāṇa to establish dravyatva of jñāna is inference and that inference is of the following form:

jñānam	(subject)
dravyam	(probandom)
avasthāvattvāt	(reason)
yathā prabhā	(example)

Varadaviṣṇumiśra² establishes dravyatva of jñāna with the help of another anumāna.

jñānam	(subject)
dravyam	(probandom)
samyoga adṛṣṭānyatvesati bhāvanākāraṇatvāt	(reason)
ātmavat	(example)

1. *evam ca guṇeṣu kaścidviśeṣaḥ | dravyātmakaguṇaḥ kevala-guṇaśceti | pūrve jñānādayaḥ | uttare sattva-rajastamaḥprabhṛtayo vakṣyante |* Nyāya-siddhāntajana, p. 263.

2. *Nyāya-siddhāntajana*, p. 265.

Ātman is different from both saṁyoga and adrṣṭa and he is also the cause of saṁskāra. Therefore ātman is dravya. In the same way dharma-bhūta-jñāna also being different from adrṣṭa and saṁyoga causes the saṁskāra. Therefore dharma-bhūta-jñāna is also dravya.

According to a Nyāya maxim "*hetukoṭipraviṣṭānām dalānām vyabhicāra vāraṇatayaiva sārthakyaṁ*", the parts (dala) included in the body of reason (hetu) should eliminate the fallacy of vyabhicāra. In the above anumāna there are two parts in the body of reason viz., saṁyoga-adrṣṭa-anything and saṁskāra-kāraṇatva. If the former part is not included in the body of reason then it commits the fallacy of overlapping in ātma-manassasāṁyoga. Because ātma-manassasāṁyoga is also saṁskāra-kāraṇa and thus it also should be called as dravya. If the later part is not included in the body of reason, then the same fallacy will be committed in colour, taste etc. Because they are also different from saṁyoga and adrṣṭa. But there is no saṁskāra-kāraṇatva and hence both parts are necessary.

Sixth objection answered

The sixth objection can be easily met with by the example, namely prabhā and prabhāvat, which is already explained. The above objection may also be answered in another way. The Viśiṣṭādvaitin also does not admit that the jñāna is completely separate from its substratum. Ācārya Yāmuna replying to the same objection, gives the same answer. Further Yāmuna says¹, if once the jñāna gets apart from the ātman, it cannot reunite with it. Dharma-bhūta-jñāna of ātman gets contact with the outer world through

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1. *ātmaprahāṇānabhyupagamāt avihāyaivātmānam itastataścetanā indriyādīdūārā nissarati, vicchināyāśca tasyāḥ sandhānā-sambhavaḥ śāstra evoktaḥ*!

Quoted in *Nyāya-siddhāntajana*, p. 265.

the vyāptijñāna and śabdajñāna. For this purpose it need not get separated from its substratum. The same position is maintained by Nāthamuni also.

Therefore, jñāna, without departing from its substratum, can get the contact with the outer world.

Seventh objection answered

Deśika answers¹ this objection in this way. When the serpent coils its body, it is contracted and while it stretches its body, it becomes expanded. The same thing can be said of jñāna also. Another point is that the above said rule cannot be applied everywhere. This rule will not apply to jñāna which is partless and a very subtle substance. On the other hand if expansion and contraction are not admitted to jñāna because of its partlessness, then it becomes impossible to apply the same for prabhā also because prabhā also is partless like jñāna. Because of the extraordinary subtlety, the knowledge gets extreme contraction even in the body of an ant. Therefore one need not entertain the doubt as how the dharma-bhūta-jñāna of an ant which is very small can get the contact with the whole universe at the time of liberation. If knowledge had parts, then the objection would have become valid. Like the prabhās of innumerable lamps get contraction in a very limited place because of their partlessness, jñāna also can get the extreme contraction in the small bodies like ant, mosquito etc. That is why Nāthamuni defined dharma-bhūta-jñāna as a dravya which possesses extreme atyantavegitva (speed) and atyanta-sūkṣmatā (subtlety).

Eighth objection answered

Nyāya thinkers say the objects of the past and future

1. *saptamasya ahikuṇḍaladrṣṭāntena nirāsaḥ* |

are known by viṣaya-viṣayī-bhāva relation. The same thing can be said in this case also.

In the objects of past and future, though there is no vartamānatva at present, in the case of an object of past time it was there, and in the case of the objects of the future, it is latent there. Therefore there is no inconsistency in asserting the relation of samyoga between jñāna and its objects.

Ninth objection answered

Siddhāntin answers that we too do not admit samyoga to be the relation between jñāna and guṇas. The relation between them is 'samyuktāśritatva'. The substance becomes samyukta with consciousness. The qualities and generality of substance are related to consciousness through the relation of samyuktāśritatva. So there is no difficulty in admitting samyoga as a relation between substance and consciousness. Rāmamiśra gives the same explanation in *Ṣaḍartha-saṅgraha*—"samyogastadarheṣu viṣayatvākāraḥ anarheṣu tatas-tadanvayiṣu" (Quoted in *Nyāya-siddhāntjana*, p. 267).

The contention of Rāmamiśra is this. According to Viśiṣṭādvaita jñāna is dravya. There is no inconsistency in accepting samyoga in between dravyas. The viṣayatva that is produced in the experienced object is of the form of the object itself. But guṇa(attributes), kriyā (action) and sāmānya (similarity) are related with consciousness through the relation of samyoga. Even the nyāya-vaiśeṣika system accepts samyukta samavāya to related consciousness with the guṇas, kriyā and jāti which are called dravyāśritas in their system. In Viśiṣṭādvaita the relation of samyogāśritatva is substituted for samyuktasamaveta relation of Nyāya-vaiśeṣika system.

Tenth objection answered

This objection can be warded off with the example of

'netra-raśmi' or the rays of the eyes. No doubt, our consciousness gets contact with the objects that are in between consciousness and the distant objects. Because of the lack of sufficient causes they are not known as in the case of atoms which are in between them.

Eleventh objection answered

In day-to-day experience, one has observed the rays of the eyes, sun and lightening etc., moving with unimaginable speed. If the movement of such inert matter, such as they, is so powerful, what wonder is there if one admits that knowledge can pervade the entire universe within a second? In fact, the knowledge possesses the highest limit of speed. Therefore there cannot be any objection regarding its speed.

Deśika says¹ that the eleventh objection is not tenable. The power of dharma-bhūta-jñāna is of special nature. The Lord has willed dharma-bhūta-jñāna to possess that power. As it is already explained, that rays of eyes and the rays of sun possess unimaginable speed and power. Hence it is in no way incompatible to accept that at the time of liberation, the dharma-bhūta-jñāna pervades the entire universe within two or three moments or simultaneously.

Twelfth objection answered

No doubt, the relation that exists between one dharma-bhūta-jñāna and another is samyoga, but the relation between dharma-bhūta-jñāna and its locus is the aprthaksiddha-sambandha, (inseparable relation). Dharma-bhūta-jñāna is ādheya of ātman by the same relation. One's dharma-bhūta-jñāna cannot become an ādheya to another by this relation

1. *ekādaśe vegātīśayaḥ, śaktiviśeṣaḥ, īśvarasaṅkalpo vā, prati-vaktāraḥ | iṣṭaṁ ca vicitravegitvaṁ nāyanatapanādi mahasām | tacca kṣāsthāprāptamyugapat, tricaturakṣaṇena vā, viśvamāskan-date iti viśvasiḥ |*
Nyāya-siddhāntajana, p. 270.

(apṛthaksiddha-sambandha). Therefore, there can be no disorderliness regarding dharma-bhūta-jñāna of jīva at the time of liberation.

In the philosophy of Viśiṣṭādvaita dharma-bhūta-jñāna gets all-pervasive nature at the time of liberation. Because of its all-pervasive nature, the dharma-bhūta-jñāna does not move. But the jīva moves. There is no inconsistency in admitting interrelation between these two inter-related objects. No doubt jīva moves but dharma-bhūta-jñāna does not. The Nyāya-vaiśeṣikas, the Sāṅkhyas and the Mīmāṃsakas accept ātman as vibhu. In addition to this they admit the plurality of souls. Because ātman is vibhu in their respective systems it does not move, but the body and senses of those ātman move in the direction where their respective ātman is present. Yet there is no confusion regarding which body belongs to which ātman. In the same way there is no confusion regarding the relation of dharma-bhūta-jñāna of muktātman also.

Thus Viśiṣṭādvaita has answered several objections raised against the nature and power of dharma-bhūta-jñāna. Deśika has established its special nature and power in Viśiṣṭādvaita, on the basis of Śruti, smṛti, reason and writings of great ācāryas like Yāmuna, Rāmānuja, Rāmamiśra and others.

DIFFERENT MODES OF DHARMA-BHŪTA-JÑĀNA

In the system of Viśiṣṭādvaita, sukhatva, duḥkhatva, dveṣatva are not different from consciousness.¹ There is no valid evidence to prove the Naiyāyika theory that consciousness causes sukha or duḥkha. Therefore, consciousness itself takes the form of sukhatva, duḥkhatva, icchātva, dveṣatva

1. *buddhireva upādhibhedāt sukhaduḥkhecchādveṣaprayatnarūpā* |

Nyāya-siddhānta, p. 270.

and prayatnatva due to different adjuncts. Here one may argue that the sukha is not one of the states of consciousness, because the absence of duḥkha itself is sukha and vice versa. Therefore sukha and duḥkha are not positive, but they are negative. Jñāna is a positive entity. How can there be an identity between bhāva-padārtha and the abhāva-padārtha? This objection may be met with in the following way. Nyāya maxim says that "*abhāvajñānam prati pratiyogi jñānasya kāraṇatvam*". According to it, the knowledge of correlative substance is necessary to cognise the negation. If the sukha is of the nature of duḥkha-abhāva, then the knowledge of duḥkha is necessary to know sukha and vice-versa. Thus it commits the fallacy of 'anyonyāśraya'. Another point is, apart from sukha and duḥkha state, we experience madhyama-avasthā which is neither sukha nor duḥkha. If both of them were of the negative nature, then either of them must be present. But we experience madhyama-avasthā. So sukha and duḥkha are bhāva-padārthas (positive entity) and are nothing but the different states of jñāna¹ itself.

Generally whenever something is experienced, it is known in the form that 'I know this'. For example when a pot is known the form of knowledge is 'I know the pot'. But if sukha and duḥkha are the modes of the knowledge itself, then the usages like 'aham sukhi', 'aham duḥkhi', 'aham icchāmi', 'aham yate' etc., (Here different roots are used) become inconsistent and the usage must have been 'aham jānāmi' (I know) in every instance. But this objection may be met in the following way. The experience of memory is expressed in the form 'aham smarāmi' (I remember), though

1. *mithassamśrayadhlbādhamadhyāvasthopalambhanaiḥ |
na syātparasparābhāvamātratā sukhaduḥkhaayoḥ ||*

Nyāya-siddhāntjana, p. 257.

tatsiddham sukhaduḥkhaḍayo buddhiviśeṣa iti |

Nyāya-siddhāntjana, p. 275

the memory is the form of consciousness it is expressed with the help of different root viz., 'smṛ' (to remember) and the root 'jñā' (to know) will not be used. For that reason alone jñāna-svarūpatva cannot be denied to smaraṇa. In the same way sukha and duḥkha also are the modes of consciousness. In all these experiences (aham sukhi, aham duḥkhi etc.) different roots are used to indicate the different modes of the jñāna. Though sukha and duḥkha are opposed to each other, they become the different states of jñāna in different times like youth, old age etc., which appear in the same body in different times. Even bhakti also is the different state of consciousness. That is why Rāmānuja in his celebrated *Śrībhāṣya*, states 'śemuṣī bhaktirūpā.' 'Let the God bless me with bhakti which is the different state of jñāna'.

ICCHĀ (*Desire*) PRAYATNA (*Effort*) ETC., OF ĪŚVARA ARE ALSO THE DIFFERENT FORMS OF HIS DHARMA-BHŪTA-JÑĀNA

Just as the dharma-bhūta-jñāna of the individual self takes different forms, the dharma-bhūta-jñāna of Lord also takes the form of icchātva sukhatva, prayatnatva, etc. Here one may argue, how is it compatible to accept vikāritva or change in dharma-bhūta-jñāna of Īśvara who is stated to be eternal by scriptures? This argument is not tenable because even the attributive knowledge of Īśvara is subjected to vikāritva (change due to adjunct kārya-sāmagri-samyoga). But by nature it has no vikāra. According to some other thinkers¹, there is also anityajñāna in Īśvara and it takes the form of icchātva, sukhatva, prayatnatva, etc.,

1. Varadaviṣṇuśāstra is quoted as—

"Īśvarajñānasyānityasya sarva-viṣayanityajñānagrhītagrāhitvāt
asyāpi indriyajatvāt iti ca"

ADRṢṬA IS THE PRĪTI (LOVE) OR APRĪTI
(ANGER OR AVERSION) OF ĪŚVARA

The above enquiry makes it clear that the consciousness or dharma-bhūta-jñāna of Īśvara takes the form of icchātva, prayatnatva, etc. In the same way, adrṣṭa which is produced by pāpa and puṇya is also the prīti (love) and aprīti (aversion) of the Lord. They (prīti and aprīti) are also the states of jñāna, but not separate entities. But in that case, one may have a doubt that adrṣṭa which was explained as the form of love and aversion of Īśvara, may be in His consciousness. How can it be in jīva? Because, if no jīva is the locus of adrṣṭa, it becomes impossible to judge who is a sinner and who is not. Thus it leads to chaos. This doubt is cleared in this way. Though adrṣṭa is in Īśvara by the relation of 'āśrayatā', it is in the jīva by the relation 'viṣayatā'. An individual self who commits pāpa and puṇya which are the causes of adrṣṭa, would become the object of prīti and aprīti of the Lord. Adrṣṭa is known by scriptures alone. The prīti-rūpatva and aprīti-rūpatva of adrṣṭa also is known from scriptures. Here Deśika quotes from Dramidācārya: "*phalasambibhatsayā karmabhirātmānam pipriṣanti*" (Quoted in *Nyāya-siddhāñjana*, p. 283.)

It means¹ that the Lord is pleased by the sacrifice and gift given to the poor etc., and thus pleased He blesses his devotees with desired rewards. By this it becomes evident that the adrṣṭa is the prīti of the Lord.

Sūtrakāra² also is of the same opinion. In the sūtra '*phalamata upapatteḥ*' (*Brahmasūtra* 3-2-38.) he says that the Lord Nārāyaṇa alone gets pleased even though the sacrifices and other worships are offered to different devatās,

1. Also see *bhāṣya*: "*vyatirekānavasthitescānapekṣatvāt*".

Brahmasūtra, 2-2-4.

2. *śrutattvācca* |

Brahmsūtra, 1-1-12.

viz., Agni, Indra, Vāyu etc. In all these places the Lord Nārāyaṇa alone gets satisfied by the offered sacrifice and he alone grants the reward of that sacrifice, being the antaryāmin in such and such devatas. This fact becomes clear from the bhāṣya of Rāmānuja also where he quotes Dramiḍācārya, to explain the above truth. In Vedas, it is said that the satisfied devatā (deity) like Indra and Agni will bless the devotee with all prosperity. The Śruti says “*tr̥pta evainamindraḥ prajayā paśubhiḥ tarpayati*”, (*Yajus-samhitā*, 2-5-4-3)—Indra being worshiped blesses his devotee with ‘prajā’ and ‘paśu’. Because adṛṣṭa is the prīti or aprīti of Īśvara. Deśika says, here also the antrayāmin, paramapuruṣa alone will get satisfied and he alone bestows the devotee with prajā and paśu. The Lord himself says: “*aham hi sarvayajñānām bhoktā ca prabhureva ca*!” (*Gītā*, 9-24).

‘I am the bhoktā (enjoyer) and svāmi (Lord) of all the sacrifices’. Like prīti, aprīti also is the state of consciousness of the Lord. Aprīti is kopa. But it is not a defect in him because kopa (anger) without reason is a defect. Otherwise, punishing the culprit also should be considered as a demerit. Lord becomes angry with those who violate the rules of the śāstra¹. The Lord calls him ‘ajñāchedi and drohi’. Such persons are punished by the Lord. That is why in the *Rāmāyaṇa*, the poet Vālmīki enumerating the auspicious qualities of Śrī Rāma states “*kālāgni sadṛśaḥ krodhe*” (1-18)—he was fearsome as kālāgni in anger. This anger is not asthāna-kopa. Therefore Īśvara-kopa is considered as an auspicious quality in Him. Therefore the import of the stanza “*aham hi sarvayajñānām....*” (*Gītā*, 9-24) is, like prīti, aprīti also is the state of knowledge of the paramapuruṣa. Deśika says further that the Lord punishes the sinners out of

1. *śrutissmṛtirmamaivājñā yastāmullaṅgya vartate*

ajñāchedi mama drohi madbhakto’pi na vaiṣṇavaḥ ||

Mahābhārata-aśvamedhika, 6-31.

compassion. That punishment of sinner is undertaken by God to purify him¹. Therefore anugraha and nigrāha are the avasthās of the dharma-bhūta-jñāna of the Lord.

FIXED CONDITIONS LIKE RATI, HĀSA, ETC., OF RHETORICIANS ARE ALSO THE MODES OF JÑĀNA

The sthāyībhāvas like rati, hāsa, śoka, krodha, utsāha, are also the different states of jñāna. In the same way, nirveda and sañcārābhāvas like nirveda, glāni, śankā, asūya, mada, ālasya, dainya, cintā, moha, smṛti, harṣa etc., are also the different states of jñāna. According to some thinkers, some of them are the dharmas of the body and some others are the dharmas of manas. Among them, supti, if it means dream, then, it is the avasthā of jñāna. If it means deep sleep, then it is the state of jñāna in which the expansion of jñāna is completely restricted. Nidrā is a state in which the manas is perturbed by cintā, ālasya and kaśmala and gets contraction or it may be the state in which the jñāna gets complete contraction and causes suṣupti. That is why the rhetoricians define supti as “*suptirnidrāsamudrekaḥ*!” (*Tattva-śuddhi*, p. 702), the state in which nidrā is increased.

Every philosopher explains the nature of jñāna according to his own system. Deśika says that all of them do not follow the scriptures. Scripture and logic which is not destructive in nature, are the two guide-lights to arrive at the truth. Manu the great law-giver said, “*ārṣaṁ dharmopadeśaṁ ca vedāśāstrā'virodhinā | yastarkeṇānusandhatte sa dharmam veda netaraḥ ||*” (*Manusmṛti*, 12-106)—‘the philosopher should find out the truth of the universe with the help of tarka (reasoning), which in no-way goes against the Śruti. Only such great people understand the heart of śāstras.

1. *nidhāya hṛdaye daye nihatarakṣitānām hitam |*

Deśika strictly follows Rāmānuja. He never tolerates the slightest difference between his conclusions and the writings of Rāmānuja. Even where there are certain apparent contradictions, they are solved in a very significant manner. In addition to this, he also contributes his own conclusions which are based upon scriptures, writings of great ācāryas, logic and experience. Thus buddhi has received a very handsome treatment at the hands of Vedānta Deśika. He compares buddhi to goddess Lakṣmī. This jñānalakṣmī is being served by the *Śrīsūktis* (auspicious statements) of Rāmānuja and bestows the desired objects to devotees. She has climbed the peak of Vedānta mountain and there she is enjoying the unbounded bliss ensued by the company of the Lord Dāmodara. Jñānalakṣmī, who is bhakti-svarūpiṇī and nityānanda-savrūpiṇī, come to our heart to lead us towards Vāsudeva.



Chapter VII

ADRAVYA

DEFINITION AND DIVISION

The entire world of prameya is grouped into two parts, namely, dravya and adravya¹. So far we have seen six dravyas, according to Viśiṣṭādvaita. In śāstras there is a maxim—“*ekasambandhijñānam aparasambandhismārakam*” which says related things remind each other. The study of dravya now reminds us of adravyas. So the study of adravya is not out of context.

The category which is devoid of saṁyoga is called adravya—“saṁyogarahitamadravyam”. Saṁyoga is said to exist only between one dravya and another dravya. The six substances which were discussed in the previous chapters may get related by saṁyoga relation. Śabda and sparśa which are adravyas are not related with anything by the relation of saṁyoga.

Adravyas are ten in number. They are sattva, rajas, tamas, śabda, sparśa, rūpa, rasa, gandha, saṁyoga and śakti. The avasthās which come intermittently in dravyas are included among the enumerated adravyas. Among these accepted adravyas the other adravyas, or the guṇas of Naiyāyika namely parimāṇa (weight), sneha (visidity), dravatva (fluidity), saṁskāra (tendency) and saṅkhyā (number) etc., are included “*evamvidheṣveva adravyeṣu gurutvadravatva....vaiśiṣṭyādīnām yathāsambhavamantarbhāvaḥ*” (Nyāya-siddhāñjana, p. 289).

1. *dravyādravyaprabhedānmitamubhayavidham* |

Among them, *sattva* is the cause of happiness, and lightness. It is *atīndriya* (beyond the perception of senses), and it is different from *śakti* (potency). *Sattva* is of two types. They are *śuddha-sattva* and *aśuddha sattva*. *Sattva* which is not tainted by *rajas* and *tamas* is called *śuddha-sattva*, which is in *nitya-vibhūti*. *Sattva* with *rajas* and *tamas* is called '*aśuddha sattva*' or '*miśra-sattva*' which is '*mūla-prakṛti*'¹

The *adravya* which causes covetousness and motion is called *rajas*². It is *atīndriya* and different from *śakti*. "*lobhapravṛtyādīnidānam...*" (*Nyāya-siddhāñjana*, p. 289.)

The *adravya* which causes delusion and carelessness is *tamas*³. It is also *atīndriya* and *śaktibhinna*. "*pramāda-mohādinidānam*" (*Nyāya-siddhāñjana*, p. 289.)

According to the philosophy of Viśiṣṭādvaita, all these *triṣṇas* are pervading the entire objects which are the transformation of *prakṛti*. In the transformed object they are *anitya* and they are *nityas* in *prakṛti* (*triṣṇādravya*). Among them *rajo-guṇa* causes '*sṛṣṭi*', *ta-mo-guṇa* causes '*pralaya*' and *sattva-guṇa* causes '*sthiti*'. In all these actions, the will of the Lord becomes an additional cause.

Even though all the *guṇas* of *prakṛti* are to be found with every embodied soul, yet they do not stand in the same proportion in all cases. In the body of a great saint *sattva-guṇa* will be predominant while *tamas* will dominate the body of a sinner. All the three *guṇas* exist in association with the

1. *tatra prakāśasukhalāghavādinidānamatīndriyam śaktyatirikta-madravyam sattvam* | *Nyāya-siddhāñjana*, p. 289.

2. *lobhapravṛttirārambhaḥ karmaṇāmasamassprhā* | *rajasyetāni jāyante vivṛddhe bhāratarābha* || *Gītā*, 14-12.

3. *aprakāśo'pravṛttiśca pramādo moha eva ca* | *tamasyetāni jāyante vivṛddhe kurunandana* || *Gītā*, 14-13.

sinner as well as the saint. Therefore all guṇas possess the binding character.

Deśika with all these above definitions of triguṇas makes it clear that the ātman is bound by the three guṇas of prakṛti. As already studied in the chapter on jīva, the individual self, is immaterial, immutable and therefore immortal. The body as we all know is material. This soul is bound by three guṇas of prakṛti because of its relation with the body.

Here it is to be noted that all the guṇas have a binding tendency in the explained way. Even the sattvagūṇa has this characteristic. In our moral life the individual has to progress from the tamas to rajas and from there to the sāttvika state. Unlike rajas and tamas, the sattvagūṇa gives rise to sukha or happiness and it increases the wisdom. Yet the sattvagūṇa which is in prakṛti-maṇḍala is not pure and is mixed with rajogūṇa and tamogūṇa and as such instigates the ātman to enjoy more and more 'sukha' of this world and the other world. Enchanted by this ephemeral happiness, the jīvātman indulges in performing such meritorious deeds which brings him heavenly happiness. Running after this mirage of happiness jīvātman forgets ātmāvalokana and the bliss of servitude of the Lord. Thus sattvagūṇa binds jīvātman and makes him to stay permanently in saṁsāra-maṇḍala. That is why the philosophy of Vedānta asks the 'mumukṣu' to rise above all the three guṇas of prakṛti.

But Śaṅkarācārya explains the binding character of sattvagūṇa in a different way. In the system of Advaita, everything belongs to māyā. Therefore when any one feels happiness, it is due to māyā but not due to sattvagūṇa.

As sattvagūṇa causes sukha, rajogūṇa causes ambition and avarice, greed and selfish attachment. Rajogūṇa influences them to increase. The predominance of rajas makes

the ātman to become aggressive. When we are in the grip of desire, we cannot live peacefully. Desire is the soul of rajas. It creates the bondage of karma. That is why Deśika defines it as the promoter of lobha or greediness.

Tamogūṇa promotes pramāda (carelessness). It makes us to mistake what is not true for what is true. It influences the ātman to get indulged in sensual pleasure. No one who is under the influence of tamogūṇa can understand the true nature of things. Tamogūṇa creates three bonds namely pramāda, ālasya and nidrā. Pramāda is heedlessness, ālasya is laziness which refers to laziness of both mind and body. Nidrā is sleep—too much sleepiness—which makes the mind dull and incapable of steady efforts.

Thus according to the definition given by Vedānta Deśika, the sattvagūṇa binds one with the bond of happiness and knowledge. Rajogūṇa gives rise to a life of aggressive achievement. Tamogūṇa causes the life of ignorance and lack of attention to one's duties and responsibilities.

All these trigūṇas are pervading the entire prakṛti and its subsequent changes. They stay permanently in prakṛti.

In the unmanifested condition of the universe, all these three guṇas remain in sāmyāvasthā or in the state of equanimity. In the state of creation and preservation, it is perturbed and becomes uneven. Among them, the rajogūṇa and tamogūṇa cause creation and dissolution respectively and sattvagūṇa becomes the cause of preservation. According to the will of Īśvara, evenness or unevenness in prakṛti takes place.

Rāmānuja in Śrībhāṣya has established¹ adravyatva of

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1. *yataḥ sattvādayo dravyadharmāḥ, na tu dravyasvarūpam |
sattvādayo hi pṛthivyādigatā-laghutvaparakāśādi-hetubhūtāḥ,
tatsvabhāvaviśeṣa eva....guṇā ityeva ca sattvādīnām prasiddhiḥ ||*

Śrībhāṣya, p. 509.

these guṇas. Rāmānuja examining the position of Sāṅkhya says that sattva, rajas and tamas are not dravyas. They are the dharma of dravyas. These are known by the name guṇas. Hence they are adravyas.

Rāmānuja clearly states that sattva, rajas and tamas are guṇas of dravyas¹. Like colour, these guṇas also are not the material cause for anything. The word 'ca' in the sūtra "*racanānupapatteṣca nānumānam || pravṛtteṣca ||*" (*Brahmasūtra* 2-2-1, 2.), explains that they are the attributes of dravya.

According to Varadaviṣṇumīśra, sattva, rajas and tamas belong to dravya group. "*dravyam ṣaḍvimsatividham, sattvarajastamāmsi* (Quoted in *Nyāya-siddhāñjana*, p. 291)

But Deśika disagrees with this view and says² that the view held by Varadaviṣṇumīśra is against bhāṣya and the statement of *Vedānta-dīpa*³. Therefore sattva, rajas and tamas are adravyas.

ŚABDA

The adravya that is grasped by our śrotrendriya is called 'śabda'. For nityas and muktas, there is no necessity of śrotrendriya because they can know everything by their dharma-bhūta-jñāna. Further there is no necessity of indriyas for them as they can grasp everything through any indriya. They can hear without śrotra. But it is not the same with saṁsāricetana because his dharma-bhūta-jñāna is not fully expanded.

1. *cakārātsattvādīnām dravyaguṇatvena śauklyāderiva upādāna-kāraṇatuḥsambhavam, samuccinoti |* *Vedānta-dīpa*, p. 47.

2. *tatsaṅkhyādhikaraṇa sūtrabhāṣyādi-virodhācca-asāṅgatam |*
Nyāya-siddhāñjana, p. 291.

3. *sattvādayo hi kāryagatalāghavādihetubhūtaḥ kāraṇabhūtaḥ prthivyādigatastatsvabhāvaviśeṣaḥ |* *Vedānta-dīpa*, p. 47.

According to Nyāya-vaiśeṣika school, śabda is a quality of ākāśa. “*śabdoguṇo bhūtvākāśasyādhigame liṅgam*” (*Prāśastapāda-bhāṣyam*, p. 7.)

But the school of Vedānta and Sāṅkya hold the view that śabda is in pañcabhūtas¹. Therefore it is defined² as an adṛavya which is grasped by śrotrendriya and which exists in all the five bhūtas. There is no difference of opinion in accepting śabda in ākāśa. When the wind blows with speed, the man who is sitting inside the house says that this is the sound of vāyu. By this perception one can know that vāyu is the substratum of śabda. When the fire is burning then we hear sounds like ‘ccha’. This proves the existence of śabda in ‘agni’. When the river flows with full-swing one can experience the sound of flowing water. This shows that ‘jala’ possesses śabda. The melodious sound produced in musical instruments, the crying of animals including man establish the earth as the substratum of śabda. Therefore the definition given by Deśika to ‘śabda’ as ‘pañcabhūtavṛtti’ is in accordance with experience.

Śabda is of two kinds. One is varṇātmaka (vocal sound) and another is avaraṇātmaka (non vocal sound). In ‘a’kāra there is ‘a’kāratva. Every alphabet has got its own dharma. In addition to this, it has the negation of the dharmas which exist in other alphabets. These varṇas manifest in God and human beings through their palates. The problem of validity or invalidity, permanency or impermanency, vācakatva or sphoṭatva is discussed regarding varṇātmaka-śabda. Varṇātmaka-śabda is of fifty-one types. It includes ‘kṣa’kāra also. If ‘la’kāra and ‘ḷa’kāra are held identical, then there are only fifty varṇas. In olden times alphabets were being

1. *ādyādyasya guṇam tveṣāmaṇvāpnoti paraḥ paraḥ |
yo yo yavatitaścaīṣām sa sa tāvadguṇassmṛtaḥ ||*

2. *śabdo asmadādiśrotragrāhyaḥ pañcabhūtavṛtti |*

practised on sand. This is called 'Māṭṛkāpāṭha'. In that system 'la'kāra and 'ḷa'kāra are held identical. There are sixteen vowels. The hr̥ṣva forms of vowels 'ए' and 'ओ' are included in varṇamāla in languages like Tamil, Telugu and Kannada, but in Sanskrit they are excluded from varṇamāla because both of them do not carry any specific meaning.

According to Śruti "*sahasrākṣare parama vyoman*" (Quoted in *Nyāya-siddhāñjana-ṭīkā*, p. 292.) it is known that there are one thousand varṇas, in nitya.vibhūti; Deśika says that they may be aprākṛtavarṇas or the same fifty-one varṇas are twisted in one thousand ways.

In avarṇātmaka-śabda, there are negation of fifty-one dharmas¹ like, 'a' tva, 'ā'tva, 'i'tva, 'ī'tva, etc., it is also called 'dhvanyātmaka-śabda'. It is manifested in throats of animals, musical instruments, clouds and blowing wind.

According to the system of Mīmāṃsā, varṇātmaka śabda is a dravya which is all-pervasive, eternal and one². Because it is of the nature of all-pervasiveness; śabda, which is inside the śrotrendriya becomes expressed and the śrotrendriya grasps the same śabda. In their system there is no śabda which is in a distant place. Therefore, śrotrendriya need not go outside for its perception. Even dhvanyātmaka-śabda which is anitya and avyāpaka will be brought inside śrotrendriya by air. This view of Mīmāṃsakā is not tenable because, if śrotrendriya grasps only the śabda which is already inside it, then the experiences like 'I hear the sound in north', 'I hear the sound in the east', 'This sound is from a distant place', become invalid. It is not even correct to say that the sound is brought inside śrotrendriya through

1. *akacātātapayādi samastaprakārābhāvasamudāyavāna-varṇātmakāḥ* |

Nyāya-siddhāñjana, p. 293.

2. Mīmāṃsā school admits eternity, oneness, and all-pervasive nature to varṇātmaka śabda, to establish eternity to Vedas.

wind. The experience says that adavyas like rūpa and rasa which are 'ekendriyagrāhya' (known by only one indriya) will not go from one place to another. So this must be the same in the case of śabda also. Therefore, one can neither admit all-pervasiveness to śabda nor its movement from one place to another.

The position of Naiyāyika is also not satisfactory. According to them, the sound moves from one place to another. Here they give the example of "vīcitarāṅga-nyāya", wave moving another wave. In a pond or a tank, when a weighty substance is thrown, it creates a wave and that wave pushes the water ahead of it, and that another wave, until the last wave reaches the bank. In the same way, the sound created by abhighāta (striking) reaches the śrotrendriya in the explained way, namely a wave pushing another wave. But in this process one has to admit innumerable sound waves which lead to infinite regress. So this process is also not satisfactory. Deśika raises many objections against the theories explained above through quoting the *kārikas* of Varadanārāyaṇa Bhaṭṭāraka and on the same basis establishes the theory of vedāntin.

THE POSITION OF VEDĀNTIN

According to the philosophy of Viśiṣṭādvaita, to grasp the sound, the śrotrendriya itself goes to the place where the śabda is. Deśika says¹ that Varadanārāyaṇa Bhaṭṭāraka also admits the śrotravyāpti when the sound is heard from a distant place. That is why there are perceptions like 'I hear sound in the north', 'I hear sound in the south'. In all these places śrotra goes to the place where the sound is. Bhaṭṭāraka

1. *tatra dūrasthaśabdagrahaṇe śrotravyāptireva varadanārāyaṇa-bhaṭṭārakairuktā | dūre śabdah samīpe ca prācyām cetyādi darśanāt gatvā śrotrendriyam tatra tatra śabdagrahakṣamam |*

Nyāya-siddhāntajana, p. 293 and 294.

further says, that if the Naiyāyika view is correct then the above mentioned experiences will contradict their position. Therefore 'śrotrendriya' is 'prāpyakārī' according to Vedānta school.

This theory of Viśiṣṭādvaita resembles the theory of Sāṅkhya who says that the sound is grasped through the śrotra-vṛtti which is expanded upto the place where the sound is produced. This śrotra-vṛtti is a part of śrotrendriya. The part of this indriya that is inside the body is called 'śrotrendriya' and the part expanded outside the body is called 'śrotra-vṛtti'.

EXISTENCE OF VARṆAS UPTO PRAĻAYA

Some other thinkers hold the view that the sound is produced with the birth of ākāśa and is dissolved when the ākāśa is dissolved. But this is not tenable because śabda continues to exist upto praḷaya. Though it is admitted that the śabda of ākāśa is dissolved, the same cannot be admitted to the śabda-rāśi of other bhūtas like vāyu, tejas, jala and pṛthvī and they too are created and dissolved with the creator's dissolution of their respective elements. The existence of śabda in pañcabhūta is already explained. Therefore, varṇas remain upto praḷaya. The experiences like "utpanno gakāraḥ" ('ga'kāra is produced) and "vinaśto gakāraḥ" ('ga'kāra is destroyed), do not mean the destruction of varṇa-svarūpa. It only means the destruction of the activities of the palate and other organs.

Tāratva (loudness) and mandatva (slowness) etc., are not the dharma of varṇa. They are in the vāyu which manifests śabda. This position is evident in Viṣṇupurāṇa¹.

1. *veṇurandhra-vibhedena bhedaḥ śadjādi samjñitah |
abhedavyāpino vāyoḥ tathāsau paramātmanaḥ ||*

Flute has seven holes. Every one of them is respectively named as, niṣāda, ṛṣabha, gāndhāra, ṣaḍja, madhyama, dhaivata and pañcama. The flute-player when he plays on this instrument, the air, which comes out of his mouth enters these different holes and gets the sign of the hole with which it gets the contact. Therefore tāratva (loudness) and mandatva (slowness) are the dharmas of vāyu which makes śabda to manifest¹.

This position of Viśiṣṭādvaita, Deśika says, is well established by the Śruti "*namaste vāyo | tvameva pratyakṣam brahmāsi | tvāmeva pratyakṣam brahma vadiṣyāmi*" (*Taittirīya Upaniṣad*) also. Viṣṇucittārya, commenting on this passage, says that here the vāyu is praised as the cause of manifestation of śabda and so he is the perceivable Brahman.

Deśika admitted that slowness and loudness are not varṇadharmas. They are the dharmas of vāyu, which manifests śabda. But this position of Deśika contradicts the view of Viṣṇucittārya, who appears to opine² that, slowness and loudness are the śabda-dharmas. But Deśika says, that the intention of Viṣṇucittārya is not to accept those dharmas in śabda. What he means is, that even śrotrendriya grasps the saviśeṣa-vastu but not the nirviśeṣa-vastu. For that purpose, Viṣṇucittārya attributes these dharmas namely loudness and slowness which are in the vāyu, to śabda which is manifested. If he had admitted those dharmas in śabda, then he would not have commented on the Śruti '*namaste vāyo...*' in a different way, which supports the view that those dharmas are of 'vāyu'. Therefore it is admitted that

1.ṣaḍjādīnām tīvratvādibhedānām vyañjakavāyudharmatvam
śrūyate | Nyāya-siddhānta, p. 275.

2. śrotamapi itarendriya viśayavat, śabdatva gatva mṛdutva
paruṣatva mandatva madhyamatvādi ananta viśeṣātmake vastu-
grāhakam iti | Quoted in Nyāya-siddhānta, p. 295.

the dharmas like tāratva and mandatva do not belong to śabda, but they belong to vāyu, the cause of manifestation of śabda.

So far, we discussed three systems, regarding śabda namely,

1. A system which says that ākāśa is the locus of śabda.
2. A school which holds the view that pañcabhūtas are the locus of śabda.
3. A third view which states that śabda is a substance, manifested by vāyu.

All these systems are mutually contradictory. Then which one is to be followed? Deśika says that among these three views no school of thought is against Vedānta. All sounds are produced by that material cause, namely Brahman to whom the avyakta is the body. But the Mīmāṃsakā view which says that śabda is an eternal substance and has no material cause for it cannot be admitted. This is the final conclusion of Vedāntasāstra¹. Therefore, the above three views are not contradictory, to the central truth of Vedānta.

EXAMINATION OF SPHOṬA-VĀDA

The paramātmopādāna-kāraṇatva of śabda is opposed by Vaiyākaraṇis (grammarians). They say, the view of Vedānta school, regarding the nature and origin of śabda, is incorrect, because Paramātmā is not the material cause of the śabda. Śabda is not an effect. So it has no cause. Śabda is identical with śabda-brahman which is called sphoṭa. Sphoṭa² is

1. *avyaktapariṇāma-viśeṣa-śarīraka-paramātmopādānakāḥ sarve śabdāḥ | na punaḥ prthagdravyatayā guṇatayā vā bhakṣa-prābhākaramatavat nityāḥ | na ca anupādānakāḥ |*

Nyāya-siddhāntajana, p. 296.

2. *anādinidhanam brahma śabdatattvaṃ yadākṣaram |
vivartate'rthabhāvena prakriyā jagato yataḥ ||*

Nyāya-siddhāntajana-ṭīkā, p. 296.

eternal, partless, the cause of the entire universe and also the substratum of vivarta (illusory development) of the world.

The position of Vaiyākaraṇis may be explained in another way. Among varṇātmaka-śabda, some are tālavya (palatals), some are kaṇṭhya (guttural), Some are mūrdhanya (cerebral), some are dantya (dental), and some others or oṣṭhya (labial). So the varṇas are caused by such and such organs. Therefore, it is sufficient to admit that the organs themselves such as palate, teeth, lips, etc., are the material causes of the varṇātmaka-śabda. Therefore, to hold the view that the Paramātmān is the material cause of the varṇātmaka-śabda is not correct.

Deśika examines this argument stating¹ that this view is against scriptures. *Taittirīya Upaniṣad* says: "namaste vāyo | tvameva pratyakṣam brahmāsi!"—vāyu is the material cause of manifestation of śabda. Here vāyu means the inner controller namely Paramātmān.

Secondly, if there is a perceptible thing, it must be perceived. If it is not perceived, then, according to śāstra, it becomes, 'yogyānupalabdhi' (non-perception of a perceptible thing). According to vaiyākaraṇis, there is śabda-brahman namely sphoṭa. If it is existent, then it must be known by śrotrendriya. But so far it is not experienced by any one by śrotrendriya. If a perceptible thing is not perceived, it is but natural to doubt its very existence itself.

Thirdly, the organs such as, palate, tongue, teeth, which are stated to be the material cause of śabda may be considered as instrumental cause for the manifestation of śabda, but not as an upādāna-kāraṇa.

The existence of sphoṭa cannot be established on personal experience, because we have not experienced it. The

1. varṇānām sphoṭādyupādānakatvañca āgama adhyakṣa
viruddham | Nyāya-siddhānta, p. 297.

perception of yogis in this regard is doubtful. The statement of *Mahābhārata* "sphoṭastvaṁ varṇajusṭam" (Quoted in *Nyāya-siddhāñjana-tīkā* p. 297) only means the power to reveal the meaning which is latent in the word, not sphoṭa as such.

If sphoṭa denotes Brahman¹, then there is no objection. Because, according to siddhāntin every word denotes Brahman. According to the sphoṭa-vādin, sphoṭa is nirviśeṣa and niravayava and being such, it becomes the substratum of the vivarta (illusory development) of prapañca. But an unqualified² and partless substance cannot become the substratum of illusory knowledge. This fact is already explained in the Chapter 'Īśvara'.

Lastly, neither Pāṇini nor Kātyāyana nor Patañjali has admitted the sphoṭa. Only subsequent grammarians like Bhartṛhari have added sphoṭa to vyākaraṇa. Its existence is not even granted by scriptures. Deśika says³ that grammarians are only empowered to derive and explain śabda-svarūpa according to the past usage and nothing new should be added to the body of grammar. Therefore, it is necessary to admit that there is no sound or śabda apart from varṇas. The group of varṇas which demonstrates meaning is called śabda. Just as guṇas like sattva, rajas and tamas are adravyas, śabda also is an adravya and is manifested by vāyu.

1. *brahmaṇa eva spoṭa śabdavācyaṭve na no virodhaḥ* |

Nyāya-siddhāñjana, p. 296.

2. *adhiṣṭhānasya kārtsnyena bhāne'bhāne' ca na bhramaḥ |*
bhātābhātākṛtibhidā saviśeṣatvasādhikā ||

Nyāya-siddhāñjana, p. 197.

3. *prākprayogānusāreṇa prakṛtipratyaya-svarān |*
prakalpaya vaiyākaraṇaiḥ vyutpādyā pada-paddhatih ||

Bhaṭṭa Parāśara quoted in *Nyāya-siddhāñjana*, p. 296.

ŚABDA IS DRAVYA

It may however be argued on the basis of Śruti “yo vedādau svarah prokto vedānte ca pratiṣṭhitah | tasya prakṛti-līnasya yah parassa maheśvaraḥ |” (Taittirīya Upaniṣad), śabda is non-eternal and is a substance. Because in this passage, varṇas are stated to be the material cause of another varṇa.

It also becomes evident that the praṇava is established in the beginning and end of the Vedas. That praṇava which is the material cause of Vedas, becomes one with ‘a’kāra and ‘a’kāra becomes one with its material cause namely Maheśvara. Therefore the śabda is non eternal. Another passage of Śruti says¹ that Vedas are the body of the Paramātman. Vedas are śabdarāśi-rūpa. If śabda is an adṛavya then how can it become the body of Paramātman? An adṛavya cannot become a material cause. So śabda must be the dravya or substance.

Rāmānuja, commenting on this passage in *Vedārtha-saṅgraha* has established the dravyatva of śabda. Accordingly praṇava—the Omkāra—is the origin and the place of dissolution of Vedas. ‘A’kāra is the laya-sthāna (the place of dissolution) of praṇava. Therefore, it becomes established that there is prakṛti-vikṛti-bhāva (the state of cause and effect) between Veda and praṇava and praṇava and ‘a’kāra. Prakṛti is the upādānakāraṇa of vikṛti. To become an upādānakāraṇa, it must be a dravya²; “*upādānaṁ dravyaṁ avasthāśraya upādānam*”. (Nyāya-siddhānta, p. 3.)

Vedas, praṇava and ‘a’kāra are śabdas. There is prakṛti-vikṛti-bhāva between them. Therefore, on the ground

1. *yasya vedāḥ śarīram* |

2. *samavāyi-kāraṇatvaṁ dravyasyaiveti vijñeyam* |

Bhāṣā-pariccheda, 23.

of Rāmānuja's statement¹ also, it is proved that śabda is dravya and non-eternal entity.

Ācārya Yāmuna² also has established in *Ātma-siddhi* that śabda is dravya and non-eternal.

The contention of Yāmuna is as follows. Sound, smell, the sun-light and effulgence etc., are the loci of movement and they occupy more space than their substratum. Among them sound is very subtle and is of the nature of moving to distant places. This sound moves from its' locus to outer place, until it contains speed. Yāmuna further says that śabda is devoid of sparśa. Deśika says, in case the sound is adravya, then there was no need to deny sparśa in it because it is evident that adravya is not the locus of adravya. Therefore śabda is neither adravya nor vyaṅgya (manifested).

The foregoing discussion about śabda makes it clear that śabda is dravya. But adravayatva of śabda also was established on rational grounds. Now it becomes doubtful whether śabda is dravya or adravya. Deśika impartially evaluates these two positions and says³, among the followers of Viśiṣṭādvaita itself, according to some ācārya śabda is dravya, according to some other ācāryas it is adravya also. But both these thinkers admit that śabda is sparśa-rahita.

1. *vedādhyantarūpatayā vedabljabhūtapraṇavasya ayamarthah | sarvasya vedajātasya prakṛtiḥ praṇavaḥ | praṇavasya ca prakṛti-rakārah | praṇavavikāro vedaḥ svaprakṛtibhūte praṇave līnaḥ | praṇavo'pi....akāre līnaḥ....akārasya yaḥ paraḥ vācyah sa eva mahēśvaraḥ |*

Vedārtha-saṅgraha, p. 133. See also *Śrībhāṣya*, 1-3-20.

2. *Nyāya-siddhāñjana*, p. 299.

3. *atrocyate | sayūthyamatabhedena dravyam, adravyam ca śabdaḥ |*
Nyāya-siddhāñjana, p. 304.

ADRAVYATVA OF ŚABDA ESTABLISHED

Deśika after giving some arguments in support of the view that śabda is a dravya (substance), offers several other arguments which supports the view that śabda is adravya and finally gives his own conclusion.

a) The arguments offered by Rāmānuja¹ to establish adravyatva of sattva, rajas and tamas may also be used to prove dravyatva of śabda.

b) In *Ātmasiddhi*, Yāmuna only explains the views of others. Dravyatva view is not his own.

c) Bhaṭṭa Parāśarapāda clearly states² that śabda is adravya and it is the quality of ākāśa.

d) The Śruti passage “yo vedādau svarah proktaḥ” only states the disappearance of praṇavābhimāni-devatā in ‘a’kāra abhimāni-devatā. Therefore, this Śruti does not establish dravyatva to śabda. Rāmānuja’s commentary on this passage in *Vedārtha-saṅgraha* also should be understood in the light of the above interpretation. Deśika on the basis of these sound arguments, logic and experience, comes to the conclusion³ that the adravyatva view of śabda alone is good and stands to reason. Further he says that it is wiser to admit śabda as adravya, because only in that view all apparent contradictions of śāstras are solved. Deśika further discusses the views like—

a) śrotrendriya going out to the place where śabda is (which is śrotrendriya-vṛtti-pakṣa);

1. See *Śrībhāṣya* on “racanānupapatteśca nānumānam || pravṛtteśca || 2-2-1, 2.

2. *gaganaguṇa-śabdādi-svarūpa-sthitiḥ pravartayatā bhagavataiva...* |
Nyāya-siddhānta, p. 305.

3. *tadevamaravyatva-pakṣa eva śabdasya ślāghyaḥ* |
Nyāya-siddhānta, p. 308.

b) The vāyu, which manifests śabda comes to śrotren-driya;

c) coming of subtle parts of drum which is the locus of śabda and

d) coming of vāyu which is the locus of śabda, may also be accepted as valid. However, śabda is not dravya, but it is adravya.

SPARŚA

Sparśa (touch) is a non-substance known by sparsēndriya (tactual senses). It is of three types, namely, śīta-sparśa (cool touch), uṣṇa-sparśa (hot touch) and anubhaya-sparśa (luke-warm). Among the five elements excluding ākāśa, there is sparśa in all the four bhūtas. In water, there is śīta-sparśa. In light there is uṣṇa-sparśa. In air and earth, there is anuṣṇa-śīta-sparśa (neither cold nor heat). The experience such as "uṣṇāpṛthivī", "śīto vāyuh" are due to the contact of another element which possesses that touch. Sometimes the contact of another bhūta causes the subjugation of its own touch. For example, when the lustre of dīpa and ratna are fallen on the body their touch is not experienced. In the tactual perception of an object, the touch of the object is an invariable cause. The special characteristic feature of tvagindriya is, that it grasps object through the 'adravya' namely 'sparśa'. Though there is sparśa in the lustre of dīpa and ratna, it is not experienced due to the obstruction of the touch of another bhūta. In the case of prabhā, either the parts of vāyu or the subtle parts of pṛthivī may be considered as the bhūtas which obstruct the tactual perception of dīpa-ratna-prabhā.

Some other ācāryas of the system opine that the perceptibility or non-perceptibility of an 'adravya' depends upon the 'udbhūtatva' (perceptibility) of the adravya. Because

there is no udbhūtatva in the touch of dīpa-prabhā, it is not experienced.

In the perception of dravya, sparśa is also one of the causes. According to Viśiṣṭādvaita, the radiance, namely, prabhā of dīpa and gem are also dravyas. But their touch is not felt because their touch is subjugated by the contact of some other element such as vāyu or the subtle parts of the earth. Sparśa once again is grouped into two. They are pākaja (produced by baking) and apākaja (not produced by baking). Pākaja sparśa is felt in the earth and apākaja sparśa is felt in earth, water, light and air. The touch of a cow, brahmin, poison, nectar, cotton, stone are apākaja sparśas. Among them, the touch of nectar causes rejuvenation. The touch of poison causes death. The touch of a brahmin and cow causes purity.

According to different pākas (change under heat), different sparśas are produced in earth. Mango fruit when it is raw possesses hard touch. When it is ripened it becomes soft.

Hardness or softness are not a type of saṁyoga (conjunction). In that case, it should have become the object of visual perception. Because saṁyoga is known by our eyes. But hardness or softness is known only by the sense of touch¹. Here the contention is, sparśa may be inferred by rūpa which is its concomitant. After the cognition of colour sparśa is known by inference. With the help of that inference softness or hardness are known. Therefore these touches are not the objects of visual perception. In case it is saṁyoga, it should become the object of visual perception. Hence they are special types of touches. Annambhaṭṭa in his *Tarkasāngraha* divides 'sparśa' into three groups²; Hot, cold, and

1. *mṛdukaṣṭhinabhāvūdayopi sparśaviśeṣā eva | sparśanenaiva tadupallabdheḥ |*
Nyāya-siddhānta, p. 311.

2. *sa ca trividhaḥ, śītoṣṇa anuṣṇāṣita bhedāt |* *Tarkasāngraha*, p. 14.

temperate. But some thinkers like Śaṅkaramiśra recognise citra-sparśa¹. Thinkers of Nyāya-vaiśeṣika also like the thinkers of Viśiṣṭādvaita do not admit mṛdutva and kaṭhīnatva² as saṁyoga viśeṣa (a peculiar conjunction).

RŪPA

Rūpa or colour is a non-substance known only by our eyes. There are four colours namely white, red, black and yellow. There are slight internal differences in each one of these colours.

According to some, the colour yellow is included in red colour. The *Chāndogya Upaniṣad* (6-4-1) says there are only three colours. According to it only white, red and black are colours. This Śruti passage does not mention the yellow colour. Therefore some ācāryas of the school opined that the 'pīta rūpa' is not a separate colour and that it must be included in red colour.

Rūpa is also classified into 'bhāsvara' (radiant) and 'abhāsvara' (non-radiant). In light there is bhāsvara-rūpa and in water and earth there is abhāsvara-rūpa. Ākāśa and vāyu are devoid of rūpa. Perception of different colours in earth is due to its contact with some other element.

Nyāya-vaiśeṣika thinkers admit 'citra-rūpa' (variegated colour) in their system and say that it is the fifth colour. Deśika rejects this view. He says 'tadasat'. Citra-rūpa is not an extra colour. It is the colour of the parts which is made up of different colours. Therefore, the views of varied smell, varied touch and varied taste are also rejected.

1. citrasparśastu rūpa sthaliya yuktyā sulkarāṇīya eva |

Vaiśeṣika-upaśhara, Calcutta ed. p-292.

2. mṛdu kaṭhīna bhāvādayopi sparśa viśeṣa eva | sparśanenaiva tadupalbdeḥ |

Nyāya-siddhānta-jāna, p. 311.

kaṭhīnatvādikam tu na saṁyoganiṣṭha jāti-viśeṣaḥ | cakṣur-grāhyatvāpatteḥ |

Nyāya-siddhānta-muktāvalī, p. 390.

In Nyāya-vaiśeṣika system colour is of seven kinds. They are śukla (white), nīla (blue) pīta (yellow), rakta (red), harita (green), kapiśa (tawny) and citra (variegated). All these several colours are not referred to by either Praśasta-pāda or Śrīdhara. But they are enumerated by Viṣvanātha Pañcānana and Annambhaṭṭa. Probably the later writer might have included these colours. That is why Deśika rejects seven colours.

Among these colours the 'citra-rūpa' is the mixture of several colours. That is why Deśika asks, why this citra-rūpa is admitted separately? Instead of admitting a new colour why not call citra-rūpa simply a mixture of several colours? Annambhaṭṭa replies that colours being 'vyāpya-dharma', there cannot be several colours in one substratum.

RASA

Rasa or taste is a non-substance grasped by the palate. It is classified into six groups. They are: madhura (sweet), āmla (sourness), lavaṇa (salt), tikta (bitter), kaṭu (pungent) and kaṣāya (astringent).

Among them the kaṭurasa is also called as uṣṇarasa in śāstras. Some thinkers opine that uṣṇarasa (pungent) and kaṣāyarasa (astringent) belong to the group of tiktārāsa (bitter). Deśika says that further details may be had from Ayurveda. "*ayurvedataśca ete viśadamanusandheyāḥ*" (Nyāya-siddhāntajana, p. 314).

GANDHA

Gandha is a non-substance grasped by the nose. This is of two types namely surabhi (fragrant) and asurabhi (non-fragrant). The smell is found only in the earth. Sometimes smell is felt in air and water. It is due to their contact with the earth which is just like the iron ball getting heated due to the contact of the fire. Though all the five

elements possess the śabda, sparśa, rūpa rasa, gandha, according to the pañcīkaraṇa (quintuplication) prakriyā, the particular gandha is revealed in a thing due to the power of abhivyañjakas (manifesting agent).

In explaining the pākaja-prakriyā (change due to heat) there is some difference between the Nyāya-vaiśeṣika school and Viśiṣṭādvaita. Pāka¹ means "*vijātīya tejassamyogaḥ*" (*Tarkadīpika*) a peculiar samyoga of heat. When a black coloured raw pot is placed on fire, it turns into red. This change of colour is due to the 'vijātīya tejassamyoga' (peculiar conjunction of heat). According to some thinkers, the 'tejassamyoga' is of different type. The 'tejassamyoga' which produces the colour is different from that of rasa and the 'tejassamyoga' which produces rasa is different from that of gandha and so on. But the great logician Gadādhara says², that there are no different 'tejassamyogas'. They are all of the same type.

Viśiṣṭādvaita being a philosophical system, it should also explain the 'pāka' and 'pākaja-prakriyā'. Therefore, Deśika says³ that the process of pāka explained in Viśiṣṭādvaita is in accordance with the philosophy of Upaniṣads. In pṛthvī alone, there are pākaja guṇas like rūpa, rasa, gandha. On the basis of Veda⁴ one should admit that there was black colour in pṛthvī even before pañcīkaraṇa. Just like touch and colour in jala and tejas are apākaja before pañcīkaraṇa, this colour of pṛthvī is also apākaja. The touch of 'anuṣṇā-sīta' is admitted in pṛthvī. It is an

1. *rūpādiparāvṛttiphalako vijātīya tejassamyogaḥ* |

Nyāyakośa, p. 494.

2. *rūparasagandhasparśaṇām nāśam prati tu eakjātīya evagnisamyogaḥ kāraṇam* | *Gadādhara-tya-caturdaśa-lakṣaṇī*, 1.

3. *athaupaniṣadānām pākajaguṇaprakriyā* |

Nyāya-siddhāntajana, p. 315.

4. *yat kṛṣṇam tadannasya* |

Chāndogya, 6-4-1.

'apākaja' guṇa. This touch is natural to earth.

The madhura-rasa (sweet taste) is the natural apākaja-rasa in pṛthvī. In the same way, there is 'surabhi gandha' (good smell) in pṛthvī. Thus, the black colour, anuṣṇā-śīta-sparsā, madhura-rasa, surabhi gandha are there in pṛthvī from the time when the pṛthvī was produced.

In such a pṛthvī, all the five qualities i.e., śabda, sparsā, rūpa, rasa, gandha will be produced with their substratum. At some other times, some qualities continue to exist or they get destroyed according to the existence or destruction of dharmi. These are all due to the 'pāka' that takes place in them.

The explanation of pāka is given differently by different philosophers. Some are 'piṭharapākavādins' and some others are 'pīlupākavādins'. 'piṭhāra' means avayavi. Therefore, they are called 'piṭharapākavādins'.

The Vaiśeṣika school¹ follows the 'pīlupākavāda'. 'Pīlu' means atoms. According to this school, pāka is not produced in the avayavi but it is produced in atoms.

Deśika says that these two methods are not acceptable to Vedānta school because this school does not admit either paramāṇu which is accepted by Vaiśeṣika school or avayavi which is accepted by Nyāya school.

*pāke ca pīlupiṭharapākabhedāt vipratipadyante tatra
nobhayamapyasmākam paramāṇuvayavinorabhāvāt |*

Nyāya-siddhāntajana, p. 317.

Now it should be known whether pāka is produced in the state when the parts are combined or at the time when they are separated. Deśika says: "*tatra yathāsambhavamubhayamapi* !" (*Nyāya-siddhāntajana, p. 317*)—According to the circumstance, we admit both.

1. See *Vaiśeṣika-upaśkara*, (7-1-6).

One may observe that when the raw pot is placed in the fire, the pot changes its colour without any destruction of its parts. This position amounts to admit 'piṭharapāka' of Naiyāyika. Deśika explains the intention behind the pīlupākavāda which is accepted by Vaiśeṣikas. Without admitting the change in their parts, it is not possible to agree the change in avayavi because in their system the qualities such as rūpa, rasa, etc., continue to exist as long as their substratum continue to exist. Another reason why 'pīlupākavāda' is admitted by Vaiśeṣikas is that the special qualities of parts alone can produce special qualities in the avayavi. Therefore pīlupākavāda is preferred by Vaiśeṣika and so they are not contradictory but they are complementary to the followers of Upaniṣadic philosophy.

SAMYOGA

saṁyogam prati yutasiddhiḥ prayojikā

Vaiśeṣika-upaskara 7-2-9.

saṁyogohyavyāpyavṛttiranityaḥ sarvadravyavṛttisca

Vākyavṛtti.

saṁyuktapratyayanimittam....

Prāśasta-pādaguṇa-khaṇḍa. p. 30.

There is an experience 'imau saṁyuktau', 'that these two are connected'. This perception is produced by 'tvagin-driya' (sense of touch) and 'cakṣurindriya' (sense of vision). Therefore saṁyoga (conjunction) is the instrumental cause in its perception. It is also an adravya. Therefore Deśika defines it as: "*saṁyuktapratyayanimittam saṁyogaḥ*" (*Nyāya-siddhānta-jana*, p. 319).

According to some thinkers, it is of positive nature. In their view 'saṁyoga' is nothing but the substances themselves which are connected. Some other thinkers view, that saṁyoga is abhāva-rūpa. It amounts to the negation of intermediate space between the connected substances. Deśika says the

former view (bhāva-rūpatva) is not correct. In that case one must have the experience 'imau saṁyuktau' before and after the 'saṁyuktatva-avasthā' of those objects, because the svarūpa of the substance continues to exist in both the times.

In the second view, if the abhāvātmaka (negative nature) saṁyoga is bhāvātmaka (positive), then it is admissible to us also, because abhāvātmakatva is antarāḷa-śūnyatva (negation of intermediate space). It is nothing but the connection with the nearest place.

According to Vedāntin, saṁyoga is avyāpyavṛtti¹. It means that saṁyoga exists with its abhāva in a substratum. This may be illustrated by the famous example of logicians:

agre vṛkṣaḥ kapisaṁyogī mūle na |

A monkey is sitting on the top of the tree. In that part of the tree there is kapisaṁyoga because the monkey touches the top. Therefore 'kapisaṁyoga' is said to be agrāvachinna. But in the root of the tree, the same monkey is not present. Hence there is kapisaṁyogābhāva. Therefore kapisaṁyogābhāva is mūlāvachinna. This shows that saṁyoga co-exists with its negation. This nature² of saṁyoga is called 'avyāpyavṛttitva' or 'svābhāvasāmānādhikaraṇya' (partial extensity). To accept saṁyoga and its abhāva in the same part of the object, is contradictory. But to admit it in different 'amśa' (parts) as in the case of 'kapisaṁyoga', is not contradictory. But this explanation of avyāpyavṛttitva of saṁyoga is compatible only regarding the objects which possess parts. There are partless objects like ākāśa, kāla etc., which also

1. *svātyantābhāvasamānādhikaraṇatvam |*

Mūlamadhurānāthiyam and Gādādharī.

*svapratīyogitva-svasāmānādhikaraṇya-etadubhaya-sambandhenā
bhāvavattvamiti niṣkarṣaḥ |*

Nīlakaṇṭhīyam, 1., p. 13.

2. *asya ca svābhāvasādeśyamupalabhyamānam amśabhedaprayukta-
tayā na virodhāvaham |*

Nyāya-siddhāntajana, p. 319.

become the pratiyogin (counter-positive) of saṁyoga. Regarding those categories the explanation of avyāpyavṛttitva of saṁyoga becomes difficult. But Deśika says, even in partless categories such as kāla, ākāśa, etc., the avyāpyavṛttitva or samānādhikaraṇya can be explained between saṁyoga and saṁyogābhāva through the adjuncts like objects. In the case of ākāśa, saṁyoga is explained through the drum. In the case of kāla and other partless categories, there may be saṁyoga and its negation through the pot, cloth, etc.

There are two types of saṁyogas. One is anitya-saṁyoga which exists between objects which are limited in size like pot, objects and its substratum. It also exists in things of unlimited size like kāla and ākāśa. Unlike the system of Vaiśeṣikas, Viśiṣṭādvaitins do not admit saṁyogaja-saṁyoga.

The second type of saṁyoga is nityasaṁyoga. It exists in dravyas like Īśvara, kāla, ākāśa, nityas and muktas.

According to the system of Vaiśeṣika, there is no saṁyoga in between two 'vibhu padārthas' (all pervasive substances). "*vibhunostu na saṁyogaḥ karmāyutasiddhyādirūpa-kāraṇābhāvāt*" (*Vaiśeṣika-sūtra*, 7-2-9).

Deśika says that vibhudvaya saṁyoga must be admitted on the basis of valid inference and Śruti. The inference is—

"vibhavaḥ"	pakṣa
"mithaḥ saṁyuktāḥ"	sādhya
"nirantaradravyatvāt"	hetu
"ghaṭādivat"	udāharaṇa.

Vibhu padārtha possess conjunction with another vibhu padārtha. Because they are nirantara-dravyas like gaṭa.

Another point is that these vibhudravyas must get conjunction with the Lord and his dharma-bhūta-jñāna which are themselves vibhudravyas. If there was no conjunction of the Lord with vibhudravyas like kāla (this conjunction is c

the form of anupraveśa) they all become inactive and hence vibhudravya saṁyoga must be admitted.

This stand of Vedāntin leads him towards another problem. The Lord being a vibhudravya pervades all objects including the all-pervasive substances like ākāśa and kāla. A substance which is pervaded by another substance cannot become a vibhudravya (all-pervasive substance). Therefore ākāśa and kāla will lose their all-pervasive nature in case the Lord pervades them.

To overcome this objection Viśiṣṭādvaita admits two types of vyāpti (pervasion) for Paramātmān. They are antar-vyāpti and bahirvyāpti. In objects like atom and such other subtle things there is antarvyāpti. Hence this vyāpti of the Lord does not obstruct the vyāpti of vibhudravyas.

That is why Deśika says¹, that according to Upaniśads, the kāla, ākāśa and such other 'vibhudravyas' cannot act without the saṁyoga of the Lord who has entered them through anupraveśa (entering the object). Therefore on the evidence of many inferences and upaniśadic passages, one has to admit the 'vibhudravya-saṁyoga'.

ŚAKTI

Effect is produced by cause. Everything cannot become a cause. To become cause it must possess certain dharma. An adṛavya which accomplishes this dharma is called 'śakti'².

1. *aupaniṣadascāyamārthaḥ | tathā ca śrutayaḥ | sarvavyāpti ca bhagavān antarbahiṣca tat sarvaṁ vyāpya nārāyaṇassthitaḥ... |*
Nyāya-siddhāntajana, p. 323.
2. *sarvakāraṇānām kāraṇatvanirvāhakah kaścit adṛavyaviśeṣaḥ śaktiḥ |*
Nyāya-siddhāntajana, p. 325.
mīmāṃsakaviśeṣaḥ prābhākaraṁtu śaktiḥ padārthāntarameva na tu kāraṇatvarūpa ityāhuḥ |
Dinakari-pratyakṣa-khaṇḍaḥ.
tacca svasavavyāpyetara-sakalasampattau kāryābhāvavyāpakābhāvapratiyogitvam.
Cintāmaṇi of Gangeśopādhyāya.

According to Vedāntin, this śakti is nothing but kāraṇatā-svarūpa. This śakti is atīndriya (beyond sense-perception). In the presence of any obstruction like 'maṇi', the fire will not burn.

Here the presence of the obstruction suppresses the power in the fire whereas the removal of the obstruction releases the power in the fire. This power of the fire is called 'śakti'. This śakti may also be experienced in magnet. Śakti cannot be admitted in the śakti. In that case, it leads to anavasthā (infinite regression). It may be argued further that if śakti is not accepted in the śakti of fire, how can it produce heat? Without śakti, nothing can produce effect. In case the cause which is devoid of śakti can produce the effect, then one should get oil from sand and the stone should sprout into a plant. Therefore it is necessary to admit śakti in śakti to avoid all these contradictions.

Deśika meets this objection by saying that śakti is not the real cause of effects like burning. The real cause of heat is the fire which is with śakti. Dahana-kāraṇatva lies with agni and not with mere śakti. Śakti is the viśeṣaṇa or attribute of kāraṇatā which is in the agent. Philosophers turn it as kāraṇatāvacchedaka (a distinguishing character of kāraṇatā). For siddhāntin, śakti and kāraṇatā are synonymous. Therefore it need not be admitted that there is śakti in śakti, but the śakti which is admitted by siddhāntin is kāraṇatā-svarūpa.

The existence of śakti is also proved by the sage Parāśara. In *Viṣṇupurāṇa*¹ he says that it is very difficult to understand the śakti of all substances. Though they are beyond sense perception, their existence is known by

1. śaktayassarvabhāvānāmacintyā-jñānagocarāḥ |
yato'to brahmaṇastāstu sargādyā bhāvaśaktayāḥ ||
bhavanti tapatām śreṣṭha pāvakasya yathoṣṇatā |

Viṣṇupurāṇa 1-3-2, 3.

inferential knowledge and the scriptural knowledge. That is why, such śaktis which are helpful in the creation of the universe are natural to the Parabrahman, like the heat to the agni.

Ahīrbudhnya-saṁhitā proves¹ the existence of śakti. *Ahīrbudhnya* answering the questions posed by Nārada says that in everything there is śakti according to the nature of the object. Though the objects are perceptible, their śakti is imperceptible. Though they are inferred on the ground of the effect produced by them, these śaktis are of the form of *kāraṇatā* itself.

In the above explained manner, on the evidence of inferential knowledge and scriptures, śakti should be admitted as a separate adṛavya.

The Śaiva school admits śakti as *bhinnābhinna* (identity in difference) from Brahman. Further this school explains that in *śāstras*, it is called *sattā jñāna* and *ānanda*. Though it is changeless, it gets transformation through *acit* (inert matter). Śakti is proved by scriptures also:

jagaduptpādikā śaktistava prakṛtiriṣyate |

Quoted in *Nyāya-siddhāntajana*, p. 328.

This śakti is identical with the happiness derived from the enjoyment of worldly things (*viśayānanda*). It is called 'śaivī' because it belongs to Śiva. Being the *cicchakti*, it is the material cause of this universe. Without this śakti everything becomes impotent.

Even Śiva² cannot move or act without śakti. Śaivites

1. *śaktayassarvabhāvānām acintyā aprthaksthitāḥ* |

svarūpe naiva drśyante drśyante kāryatastu tāḥ |

Ahīrbudhnya-saṁhitā.

2. *sivaśśaktyā yukto yadi bhavati śaktaḥ prabhavitum na cedevam devo na khalu kuśalaspanditumapi* |

Saundaryalaharī by Śaṅkarācārya.

further say śakti which is in different causes is one. They are not many, "*ekaiva tu parāśaktirjñānānandakriyāmayī*" (*Nyāya-siddhānta*, p. 328).

Śakti is unlimited because it is only one. It is of an all-pervasive nature. The entire universe is enveloped in this śakti¹. It is sāvayava (with parts) through acidviśiṣṭākāra (inert matter) and niravayava (partless) through cic-chaktyākāra (consciousness). It is śakti that is the material cause of the world and is anādi. This śakti is independent and is not limited by 'deśa', 'kāla' and 'vastu'. That is why śakti pervades the universe. With all these special qualities it becomes the object of contemplation.

This view is not admitted by other Vedāntins. According to these thinkers, the tattva which possesses this śakti is the object of scriptural² investigation³. Śakti is only an upasarjana (dependent). On account of the same reason, it cannot become an upādāna-kāraṇa. Śakti is not one. If it is so, then the same effect should be produced every where. To hold śakti as eternal is incompatible because the śakti which is in impermanent things cannot become eternal. Anāditva of śakti is also not compatible because śakti is produced with its substratum which is a cause. To admit its presence before the production of its substratum is not possible. Deśika says that śaivite's śakti is not all-powerful. In that case, sprinkling from fire and burning from water also must become possible because the śakti therein is

1. *vyāpikā tu parāśaktirvyāpyā viśvamidam jagat* |

Nyāya-siddhānta, p. 328.

2. *śaktayassarva bhāvānām acintyājñāna gocarāḥ* |

yato'to brahmaṇastāstu sargādyā bhāvaśaktayaḥ ||

Viṣṇupurāṇa 1-3-2.

3. Rāmānuja commenting on this passage says: '*ato vicitra ananta śaktiyuktam brahmaiva ityarthah*'. *Vedārtha-saṅgraha*, p. 100.

identical. Because they are not identical on the said ground, it is not unlimited.

Śaivites do not even maintain the position that the Brahman is the locus of śakti. In that case, the previous objection may be warded off. But another objection creeps in. In our usage we say śakti of Brahman and not Brahman of śakti. If the Brahman is the locus of śakti and that śakti is the material cause of the universe, then śakti gains importance and Brahman becomes secondary, making the usage, i.e., 'Brahman of śakti' possible.

Lastly, Deśika raises another objection against the view that the śakti is identical with the material happiness of jīva. The objections pointed out against advaitin¹ who does not admit the difference between various modes of consciousness are the same here also. If the śakti is identical everywhere, then we should experience the power of burning in water and quenching power in fire. In the above explained way, the exposition of śakti by śaivites is not correct. Therefore, the followers of scriptures have to admit 'śakti' in the way it is explained by the siddhāntin.

Among the followers of Rāmānuja, according to some thinkers, śakti is in dravya only whereas to some other thinkers, śakti is in both dravya and adravya².

Deśika opines that whether śakti is in dravya or in both dravya and adravya, we need not be much bothered about this. However, according to all followers of Viśiṣṭādvaita, śakti is considered³ as one among ten adravyas.

1. *samvidadvaitadūṣaṇāni ca sarvāṇi atrāpi anusandheyāni* |
Nyāya-siddhāntajana, p. 329.
2. *sarvadravyeṣu tatkāryasamadhigamyah tatpratiyogi śaktyākhyah*
guṇah sādharmaṇah |
Nyāya-siddhāntajana, p. 239.
3. *evam dravyamātre rūpadiṣvapīti vṛttistāvat yathā kathaṅcidastu* |
śaktimātram sāmpradāyikamiti sthitam |
Nyāya-siddhāntajana, p. 329.

Rāmānuja commenting on the sūtra “*na tu dr̥ṣṭānta bhāvāt*” (2-1-9) proves¹ the existence of śakti. At some other places in *Bhāṣya* and *Vedārtha-saṅgraha*², Rāmānuja appears not to have admitted śakti as an extra category and also uses the word śakti in a different sense (puṇya, pāpa etc.). But where Rāmānuja, uses the word ‘śakti’ in a different sense, there it does not mean that he repudiates śakti as a separate category. Rāmānuja’s use of the word śakti in the sense of pāpapuṇya of jīva and prīti and aprīti of the Lord, should be taken in the secondary sense (gauṇī), because he himself has stated³ in clear terms in *Vedārtha-saṅgraha* that śakti is a separate category. To attribute the same to the prīti and aprīti of Īśvara only implies their dependency. Even to say the world as the śakti of Paramātmā is to mean that he is the root cause of it and the dependency of the world on Him. Therefore, it stands proved that śakti is an adṛavya and so is a separate entity.

1. *agnyādeḥ śaktipratibandhādaupnyādyanudayaḥ* | Śrībhāṣya, 2-1-9.

2. See bhāṣya on: “*vaiṣamyānairghṛṇye na sāpekṣatvāt tathā hi darśayati* (2-1-34). There he quotes: “*nimitamātramevāsau sṛjyānām sargakarmaṇī*” (*Viṣṇupurāṇa*, 1-4-51, 52).

svaśaktiḥ-svakarmaṇaiva devādi vastutāprāptiḥ |

Śrībhāṣya, p. 504.

Here puṇya or pāpa karma of jīva is admitted as śakti.

tadadhi game uttarapūrvāghayoraśleṣa-vināśau tadavyapadeśāt |

Brahmasūtra, 4-1-13.

aghasya vināśakāraṇam utpannāyāstacchaktervināśakāraṇam, śaktirapi paramapurusaḥprīṭireva |

Śrībhāṣya, p. 820.

śaktayaḥ sarvabhāvānām acintyājñānagocarāḥ |

Viṣṇupurāṇa, 1-3-2.

3. *ato vicitrānantasaktiyuktam brahmetyarthaḥ* |

Vedārtha-saṅgraha, p. 100.

na tu dr̥ṣṭānta bhāvāt |

Brahmasūtra, 2-1-9.,

agnyādeḥ śaktipratibandhādaupnyādyanudayaḥ.

Śrībhāṣya, p. 458.

INCLUSION OF REMAINING CATEGORIES IN THE ACCEPTED ONE

Thus Vedānta Deśika has explained the six dravyas, the ten adṛavyas according to the division of categories in the beginning¹. Now in addition to ten adṛavyas namely sattva, rajas, tamas, śabda, rasa, gandha, sparśa, rūpa, śakti and saṁyoga which are already explained, Deśika also includes the remaining guṇas and other categories accepted in Nyāya-vaiśeṣika system, either in the admitted adṛavya group or in the group of dravya.

First he takes up gurutva. According to Nyāya-vaiśeṣika school the quality which is the non-inherent cause of the first fall of an object is called gurutva². When a fruit falls down from the tree, the first kriyā (action) which made the fruit to fall is gurutva. The succeeding falls are due to the impulse (vega). This gurutva is inferred by patana (falling) and it is atīndriya. It is eternal in atoms (eternal things). It is transitory in dvyaṇuka (dyads). This quality is enumerated as a separate quality in their system.

Deśika explains that gurutva is not a separate quality. It may be included in śakti or the svarūpa of the object. It is already admitted that śakti is a cause everywhere and gurutva is not separate from that.

Further Deśika explains the view held by some thinkers who say that gurutva is the svarūpa of pṛthvī and jala. In the end, Deśika giving his own conclusion says that there are two views regarding the acceptance of śakti. If śakti is not admitted, then gurutva is the svarūpa as pṛthvī or jala.

1. *dvedhā jaḍājaḍatayā pratyaktaditaratayāpi vā dravyaṁ śodhā triguṇāneho jīveśvarabhogabhūtimatibhedāt*

Nyāya-siddhānta, p. 15.

2. *ādyapatanāsamavāyī-kāraṇaṁ gurutvaṁ | Tarkasaṅgraha, p. 30.*
atīndriyaṁ gurutvaṁ syāt | Bhāṣa-pariccheda, 153.

If śakti is admitted, then gurutva is identical with it. If śakti is admitted as the general cause of all, In that case gurutva need not be admitted as a separate quality.

This gurutva abides in the two substances beginning with earth and is inferred by patana: "*tacca salilaprthivī-gatam patanakalpyam*" (*Nyāya-siddhājana*, p. 331).

DRAVATVA

dravatvaṃ tu nimnonnatileśarahita-saṃyoga-viśeṣaḥ |
Nyāya-siddhājana, p. 335.

Dravatva is of two kinds, namely natural and artificial. Natural liquidity is in water and the second type is in earth and light. There are some other thinkers who say that fluidity seen in the melted gold is not of light. It is due to the contact of the water that dravatva is there. This contact also is due to pañcīkaraṇa which has been already explained. Rāmānuja has established this fact in the same way, taking the example of the mirage. Deśika sides with the second explanation that fluidity is the quality of water alone. Just as dravatva is not a separate quality, the mṛdutva (softness) and kṛthiṇatva (hardness) are also not separate qualities. They too are included in saṃyoga. If the conjunction of parts is thin it is called 'mṛdu'. If it is thick, it is called 'kṛthiṇa', Deśika quotes from *Nyāyatattva* of Nāthamuni¹ in this regard. According to the system of Nyāya-vaiśeṣika, dravatva is a separate quality. Praśastapāda says: "*syandanakarma kāraṇam*". (*Praśastapāda-bhāṣya*, p. 33).

SNEHA

Sneha (visciduity) is also not a separate quality. The Vaiśeṣika system says that it is experienced and so becomes

1. *viraḥsaṃyoga-prayuktasparśo mṛduḥ; nirviraḥsaṃyoga-prayuktasparśaḥ kṛthiṇaḥ* | Quoted in *Nyāya-siddhājana*, p. 335.

the object of tactual perception. It is only in jala. In ghee it is experienced temporarily. That is why they say that "*sneho jale sa nityonu*" (*Bhāṣā-pariccheda*, p. 157).

But according to Viśiṣṭādvaita it is not a separate quality as considered by Vaiśeṣikas. Some thinkers of the Viśiṣṭādvaita accept it to be a quality which is in water and which helps to collect the parts or dusts. Deśika says that there is the experience of the type 'snigdham' (an object with viscosity). That experience refers only to the colour and the touch of object. More than this nothing is experienced there. The experience of viscosity in water is due to its softness. This is same with gold. In the collection of particles the water itself becomes the cause. When there is no water the collected parts get separated. This sneha is accepted in 'cetana' also. In cetana it is of the form of prīti (love) upāditsā (desire to take or collect). The hardness or cruelty is of the form of duḥkha or jihāsā or anger. Therefore sneha is not a separate quality.

ato na guṇāntara siddhihi |

Nyāya-siddhānta, p. 338.

VĀSANĀ

The tendency known as 'bhāvanā' (reminiscent impression) is included under the consciousness of jīvātman¹. Deśika at first discusses the vāsanā as a separate quality. According to Nyāya-vaiśeṣikas, bhāvanā abides in the soul and is imperceptible to the senses and so the bhāvanā is a separate quality of ātman. This bhāvanā is one of the forms of saṁskāra. Bhāvanā is called as vāsanā in Viśiṣṭādvaita. 'Vāsanā' is inferred by effect namely the smṛti (representative cognition). Smṛti is not produced by 'anubhava' (presentative cognition) because it is lost long before. Ātman who is

1. *asman mate anubhava saṁskārasmṛtīnām jñānavasthāviśeṣa rūpatvāt....*"

Nyāya-siddhānta, p. 339.

characterised by anubhava cannot be treated as the cause of *smṛti*. That which is unintelligible cannot become the cause of something by the way of upalakṣaṇa also. Nor is *smṛti* caused by anubhavadhvamsa (consequent negation of anubhava). In that case *saṃskāra* should remain for all time. Therefore in between the *smṛti* and the anubhava, one has to admit 'vāsanā' which is produced by anubhava and which causes *smṛti*.

Further Deśika discusses the locus of 'vāsanā' and concludes that the 'vāsanā' remains in 'jñāna-dravya', because, both presentative and representative cognitions are the different stages of jñāna-dravya. They are in the same object. Therefore it is proper to say that 'vāsanā' also resides in jñāna-dravya. Further Deśika concludes that thus described 'vāsanā' is identical with the dharma-bhūta-jñāna of 'cetana'. Because, the presentative and representative cognition and tendency are nothing but the different modes of dharma-bhūta-jñāna.¹ Therefore, in Viśiṣṭādvaita, bhāvanā, which is one among 'saṃskāras' according to Nyāya-vaiśeṣika, is not a separate quality of ātman as they opine.

Here this position of Deśika may appear to contradict the statements of Rāmānuja: "*etadubhaya-kāryakāraṇa-bhūtānādi viparīta vāsanābaddho'pi*" (*Gadyatraya* p. 250) in which he seems to admit 'vāsanā' as a separate quality. But here also we have to interpret 'vāsanā' as the mode of consciousness. This is clear from the statement of Rāmānuja himself¹, which says that there is no proof for the existence

1. Refer *Tattvamuktā-kalāpa*, 5-103.

*itthaṃ saṃskāra sadbhāvamuktvā tasya buddhiniṣṭatvaṃ
upapādayati* | *Sarvārtha-siddhi*, p. 772.

2. *anārabdhakārya eva tu* | *Bṛahmasūtra*, 4-1-15.

*na ca puṇyāpuṇyajanya....śarīrasthitihetubhūta saṃskārasadbhāve
pramāṇābhāvāt* | *Śrībhāṣya*, p. 825.

of 'saṁskāra' apart from the prīti or aprīti of the Lord.

Rāmānuja commenting on *Gītā* (17-2) explains how the 'vāsanā' is born out of anubhava, and this affirms the view of Deśika¹, that there is nothing like saṁskāra apart from anubhava and 'vāsanā' which in turn are the modes of dharma-bhūta-jñāna.

Deśika further says that by the chanting of the 'garuḍamantra' certain saṁskāra in the water is produced, and the touch of that water mitigates the pain of poison caused by the snake-bite. But this saṁskāra is not different from the accepted śakti.

Some thinkers opine that 'vāsanā' should be admitted as a separate quality and they give the analogy of cotton-seeds which are dyed by lac. These seeds, even after the removal of redness by the process of washing, yield flowers and cotton of red colour by the saṁskāra they had received. These thinkers say that it is sufficient to prove the existence of 'vāsanā' in seeds, otherwise the cotton would not have turned into red.

Deśika says that here one has to use his discriminatory knowledge. He poses two questions against this problem of kārpāsa bīja (cotton-seed). Whether the vāsanā which is desired to be proved is admitted in sprouts which are the effects of the seeds, or in the parts of the seeds which transform into bud, flower, cotton etc.? The former position is not tenable because there is no co-existence between the cause and the effect. 'Vāsanā' which is the effect is produced in different substratum namely ankura and the cause exists in the kārpāsa-bīja. Therefore there is no co-existence of cause and effect.

1. *śuddhasvabhāvasyaiva ātmanaḥ karmamūla guṇamaya prakṛti saṁsargopādhika dharma-bhūta-jñāna pariṇativīṣeṣa ityarthah*!

Tātparya-candrikā, p. 517.

The latter position is also not tenable because, while the red seeds of cotton transform into red flower and red cotton, the parts of lac also follow the transforming seeds and causes redness in them. Therefore in no way it necessitates the acceptance of vāsanā in them.

According to Mīmāṃsā school, in performing certain rites such as sprinkling the paddy, a peculiar type of saṃskāra is admitted in them. Deśika says that it is nothing but the mode of the consciousness of the worshipped deity. When the paddy is sprinkled by water it becomes purified and becomes agreeable to the deity or that sprinkling may produce sattva quality in that substance. In the former case, it is the mode of consciousness. In the latter case it is included in the accepted adravya¹ namely sattva.

Vega

According to Vaiśeṣikas, 'vega' (impulse) bhāvanā (impression) and sthitasthāpakatva (elasticity), are the three varieties of saṃskāra (tendency). "saṃskārabhedo vego'tha stitisthāpakabhāvane (*Bhāṣā-pariccheda*, p. 158).

Deśika says that even saṃskāra of Vaiśeṣika is not a separate quality. Among these subdivisions of vaiśeṣikas, it is proved how bhāvanā also is not a separate quality. Vega (speed or impulse)² may be included in the cause which produces speed. It may be included in the accepted karmaviśeṣa³. This karmaviśeṣa is accepted by both Vaiśeṣika and Vedāntin.

1. *atrocyate yadyapyevam | athāpyayam saṃskāraḥ tattaddevatādhi-
mativiśayatvaṃ vā satvādiguṇodbodhena yāga योगyatvaṃ vā anena
na tatotirikta guṇa viśeṣasiddhiḥ | Nyāya-siddhāñjana*, p. 345.
2. *mūrtamātre tu vegasyāt | Bhāṣā-pariccheda*, p. 158.
3. *vegasya karmaviśeṣavyatireke pramāṇābhāvāt..... karmātiśaya-
mātreṇa caritārthatvāt karmātiśayasya cobhayavādisiddhatvāt |
Nyāya-siddhāñjana*, p. 339.

The experience 'śīghram gacchati' (moves fastly) also does not prove the separateness of the speed. It only refers to the latent 'atīśaya' (śakti or potency) of the action. This atīśaya should be admitted by both Vedāntin and Vaiśeṣika. Here Deśika quotes from *Nyāyatattva* of Nāthamuni. "*saṁyogakāla-sāmlpyam vegaḥ*" (*Nyāya-siddhāñjana*, p. 340.) "The time taken by an arrow to reach its target is called 'vega'." It is nothing but the above mentioned karmātiśayas namely the śakti.

Sthitasthāpakatva

According to Nyāya-vaiśeṣika sthitasthāpakatva¹ (elasticity) is one of the varieties of saṁskāra (tendency) which abides in earth. Some consider it to be present in all the four substances. This elasticity may be seen in the branches of the trees which return to their former position when they are pulled and let go.

Deśika includes this elasticity in saṁsthāna-viśeṣa (form of the object). "*sthitasthāpakō'pi saṁsthānaviśeṣa eva*" (*Nyāya-siddhāñjana*, p. 341).

The branches of the tree which have been pulled and let go, return to their former position due to their peculiar figure itself. To explain this, one need not admit sthitasthāpakatva as a separate quality. This avayava-saṁsthāna is nothing but the peculiar conjunction² of parts.

It may be further argued, if this 'saṁskāra' is nothing but the saṁsthāna, then one has to experience the action (going and returning of the branch) at all times, because the cause, namely the saṁsthāna of branch is present there.

1. *kriyāviśeṣajanakaḥ kriyāviśeṣajanyaḥ svajanyakriyānāśyaḥ*
guṇaviśeṣaḥ | *Dinakari-guṇa-khaṇḍa*, p. 233.

2. *saṁyogamādāya sthitasthāpakasyāpi sambhavāt* |
Yatīndramata-dīpikā, p. 152.

This argument of Vaiśeṣika is not tenable because he also has to answer this problem. Therefore this objection is same to both and hence cannot become a demerit to one system.

Therefore saṃskāra is not a separate quality as the Nyāya-vaiśeṣika school argues. This vāsanā and other varieties are included in the accepted adṛavyas.

Saṅkhyā

Saṅkhyā (number) is accounted for by the essential nature of the substance to which it belongs. This saṅkhyā becomes the object of the usage namely one, two, three etc. According to Vaiśeṣikas, this number exists in dravyas only. according to some others it exists in all dravyas and guṇas. The Vaiśeṣika system admits unity¹ as eternal in the eternal substances such as the atoms, while it is transitory in the substances such as jar, cloth etc. Numbers that collectively cover many things such as duality are the result of apekṣā-buddhi (the notion of addition). This apekṣā-buddhi is of the form 'this is one, this is one', and so on. According to Nyāya Kaṇḍallīkāra and Udayana, there are some difference of opinions regarding the notion of triplicity and multiplicity.

In the system of Vaiśeṣika the notion of duality is produced in this way. First in objects there will be 'apekṣā-buddhi' which is of 'samūhālambanarūpa' (collective cognition), which contain the notions of ekatva and dvitva. Then there will be the origination of duality; with its help, the perception of the characteristic traits of duality is produced. In this perception ekatva is the non-inherent cause and the apekṣā-buddhi is the instrumental cause. This is nirvikalpaka—the indeterminate perception of duality-hood. This is followed by the perception of dvitvatva—what is possessed of duality-hood. At the same time there will be

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1. The Vaiśeṣika system counts numbers as unity, duality etc., and not one, two... etc.

the destruction of the *apekṣā-buddhi* (the notion of addition). Then there is the destruction of duality. Then the knowledge namely 'these are two' is produced. In this process although the knowledge lasts only for two moments, the notion of addition is assumed to last for three moments.

Deśika says that there are no *saṅkhyas* like *dvitva*, *tritva* etc. The *apekṣā-buddhi* which is accepted by *Vaiśeṣikas* also will suffice to become the cause of the convention of counting. Further there is no valid proof to accept them.

Ekatva is admitted in atoms in primary sense. In aggregates it is in the secondary sense. The usage of *ekatva* (unity) in such places is due to adjuncts. In the same way the usage of *ekatva* in *adravyas* should be taken in the secondary sense. Because there cannot be *guṇa* in the *guṇa*. "*guṇe guṇānāṅikārāt*" (*Nyāya* maxim). This *ekatva* is identical with the object which possesses it. But it is not a separate quality.

Refuting the *nirviśeṣa-vāda*, Rāmānuja says: "*ekatva-meka saṅkhyā vacchedaḥ*" (*Śrībhāṣya*)—"ekatva" is in 'eka saṅkhyā'.

By this statement, Rāmānuja appears to have admitted the *saṅkhyā* as a separate quality. But in that context Rāmānuja opines by that interpretation that *nirviśeṣa-vāda* becomes the *saviśeṣa-vāda*. In *advaita* if 'ekatva saṅkhyā' is admitted in Brahman then *advaita* becomes the *saviśeṣa-vāda*.

Further Yāmuna-muni appears to have admitted *saṅkhyā* as a separate quality in *Ātmasiddhi*. But in the *Prameyapāda-saptamādhikaraṇa*, Nāthamuni clearly says: "*saṁyogāntar-bhūtā saṅkhyā*" (Quoted in *Nyāya-siddhāntajana*, p. 351). 'Saṅkhyā' is included in 'saṁyoga.'

Varadaviṣṇu-miśra, following the statement of Yāmuna-muni in *Ātmasiddhi* accepts *saṅkhyā* as a special quality.

He admits saṅkhyā even in guṇas. Deśika says that all this is only the explanation of others view.

Bhaṭṭa Parāśara refuting the prākṛtya of Mīmāṃsaka seems to have accepted saṅkhyā. But it is doubtful whether this is his own position or the position of some other school. However according to the Viśiṣṭādvaita saṅkhyā is not a separate quality.

Parimāṇa

Parimāṇa (dimension) becomes the object of the 'parimāṇa pratyaya' (knowledge of parimāṇa). There are four types of parimāṇa. They are aṇu (minute), mahat (medium or big), dīrgha (long) and hrasva (short). All these dimensions are known by their counter-positives. Because there are usages like 'this is more minute than that'. 'It is shorter or longer than that' etc.

Some thinkers of this school say that there is no dimension in all-pervasive substances because they are immeasurables. Thus opines Śrīrāmamiśra while he comments on the word 'ananta' in *Vedārtha-saṅgraha*.

Yāmunamuni in *Āgama-prāmāṇya*, explaining the pūrvapakṣa¹ says, though in ākāśa parimāṇa is explained, yet this view must be re-examined.

Some other thinkers accept parimāṇa even in all-pervasive substances because there is a usage that this is bigger than this. The usage like 'all-pervasive substances are immeasurable' only means that they are not of small dimension.

Further Deśika explains the view of some other thinkers who hold that there is no parimāṇa at all. Probably this must be the view which is acceptable to Deśika. According

1. *yadapi viyati parimāṇamiha nidarśitam, tadapi vimarśanīyameva* |

Quoted in *Nyāya-siddhānta*, p. 362.

to them, this *parimāṇa* is the place itself which is occupied by the object. But it is not a separate quality. Deśika explains how the usages like 'this is bigger' or 'smaller' take place. When an object occupies 'more place' in addition to 'the place occupied by the other object' at the same time, then there will be usage like this is bigger? (*adhika-parimāṇam*). While an object cannot occupy the entire space occupied by the other object at the same time, then the usage namely 'this is smaller in dimension (*nyūna parimāṇam*) takes place¹.

Length in the object is its extension in particular direction than other objects. If it is less straight then it is called short. An object which is bigger in dimension in several directions is called *mahat*. If it is smaller in many directions it is called '*aṇu*'. Deśika says¹ that all these dimensions may co-exist in a single object. For example *stamba* (a clump of grass) may be bigger or smaller relatively than the other one. Therefore *parimāṇa* is not a separate quality. *Parimāṇa* which is of the *saṁsthānarūpa* is of three varieties. They are *āyāma* (length) *vistāra* (width) and *ghana* (hard).

Prthaktva

Like *parimāṇa* *prthaktva* also is not a separate quality. It is nothing but 'difference'. Wherever there is the usage like '*idamasmād bhinnam*' (This is different from that), there is the usage '*idamasmād prthak*'. Therefore these two words are synonyms. Further it may be argued that why '*bheda*' itself should not be included in *prthaktva*. But *bheda* is the self-sameness of the object.

1. *yat saṁyuktam deśam deśāntaram ca yat yugapadākramitum śaktam tattato'dhika parimāṇam | yat saṁyuktam deśamakhilamekadaiva yadākramitum naśaktam tattato nyūna parimāṇam |*

Nyāya-siddhānta, p. 353.

2. *yathā stamba viśeṣaeva stambāntarāpekṣayā sthūlānutva dīrgha hrasvatva vyavahārah iti |*

Nyāya-siddhānta, p. 353.

Vibhāga

In the same way vibhāga also is not a separate quality. This is not 'saṁyoga-virodhi' as the Vaiśeṣikas think. It is the negation of saṁyoga. Saṁyoga is accepted as a separate adṛavya and explained in the previous chapter. This position is accepted in *Nyāyatattva* by Nāthamuni¹.

Paratva-Aparatva

Paratva (remoteness) and aparatva (proximity) are not separate qualities as it is in the system of Vaiśeṣikas. These two are the relation of time and direction to an object. It is lāghava (simplicity of reasoning) not to accept them as a separate quality. It may be argued how the relation with an imperceptible thing can become perceptible. But in Viśiṣṭādvaita even time and directions are perceptible². Hence there is no incompatibility in the perception of their relation. Further even for Vaiśeṣika it is difficult to explain them, because Vaiśeṣikas have to explain them in relation to time and direction. Therefore these qualities may be included in the accepted adṛavyas.

REMAINING CATEGORIES OF VAIŚEṢIKAS EXAMINED

Deśika thus explained the way in which the extra qualities of Vaiśeṣika and other systems are included in accepted adṛavyas. He includes the remaining categories of Vaiśeṣika in the accepted one. Other categories accepted by them are karma, sāmānya, viśeṣa, samavāya and abhāva. Kaṇāda defines³ karma (motion) as that which exists in

1. *atyanta sāmīpyam saṁyogaḥ, dūratvaṁ viyogaḥ iti*

Quoted in *Nyāya-siddhānta*, p. 361.

2. *dikkālayorapi pratyakṣatvasya samarthitāt*

Nyāya-siddhānta, p. 362.

3. *ekadravyamaguṇam saṁyogavibhāgeṣvanapekṣakāraṇamiti kar-malakṣaṇam*

Vaiśeṣikasūtra, 1-1-17.

active substance. According to them karma is known by inference.

In Vedānta 'karma' is not a separate category. It is included in 'saṁyoga'¹ which is the cause of karma. The conjunction is admitted by both Vedāntin and Vaiśeṣikas. Further according to Vedāntin karma is known by perception² but not inferred.

But sūtrakāra has not rejected the karma in clear terms. Therefore, according to some ācāryas, there are three categories, i.e., dravya, guṇa and karma. Sūtrakāra has clearly rejected the categories like 'sāmānya', 'viśeṣa' etc., but not the karma. Therefore as a result three categories³ namely dravya, guṇa and karma were admitted by these ācāryas. But Deśika concludes⁴ that this view is held only by a section of ācāryas. In fact there are only two categories namely dravya and adravya. Further he says⁵ that karma is not separate from the accepted guṇavarga (saṁyoga). This position of Viśiṣṭādvaita is accepted by Bhūṣaṇakāra also.

According to Vaiśeṣikas the category which generates the knowledge of common feature in different substances is called generality. Vātsyāyana puts this idea in clear terms.

-
1. *ye ca....karmaphalatvenābhyupagata-saṁyoga vibhāgātiriktaṁ nipuṇanirikṣaṇe'pi nopa labhyate iti manyāmahe* |

Nyāya-pariśuddhi, p. 180.

2. *tat pratyakṣameva, karatalādiṣu tathopalambhāt | na tvanumeyam |*
Nyāya-siddhāñjana, p. 364.

3. *evam sāmānyādiṣu sūtrakārādibhiḥ nirasteṣu pariśiṣṭa dravya-guṇakarmarūpāstrayaḥ padārthāḥ iti kecidācāryāḥ |*

Nyāya-pariśuddhi, p. 180.

4. *ato dravyam adravyamityeva vibhāgaḥ |*

Nyāya-siddhāñjana, p. 368.

5. *idaṁ tu manyāmahe, atireke'pi guṇavargānnarāśyantarām̐karma, vibhājakābhāvat |*

Nyāya-pariśuddhi, p. 180.

yā samānānām buddhim prasūte

bhinneśvadhikaraṇeṣu |

Vātsyāyana-bhāṣya, 1-1-68.

This *sāmānya* becomes the cause of 'ekatāvyavahāra' (usage of oneness) in many things. The generality which exists in many substrata is eternal and is inherently related to them. That is to say, the individual unit like man may come and go but the generality is eternal.

Deśika refutes this position and says that *sāmānya* is nothing but *avayava samsthāna* (the peculiar structure of an object). This *samsthāna*¹, the knowledge of similarity, can generate the knowledge of common feature in different substances:

Deśika after establishing this position by reason, gives the scriptural evidence also. Sūtrakāra in the aphorism: '*tadananyatvamārambhaṇaśabdādibhyaḥ*' etc. (*Brahmasūtra*, 2-1-15), has refuted the Vaiśeṣika system. In Vedānta, the material cause gets the different *avasthā* (modes) in the state of effect. But there is no separate *avayavi* which is the substratum of generality of Vaiśeṣikas. Therefore there cannot be any *jāti* (generality) which depends upon *avayavi*². Rāmānuja commenting on the aphorism clearly states³ that *samsthāna* itself is *jāti*. *Avayava samsthāna* is the extraordinary shape of the object. Therefore *sāmānya* cannot be considered as a separate category.

Unfortunately the work *Nyāya-siddhāntajana* abruptly

1.*anuṣṭtāpratiṭivavahārayoḥ samsthānasādṛṣyameva nibandhanam |*
Nyāya-siddhāntajana, p. 372.
2. *sāmānyamapi paroktaṁ sūtrakāraireva nirastaprāyam | tathāhi, tadananyatvamārambhaṇa śabdabibhyaḥ ityādibhiḥ sūtraiḥ |*
Nyāya-pariśuddhi, p. 179.
3. *samsthānātirekino'nekeṣvekākāra- buddhibodhyasya darśanāt |*
samsthānam nāma svāsādhāraṇam rūpamiti yathāvastu samsthānamanusandheyamiti |
Śrībhāṣya, 2-1-15.

ends while discussing the category namely *sāmānya*. But whatever is to be stated is already stated in *Nyāya-pariśuddhi* and *Tattvamuktā-kalāpa* by Deśika himself. Here according to those works other categories are also included in the accepted division.

In the system of Vaiśeṣika, 'viśeṣa' is a separate category. According to them, that difference which belongs to the eternal substances is called 'viśeṣa' (ultimate difference). "*antyonyadravyaṇṣṭirviśeṣaḥ parikīrtitaḥ*" (*Bhāṣā-pariccheda*, 10).

Deśika says this category is not admissible to sūtrakāra. This is indicated in the sūtra "*mahaddīrghavadvā hrasva-parimaṇḍalābhyām*" (*Brahmasūtra*, 2-2-10).

Further he argues that in impermanent substances the difference is known by their qualities and by their peculiar shape. The acceptance of 'viśeṣa' as a special category is not even necessary to know the difference between the eternal substances. In Vedānta the 'dik' (direction) is not a separate substance and hence there is no need of viśeṣa to know its difference from other substances. There are innumerable atoms, which are identical with the parts of the earth and water, etc. To admit viśeṣa in each one of them is to commit infinite regress. The difference in time is known by kṣaṇatva, lavatva, acetanatva, etc. Difference in ātman (between jīva and Īśvara) is known by aṇutva, vibhutva, niyāmyatva and niyantr̥tva, etc. However according to Viśiṣṭādvaita, there is no need to admit viśeṣa as a separate category¹.

Samavāya, according to Vaiśeṣika is a permanent connection existing between two things that are always found inseparable. This relation exists¹ between parts and products,

1. Refer *Tattvamuktā-kalāpa*, 5-125.

2. *avayavāvayavinoḥ guṇaguṇinoḥ kriyākriyāvatoḥ jātivyaktyoḥ nityadravyaṇṣṭirviśeṣayoḥ sa yassambandhaḥ sa samavāyaḥ* |

Nyāya-siddhānta-muktāvalī, p. 53.

quality and qualified, motion and their substratum, generality and the individual unit, and lastly particularity and eternal substances.

Deśika refutes this samavāya of Vaiśeṣika. The relation is common to two things. Between them one is ādhāra (support) and another is ādheya (supported). This difference is known by their nature itself. This svabhāva (nature) of the related substances must be admitted by Vaiśeṣika and others who admit samavāya. Samavāya is the peculiar svabhāva of related parts and hence it is unnecessary to admit samavāya in between them¹.

Further one more objection also may be levelled against samavāya. According to Vaiśeṣika it is an eternal relation (nitya-sambandha). Therefore the pratiyogi (counter positive of the relation) like jar should become eternal. But it goes against the experience. Therefore samavāya is not a separate category.

Further sūtrakāra has rejected samavāya in Vaiśeṣikādhikaraṇa. The heart of sūtrakāra's objection is this. If Vaiśeṣikas accept samavāya to prove the eternal relation between the quality and qualified, motion and their substrata, generality and the individual unit, and lastly particularity and eternal substances; they are committing the fallacy of infinite regress. Because in that case one has to admit samavāya in the samavāya and so on. But in the case of daṇḍa (stick) and puruṣa (man) saṁyoga, this type

1. *sambandhasyobhaya tulyatvāt, tasmāt samavāyāṅgikāra vādināpi sambandhinosvabhāvaviśeṣaḥ svikāryaḥ | tathā ca madhye samavāyayaklptir nirarthakā |* Nyāya-siddhāntajana, p. 178.

vaiśeṣikādhikaraṇe: 'samavāyābhyupagamācca sāmānyādanavasthitē' iti sūtrakāraireva samavāyākhyā padārthāntaradūṣaṇena parāṣṭam |

Nyāya-pariśuddhi, p. 178.

sambandhe sarvatulye...

Tattvamuktā-kalāpa, 5-127.

of infinite regress is not admitted. Because in that place *saṁyoga* is perceptible whereas the *saṁavāya* is not perceptible. Here to prove the *ādhāra-ādheyabhāva* (relation of container and contained) between inseparables, Vaiśeṣikas admit *saṁavāya*. Instead of accepting a new relation like *saṁavāya* it is better to admit 'ayutasiddhi' itself as a relation to prove *ādhāra-ādheyabhāva*. Therefore *saṁavāya* is not a separate category.

According to Vaiśeṣikas *abhāva* is a separate category. It is not *bhāvarūpa* (positive). That is why that system defines *abhāva* as 'bhāva-bhinnaḥ'. In their system they are of four kinds namely *prāgabdhāva* (antecedent negation), *pradhvaṁsābhāva* (consequent negation), *anyonyābhāva* (reciprocal negation) and *atyantābhāva* (absolute negation). Among these the first two are considered to be transient negations and the other two are permanent negations.

In Vedānta, *abhāva* (non-existence) is not a separate category. *Abhāva* is a *bhāvaviśeṣa*¹, i.e., *avastha-viśeṣa* (state or mode of a thing). To accept an additional and unnecessary category is to commit *gurutva doṣa*.

It may be argued, that in case *abhāva* is considered as *bhāvarūpa* then why not the *rūpa* and *rasa*, which are commonly admitted as *bhāvarūpa* be considered as *abhāvarūpa*? Vedāntin answering this objection says that *rūpa* and *rasa* etc., are known by *ananyathāsiddha* (indispensable antecedent) knowledge and hence they cannot be proved as *abhāvarūpa*. But in the experience like 'ghaṭa *abhāva*' the knowledge of 'ghaṭa' which is the counter-correlative of the *abhāva* is necessary to know the 'ghaṭa-*abhāva*'. That counter-correlative is *bhāvarūpa* and hence *abhāva* becomes the *dharma-svarūpa* of *bhāva-padārtha*.

1. *abhāvasya tu bhāvaviśeṣaiścānyathāsiddhatvena tyāgasmucita iti bhāvaḥ* | *Sarvārtha-siddhi*, p. 794.

Even Nyāya- vaiśeṣika school admits abhāva as bhāvarūpa in certain experiences. For example in the experience 'ghaṭa-abhāva-abhāvaḥ', means 'ghaṭa' itself, which is bhāvarūpa. Here the second abhāva negates the first abhāva. The nyāya maxim 'dviṭīya abhāvasya prathama abhāva pratiyogi svarūpatvam' also means the same thing. Therefore abhāva is not a separate category and it is bhāvarūpa.

Viśiṣṭādvaita system offers different explanations to all abhāvas accepted in Nyāya-vaiśeṣika system. The continuance of a prior state is called 'prāgabdhāva' (antecedent negation). The continuance of an after state is the pradhvaṁśābhāva (consequent negation), the extraordinary attribute or the structure of an object itself is anyonyābhāva (the reciprocal negation) and atyantābhāva (absolute negation). When mud is in the form of 'piṇḍatvāvasthā', it is called prāgabdhāva. When the pot gets 'the kapālatva avasthā', it is called pradhvaṁśābhāva. Ghaṭatva is different from paṭatva. Here ghaṭatva and paṭatva refer to the structure of the object. It is known as anyonyābhāva. When the pot is present in the kitchen then it is not present in the hall. It is known as atyantābhāva.

Deśika says¹ that sūtrakāra has rejected even abhāva in the aphorism which refutes samavāya. Therefore non-existence is not a separate category². So, the foregoing discussion about the categories of Vaiśeṣika proves that there are only six dravyas and ten adravyas. In the above explained way, the other different categories of various systems should be included either in dravya or in adravya.



1. *abhāvatadadhikarāṇayoḥ viśeṣaṇa viśeṣyabhāvasannidhi-viśeṣādi śabdavācya sambandhāntarānumānamapi samavāya- dūṣaṇa- cchāyayaiva dūṣitameva* | *Nyāya-pariśuddhi*, p. 178.

2. Refer *Tattvamuktā-kalāpa*, 5-102, 132.

Chapter VIII

CONCLUSION

The system of Viśiṣṭādvaita is a very ancient system. This system is also called Rāmānuja-darśana, because Rāmānuja expounded this system by writing celebrated commentaries on the *Brahmasūtra*, the *Bhagavadgītā* and on the important passages of Upaniṣads. He was influenced by the devotional songs of the Ālvārs.

Generally Advaita is translated as monism and Viśiṣṭādvaita as qualified monism. Viśiṣṭa means qualified. Viśiṣṭādvaita implies the Parabrahman qualified by its attributes cit (soul) and acit (matter). The soul and matter have no separate existence apart from the Parabrahman. They are inseparable parts of it. The Supreme Being is the soul of all souls and soul of all matters. That is why He is called Paramātman. The *Antaryāmi Brāhmaṇa* of the *Bṛhadāraṇyakopaniṣad*, and such other vedic passages establish this inseparable relation between Paramātman and the universe.

As the word itself suggests, the Viśiṣṭādvaita system asserts monism, but it maintains the natural differences between the nature, soul and God. The matter and soul are as real as God himself. Both of them stand in an attributive relation to him.

Here one of the attributes namely nature is referred to as non-sentient nature (acit). It is devoid of consciousness. Another attribute referred to is the sentient (cit), which consists of human beings, animals, plants etc. Both the conscious and self-conscious things are suggested by the

word cit. God manifests in this universe through cit and acit. When the Brahman is in the un-manifested causal form, it is called 'sūkṣma-cid-acid-viśiṣṭa-Brahman' and when it manifests in the form of visible universe, it is called 'sthūla cid-acid-viśiṣṭa-Brahman'. Both of them are identical.

Philosophical knowledge consists in understanding the unity of Brahman qualified by the sentient and the non-sentient. The great sage Bādarāyaṇa, with the intention of teaching this Brahman as the only reality, which is qualified by cit and acit, began his enquiry about this Brahman and explained that Brahman possesses attributes like cit and acit. The great exponents of the Viśiṣṭādvaita system opine that Bādarāyaṇa here indicates by the term 'Brahman', Śrīmannārāyaṇa who is qualified by cit and acit as the only reality. This is what is suggested by the term 'The Philosophy of Viśiṣṭādvaita'¹.

Rāmānuja says that the Brahman of Viśiṣṭādvaita is free from all defects and is the ocean of beneficent attributes¹. That is way Rāmānuja addresses Him 'akhila heya praty-anika, samasta kalyāṇa guṇākara etc.' He is the natural abode of jñāna, bala, aiśvarya, vīrya, śakti, tejas, sauṣṭilya, vātsalya, audārya, mārḍava, saundarya, sāmya and gāmbhīrya etc. He is the ocean of compassion and easily accessible to his devotees.

Rāmānuja's full-fledged God with a name and form and attributes is more attractive a personality. The upāsaka was thus presented with a more lovable and gracious God.

Rāmānuja with this postulate of the highest God-head, restated the tattva, hita and puruṣārtha in a more appealing from. This service of Rāmānuja satisfied both the intellectual

1. Refer *Yatindra-matadīpikā*, p. 155.

2. Refer *Gadyatraya*, p. 216 and 264.

quest for God and furnished food for that great human emotion, Love. At the hands of Rāmānuja, the centre was shifted in Upaniṣadic philosophy from the 'aham' (one's own self) to God (Supreme-self). So'ham (I am He) gave place to 'dāsoham' (I am his servant).

All types of good karmas were converted into kainkarya (service to the Lord). Both puṇya and pāpa were considered as obstacles to obtain liberation. The true puṇya is the kainkarya and experience of the Puruṣottama and his attributes and pāpa is to forget him. The wholehearted surrender to paramapuruṣa, that is prapatti, is the sure and easiest means to achieve the grace of the Lord. The grace of the Lord frees us from all types of sins such as bhagavadapacāra (denigration of God Himself), bhāgavata-apacāra (ridiculing of His devotees), asahyāpacāra (obstructing the religious duties being carried out by sincere men) and so on. The devotion of Śrīmannārāyaṇa burns into ashes all types of sins that have been committed, that are being committed and that are going to be committed in thought, word and deed.

Śarīra-śarīri-bhāva or body-soul relationship is the corner-stone of Viśiṣṭādvaita philosophy. This relationship is the pradhāna-pratitantra of the Viśiṣṭādvaita siddhānta. The principles which are peculiar to the particular system and not adopted by other systems are called as pradhāna-pratitantra.

This principle means that God sustains, commands and obtains all benefits from both the ātman and the nature, who in turn are sustained and commanded by God and exist only for him. The paramapuruṣa, soul and matter are inter-linked and united. Ātman and the nature have no independent existence apart from the Paramātmā. Rāmānuja elucidated this glorious principle in all his works.

Innumerable corollaries may be derived from this

synthesis and every one of them leads to the well-being of man and the world.

If all the souls are the prakāras or modes of Brahman then it certainly follows that they must all act in unison. It also suggests that all men should not quarrel among themselves. There should be complete unity among men just as there is no conflict between one part of the body and another.

The beautiful result of body-soul relationship in Viśiṣṭādvaita may be further elucidated with an example. Taking the family as a unit, the entire family is the soul. The members of the family are different parts of that family's body. Each member works for the welfare of the family. From family to society is the next step. There society is the aṅgi. Member of the society is an aṅga.

If this relationship is kept in mind, there can be no conflict between one individual and another and one nation and another. Therefore the synthetic body-soul conception is capable of universal application.

For the service rendered by that great ācārya Rāmānuja, Svāmi Vivekānanda paid a very high compliment in these terms. "Rāmānuja....with a most practical philosophy, a great appeal to the emotions, an entire denial of birthrights before spiritual attainments, and appeals through the popular tongue, completely succeeded in bringing the masses back to the vedic religion."

It is already explained many times, that the philosophy of Viśiṣṭādvaita is a very ancient one. The deep and strong foundation for this philosophy was laid in the remotest past by Ṭaṅkha, Dramiḍa, Guhadeva and Bodhāyana in the form of Bhāṣyas and Vṛttis on the *Brahmasūtra* of Bādarāyaṇa. Rāmānuja refers to this point in his celebrated commentary *Śrībhāṣya* on *Brahmasūtra*.

He says¹ that great ācāryas of the past wrote commentaries on *Brahmasūtra* in a concised form, which he would expound following the ideas of those great ācāryas.

Nāthamuni and Yāmunācārya wrote several works and raised the Viśiṣṭādvaita siddhānta on those foundations to the basement level. Rāmānuja completed this glorious edifice by writing his celebrated *Śrībhāṣya* and such other works.

Vedānta Deśika who is only next to Rāmānuja in every aspect in the garland of Viśiṣṭādvaitic ācāryas, enriched and beautified that edifice by illuminating the entire edifice by the beauty and the brilliance of his poetry and logical acumen. Deśika re-told and explained the Viśiṣṭādvaita siddhānta in all of his innumerable works. The credit of explaining, elaborating, reaffirming, consolidating and establishing on firm grounds the philosophy of Viśiṣṭādvaita goes to Vedānta Deśika, one of the greatest successor in the school of Viśiṣṭādvaita. On the evidence of the Vedas, purāṇas, itihāsas, āgamas, the Divyaprabandams of Ālvārs and the expositions of the ancient ācāryas, Deśika established the siddhānta on solid ground. Had it not been for the much needed exposition and systematisation by Vedānta Deśika, the Viśiṣṭādvaita siddhānta would have ever remained hazy and indefinite. Deśika bases his exposition on the innumerable authorities and teachings of the ancient masters, and never gives an arbitrary and imaginary explanation.

Contributions of Vedānta Deśika to 'Indian philosophy in general and Viśiṣṭādvaita in particular are many. He synthesised Nyāya and Mīmāṃsā with the Vedānta by re-interpreting the *Nyāyasūtras* of Gautama and *Mīmāṃsā-sūtras* of Jaimini. He accommodated many of the theories of those schools in Vedānta system and repudiated some

1. *bhagavadbodhāyanakṛtām brahmasūtra vṛttim pūrvācāryāḥ sancikṣipuḥ tanmatānusāreṇa sūtrākṣarāṇi vyākhyāsyante* |

Śrībhāṣya, p. 4.

others which were against the evidence of scriptures. By his original arguments he kept the system of Viṣiṣṭādvaita safe from the attacks of the rival schools. To uphold the validity of *Pāñcarātra-āgama* he wrote *Pāñcarātra-rakṣā*. Deśika on the basis of Śruti, *Viṣṇupurāṇa*, *Pāñcarātra-āgama* and teachings of ancient ācāryas, re-established the traditional view that 'Śrī' (goddess Lakṣmī) is equal in every aspect to Viṣṇu and that they are one tattva.

He gave much importance to the arcā form of worship and admitted the holiness of pilgrimage centers like Śrīraṅgam, Kāñci, Paṇḍarapur etc. But he cautions us that the purity or the impurity of such places depends upon the people who reside in such places. He states in clear terms that one should reside in such places where one can get concentration¹ and can have the congenial atmosphere to enjoy the bliss of communion with Lord Śrīmannārāyaṇa. The greatness and holiness ascribed to places like Śrīraṅgam and Kāñci in purāṇas are maintained only when sāttvika type of people reside there.

Deśika has expounded the inner meaning and significance of the doctrine of prapatti in all aspects and for this purpose he wrote *Nikṣepa-rakṣā* and his magnum opus, the *Rahasyatraya-sāra*. In his *Rahasyagranthas*, he clearly states¹ that there are no differences of opinion among the followers of Rāmānuja and thus has strived to synthesise the sectarian divisions among Śrīvaiṣṇavism.

Deśika was responsible to celebrate publicly the holy union of the Sanskrit and the Tamil Vedas. It is he who first called the prabandhams of Āḷvārs as '*Tamil Veda*'. He called them as *Draṁiḍopaniṣad*. He established the equal validity of the Tamil scriptures with that of the Sanskrit

1. *yatraikāgrayam bhavati bhagavatpāda sevārcanādeḥ* |

Rahasyātṛaya-sāra, adhikāra 19.

2. Refer *Sampradāya-pariśuddhi*, p. 6.

scriptures and thus elevated the status of other languages. He wrote many works in Maṇipravāḷa and Tamil. It is said that Lord Raṅganātha was so pleased at this achievement of Deśika that he bestowed on Deśika the title of "Ubhaya Vedāntācārya"¹.

In the history of Viśiṣṭādvaita, the place of Vedānta Deśika is unique². He wrote many independent treatises like *Tattvamuktā-kalāpa*, *Sarvārtha-siddhi*, *Adhikaraṇa-sārāvaḷi*, *Seśvara Mīmāṃsā*, *Mīmāṃsā-pādukā*, *Nyāya-parisuddhi*, *Nyāya-siddhānjana* and so on.

1. This episode is vouched for by Deśika's own work. "*vedāntāchārya sañjñāmahavahita bahuvit sārathamānavarthayāmi*".

Adhikaraṇa-sārāvaḷi, 1.

2. Prof. M. Hiriyanna observes "Then came Venkaṭanātha, better known as Vedānta Deśika (A. D. 1350) whose many sided scholarship and long labours contributed much to establish the doctrine of Rāmānuja on a firm basis. First, he formulated even better than his predecessors had done the objections to the advaita, taking into consideration the defence put up by its exponents since Rāmānuja's time. Not only did he thus render the doctrine stronger on its critical side; he also undertook the task of internal systematization and set aside once for all whatever departures from strict tradition had taken place by his time.

Outlines of Indian Philosophy, p. 385.

Dr. Satyavarata Singh observed "Vedānta Deśika is the real representative of the Rāmānuja-darśana and the Śrīvaiṣṇava sampradāya. This fact has abundantly been made clear by the great sage Vidyāraṇya (13th-14th centuries A. D.) who quotes Vedānta Deśika's *Tattvamuktā-kalāpa*, instead of Rāmānuja's *Śrībāṣya* while summarising the points of the philosophy of Viśiṣṭādvaita (vide the *Sarvadarśana-saṅgraha*)".

"That Appayya Dīkṣita (15th-16th century A. D.) took Vedānta Deśika's *Yādavābhyudaya* and *Pādukā-sahasra* to be the real poetic presentations of Viśiṣṭādvaitic Vaiṣṇavism is an evidence in itself of Vedānta Deśika's eminence in the galaxy of post-Rāmānuja Viśiṣṭādvaitins."

Vedānta Deśika-A Study, p. 149.

The present work *Nyāya-siddhāñjana* of Vedānta Deśika may be called as the II part of *Nyāya-pariśuddhi* because the discussion about prameyas which were introduced in the last chapter of *Nyāya-pariśuddhi* is continued in this work. This work is a *Prakarāṇa-grantha* which explains the prameyas of the school. This work is not only a prakaraṇa but also an independent and important treatise of Viśiṣṭādvaita. The text has a remarkable logical rigour. Every sentence in it contains abundant meaning like the aphorisms of great ṛṣis. In fact this work is also one of his great contributions to the system. The special characteristic feature of this work is whenever the author explains or interprets something, he traces them to the scriptures and *Brahmasūtra* and the teachings of great ācāryas of the system. Unfortunately the last portions of *adravya pariccheda* have been lost.

Thus Vedānta Deśika with the help of scriptures, logic, experience, and the statements of great ācāryas, has purified the Brahman which was *upapluta* (eclipsed) by the misrepresentation by other systems and thus has fulfilled his oath. "*upaplutasya tattvasya śuddhyartho'yamupakramah*" (*Nyāya-siddhāñjana*, p. 2). "Here in this work namely *Nyāya-siddhāñjana* the Brahman which is misrepresented by other schools will be represented in correct way."

Though Vedānta Deśika has achieved success in synthesising Nyāya and Vedānta, yet some of the unbridgeable major differences may be noted in the following way.

1. Nyāya-vaiśeṣika system admits ātman as the substratum of jñāna. But Viśiṣṭādvaita admits jñāna-svarūpatva of ātman, in addition to jñānādhikaraṇattva.

2. The 'paramāṇu-kāraṇavāda' of Nyāya-vaiśeṣikas is not admitted by Viśiṣṭādvaita. The paramāṇu-kāraṇavāda is

refuted by sūtrakāra himself in the aphorism "*mahad-dīrgha-vadū-hrasva-parimaṇḍalābhyām*" (*Brahmasūtra*, 2-2-10.)

3. Samavāya which is accepted as a separate category in Nyāya-vaiśeṣika system is not admitted in Viśiṣṭādvaita.

4. In Nyāya-vaiśeṣika the movement in atoms is started on account of the adrṣṭa that is in ātman. But the adrṣṭa is not admitted in Viśiṣṭādvaita.

5. According to the scriptures the ātman is anu and hence the Viśiṣṭādvaita disproves the vibhūtvavāda of Nyāya-vaiśeṣika system.

6. Further, Viśiṣṭādvaita says that the explanation given by Nyāya-vaiśeṣika regarding jagat, Īśvara, karma and jīva also is not satisfactory and against the principles of Upaniṣads.

7. Though both Nyāya and Viśiṣṭādvaita admit mokṣa, there is much difference in between them regarding the means of liberation. According to Nyāya-vaiśeṣikas, tattvajñāna is the means of liberation. They say: "*tattvajñānānniśśreyasa adhigamaḥ*" (*Nyāyasūtra*, 1-1-1).

But Viśiṣṭādvaita prescribes the grace of the Lord as the redeemer of the individual from ajñāna. This philosophy of Viśiṣṭādvaita is derived from the Upaniṣadic philosophy "*yamevaiṣa vṛṇute tena labhyaḥ*" (*Muṇḍaka*, 3-2-3).

The Īśvara of Nyāya-vaiśeṣika is only the instrumental cause of the universe and He is in no way connected with the redemption of the individual. But in Viśiṣṭādvaita the grace of the Lord alone is the redeemer.

8. According to Nyāya-vaiśeṣika the liberation of the individual consists in 'duḥkha-dhvaṃsa'. The liberated soul becomes like a slab of stone without experiencing either sukha or duḥkha. This type of mokṣa is known as 'upalavadbhāva' in that system. Viśiṣṭādvaita maintains that

mokṣa is not only 'duḥkha dhvaṁsa' but also it is the state in which the individual soul gets supreme bliss in the communion of the Lord.

9. In Nyāya-vaiśeṣika system the Lord is only a nimitta-kāraṇa of the world, but in Viśiṣṭādvaita He is 'abhinna-nimitta-upādāna-kāraṇa' of the world. Though the philosophy of Nyāya-vaiśeṣika discusses the cetana and acetana tattvas in detail, it does not derive its conclusions from the Vedas; whereas the Viśiṣṭādvaita maintains that both these cit and acit tattvas are the viśeṣaṇa of the Lord and thus both of them are dependent tattvas.

Nyāya-vaiśeṣika system advocates the reality of the world and plurality of souls. Īśvara, jīva, karma, transmigration and the validity of Vedas are admitted in that system. Further, this system advocates that 'ātyantika duḥkha nivṛtti' is mokṣa. None of these great principles are against the principles of Viśiṣṭādvaita. That is why the great thinkers of Viśiṣṭādvaita beginning from Nāthamuni to Vedānta Deśika endeavoured to synthesise Nyāya and Vedānta. Deśika achieved complete success in this attempt by writing great works like *Nyāya-pariśuddhi* and *Nyāya-siddhāñjana*. He discarded some principles of Nyāya-vaiśeṣika which were against Veda and accommodated some principles of that system which were in agreement with the Vedas. He reinterpreted some other principles of Nyāya-vaiśeṣika in the light of Upaniṣadic philosophy.

In the beginning of *Nyāya-pariśuddhi* Deśika has said¹ that the two systems are interdependents like 'siṁha' (lion) and 'vana' (forest) and he has demonstrated this truth in the above mentioned two works. That is why conventionally it is said that the study of Vedānta must be accompanied with the study of Nyāya. Then alone the Vedānta becomes

1. Refer *Nyāya-pariśuddhi*, p. 86.

'Nyāya Vedānta'. Thus Vedānta Deśika concretised the relation between Nyāya and Vedānta by writing *Nyāya-pariśuddhi*, *Nyāya-siddhāñjana* and thus he fulfilled the great ambitions of the ācāryas of Viśiṣṭādvaita.

The aim of all the śāstras is to bring peace of mind to mankind which is tortured by worldly pleasures and miseries. A man who possesses the peace of mind is a philosopher in the Indian sense of the term. "*śamārthaṃ sarvaśāstrāṇi vihitāni manīṣibhiḥ | sa eva sarva-śāstrajñāḥ yasya śāntam manassadā ||*" (*Mahābhārata-śāntiparva*).

The equanimity of the mind can be had only when we know the real nature of the cit, acit and Īśvara in the light of scriptures and logic. Gautama says that the padārtha-tattva jñāna (knowledge of the categories in their reality) leads to liberation "*tattvajñānānniśreyasādhigamaḥ*" (*Gautama-nyāyasūtra*, 1-1-1).

Deśika by his wonderful erudition which is obtained through the unbounded compassion of his ācāryas has prepared the añjana (collyrium) viz., *Nyāya-siddhāñjana* for the benefit of mankind. Intelligence lies in understanding the nature and character of cit, acit and Īśvara and enjoy the ecstasy of the divine communion in this life itself. To conclude, in the words of Vedānta Deśika himself in his *Dayā-śataka*, "*muktānubhūtimiha dāsyati me mukundaḥ*".

Dayā-śataka, 100.



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
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He hails from Melkote (Karnataka) which is sanctified by the long stay of Śrī Bhagavad Rāmānujācārya and of Śrī Vedānta Deśīkar, the two stalwarts of Indian Philosophy, particularly of Viśiṣṭādvaita Siddhānta (Qualified Monism). Dr. Rangachar imbibed his scholarship and initial learning directly from his learned father, learning at his feet Veda-Vedānta,



and Nyāya Vaiśeṣika. Later he studied philosophy in depth—both Western and Eastern—as a student of Mysore University and obtained M.A. Degree with distinction. He obtained Post Graduate degree in Sanskrit also. He secured Vidvat degree in Nyāya and Vedānta from Maharaja Sanskrit College, Mysore. As a further distinction, he secured Ph.D. (Doctor of Philosophy) from Bombay University for his brilliant thesis titled “*The Philosophy of Viśiṣṭādvaita*” under the guidance of Dr. S. G. Mudgal. He has put in twenty eight years of fruitful service as head of the Department of Sanskrit in Deśīya Vidyāśāla Senior College, Shimoga and also served as Guest lecturer in Post Graduate classes of Kuvempu University.

He has about seven titles to his credit such as *Rāmāyaṇa Vicāra Lahari*, *Maharṣi Vedavyāsa*, *Ramaṇa Gītā* in Kannada, *Rāmakṛṣṇopaniṣat* in Sanskrit, *Some concepts in Nyāya Vaiśeṣika System* in English. He is an orator of eminence, engaged in philosophic discourses in Ramakrishna Math, Bangalore, Shankara Krupa, Indian Institute of World Culture etc. He has addressed several universities in U.S.A. He is honoured by great sages and religious pontiffs of Sringeri Sharada Peetham, Parakala Mutt and H. H. Sri Vishvesha Tirtha Swamiji of Pejvara Mutt, Udupi and Swami Chinmayanandaji.

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